

Preparing for European carbon allowance auctions

State of play

**CCAP Workshop
Warsaw, 28 January 2010**

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Chartering new territory

- Move to auctioning represents a fundamental change to the EU ETS:
 - Phase 3 auctioning will be more than half the annual cap. Phase 1: less than 1%. Phase 2: 3-4%
 - Assuming 1 billion allowances: weekly auction = 20 million. Current trading = 10-20 million / day.
 - First large-scale auctioning in environmental markets world-wide

Thorough preparation:

- Learn from phase 2 experience
- Open stakeholder consultation 3 June – 3 August 2009
- Stakeholder meetings in September and October 2009

- Adopt “a Commission Regulation on the timing, administration and other aspects of auctioning”
- Aim is to ensure that auctions are:
 - Open
 - Transparent
 - Harmonised
 - Non-discriminatory
 - Predictable auction calendar
 - Cost-efficient, avoiding undue administrative costs
 - Access to SMEs and small emitters
- Strengthen secondary market, not distort it
- Revenues go to Member States - efficiency

Disadvantages of auctioning futures:


- More complex and less accessible, in particular for SMEs and small emitters
- Strong impact on the secondary market: locking in trade until its maturity
- Liquidity in spot market not increased until maturity
- Product specification may not suit all. No immediacy: not possible to buy in an auction and buy a fuel future at the same time ('spread trading')
- Reduced participation => higher risk of market abuse
- Potentially high financing cost for Member States

- Weekly auctions of equal distribution, but
 - ½ volumes in August
 - no auctions 2 weeks over Xmas
- 2011+2012 volume (if any): to be decided within 3 months from adoption of the Regulation
- 2013 volume: to be decided by January 2012
- 2014 volume: to be decided by January 2013, etc.
- Annual volume to be auctioned is calculated on the basis of a) cap minus free allocation and b) early auctions.
 - Straightforward and fixed formula => predictability

Use of a trading platform - auction design

- Make use of existing infrastructure, experience and commercial relationships
- Directly accessible for all allowed bidders
- Selection of auction platform through a competitive dialogue procurement procedure
 - Best value for money – lowest cost for participants
- Single-round, sealed-bid, uniform-price auctions

- ETS operators
 - Parent or sister undertakings, associations
- Banks and investment firms covered by the Anti-Money-Laundering and Financial Markets legislation
 - When bidding on account of clients, the latter must be accepted bidders
- Commodity traders exempted from Financial Markets legislation
 - e.g. oil and gas traders
 - Provided that they are authorised
- Option to add further categories



- Options:
 - Centralised auction process
 - Co-ordinated approach with a limited number of auction processes
 - Hybrid approach with several platforms but one clearing system
- Consultation response: strong support for a **single auctioning process**; coordinated approach by far least popular
 - Auctioned value is relatively small compared to other markets. In 2009, UK and DE auctioned government bonds to the amount of £ 203 billion and € 153 billion respectively.

Advantages of centralised approach

- most cost efficient:
 - set-up cost – transaction cost – pre-registration
- most open and transparent – best access for SMEs
- best mitigates risk of market abuse
 - Avoid spreading volume and participation over several platforms
- reputation and credibility world-wide

Co-ordinated approach bears risk of de facto discriminatory rules

- Any platform must be open to any bidder without discrimination: no possibility to select “national platform”
- Even the most detailed legislation cannot exclude discrimination in detailed implementing rules

Competitive selection

- Appointment for 5 year period - repeat open and competitive selection procedure
 - Low barriers to entry: setting up an auction platform does not involve 'high tech'
 - Auctioning spot only, no immediate impact on futures markets
- Market development is uncertain under all three models:
 - under the co-ordinated approach, the same exchange could be selected several times
 - under the hybrid approach, winning bids may be concentrated with one single exchange

Full, fair and equitable access for SMEs and small emitters

- SMEs and small emitters may access the auctions:
 - Directly, becoming member of exchange and clearing/settlement system
 - Directly on the exchange, but clearing via clearing/settlement system ('order routers')
 - Indirectly through intermediaries.
- Selected exchange must offer full, fair and equitable access through the first option, or otherwise through the other two options


Mitigating risk of market abuse

- Simple auction design, high frequency
- Bidders are ETS operators and authorised intermediaries. Strict know-your-customer checks
- Rules of the exchange apply
 - regulated markets' or similar protections
- Auction monitor, transparency rules
- Random resolution of tied bids
- Option of maximum bid-size
- Centralised approach: maximise participation

Commission will also examine whether the carbon market is sufficiently protected from market abuse.

Auctioning EU Aviation Allowances

- All the same as for EUAs, except:
 - Lower frequency, which reflects much smaller number of EUAAs to be auctioned
 - No early auctions needed



- February: Commission to propose draft regulation for vote in Climate Change Committee. After the vote: 3 months scrutiny by European Parliament and Council
- June 2010: adoption of the Regulation
- Further work: start selection process for auction platform, clearing or settlement system and auction monitor
- Auctioning website:
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/auctioning_en.htm

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Info on the Climate Action and Renewable Energy Package at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/climate_action.htm