

# Carbon leakage and competitiveness – how to measure it?

First Stakeholder meeting on post-2020 carbon leakage provisions for the EU Emissions Trading System



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# Carbon leakage provisions: Pre-conditions for win-win solutions

- Precondition 1: the most effective, workable policy tool & ETS design
- Precondition 2: create fair & realistic impact assessment as basis

# Precondition 1: the most effective, workable policy tool & ETS design

- Now ETS is fundamentally changing, from the most cost-effective policy tool to reduce emissions, to a very cost driven one with the MSR; is it the best policy instrument?
- ETS is only acceptable if it provides effective GHG reduction while protecting against carbon- and investment leakage
- 100% free allocation at benchmark level should be 100%, not mean in practice 50% shortage or more on direct emissions
- Effective compensation for indirect costs in place
- Feasible long-term future investment management possible


## Precondition 2:

# Create fair & realistic impact assessment as basis

- No realistic EC impacts assessment have been done on the ETS sector shortages, nor on consequences on direct and indirect and cost impact on the steel industry and society
  - It still needs to be done, at EU & national level
  
- The macro models used by the EC impact assessments can still not match the real costs impact on industry and society
  - **Structural improvements are required:** eg use real data, all aspects
  
- CEPS energy costs & cumulative costs studies: good start how to match reality, but ad-hoc
  - **Agree: creation of an adequate analytical framework is key**

# Improving EC Impact assessments on industry

## Reality vs EC impact assessment structurally too big



- (A) Business as usual
- (B) 100% free allowances and 10% efficiency increase from 2010 to 2030
- (C) Carbon leakage provision as of phase 3; Continuous CSRF<sup>2)</sup> post 2020; LRF<sup>3)</sup> of 2.2%
- (D) Free allocation reduced from 25% in 2021 to 0% in 2027; LRF of 1.74%

<sup>4)</sup> Accumulated shortage of allowances for **direct** emissions in 2030: (B) 0.43 bn t; (C) 1.03 bn t; (D) 2.23 bn t

<sup>5)</sup> Shortage for **indirect** emissions: 32 Mio t CO<sub>2</sub>/year (Assumptions: (a) Electricity consumption EAF=550 kWh/t cs; BF/BOF = 150 kWh/t cs; Downstream processes = 136 kWh/t HRC; (b) 10% electricity import for BF/BOF route; (c) Electricity emission intensity in line with state aid guidelines; (d) yield for hot rolling = 98%)

**Source: Own calculations dated June 2014, based on information available at that stage.**

# Impact of the EU Com proposal for the Review of EU ETS Post-2020 on the EU steel industry

Scenarios	CO <sub>2</sub> price EUR/t	Direct + Indirect CO <sub>2</sub> costs billion EUR
<b>B:</b> (a) 100% free allowances on benchmark level and financial compensation for indirect emissions, (b) 10% efficiency increase from 2010 to 2030 (Steel Roadmap)	30	21.4
	40	28.5
<b>C:</b> (a) Carbon leakage provisions, (b) CSCF remains, (c) 2.2% linear reduction factor	30	39.6
	40	52.9
<b>D:</b> Current EU ETS	30	78.6
	40	100.8

- Any case scenario shows that the steel industry will face high direct and indirect costs related to the EU ETS.
- The EU Com proposal (D) leads to CO<sub>2</sub> costs of 79 to 101 billion EUR bis 2030
- Even with 100% free allowances (scenario B) the CO<sub>2</sub> costs will amount 22 to 29 billion EUR by 2030

Source: Own calculations dated June 2014, based on information available at that stage.

- Best available on modeling is not good enough
- Optimization of modeling was tried in vain: PACE model - DG Enterprise process “Improving macro modeling to realistic impacts”: not possible to match reality with the least worse model: PACE
- Test: test all models on empiric evidence (eg NAP1 windfall profits power sector), stop using unsuitable products / models; eg GEM E3, E3MG
- Macro-equilibrium models should not be used: no equilibrium
- Do not use power sector models for overall conclusions for other sectors or society, eg on cost or allowances surplus (Primes, Gaines)
- Use realistic assumptions: eg not full revenue recycling to industry

- Full transparency: eg need right classification steel waste gases in CITL – now partly hidden in power, while branding sector as benefitting from ETS
- Use regular realistic existing (forward) price data, like Platts, Eurostat
- Need a more regular data / impact monitoring, not ad-hoc
- Game theory on commercial sector behavior (see later)
- Use micro models on sectors & carbon market studies on price CO<sub>2</sub>



- Create credibility & trust in EC independence and impact assessments
- Test any tool to past data – only allow proven successful assessments
- An impact on a sector can be huge, should not be hidden as GDP %
- NAP2 Carbon Leakage assessment is no justification for NAP4 policy
- Need fair data: eg as basis benchmarks setting: no steel plant can make it
- CL list: set indirect impacts as in the CO<sub>2</sub> compensation guidelines  
DG Comp : use marginal prices, not average CO<sub>2</sub> grid factor

- Do not hide policy impacts:
  - Current creation by higher carbon & energy prices of new 'MSR' windfall profits in the power sector, who bought huge surplus allowances
  - ETS targets & switch to gas create further EU gas dependency and costs
  - Extreme shortages in industry - 100% or - 50% by 2030

**Priority 1:** solve ETS problem: impact assessment & huge policy impacts

**Priority 2:** other indicators on industrial competitiveness:

- Value chain impacts, EU dependence, price taker
- Excess of production to demand in EU, but also worldwide -> China
- Measure leakage: carbon intensity consumption vs domestic production
- Raw materials quality evolution: possibly > impact technology
- External market aspects; the EU is an open economy vs closed markets
- When Life Cycle Assessment is not applied, steel is disadvantaged vs. competing materials and recycling can be a disadvantage
- Distinctive aspects between Energy Intensive industries, eg profits, see later

# Distinctive aspects between Energy Intensive industries **EUROFER** The European Steel Association

## *Base policy on different economic and technical sector realities*

- Large span of profitability ranges, per sector. Steel at the very low end
- Huge difference of ability to pass on costs
- Steel process emissions: less potential for change than other sectors
- Power sector asking for carbon price 30 and 50€/t, then no point to produce steel, while it may be too weak an incentive for sector X to move
- Not reasonable to think that a single carbon price will incentivize all these sectors without closing one of them: steel first (indirect CL started)
- Some sectors can wait for eg steel to stop producing; no lobby 2030 cost
- Some sectors accept high reduction targets; eg innovation subsidy ok
- Steel are asking for an approach by sector, based on benchmarking with the right to produce for the most efficient producers

## Regulatory costs for steel compared to EBITDA per tonne of steel, 2002-2011:

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
<b>EBITDA t/steel</b>	€48	€71	€99	€77	€142	€110	€92	- €25	€38	€43
<b>EU regulatory costs</b>	28.1%	18.9%	13.4%	17.3%	9.4%	12.2%	14.5%	-53.9%	35.0%	30.9%

Source: Centre for European Policy Studies, *Assessment of Cumulative Cost Impact for the Steel Industry*, 2013, p. 55-58  
EBITDA: earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization

- ▶ Already today huge impact on profit margins
- ▶ At an Ø EBITDA of €69,5 (2002-2011) a CO2 price of €30 or €40 without safeguard measures for direct and indirect costs could wipe out all profit margins.
- ▶ **A CO2 price of €40 = up to €80 additional costs** per tonne of steel (BF/BOF route)

# Impact of the EU Com proposal for the EU climate and energy package 2030 on the EU steel industry

- Preliminary assessments show that the implementation of the EU Commission proposal would lead to increased high additional costs and a further damage of the competitiveness of EU energy intensive industries.
- EUROFER believes that a genuine reform of the EU ETS with an improved carbon leakage support must take place and not the proposed piecemeal approach of the EU Commission.
- EUROFER is actively involved in finding solutions for achieving both the EU's climate objective for 2030 while safeguarding the global competitiveness of industries at risk of carbon leakage.
- Therefore EUROFER has made concrete proposals for the Review of EU ETS Post-2020

## What we need to safeguard our global competitiveness:

- Provide sectors at risk of carbon leakage with 100% free allocation at the level of the most efficient installations, based on achievable benchmarks and no correction factor **and continuation of 100% free allowances beyond 2020.**
- Provide sectors at risk of carbon leakage **with full off-setting of CO<sub>2</sub> cost-pass through in electricity prices** in all member states by either financial compensation, free allocation, or re-designing the electricity market in a way that it prevents any carbon price pass through in electricity prices, or a combination of these.

## More concrete proposals for a review of the EU ETS Post-2020:

- The repartition of the ETS cap between a manufacturing cap and a power cap shall become flexible to allow full free allocation up to the level of the benchmark to every leakage industry. The remaining part is left for auctioning. **In this way there is no longer any need for a correction factor.**
- Leakage industries should receive free allocation for their direct emissions up to the level of their benchmarks **times the effective production** (based on the year n-1); they need however to purchase and surrender additional allowances to cover the emissions emitted **beyond the benchmark** times the real production level.



**Thanks for your attention**