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# The 2015 International Climate Change Agreement:

## Shaping international climate policy beyond 2020

With this consultation response, WWF wishes to bring forward a number of essential aspects that should be incorporated into the emerging 2015 International Climate Change Agreement. The response follows the order of the questions posed by the Commission, first laying out a number of equity principles that should underpin overall adequate emission reductions. This is followed by a suggestion for mitigation efforts by all economies aligned with a global carbon budget, as well as complementary actions to be taken to ensure that greenhouse gas emissions start declining within the decade – in line with recent findings by climate scientists and analysts on the need to keep average global temperature increases well below 2°C.

All recent evidence points to the fact that we are not doing nearly enough to address the threat of global climate change. While it is critically important that the EU and other Parties to the UNFCCC work in earnest to ensure that a new comprehensive climate agreement is put in place in 2015, action cannot be delayed until the new agreement enters into force in 2020. Countries must urgently stem the tide of increasing global greenhouse gas emissions by ensuring that they peak before the end of the decade. WWF has presented proposals on how this can be achieved. There are many other proposals on the table as well. *The time for action is now.*

### Question 1.

**How can the 2015 Agreement be designed to ensure that countries can pursue sustainable economic development while encouraging them to do their equitable and fair share in reducing global GHG emissions so that global emissions are put on a pathway that allows us to meet the below 2°C objective? How can we avoid a repeat of the current situation where there is a gap between voluntary pledges and the reductions that are required to keep global temperature?**

The 2015 Agreement needs to strive for a long-term vision that Parties will seek to achieve under the ADP. This objective must include a recommitment to keep average global warming to well below 2°C and that global emissions need at the very least follow a trajectory (including via key milestones) that will ensure 80% reduction in global emissions below 1990 levels by 2050. Industrialized countries need to reduce their GHG emissions by 95% below 1990 levels by 2050

In addition to the overall adequacy, key equity principles should revolve around:

1) **The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDRRC).** A common understanding of equitable effort sharing is required that moves forward to a dynamic approach based on clear principles and indicators – an approach to global differentiation that is adequate to the complexities of the emerging world system. This must take into account both historical responsibility for the climate problem and the capability to act on it.

2) **The right to sustainable development.** This principle (and its reach beyond “poverty eradication”) is inevitably controversial, but nonetheless indispensable. “Equitable access to sustainable development” implies no right to unconstrained emissions; such a misinterpretation would conflict with the fundamental objective of the

Convention (to protect the climate system). Development does not equal replication of the historical technological pathways of today’s industrialized countries in other parts of the world. On the contrary, step changes in living standards and business opportunities can be achieved by “leapfrogging” (technology skipping), which avoids environmentally harmful stages of development. Adaptation is an integral element of sustainable development.

3) **Precautionary Measures.** Article 3.3 of the Convention is based on the precautionary principle and requires all countries to take measures to “anticipate, prevent and minimise the causes of climate change and its adverse effects.”

To get on track to meeting the overall goal, significantly greater emissions reductions are needed already in the short term, beyond the actions and commitments put forward to date. The UNEP has projected an **emissions reduction gap of 8-13 Gigatonnes of CO<sub>2</sub>e annually by 2020**, between the existing commitments and pledges under the UNFCCC, and the emissions trajectory required to have a “likely” chance of staying below 2 degrees Celsius rise.

**Two broad options available to close the emissions gap include:**

1) **Negotiating increased targets and pledges:** Developed countries raise their emissions reduction targets, and those with ranges go at least to the upper range (with the EU to go from 20% to 30% reductions below 1990 by 2020), and provide certainty about their scaled up financing, technology and capacity building support. This should include improved access to most recent technologies to support “leapfrogging”. Developing countries, based on confidence in receiving such support, raise the ambition level of their pledges.

2) **New initiatives with reductions additional to existing targets and pledges:** Countries collectively or individually identify new emissions reduction initiatives, or raise the ambition level of

existing initiatives, and ensure that the reductions from these initiatives will be in addition to their existing emissions reductions targets or pledges.

### Question 2.

**How can the 2015 Agreement best ensure the contribution of all major economies and sectors and minimise the potential risk of carbon leakage between highly competitive economies?**

**WWF fully endorses and encourages the approach to include the major economies in the international climate policy measures.** The transition to a low, and eventually zero, carbon and climate resilient global economy will require long-term planning. In order to ensure that emissions trajectories are aligned with the global carbon budget to stay well below 2°C it is essential that all developed countries produce Zero Carbon Action Plans (ZCAPs) and that Developing Countries produce climate-resilient Low Carbon Action Plans (LCAPs) as soon as possible.

The UNFCCC can provide essential guidance to ensure that national **ZCAPs and LCAPs are in line with a global carbon budget** by setting clear parameters for what is meant by Low Carbon Development Strategies, including an ambitious **2050 decarbonization goal** and indicative **5-yearly targets for developed countries**. The EU can show leadership here based on its experience with the development of its roadmap for moving to a low-carbon economy in 2050 with a reduction by 80% below 1990. Putting these strategies in place will also make it easier to identify the support required to achieve low carbon development in developing countries.

**WWF wishes to highlight that there is little empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that climate policy has led to the relocation of energy-intensive industry**, including in the EU. While the issue of competitiveness is of concern, the notion of ‘carbon leakage’ should not get disproportionate attention given that the impact on production costs has remained moderate and the international trade is more complex than that depicted by interest groups. International mobility for many industries is in fact restrained by a multitude of trade “barriers” such as transport costs and risks. Environmental regulation is only one determinant of location and trade, among many others such as labour costs and labour skills, which are usually more important.

**Furthermore, the aviation and maritime sectors should be covered by the 2015 agreement.** The international transport sector accounts for about 5-8% of global emissions with strong growth leading to 10% - 32% of total CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent emissions by 2050. Therefore it is critical that this sector be included in the work of the ADP. 2013 is a key year for action in these sectors as the three-yearly International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) general assembly is taking place in September 2013 and discussions on emissions are on-going in the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). **Therefore, the UNFCCC should provide clear guidance to the IMO and ICAO on how the principles of the various bodies can be reconciled, as well as on the use of finance generated through market-based measures for emission reductions in these sectors.** The EU should further these objectives where possible.

### Question 3.

**How can it encourage complementary processes and initiatives, including those carried out by non-state actors?**

WWF recognizes that the principle responsibility for increasing mitigation lies with countries increasing their pledges, particularly developed countries meeting their commitment to take the lead in reducing their emissions. However, while governments work at this it is imperative that other complementary actions are taken to ensure that greenhouse gas emissions start declining well within the decade - in line with recent findings by climate scientists and analysts. **The EU should be vigilant that developing options for such complementary measures should not be interpreted as an endorsement of the current inadequate mitigation pledges and commitments.**

Potential policies and measures to close the mitigation gap include amongst others:

- Scaled up shift to renewable energy **including phasing out fossil fuel subsidies, and using the financial resources freed up to support renewable energy and efficiency measures, and in the case of developed countries, as a source of financing for the Green Climate Fund to support actions in developing countries.**
- In order to close this investment gap the actors contributing to the bottleneck effect

need to be addressed. Therefore, **WWF calls for greater scrutiny of public and private financial institutions.** These include the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), sovereign wealth funds, pension funds, insurance companies and banks and similar institutions that are currently steering large volumes of capital through investments and lending policies supporting fossil fuel industries. The 2015 agreement should be designed to push these institutions to phase out support for coal-based infrastructure projects, avoid the unsustainable expansion of gas, ensure sustainability criteria (especially for biomass and hydropower) and boost energy savings and renewable energy.

- Measures to **address greenhouse gas emissions from international aviation and maritime transport** (see above).
- **Enhanced actions on energy efficiency:** Agreement on regulating minimum efficiency standards for household appliances, lighting and cars. These are sectors with comparably rapid equipment turnover. About ¾ of manufacturing is in the hands of around a dozen companies globally and hence should cover all major manufacturers in the major consumer markets. The EU has leading ecodesign measures and cars standards in place.
- **Mandatory filters for new Diesel vehicles and lorries and catalytic converters for gasoline-powered vehicles.** This is easily achievable, technically available and addresses Black Carbon but also other health-harming air pollution and GHG precursors such as NOx.
- **Agreement on targets for phasing out of inefficient coal-fired power stations** with appropriate support for such action in poor developing countries
- **Sustainable Energy for All rapid scale-up** including replacement programme for efficient cookstoves. This would address mainly Black Carbon but is also a major component for sustainable livelihoods of the poor.
- **Applying best practice in the oil and gas industry:** Incentivising the complete phase out of methane venting and flaring.
- **Developing a strong and immediate replacement programme of long-lived F-gases**
- **Agree on a rapid programme to stop further deforestation.**
- Coordinated **sub-national initiatives** – at municipal, city, state or regional level.
- Crosscutting to technological and sectoral policy options mentioned above, there are potential initiatives involving other major global economic or industrial sectors, including potentially voluntary initiatives from the sectors themselves. For example, a group of cities in a country, region or globally could commit to measures to reduce emissions, above and beyond existing national commitments. Alternatively, businesses could commit to purchasing up to 100% renewable power with a credible verification scheme such as “WindMade”.

Such initiatives carried out in developing countries would be eligible **for scaled up, new and additional financing, technology and capacity building support.**

#### Question 4.

**What criteria and principles should guide the determination of an equitable distribution of mitigation commitments of Parties to the 2015 Agreement along a spectrum of commitments that reflect national circumstances, are widely perceived as equitable and fair and that are collectively sufficient avoiding any shortfall in ambition? How can the 2015 Agreement capture particular opportunities with respect to specific sectors?**

The wide range of equity principles indicates that a small number of “**core**” principles should form the foundation of the discussion and negotiation outlined above:

**1) The adequacy principle**, which is an equity principle for the simple reason that catastrophic climate change would be the ultimate injustice. If any proposed regime is incapable of delivering an ambitious global mobilization (using 1.5°C and the survival of the most vulnerable as our ultimate

benchmark) it simply cannot be accepted as equitable.

**2) Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDRRC)** remains a key and underlying principle of the Convention and, along with the other principles of the Convention and the ultimate objective, should form the basis of discussions in Workstream 1 under the ADP and the final outcome of the 2015 Agreement. These discussions could build up an equity corridor of principles that recognise principles around the equitable sharing of the remaining carbon space; the equitable sharing of the costs of mitigation and adaptation by developed countries and a model for differentiation that could result in the graduation of countries whose capacities and responsibilities have increased over time. Once a sufficient level of joint understanding is reached, Parties must negotiate aggregate and individual levels of ambition; including what form that ambition should take for countries at various stages of development and how means of support will be made available for developing countries to implement nationally appropriate mitigation and adaptation action.

**3) The right to sustainable development.** This principle (and its reach beyond “poverty eradication”) is inevitably controversial, but nonetheless indispensable. To be very clear, “equitable access to sustainable development” implies no right to unconstrained emissions; such a misinterpretation would conflict with the fundamental objective of the Convention (to protect the climate system). Adaptation is an integral element of sustainable development.

**4) Precautionary Measures.** Article 3.3 of the Convention is based on the precautionary principle and requires all Countries to take measures to “anticipate, prevent and minimize the causes of climate change and its adverse effects.” This is arguably the Convention principle that most strongly supports the objective of a strong, science-based level of ambition, because a responsibility to “prevent or minimize the causes of climate change” speaks directly to the core of the issue: emission reductions. Article 3.3 specifies that efforts should take into account different socio-economic contexts, linking it to Article 3.1 and CBDR, yet in the context of a comprehensive agreement that can “cover all relevant sources.” It also implicitly references the reality that reconciling strong ambition with CBDR entails carrying out efforts cooperatively among Parties.

The ADP negotiations can only succeed if they reaffirm, and embody, the principles of

differentiated responsibility and capability, as well as other key equity principles outlined above. This requires Parties **to consider a new, dynamic, principle- and indicator-driven interpretation of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” that is transparently based upon explicit and clearly-stated equity principles, and upon indicators that embody those principles.** Such an approach alone would not define national obligations, but it can help to inform and shape a common understanding – a shared vision – of the equity challenge. What is critical is that the equity principles that underlie any proposed approach be specified, embodied in well-designed indicators, and used to estimate a set of national obligations – for both mitigation and international financial and technical support.

**Such an approach would not preclude country groupings (like today’s annexes) but rather it would make such groupings more coherent.** For example, the set of countries that is high in capacity and responsibility would change over time - an important fact, given that such countries are candidates for ambitious, legally-binding economy-wide quantified emissions reduction targets.

Other kinds of commitments are also possible and desirable such as renewable energy and/or energy efficiency targets. All commitments and actions should be amenable to measurement and reporting.

#### Question 5.

**What should be the role of the 2015 Agreement in addressing the adaptation challenge and how should this build on on-going work under the Convention? How can the 2015 Agreement further incentivise the mainstreaming of adaptation into all policy arenas?**

It is imperative that Adaptation be given consideration under the pre-2020 discussions. Pre-2020 mitigation action keeps the window for successful climate action open, pre-2020 adaptation is the element that protects those bearing the brunt of already unavoidable climate change impacts. Adaptation must be brought into the work programme of the ADP and further action should build on the findings of the WG 2 IPCC AR5 (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change fifth assessment report), Adaptation financing needs, the work program on loss and damage and the

implementation of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs). To work towards sufficient protection for the most vulnerable the following must be achieved:

- **Principles, functions, and institutional arrangements of the International Mechanism on Loss and Damage under the UNFCCC.**

- Formal opportunities must be created to **review the IPCC findings on the potential loss and damage impacts of climate change**, when released, so that the latest scientific findings can inform further deliberations.

- **Financial arrangements for the implementation of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and development and implementation of NAPs for Non-LDC countries.**

- **Scaling up the adaptation finance for the implementation of NAPAs (National Adaptation Programmes of Action) for least developed countries.**

#### Question 6.

**What should be the future role of the Convention and specifically the 2015 Agreement in the decade up to 2030 with respect to finance, market-based mechanisms and technology? How can existing experience be built upon and frameworks further improved?**

**The ADP should continue to emphasise the rapid operationalizing of the institutions of the UNFCCC**, and draw lessons from experiences between now and 2015 for the further strengthening and optimizing of the financing architecture of the UNFCCC for the post 2020 period.

Developing countries must increase their efforts to shift to a **low carbon development path** in order to prevent a 2 degree Celsius temperature increase. This will require developed countries to, first, increase their own mitigation efforts and convincingly take the lead in reducing emissions, and second, **provide confidence that financing will be available to developing countries for their own mitigation actions e.g. like NAMAs and adaptation efforts.** While private investments will play an important role in mitigation efforts, scaled up and reliable flows of public finance are a crucial pre-condition for scaling

up mitigation efforts by developing countries. Public finance is also a crucial pre-condition to leverage a even bigger amount of private finance and investment that is needed. This year, the EU and other developed countries must set out a concrete road map/pathway to scaling up public financing to meet their \$100bn commitment by 2020. This commitment must be primarily fulfilled through new and additional public finance as part of a strategy to mobilize much greater amounts of private finance investment shifts. The excuse that developing countries do not show up with bankable project can not be used repeatedly to explain the lack of concrete plans to meet the \$100b commitment by 2020. **Delivery on finance commitments is one prerequisite for developed countries to build trust and confidence in the UNFCCC process with their colleagues from developing countries.**

**The Work Program on long-term finance**, should provide the basic building blocks of such a road map this year while the Finance Ministerial meeting at COP 19 must bring together Ministers of Finance, Environment and other relevant Ministries to hammer out a financing package that will deliver on the \$100bn commitment. This requires agreeing to put financing in place to support efforts to ensure that global emissions peak well before 2020. This will involve:

- **Significantly scaling up concrete commitments** for contributions from national budgets,

- **Rapid progress on sources of additional public finance** such as carbon pricing for international transport, and financial transaction taxes.

- **Commitment by developed countries in Warsaw to collectively contribute at least \$ 60 billion in public finance for the period 2013-2015, including concrete pledges to the Green Climate Fund** for this period, as the first step to scaling up to \$100bn by 2020.

In addition to scaling up conventional public finance Parties must also consider **innovative sources of finance to supplement public funding pledges.** In particular, carbon-pricing mechanisms for the international transport sector could serve the dual purpose of reducing emissions and funding climate action. This can be done through implementing carbon pricing for international bunker fuels with no net incidence or burden on developing countries through, for example, a rebate mechanism.

### Question 7.

**How could the 2015 Agreement further improve transparency and accountability of countries internationally? To what extent will an accounting system have to be standardised globally? How should countries be held accountable when they fail to meet their commitments?**

#### **WWF endorses the reply as submitted by CAN-Europe:**

*Parties made the MRV system operational in Durban: Parties developed guidelines for reporting and review including: biennial reports by developed countries; biennial update reports (BUR) by developing countries; international assessment and review (IAR) for developed countries, and international consultation and analysis (ICA) for developing countries. However, the outcome fell significantly short of what is needed for a robust regime to account for mitigation actions and finance. Further work is critical to help ensure the environmental integrity of the regime.*

*On clarification of pledges, a common template for A1 Parties was agreed, but not for NA1 Parties, and this is needed. More clarity and detail, especially related to coverage of sectors and gases, role of LULUCF and offsets/credits, mechanisms for preventing double counting of offsets/credits, and assumptions and methods for calculating baseline (BAU) scenarios for NA1 Party reduction efforts, is critical for tracking progress toward national goals and progress toward the agreed aggregate global goal of limiting warming to less than 20C, and ensuring that the option to limit warming to less than 1.50C remains viable. Additionally, Parties should agree on general guidelines for developing country domestic MRV, and initiate immediate steps to provide support for building the necessary capacities and arrangements for effective in-country MRV, as well as for the robust preparation of GHG inventories.*

*With respect to verification, the current ICA processes do not yet provide the authority for the Technical Team of Experts (TTE) or the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to make recommendations to the Party under review. Thus, in addition agreeing on the modalities for the composition of TTE for ICA, Parties should agree at COP 19 to allow recommendations by TTEs and the SBI to Parties under ICA. Furthermore, the IAR process for developed countries must have compliance consequences attached to the review.*

*It is also critical to ensure that important opportunities for public participation in MRV processes that were stripped from the final decision*

*are brought back into MRV rules and agreed at COP19.*

*Parties should also agree to develop common reporting format tables for developing countries at COP19. Such formats were agreed in Doha for developed countries, with a view to strengthen the transparency of information on mitigation action and support. However, a double book keeping, through the use of common reporting format table by both developed and developing countries would be necessary to ensure an effective tracking of financial contributions. Robust MRV rules will be particularly important in the design of the new market-based mechanism called for of the Durban LCA text. Parties must develop strong rules to ensure commitments are being achieved and that double counting of emission reductions is prevented. Such rules must apply to all Parties who participate in international market-based mechanisms, for both pre-2020 and post-2020 commitments.*

*Parties should agree to incorporate reporting on the existence of fossil fuel subsidies and, separately, efforts to remove these subsidies in their reporting (either through National Communications or Biennial Reports, as appropriate). Increased transparency on this issue is critical to ensuring that efforts to remove these subsidies are comprehensive and well-planned in order to be successful.*

*Significant work is needed to agree to common, consistent, complete, comparable, transparent and accurate accounting rules for all developed countries to help ensure comparability and compliance. In particular, common accounting rules must be adopted by developed countries regarding the coverage of sectors and gases and the treatment of LULUCF, offsets, and assigned amount units (AAUs) by emissions reduction targets. Respecting CDBRRRC, a work program should be established to assess mitigation reductions from developing countries in a facilitative manner to help gauge aggregate global emission reductions and keep track of progress against the 2 degree / 1.5 degree goal. In particular, the work program should aim to standardize methods for assessing the GHG impacts of NAMAs, developing baseline (BAU) scenarios, assessing emissions reductions from the land use sector, and preventing the double counting of offsets and credits. At present, developing countries have varying, often limited, capacities to participate in a common accounting framework. Over time, this capacity will need to be built up. The international framework should allow for a reasonably smooth transition in methodologies, reporting requirements, and capabilities, over nationally-appropriate time periods; it should facilitate moving from accounting and reporting for project-level NAMAs through to wider scale NAMAs (including sectoral NAMAs), and eventually to economy-wide plans and actions. Such transitions could continue to be addressed through a tiering of accounting and reporting methodologies, respecting CDBRRRC.*

Over time common accounting rules will have to apply to an ever growing set of Parties.

Moving beyond existing processes and in the context of a post-2015 regime, the ADP must build on and strengthen current MRV rules. Any outstanding issues from the LCA should be delegated to the COP to relevant subsidiary bodies to carry forward into the ADP. Additionally, the text must include a mandate to elaborate future compliance mechanisms with both facilitative and enforcement aspects, while respecting CDRRC. Also, the Durban Platform must agree on common criteria for the technology registry for support framework under the Durban Platform by the end of 2013, which should be made operational by 2015 under the MRV system.

#### Question 8.

**How could the UN climate negotiating process be improved to better support reaching an inclusive, ambitious, effective and fair 2015 Agreement and ensuring its implementation?**

In order to demonstrate early action WWF calls for **the negotiation text to be ready for discussion at COP20.**

**In addition, WWF endorses the reply as submitted by CAN-Europe regarding the need to:**

#### Produce a balanced package from every COP

A clear lesson from Copenhagen is that the 'nothing is agreed unless everything is agreed' approach simply cannot deliver in negotiations covering as complex an array of issues as under consideration in the UNFCCC. The ADP will therefore need to be constructed in ways that create balanced packages of agreement at each COP, starting with outcomes from the Warsaw COP.

#### Ensure Leaders' Involvement

The experience of Copenhagen demonstrates that there are certain decisions that will only be taken at the Head of Government level. CAN Europe suggests that these could include decisions on the legal form of the 2015 agreement, the levels of ambition for each country and decisions around means of implementation, especially provision of climate finance. These are complex and interlinked decisions and as a result, they cannot be left to the final night in France to be discussed. There is a need to ensure that leaders are able to contribute to

the process in a timely manner to ensure that they have sufficient understanding of the issues and opportunities for discussion with each other, to make wise decisions commensurate with the levels of action the global climate crisis requires. Ban Ki Moon's proposed leaders' meeting in 2014 would be a timely moment of such a process, but other opportunities for leaders to engage need to be considered.

Finance and other ministers will need to be engaged in the process more actively, as well as the current annual engagement with environment ministers at the COP. All countries should engage in the Kyoto Protocol high-level ministerial round table in mid-2014, and all countries should increase their level of ambition.

#### Ensure adequate negotiating time

To complete the large amount of work ahead of it on the agreed timelines, the ADP will need to ensure that there is sufficient negotiating time, including intersessional meetings. The periods between sessions should be used to amass and analyse information in technical papers and to allow for rounds of submissions from Parties and Observers.

#### Embrace multi-stakeholder process

The expertise and knowledge of observers should be valued as a resource and a culture of transparency and inclusiveness in the negotiations fostered. This should include creating regular opportunities for NGO interventions, calling for submissions from observers, opportunities to present in workshops, and opportunities to speak from the floor, as has been increasingly offered in the UNFCCC in recent years.

#### Account for work done in other negotiating tracks:

The ADP workplans should take into account work that is undertaken or has been undertaken in the other negotiating tracks, the LCA, KP and SBs, and ensure that it does not build in duplication of work. There should be clarity on scope and institutional linkages (AWG-LCAs/KP and SBI/SBSTA, GCF, Adaptation Committee, new work on Loss and damage, MRV/compliance) and any other relevant areas. The ADP should be informed by the Review incorporating outcomes of the IPCC reports.

#### Question 9.

**How can the EU best invest in and support processes and initiatives outside the Convention to pave the way for an ambitious and effective 2015 agreement?**



For the 2015 agreement to have a chance of adequately tackling the climate challenge facing us, an active and ambitious input from the EU is crucially important. **The EU's best leverage to ensure a successful global agreement on climate change in 2015 will be its domestic pre and post-2020 climate and energy policy.** This will need to reflect the EU's fair share of the global effort and to be agreed well in time before the Ban Ki-moon meeting in autumn 2014.

In the context of finding ways to close the huge gap between the emissions reduction commitments by 2020 and what's needed to keep us on track to staying well below 2 degree Celsius warming, the EU should turn its record of falling emissions into a success story by describing how it will go further between now and 2020. Data released by Eurostat and the European Environment Agency show that in 2011 the EU's total greenhouse gas emissions were 18.4 % below 1990 levels, and that energy-related CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are estimated to have dropped 2.1% in 2012. On this basis, **the EU must signal internationally that its domestic policies require pre-2020 adjustment in order to reach the 95% cuts (below 1990) needed by 2050.**

**In addition, the EU must reach a political agreement on the need for post-2020 climate and energy legislation that builds on the success and corrects the failures of the European 20-20-20 package.** This agreement should specify that binding targets for energy savings, renewable energy generation, and emissions reductions are needed, should be delivered by Member States, and should be designed so that the measures used to achieve them are coherent and complementary.

WWF also considers it to be essential for the EU to **increase the capacity within European External Action Service (EEAS)** in order to significantly increase and enhance outreach in third countries. The Joint Reflection Paper (2011)<sup>2</sup> already outlines the ways in which the EU could scale up its climate diplomacy efforts in the third countries with tangible recommendations. WWF sees it as important to follow up on the suggestions aimed at significantly mainstreaming climate change into the core functions of the delegations around the world. This should be reflected in diplomatic climate alliance-building coupled with the active efforts in order to engage with the host countries to bring about progressive climate action domestically. Furthermore, the EEAS outreach

should increase its reach beyond government stakeholders and have adequate public diplomacy functions as well, establishing dialogue and exchanges with civil society globally.

On top of being able to influence the overall dynamic and level of ambition at the international level, **the EU also plays a very central role in shaping the content of more technical aspects in the UNFCCC negotiations.** In recent years the EU has been active and helpful at the UNFCCC by putting forward proposals both on process and on potential deliverables. Two out of three of the next COPs will take place in Europe - this year in Poland and in 2015 in France. This will increase the EU's influence and responsibility in the international process even more than usual.

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[http://www.eeas.europa.eu/environment/docs/2011\\_joint\\_paper\\_euclimate\\_diplomacy\\_en.pdf](http://www.eeas.europa.eu/environment/docs/2011_joint_paper_euclimate_diplomacy_en.pdf)

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