## EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions

This document is the questionnaire for this consultation. The survey contains 4 initial questions (A-D) to identify respondents, 86 questions for which responses will be made public and 4 questions that are classified confidential, must be sent directly to the European Commission and will not be made public. The questions that are classified potentially confidential are on two separate pages (2 questions on each page) and highlighted in green boxes.

#### Period of consultation

From 3 June 2009 to 3 August 2009 inclusive

#### How to submit your contribution

This consultation seeks to obtain feedback from all categories of stakeholders regarding the different aspects of auction design and implementation covered in the Consultation Paper.

We are sorry for the inconvenience, but the web-based survey is not available yet. If participants wish to complete the survey on this document and send their contributions back to **contact\_ets\_auctions\_consultation@icfi.com** their responses can be accepted in this format. The web-based survey will be available as soon as possible if participants wish to wait till that is available.

Received contributions will be published on the Internet. It is important to read the specific privacy statement attached to this consultation for information on how your personal data and contribution will be dealt with.

#### **Specific privacy statement**

"Received contributions, together with the identity of the contributor, will be published on the Internet, unless the contributor objects to publication of his or her personal data on the grounds that such publication would harm his or her legitimate interests. In such cases the contribution may be published in an anonymous form. Otherwise, the contribution will not be published nor will, in principle, its content be taken into account. Responses for questions deemed confidential in the consultation will not be available for view on the website irrespective of contributor objecting or not."

## Instructions to filling out the questionnaire

•	Questions may only be answered in designated response fields
•	For certain multiple choice questions, simply click on box to indicate choice
•	Answer [Y/N] questions by typing "y" / "Y" or "n" / "N" on underlined area ()
•	Some responses require explanations, additional comments and detailed answers These will either by identified by underline ( ) or an answer section (A: ). The amount of text that can be entered here is unlimited.
•	After completing the survey, please save and send to <a href="mailto:contact_ets_auctions_consultation@icfi.com">contact_ets_auctions_consultation@icfi.com</a>
•	If any questions seem unclear in context or for method of response, please mail contact ets auctions consultation@icfi.com to clarify

## Thank you

## **Section 1: Questions to categorize participants**

ion A
of Company/Organization: Rio Tinto Alcan
pal nature of activities: Production of primary aluminium
er of employees in 2008:
-wide <u>65,000</u> Europe-wide <u>4,400</u>
ver in 2008:
-wide \$23,839m Europe-wide not published
ion B
of respondent:
Member State
Company operating one or more installations covered by the EU ETS    Electricity generators   Energy companies other than electricity generators   Industrial sectors   Aviation   Other. Please specify: Approx Annual Emissions: tCO <sub>2</sub>
<ul> <li>Intermediary</li> <li>☐ Financial institution</li> <li>☐ Trading arm of non-financial institution</li> <li>☐ Other. Please specify</li> </ul>
Trader on own account    Financial institution   Trading arm of non-financial institution   Other. Please specify

			ne (ETS) – rganisation of emissions allowance auctions	
	Regulated market			
		Carbon	n only	
		Carbon	and electricity	
		Carbon	and other energy products	
	Other o	carbon 1	market	
		Multila	ateral trading facility trading carbon derivatives	
		Carbon	n exchange trading spot carbon	
		Other.	Please specify	
	Clearin	ng hous	e	
	Centra	l counte	erparty	
	Other (multiple choices apply)			
			Non-governmental organisation	
			Trade association	
			Carbon analyst	
			Carbon publication	
	Academic			
			Other. Please specify	
Questi	on C			

Contact details will not be made public.

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#### **Question D**

Questions relating to the "Specific privacy statement" above.

Do you object to publication of your personal data because it would harm your legitimate interests? [Y/N] N

If so, please provide an explanation of the legitimate interests that you think will be harmed:

A:

o Are any of your responses confidential? [Y/N] N

If so, please indicate which ones and provide an explanation:

A:

### Section 2: Survey questions (86) and potentially confidential questions (4)

Quest	ion 1					
_	As a general rule throughout the trading period, in your opinion, are early auctions necessary? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$					
If so, v	what should the profile	of EU	JA auctions	be?		
	5-10% in year n-2, 10	)-20%	in year n-1,	remai	nder in year n	
	10-20% in year n-2, 2	20-30%	% in year n-1	, rema	ninder in year n	
	20-30% in year n-2, 3	30-35%	% in year n-1	, rema	ninder in year n	
to dete	Other? Please specify as should be made by a ermine the optimum time the hedging requirement as they will impact on	rbitrar ning a nents o	y calculation nd volumes of all sectors	ns. Wo of rele and, e	e recommend an in case of allowances, especially, the pow	dependent study taking into er generation
Quest	ion 2					
Do yo	u think there is a need	to auc	tion futures?	? [Y/N	] <u>Y</u>	
If so, v	why?					
delive that th	e support forward aucti ry of EUA for industria is should increase second ity on the forward mark	als wit ondary	hout having market liqu	to trac	de through a bank o	or utility. We note
Quest	ion 3					
	share of allowances shoures for each year?	ould b	e auctioned	spot aı	nd what share shou	ld be auctioned
			SPOT		FUTURES	
•	year n	:	%			
•	year n-1	:	%		%	
•	year n-2	:	%		%	
Please	provide evidence to su	ıpport	your case.			

A:We do not believe that the separation between Spot and Futures should be made by arbitrary calculations. We recommend an independent study to determine the optimum timing and volumes of release of allowances, taking into account the hedging requirements of all sectors and, especially, the power generation sector as they will impact on both the market price for emissions and for electricity.

NB: The answer to this question will be published as part of the public consultation. Please do not submit confidential information as part of your answer to this question.

#### **Question 4**

Should the common maturity date used in futures auctions be in December (so the maturity date would be December in year n, both when auctioning in year n-2 as when auctioning in year n-1)?  $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$ 

If not, please suggest alternative maturity dates and provide evidence to support your view.

A:

## This page contains two questions that will not be made public. These questions cannot be completed on this document

<b>Request for</b>
potentially
confidential
information 1

Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.

For ETS operators: what share of your expected emissions covered by the EU ETS in a given year n do you hedge and how much in advance?

year n
 year n-1
 year n-2
 earlier years (please specify)

# Request for potentially confidential information 2

Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.

What share of the annual quantity of allowances you intend to purchase *via* auctions would you wish to buy spot or futures respectively?

		SPOT	FU	FUTURES	
•	year n	:%		%	
•	year n-1	:%		%	
•	year n-2	:	5	%	

Please specify whether you are an:

- ETS operator; or
- Other participant.

Question	15
For spot a	auctions:
What sho	ould be the <b>optimum</b> frequency of auctions?
$\boxtimes$ W	Veekly?
☐ Fo	ortnightly?
	Ionthly?
Q Q	uarterly?
O1	ther? Please specify:
What sho	ould be the minimum frequency of auctions?
$\boxtimes$ W	Veekly?
☐ Fo	ortnightly?
	Ionthly?
Q	uarterly?
O1	ther? Please specify:
What sho	ould be the maximum frequency of auctions?
$\boxtimes$ W	Veekly?
☐ Fo	ortnightly?
	Ionthly?
Q	uarterly?
O1	ther? Please specify:
Please pro	ovide arguments to support your case.
	ns should be frequent, we suggest weekly, to ensure balance between liquidity num market impact.
Question	
•	auctions, what should be the:
•	ptimum auction size?
	linimum auction size?
	laximum auction size?
If deemed	d appropriate, please indicate a range and/or distribution over different sizes.
Please pro	ovide arguments to support your case.

Minimum auction size? Maximum auction size?

If deemed appropriate, please indicate a range and/or distribution over different sizes.  Please provide evidence to support your case.  A:
Question 9
Should volumes of spot allowances be auctioned evenly throughout the year? [Y/N] _
If not, how should volumes be distributed? (more than one answer possible) Please specify:
A larger proportion in the first 4 months of the year?
A larger proportion in December?
A smaller proportion in July and August?
Other? Please specify: we support single, simple, rules for all auctions, with clear timetable visibility and certainty as far in advance as possible
Question 10 In case futures are auctioned, should the volumes for spot and futures auctions be spread
over the year in the same manner? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$
If not, how should they differ? (more than one answer possible)
No futures auctions less than six months before the maturity date.
A larger proportion in December.
A smaller proportion in July and August.
Otherwise? Please specify how and comment:
Question 11
Does the Regulation need to have provisions to avoid holding auctions during a short period of time before the surrendering date (30 April each year)? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$
If yes, how long should this period be:
One week
In case futures are auctioned, should there be similar provisions with respect to the period immediately prior to the maturity date? [Y/N] _
If yes, how long should this period be:

Consultation or	n design and organisation of emissions a	Illowance auction	1S
One week [	☐ 2 weeks ☐ 3 we	eeks 🗌	1 month
Pub Day Day Oth	es should be avoided? (more the blic holidays common in most as where important relevant easys where emissions data are refere? Please specify:	Member Sta conomic data eleased?	ates?a is released?
	13 nised 10-12 hrs CET auction s t alternative(s) would you sug		e? [Y/N] <u>Y</u>
Question 1	<b>.</b>		
How long i	in advance should each eleme	nt of the cale	endar be determined?
Annual vol	umes to be auctioned:		
1 ye	ear in advance		
2 ye	ears in advance		
	ears in advance		
	re years in advance		
	n of annual volumes over spor	t and futures	(if applicable):
_	ear in advance		
	ears in advance		
	ears in advance		
	re years in advance		
_	dividual auctions: ear in advance		

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	sions Trading Scheme (ETS) – tion on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions
	2 years in advance
	3 years in advance
$\boxtimes$	more years in advance
Volum	ne and product type for individual auctions:
	1 year in advance
	2 years in advance
	3 years in advance
	more years in advance
Each a	uctioneer carrying out auction process (if more than one):
	1 year in advance
	2 years in advance
	3 years in advance
	more years in advance
Please	provide arguments to support your case.
	support single, simple, rules for all auctions, with clear timetable visibility and ity as far in advance as possible
Questi	ion 15
What s	should be the volume of allowances to be auctioned in 2011 and 2012?
•	in 2011: % of the 2013 volume and % of the 2014 volume
•	in 2012:% of the 2013 volume and% of the 2014 volume
What p	percentage of these shares should be auctioned as futures?
•	in 2011:% of the 2013 share and% of the 2014 share
•	in 2012:% of the 2013 share and% of the 2014 share
Please	provide evidence to support your case.
of rele	recommend an independent study to determine the optimum timing and volumes ase of allowances, taking into account the hedging requirements of all sectors and ally, the power generation sector as they will impact on both the market price for ons and for electricity.

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Quest	tion 16
What	should be the rule with respect to allowances not auctioned due to force majeure?
	They should automatically be added to the next auction on the calendar, irrespective of the auction process.
	They should be auctioned within one month, though leaving flexibility as to which auction(s) the EUAs should be added.
	They should be auctioned within three months, though leaving flexibility as to which auction(s) the EUAs should be added.
	Other? Please specify:
Quest	tion 17
Is 1,00	00 allowances the most appropriate lot size? [Y/N] $\underline{Y}$
If not,	, why not?
A:	
Quest	tion 18
	ngle-round sealed-bid auction the most appropriate auction format for auctioning lowances? [Y/N] $\underline{Y}$
If not,	please comment on your alternative proposal?
A:	
Ouest	tion 19
_	is the most appropriate pricing rule for the auctioning of EU allowances?
W Hat	Uniform-pricing.

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Discriminatory-pricing.
Indifferent.
Please provide arguments to support your case.
A:We have limited expertise to comment on the most appropriate price setting mechanism, however favour sealed bids and encourage that if a uniform price is chosen the broader auction design should protect against the risks of undue price spirals as a result of bidding strategies of individual participants.
Question 20
Should the rules for solving ties in the Regulation be:
random selection; or
pro-rata re-scaling of bids?
Please comment on your choice.
A:
Question 21
Should a reserve price apply?
A: Not favoured. If reserve prices are necessary this should expressly be to prevent significant and unforeseen events leading to undue impact on auctions. As such the reserve price should be dynamic and a significant discount to prevailing secondary market prices. We propose that this be reciprocal and a ceiling be placed on auction prices to protect against a similar event leading to significantly higher prices
Question 22 In case a reserve price would apply, should the methodology/formula for calculating it be
kept secret? $[Y/N] \underline{N}$
Please comment on your choice.
A:we support single, simple, rules for all auctions and full transparency
Question 23
Is a maximum bid-size per single entity desirable in a Uniform-price auction?
$[Y/N] \underline{Y}$

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) -Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions Is a maximum bid-size per single entity desirable in a discriminatory-price auction? [Y/N]Please comment on your choice. A:encourage that if a uniform price is chosen the broader auction design should protect against the risks of undue price spirals as a result of bidding strategies of individual participants. **Question 24** If so, what is the desirable bid-size limit (as a percentage of the volume of allowances auctioned per auction – only one choice is possible): 10%: 15%: 20%: 🔀 25%: 30%: More than 30%: Please specify: \_\_\_\_\_ Please comment on your choice. A: The impact of auctioning on our industry can be partially mitigated by a sensible approach which maximises participation of all industry whilst ensuring through market rules and regulation that the dominant sectors do not intentionally or unintentionally exercise market power within the market

#### **Question 25**

In case only one of the two following options would be chosen, to limit the risk of market manipulation or collusion, which one would be preferable?

A discriminatory-price auction format?

A maximum bid-size per single entity?

Please comment on your choice.

A: We encourage that the broader auction design should protect against the risks of undue price spirals as a result of bidding strategies of individual participants.

Are the	e following pre-registration requirements appropriate and adequate?	
Identit	y:	
	Natural or legal person;	
	Name, address, whether publicly listed, whether licensed and supervised under the AML rules; membership of a professional association; membership of a chamber of commerce; VAT and/or tax number;	
	Contact details of authorised representatives and proof of authorisation; and	
	CITL-Registry account details.	
	Anything else? Please specify:	
Declar	vations with respect to the past 5 years on absence of:	
	Indictment or conviction of serious crimes: check corporate officers, directors, principals, members or partners;	
	Infringement of the rules of any regulated or unregulated market;	
	Permits to conduct business being revoked or suspended;	
	Infringement of procurement rules; and	
	Infringement of disclosure of confidential information.	
	Anything else? Please specify:	
Declar	rations and submission of documentation relating to:	
	Proof of identity;	
	Type of business;	
	Participation in EU ETS or not;	
	EU ETS registered installations, if any;	
	Bank account contact details;	
	Intended auctioning activity;	
	Whether bidding on own account or on behalf of another beneficial owner;	
	Corporate and business affiliations;	
	Creditworthiness;	
	Collateral; and	
	Whether it carries out transactions subject to VAT or transactions exempted from VAT.	
	Anything else? Please specify:	

Question	n 27	
Do you agree that the pre-registration requirements for admittance to EU auctions should be harmonised throughout the EU?		
Yes 🖂	No 🗌	
Please co	omment on your choice.	
A:we sup	port single rules for all auction	
Question	n 28	
	ne amount of information to be supplied in order to satisfy the pre-registration ents for admittance to EU auctions depend on the:	
☐ m	eans of establishing the trading relationship;	
id	lentity of bidder;	
□ w	hether auctioning spot or futures;	
Si	ze of bid;	
☐ m	leans of payment and delivery;	
ar	nything else? Please specify:	
If so, wha	at should the differences be?	
A:		
Question	n 29	
Should the bidder pre-registration requirements under the Regulation apply in the same manner irrespective of whether or not the auctioneer is covered by the MiFID or AML rules? [Y/N] _		
A:		
If not, wh	ny not?	
A:		
Please provide arguments to support your case.		

Question 30				
Do you agree that the auctioneer(s) should be allowed to rely on pre-registration checks carried out by reliable third parties including: $[Y/N]$				
Other auctioneers?				
Credit and/or financial institutions?				
Other? Please specify:				
Please comment on your choice.				
A:				
Question 31				
In order to facilitate bidder pre-registration in their home country, should the auctioneer(s) be allowed to provide for pre-registration by potential bidders in other (or all) Member States than the auctioneer's home country e.g. by outsourcing this to a reliable third party?				
Yes No No				
Please comment on your choice:				
A:				
If so, should such entities be:				
Covered by the AML rules?				
Covered by MiFID?				
Covered by both?				
Other? Please specify:				
Please comment on your choice:				
A:				

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Should the Regulation prohibit the multiplicity of pre-registration checks in the case of Member States auctioning jointly?
Yes No No
Please comment on your choice.
A:
Question 33
Do you agree that the $level$ of collateral accepted in EUA auctions should be harmonised for all EU ETS auctions? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$
If so, how should they be harmonised?
A:consideration should be given to the ability of industrial installations to participate directly alongside the dominant sectors and financial participants. As industry has been more risk averse in its approach to emissions trading, seen as a non-core business, the rules should encourage its participation by limiting exposure to credit requirements such as collateral posting, creating simple and transparent rules, and by keeping transaction costs as low as possible. We believe that the need for collateral posting should be reduced and question its necessity at all for spot auctions. Furthermore, we believe that trade exposed industry should be encouraged to participate in Futures auctions through more flexible collateral options to reduce cash flow impact and costs of credit, including the ability to post EUAs from its free allocation where appropriate
If not, why not?
A:

#### **Question 34**

Do you agree that the *type* of collateral accepted in EUA auctions should be harmonised for all EU ETS auctions?  $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$ 

If so, how should they be harmonised?

A:consideration should be given to the ability of industrial installations to participate directly alongside the dominant sectors and financial participants. As industry has been more risk averse in its approach to emissions trading, seen as a non-core business, the rules should encourage its participation by limiting exposure to credit requirements such as collateral posting, creating simple and transparent rules, and by keeping transaction costs as low as possible. We believe that the need for collateral posting should be reduced and question its necessity at all for spot auctions. Furthermore, we believe that trade exposed industry should be encouraged to participate in Futures auctions through more flexible collateral options to reduce cash flow impact and costs of credit, including the ability to post EUAs from its free allocation where appropriate

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If not, why not?

A:

#### **Question 35**

Do you agree that 100% collateral in electronic money transfer ought to be deposited upfront at a central counterparty or credit institution designated by the auctioneer to access spot auctions? [Y/N] N

If not, why not?

A:We believe that the need for collateral posting should be reduced and question its necessity at all for spot auctions.

What alternative(s) would you suggest? Please provide arguments to support your case:

A: The Secondary market does not typically require collateral for spot transactions. Furthermore, we believe that trade exposed industry should be encouraged to participate in auctions through more flexible collateral options to reduce cash flow impact and costs of credit, including the ability to post EUAs from its free allocation where appropriate

#### **Question 36**

In case futures are auctioned, should a clearing house be involved to mitigate credit and market risks?  $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$ 

If so, should specific rules – other than those currently used in exchange clearing houses – apply to:

1	$\times$	1 +	ha	0770	$\sim$ +	tha	11011101	margin;

the level of variation margin calls;

the daily frequency of variation margin call payments?

If you have answered yes, please justify and elaborate on the rules that should apply and the mechanisms to implement them:

A:consideration should be given to the ability of industrial installations to participate directly alongside the dominant sectors and financial participants. As industry has been more risk averse in its approach to emissions trading, seen as a non-core business, the rules should encourage its participation by limiting exposure to credit requirements such as collateral posting, creating simple and transparent rules, and by keeping transaction costs as low as possible. We believe that the need for collateral posting should be reduced.

What are the most preferable payment and delivery procedures that should be implemented for auctioning EUAs?
Payment before delivery.
Delivery versus payment.
Both.
Please comment on your choice.
A:
Question 38
Irrespective of the payment procedure, should the Regulation fix a maximum delay of time for payment and delivery to take place? $[Y/N]_{-}$
If yes; what should it be?
4 working days
5 working days
6 working days
7 working days
Other? Please specify:
Question 39
Should the Regulation provide any specific provisions for the handling of payment and delivery incidents or failures? [Y/N] _
If yes, what should they be?
A:
Question 40
Should the Regulation provide for all matters that are central to the very creation, existence and termination or frustration of the transaction arising from the EUA auctions? [Y/N] _
If not, why not?
A:

If so, are the matters enumerated below complete? [Y/N] \_

- The designation of the parties' to the trade.
- The characteristics of the auctioned product:
  - o <u>Nature</u>: EUAs or EUAAs, trading period concerned.
  - o <u>Date of delivery: date at which winning bidders will receive the allowances on</u> their registry account.
  - o <u>Date of payment: date at which payment will be required from winning</u> bidders.
  - o Lot size: number of allowances associated with one unit of the auctioned good.
- Events of `force majeure' and resulting consequences.
- Events of default by the auctioneer and/or the bidder and their consequences.
- Applicable remedies or penalties.
- The regime governing the judicial review of claims across the EU.

If not, what additional matters should be foreseen in the Regulation and why?

A:

Should the Regulation provide for rules on jurisdiction and the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments? $[Y/N]$
If so, should these be:
specific to the Regulation;
by reference to the Brussels I Regulation;
by citing exceptions from the Brussels I Regulation;
by citing additions to the Brussels I Regulation?
Please comment on your choice:
A:
If not, why not?
A·

Question 42				
Which auction model is preferable?				
Direct bidding?				
Indirect bidding?				
Both?				
Please comment on your choice.				
A:consideration should be given to the ability of industrial installations to participate directly alongside the dominant sectors and financial participants. As industry has been more risk averse in its approach to emissions trading, seen as a non-core business, the rules should encourage its participation by limiting exposure to credit requirements such as collateral posting, creating simple and transparent rules, and by keeping transaction costs as low as possible.				
Question 43				
If an indirect model is used, what share of the total volume of EU allowances could be auctioned through indirect bidding? $\underline{0\%}$				
Please provide arguments to support your case.				
A:Indirect bidding should not be used				

	rimary participants model is used, what provisions would be desirable for ing disadvantages of restricting direct access (more than one answer is possible):
	Allow direct access to largest emitters, even if they trade only on their own account?
	If so, who should have direct access and what thresholds should apply?
	Disallow primary participants trading on their own account?
	Impose strict separation of own-account trading from trading on behalf of indirect bidders?
	Other? Please specify:
Questi	on 45
	orimary participants' model is used, what conflict of interest requirements should osed? (more than one answer possible)
	Separation of client registration and trading on behalf of clients from all own account trading activities.
	Separation of collateral management, payment and delivery on behalf of clients from all own account trading activities.
	Separation of anything else, please specify:
Questi	on 46
What o	obligations should apply to primary participants acting in EU-wide auctions as:
•	Intermediaries? A:
•	Market makers? A:
Please	provide arguments to support your case.

Under what conditions should auctioning through exchanges be allowed (more than one answer possible):
Only for futures auctions open to established members of the exchange?
Also for spot auctions open to established members of the exchange?
Only when the exchange-based auction is open to non-established members on a non-discriminatory cost-effective basis?
Other? Please specify:
Please provide arguments to support your case.
A: We support single, simple, rules for all auctions, with clear timetable visibility and certainty as far in advance as possible. A single platform should be considered to maximise cost efficiency and effectiveness, if this is not possible homogenous rules are necessary to avoid arbitrage and disconnect
Question 48
Should direct auctions be allowed through:
1) Third party service providers? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$
2) Public authorities? [Y/N] _
Please comment on your selection:
A:A single platform should be considered to maximise cost efficiency and effectiveness, if this is not possible homogenous rules are necessary to avoid arbitrage and disconnect
Question 49
Do the general rules for auctioning EUAs suffice for ensuring full, fair and equitable access to allowances to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$
If not, why not?
A:
Question 50

Is allowing non-competitive bids necessary for ensuring access to allowances to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters in case of:

• discriminatory-price auctions? A:

• uniform-price auctions? A:

Question 51	
If non-competitive bids are provided for in spot auctions, what maximum share of allowances could be allocated through this route?	
☐ 5%	
□ 10%	
Other? Please specify:	
Please comment on your choice.	
A:	
Question 52	
What rule should apply for accessing non-competitive bids (more than one answer possible):	
Participants should only be allowed to use one of the two bidding routes?	
Non-competitive bids should be restricted to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters only?	l
Other? Please specify:	
Please comment on your choice.	
A:	
Question 53	
What should be the maximum bid-size allowed for SMEs covered by the EU ETS at small emitters submitting non-competitive bids?	nd
5 000 EUAs	
☐ 10 000 EUAs	
25 000 EUAs	
Over 25 000 EUAs, please specify exact size and give reasons for your answer:	

Question 54		
Are there any other specific measures not mentioned in this consultation that may be necessary for ensuring full, fair and equitable access to allowances for SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters? $[Y/N] N$		
If so, please specify:		
A:		
Question 55		
What should be the minimum period of time before the auction date for the release of the notice to auction?		
2 weeks 1 month 2 months 2		
Other Please specify:		
Please comment on your proposal.		
A:we support single, simple, rules for all auctions, with clear timetable visibility and certainty as far in advance as possible.		
Question 56		
What should be the minimum period of time before the auction date for the submission of the intention to bid?		
1 week ⊠ 2 weeks □ 1 month □		
Other Please specify:		
Please comment on your proposal.		
A:		

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**Question 60** 

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-	bu feel that any specific additional provisions should be adopted in the Regulation e granting of fair and equal access to auction information? $[Y/N]_{-}$
If so,	what may they be?
Quest	tion 61
Shoul	d an auction monitor be appointed centrally to monitor all EU auctions?
[Y/N]	$\underline{Y}$
If not	, why not?
A:	
Quest	tion 62
	ou agree that the Regulation should contain general principles on [mark those that gree with, $\boxtimes$ ]:
$\boxtimes$	the designation and mandate of the auction monitor; and
$\boxtimes$	cooperation between the auctioneer(s) and the auction monitor?
If not	, why not?
A:	
	d these be supplemented by operational guidance, possibly through Commission lines? [Y/N] _
If not	, why not?
A:	

Is there a need for harmonised market abuse provisions in the Regulation to prevent insider dealing and market manipulation?  $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$ 

If not, why not?

A:• we strongly support the proposal for a monitor of auctions and for the strongest possible application of the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) and other appropriate legislation to ensure that abuse does not take place both within the auctions and in the wider secondary market. This may include publication of net open positions on exchanges as is currently reported in commodities markets

Please comment on your choice outlining the provisions you deem necessary and stating the reasons why.

	issions Trading Scheme (ETS) – tation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions
<b>A</b> :	
Ques	tion 64
	Id the Regulation provide for harmonised enforcement measures to sanction [mark that you agree with, $\boxtimes$ ]:
$\boxtimes$	Non-compliance with its provisions?
$\boxtimes$	Market abuse?
Please	e provide arguments to support your case.
legisl	we strongly support the proposal for a monitor of auctions and for the strongest ble application of the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) and other appropriate ation to ensure that abuse does not take place both within the auctions and in the secondary market.
Ques	tion 65
Shou	ld the enforcement measures include [mark those that you agree with, ⊠]:
	The suspension of the auctioneer(s) and/or bidders from the EU-wide auctions? If so, for how long should such suspension last?
	Financial penalties? If so, at what level should such penalties be fixed?
	The power to address binding interim decisions to the auctioneer(s) and/or bidders to avert any urgent, imminent threat of breach of the Regulation with likely irreversible adverse consequences?
	Anything else? Please specify:
Please	e provide arguments to support your case.
A:	
Ques	tion 66
Shoul	ld such enforcement measures apply at:
	EU level?

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions
<ul><li>□ National level?</li><li>☑ Both?</li><li>Please comment on your choice.</li></ul>
A:
Question 67   Who should enforce compliance with the Regulation (more than one answer is possible):   ☑ The auction monitor?   ☑ The auctioneer?   ☑ A competent authority at EU level?   ☐ A competent authority at national level?   ☐ Other? Please specify:
Please provide evidence to support your case.  A:  Question 68
Which of the three approaches for an overall EU auction model do you prefer? Please rate the options below (1 being the most preferable, 3 being the least preferable)  Limited number of coordinated auction processes.  Full centralisation based on a single EU-wide auction process.  The hybrid approach where different auction processes are cleared through a centralised system.  Please give arguments to support your case.  A:Full Centralisation based on single EU-wide auction process. We support single, simple, rules for all auctions, with clear timetable visibility and certainty as far in advance as possible. A single platform should be considered to maximise cost efficiency and effectiveness, if this is not possible homogenous rules are necessary to avoid arbitrage and disconnect.

If a limited number of coordinated auction processes develops, what should be the maximum number?		
$\square$ 2		
$\boxtimes$ 5		
□ 7		
more than 7, please specify:		
Please give arguments to support your case.		
A: we support single, simple, rules for all auctions, with clear timetable visibility and certainty as far in advance as possible. A single platform should be considered to maximise cost efficiency and effectiveness, if this is not possible homogenous rules are necessary to avoid arbitrage and disconnect.		
Question 70  Is there a need for a transitional phase in order to develop gradually the optimal auction		
infrastructure? [Y/N] _ If so, what kind of transitional arrangements would you recommend?		
Question 71		
Should the Regulation impose the following requirements for the auctioneer(s) and auction processes? [mark those that apply, $\boxtimes$ ]:		
Technical capabilities of auctioneers:		
capacity and experience to conduct auctions (or a specific part of the auction process) in an open, fair, transparent, cost-effective and non-discriminatory manner;		
appropriate investment in keeping the system up-to-date and in line with ongoing market and technological developments; and		
relevant professional licences, high ethical and quality control standards compliance with financial and market integrity rules.		
Integrity:		

A:

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) -

Please elaborate what additional requirements would be desirable.

What provisions on administrative fees should the Regulation answer is possible)?	include (more than one	
General principles on proportionality, fairness and nor	n-discrimination.	
Rules on fee structure.		
Rules on the amount of admissible fees.		
Other? Please specify:		
Please provide arguments to support your case.		
A:the relevant costs (including administration, IT platform, et covered through auction revenues not by an additional fee pla	·	
Question 73		
Should there be provisions for public disclosure of material st (or adapted) auction processes?	eps when introducing new	
A:		
Should new (or adapted) auction process be notified to and au Commission before inclusion in the auction calendar?	thorised by the	
A:		
Question 74		
Which one of the following options is the most appropriate in not hold auctions (on time)?	case a Member State does	
Auctions by an auctioneer authorised by the Commissi	on.	
Automatic addition of the delayed quantities to those f three auctions.	oreseen for the next two or	
What other option would you envisage? Please specify:		
A:		
Question 75		
Should a sanction apply to a Member State that does not auction allowances in line with its commitments? $[Y/N]_{\_}$ If so, what form should that sanction take?		

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions
A:
Question 76
As a general rule throughout the trading period, in your opinion, are early auctions necessary? [Y/N]_
If so, what should the profile of EUAA auctions be:
5-10% in year n-2, 10-20% in year n-1, remainder in year n
10-20% in year n-2, 20-30% in year n-1, remainder in year n
20-30% in year n-2, 30-35% in year n-1, remainder in year n
Other? Please specify:
Question 77
Do you think there is a need to auction EUAA futures? [Y/N] _ If so, why?
A:

# This page contains two questions that will not be made public. These questions cannot be completed on this document

Request for potentially confidential information 3	Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.
	For aircraft operators covered by the EU ETS:
	Have you determined a corporate hedging strategy for carbon needs?  Yes [ ] No [ ]

If so, what share of your expected emissions covered by the EU ETS in a given year n do you (intend to) hedge and how much in advance?

•	year n	:	%
•	year n-1	:	%
•	year n-2	:	%

Request for potentially confidential information 4

Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.

What share of the annual quantity of allowances you intend to purchase *via* auctions would you wish to buy spot or futures respectively?

		SPOT	FUTURES
•	year n	:%	%
•	year n-1	:%	%
•	year n-2	:	%

Question 78
What should be the optimal frequency and size of EUAA auctions:
2 auctions per year of around 15 million EUAAs?
3 auctions per year of around 10 million EUAAs?
More than 3 auctions per year? Please specify:
Please comment on your choice.
A:
Question 79
What would be your preferred timing for EUAA auctions:
Equally spread throughout the year?
November – March?
Other? Please specify:
Question 80
Should any of the EUAA auction design elements be different compared to EUA auctions (see section 3)? [Y/N] _
f so, please specify and comment on your choice.
A:
Question 81 Do you agree there is no need for a maximum bid-size? [Y/N] _ f not, why not?
A:
Question 82
s there any information regarding aircraft operators made available as part of the regulatory process to the competent authorities that could facilitate the KYC checks performed by the auctioneer(s)? [Y/N] _

If so, please describe what information is concerned and whether it should be referred to in the Regulation or any operational guidance published by the Commission.		
A:		
Question 83		
In your opinion, is there a specific need to allow for non-competitive bids in EUAA auctions?		
A:		
Would this be the case even when applying a uniform clearing price format?		
A:		
Please provide arguments to support your case.		
Question 84		
Do you agree that there is no need for any specific provisions for EUAA auctions as regards [mark those that you agree with, $\boxtimes$ ]:		
☐ Involvement of primary participants, exchanges or third party service providers?		
Guarantees and financial assurance?		
Payment and delivery?		
☐ Information disclosure?		
Auction monitoring?		
Preventing anti-competitive behaviour and/or market manipulation?		
Enforcement?		
If not, please describe in detail what rules would be needed and why.		
A:		

Taking into account the smaller volume of EUAA allowances to be auctioned compared to EUAs, which of the three approaches for an overall EUAA auctioning model do you prefer? Please rate the options below (1 being the most preferable, 3 being the least preferable)

_	Limited number of coordinated auction processes.
_	Full centralisation based on a single EU-wide auction process.
_	Hybrid approach where different auction processes are cleared through a centralised system.
Does y	our choice differ from the approach preferred for EUAs? [Y/N]_
Please	provide arguments to support your case.
A:	
Questi	on 86
	agree that there is no need for any specific provisions for EUAA auctions as . [mark those that you agree with, $\boxtimes$ ]:
	Requirements for the auctioneer(s) and auction processes?
	Administrative fees?
	Rules to ensure appropriate and timely preparation of the auctions?
If not, 1	please describe in detail what rules would be needed and why.
A:	