EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions

This document is the questionnaire for this consultation. The survey contains 4 initial questions (A-D) to identify respondents, 86 questions for which responses will be made public and 4 questions that are classified confidential, must be sent directly to the European Commission and will not be made public. The questions that are classified potentially confidential are on two separate pages (2 questions on each page) and highlighted in green boxes.

Period of consultation

From 3 June 2009 to 3 August 2009 inclusive

How to submit your contribution

This consultation seeks to obtain feedback from all categories of stakeholders regarding the different aspects of auction design and implementation covered in the Consultation Paper.

We are sorry for the inconvenience, but the web-based survey is not available yet. If participants wish to complete the survey on this document and send their contributions back to **contact_ets_auctions_consultation@icfi.com** their responses can be accepted in this format. The web-based survey will be available as soon as possible if participants wish to wait till that is available.

Received contributions will be published on the Internet. It is important to read the specific privacy statement attached to this consultation for information on how your personal data and contribution will be dealt with.

Specific privacy statement

"Received contributions, together with the identity of the contributor, will be published on the Internet, unless the contributor objects to publication of his or her personal data on the grounds that such publication would harm his or her legitimate interests. In such cases the contribution may be published in an anonymous form. Otherwise, the contribution will not be published nor will, in principle, its content be taken into account. Responses for questions deemed confidential in the consultation will not be available for view on the website irrespective of contributor objecting or not."

Instructions to filling out the questionnaire

•	Questions may only be answered in designated response fields
•	For certain multiple choice questions, simply click on box to indicate choice
•	Answer [Y/N] questions by typing "y" / "Y" or "n" / "N" on underlined area ()
•	Some responses require explanations, additional comments and detailed answers These will either by identified by underline () or an answer section (A:). The amount of text that can be entered here is unlimited.
•	After completing the survey, please save and send to contact_ets_auctions_consultation@icfi.com
•	If any questions seem unclear in context or for method of response, please mail contact ets auctions consultation@icfi.com to clarify

Thank you

Section 1: Questions to categorize participants

Question A Name of Company/Organization: The European Petroleum Industry Association, EUROPIA, Principal nature of activities: Trade Association for the European Refining and Marketing. Number of employees in 2008: World-wide Europe-wide _____ Turnover in 2008: World-wide _____ Europe-wide **Question B** Type of respondent: Member State Company operating one or more installations covered by the EU ETS Electricity generators Energy companies other than electricity generators Industrial sectors Aviation Other. Please specify:_____ Approx Annual Emissions: _____tCO₂ Intermediary Financial institution Trading arm of non-financial institution Other. Please specify _____ Trader on own account Financial institution

Contact details will not be made public.

Question D

Questions relating to the "Specific privacy statement" above.

Do you object to publication of your personal data because it would harm your legitimate interests? [Y/N] N

If so, please provide an explanation of the legitimate interests that you think will be harmed:

A:

• Are any of your responses confidential? $[Y/N] \underline{N}$

If so, please indicate which ones and provide an explanation:

A:

Section 2: Survey questions (86) and potentially confidential questions (4)

C 3-3-3-3-1			
As a general rule throug	hout the trading period	, in your opinion,	are early auctions
necessary? [V/N] V			

If so, what should the profile of EUA auctions be?

5-10% in year n-2, 10-20% in year n-1, remainder in year n

10-20% in year n-2, 20-30% in year n-1, remainder in year n

20-30% in year n-2, 30-35% in year n-2, remainder in year n

Other? Please specify:

The Commission should conduct an independent and transparent study to assess demand.

Question 2

Question 1

Do you think there is a need to auction futures? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$

If so, why so?

A: To allow auctioning before start of the registry and to permit the electricity generation sector, in particular, to hedge risk.

The Commission should conduct a study to assess these needs before deciding futures vs. spot.

Question 3

What share of allowances should be auctioned spot and what share should be auctioned as futures for each year?

			SPOT	FUTURES
•	year n	:		
•	year n-1	:		
•	year n-2	:		%

Please provide evidence to support your case.

A:This should be decided by results of Commission assessment.

NB: The answer to this question will be published as part of the public consultation. Please do not submit confidential information as part of your answer to this question.

Should the common maturity date used in futures auctions be in December (so the maturity date would be December in year n, both when auctioning in year n-2 as when auctioning in year n-1)? [Y/N]

If not, please suggest alternative maturity dates and provide evidence to support your view.

A:No opinion

This page contains two questions that will not be made public. These questions cannot be completed on this document

Request for
potentially
confidential
information 1

Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.

For ETS operators: what share of your expected emissions covered by the EU ETS in a given year n do you hedge and how much in advance?

year n
 year n-1
 year n-2
 earlier years (please specify)

Request for potentially confidential information 2

Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.

What share of the annual quantity of allowances you intend to purchase *via* auctions would you wish to buy spot or futures respectively?

		SPOT	FUTURES
•	year n	:%	%
•	year n-1	:%	%
•	year n-2	:%	%

Please specify whether you are an:

- ETS operator; or
- other participant.

Question 5			
For spot auctions:			
What s	hould be the optimum frequency of auctions?		
	Weekly?		
	Fortnightly?		
	Monthly?		
	Quarterly?		
	Other? Please specify:		
What s	hould be the minimum frequency of auctions?		
	Weekly?		
\boxtimes	Fortnightly?		
	Monthly?		
	Quarterly?		
	Other? Please specify:		
What s	hould be the maximum frequency of auctions?		
\boxtimes	Weekly?		
	Fortnightly?		
	Monthly?		
	Quarterly?		
	Other? Please specify:		
Please	provide arguments to support your case.		
A:Auction timing and volume has an effect on overall auctioined EUA cost through either installation working capital and/or cost of carry. There is a balance between too many auction events (distraction for potential bidders) and too few auction events (secondary market dries up ahead of large auction events). We favour weekly auctions using a single harmonised and centralised auctioneer system.			
Questi			
For spo	For spot auctions, what should be the:		
•	Optimum auction size?		
•	Minimum auction size?		
•	Maximum auction size?		

If deemed appropriate, please indicate a range and/or distribution over different sizes.

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A: Auctions should be large enough to be material but not so large as to interfere with the secondary market. The size of each auction will depend upon frequency and should be determined as a result of the Commission study.

Question 7				
For futures auctions:				
What should be the optimum frequency of auctions?				
☐ Weekly?				
Fortnightly?				
Monthly?				
Quarterly?				
Other? Please specify:				
What should be the minimum frequency of auctions?				
☐ Weekly?				
Fortnightly?				
Monthly?				
Quarterly?				
Other? Please specify:				
What should be the maximum frequency of auctions?				
☐ Weekly?				
Fortnightly?				
Monthly?				
Quarterly?				
Other? Please specify:				
Please provide arguments to support your case.				
A: No opinion				
Ouestion 8				

For futures auctions, what should be the:

Optimum auction size?
Minimum auction size?
Maximum auction size?
If deemed appropriate, please indicate a range and/or distribution over different sizes.
Please provide evidence to support your case.
A: Please refer to answer to Question 6
Question 9
Should volumes of spot allowances be auctioned evenly throughout the year? [Y/N] \underline{Y}
If not, how should volumes be distributed? (more than one answer possible) Please specify:
A larger proportion in the first 4 months of the year?
A larger proportion in December?
A smaller proportion in July and August?
Other? Please specify:
Question 10
In case futures are auctioned, should the volumes for spot and futures auctions be spread over the year in the same manner? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$
If not, how should they differ? (more than one answer possible)
No futures auctions less than six months before the maturity date.
A larger proportion in December.
A smaller proportion in July and August.
Otherwise? Please specify how and comment:
To match auctioning of spot allowances and minimize impact on secondary market.
Question 11
Does the Regulation need to have provisions to avoid holding auctions during a short period of time before the surrendering date (30 April each year)? [Y/N] \underline{N}
If yes, how long should this period be:
One week

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions

In case futures are auctioned, should there be similar provisions with respect to the period immediately prior to the maturity date?
If yes, how long should this period be:
One week
Question 12
Which dates should be avoided? (more than one answer possible)
Public holidays common in most Member States? <u>25/12, 1/1, 1/5, Easter Monday, Ascension Day</u>
Days where important relevant economic data is released?
Days where emissions data are released?
Other? Please specify:
Please specify the dates you have in mind in your answers.
Question 13
Is a harmonised 10-12 hrs CET auction slot desirable? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$
If not, what alternative(s) would you suggest?
A:
Question 14
How long in advance should each element of the calendar be determined?
Annual volumes to be auctioned:
1 year in advance
2 years in advance
✓ 3 years in advance
more years in advance
Distribution of annual volumes over spot and futures (if applicable):
1 year in advance
2 years in advance

	sions Trading Scheme (ETS) – tion on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions
	3 years in advance
	more years in advance
Dates	of individual auctions:
	1 year in advance
	2 years in advance
	3 years in advance
\boxtimes	more years in advance
Volum	ne and product type for individual auctions:
	1 year in advance
	2 years in advance
	3 years in advance
	more years in advance
Each a	nuctioneer carrying out auction process (if more than one):
	1 year in advance
	2 years in advance
	3 years in advance
	more years in advance
Please	provide arguments to support your case.
preferr depend rules f	e would support the calendar of auctions being established for at least 5 years and rably for the whole phase. The exact volumes to be auctioned will change ding on new entrant activity, installation closure and any modification of allocation following a periodic review. However the exact volumes should be published as a possible. Any change of auctioneer must be seamless.
Additi 8 years variable prior to closed	Id be helpful to differentiate between Core Auction Volumes (CAV) and onal Auction Volume (AAV). CAV is mechanistically determined by phase length is x annual non free allocation divided by number of auctions. The potentially le AAV will require advanced notification of the additional volume say 3 months to auction. AAV volume would be formed from unused NER, early release NER, installation unissued allocation, additional auction allocation due to carbon the sectors being redefined as non carbon leakage etc.
Quest:	ion 15 should be the volume of allowances to be auctioned in 2011 and 2012?
•	in 2011:% of the 2013 volume and% of the 2014 volume
•	in 2012:% of the 2013 volume and% of the 2014 volume

What p	percentage of t	hese shares should be auctioned	ed as futures?
•	in 2011:	% of the 2013 share and	% of the 2014 share
•	in 2012:	% of the 2013 share and	% of the 2014 share
Please	provide evide	nce to support your case.	
A: Plea	ase refer to ans	swer to Question 1	
Questi	ion 16		
What s	should be the r	ule with respect to allowances	not auctioned due to force majeure?
	-	automatically be added to the after the auction process.	next auction on the calendar,
	-	be auctioned within one month n(s) the EUAs should be added	n, though leaving flexibility as to l.
	•	be auctioned within three mon n(s) the EUAs should be added	ths, though leaving flexibility as to l.
	Other? Please	e specify:	
Questi	ion 17		
Is 1,00	0 allowances t	the most appropriate lot size? [[Y/N] <u>Y</u>
If not,	why not?		
A:			
Questi	ion 18		

Is a single-round sealed-bid auction the most appropriate auction format for auctioning EU allowances? [Y/N] \underline{Y}			
If not, please comment on your alternative proposal?			
A:			
Question 19			
What is the most appropriate pricing rule for the auctioning of EU allowances?			
□ Uniform-pricing.			
Discriminatory-pricing.			
Indifferent.			
Please provide arguments to support your case.			
A:To avoid prejudicing smaller or less sophisticated players.			
Question 20			
Should the rules for solving ties in the Regulation be:			
random selection; or			
pro-rata re-scaling of bids?			
Please comment on your choice.			
A: Pro-rata scaling should apply only to ties on exact price.			
Question 21			
Should a reserve price apply?			
1 11 2			
A: We do not support Price Floors or Reserve Prices as they distort the value of the auction as a process by which the market price is determined and thus inhibit market efficiency. Prices should depend on supply and demand fundamentals at the time of the auction.			
Question 22			
In case a reserve price would apply, should the methodology/formula for calculating it be kept secret? $[Y/N] N$			

Please comment on your choice.

A:We believe that Regulations and rules associated with the auction process should be open and transparent.

Question 23
Is a maximum bid-size per single entity desirable in a Uniform-price auction?
[Y/N] <u>N</u>
Is a maximum bid-size per single entity desirable in a discriminatory-price auction? $[Y/N] \underline{N}$
Please comment on your choice.
A:
Question 24
If so, what is the desirable bid-size limit (as a percentage of the volume of allowances auctioned per auction – only one choice is possible):
10%:
25%:
Please comment on your choice.
A:
Question 25
In case only one of the two following options would be chosen, to limit the risk of market manipulation or collusion, which one would be preferable?
A discriminatory-price auction format?
A maximum bid-size per single entity?
Please comment on your choice.
A:Neither appropriate. Should be handled by market regulator and transparent auction rules/process.

Page 16

Are the	Are the following pre-registration requirements appropriate and adequate?	
Identit	y:	
\boxtimes	Natural or legal person;	
	Name, address, whether publicly listed, whether licensed and supervised under the AML rules; membership of a professional association; membership of a chamber of commerce; VAT and/or tax number;	
	Contact details of authorised representatives and proof of authorisation; and	
	CITL-Registry account details.	
they ar	Anything else? Please specify: Need to be able to identify who is bidding and re legitimate.	
Declar	rations with respect to the past 5 years on absence of:	
	Indictment or conviction of serious crimes: check corporate officers, directors, principals, members or partners;	
\boxtimes	Infringement of the rules of any regulated or unregulated market;	
\boxtimes	Permits to conduct business being revoked or suspended;	
\boxtimes	Infringement of procurement rules; and	
\boxtimes	Infringement of disclosure of confidential information.	
\boxtimes	Anything else? Please specify: Certain financial or fraud related offences	
Declar	rations and submission of documentation relating to:	
\boxtimes	Proof of identity;	
\boxtimes	Type of business;	
\boxtimes	Participation in EU ETS or not;	
\boxtimes	EU ETS registered installations, if any;	
	Bank account contact details;	
	Intended auctioning activity;	
	Whether bidding on own account or on behalf of another beneficial owner;	
	Corporate and business affiliations;	
	Creditworthiness;	
	Collateral; and	
	Whether it carries out transactions subject to VAT or transactions exempted from VAT.	
	Anything else? Please specify:	

Question 27	
Do you agree that the pre-registration requirements for admittance to EU auctions should be harmonised throughout the EU?	
Yes No No	
Please comment on your choice.	
A:We support auction system harmonisation	
Question 28	
Should the amount of information to be supplied in order to satisfy the pre-registration requirements for admittance to EU auctions depend on the:	
means of establishing the trading relationship;	
identity of bidder;	
whether auctioning spot or futures;	
size of bid;	
means of payment and delivery;	
anything else? Please specify:	
If so, what should the differences be?	
A:Harmonised for all participants.	
Question 29	
Should the bidder pre-registration requirements under the Regulation apply in the same manner irrespective of whether or not the auctioneer is covered by the MiFID or AML rules? [Y/N] _	
A:No opinion	
If not, why not?	
A:	
Please provide arguments to support your case.	

Question 30		
Do you agree that the auctioneer(s) should be allowed to rely on pre-registration checks		
carried out by reliable third parties including: $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$		
Other auctioneers?		
Credit and/or financial institutions?		
Other? Please specify:		
Please comment on your choice.		
A:Harmonisation should be applied to credit checking and 'know your customer' checks on a pan European basis. We would prefer a single platform/auctioneer and appropriately accredited verifiers.		
Question 31		
In order to facilitate bidder pre-registration in their home country, should the auctioneer(s) be allowed to provide for pre-registration by potential bidders in other (or all) Member States than the auctioneer's home country e.g. by outsourcing this to a reliable third party?		
Yes ⊠ No □		
Please comment on your choice:		
A:Same comment as above. Do not want each MS to conduct their own auctions.		
If so, should such entities be: Covered by the AML rules? Covered by MiFID?		
Covered by both?		
Other? Please specify:		
Please comment on your choice:		
A:		

Question 32
Should the Regulation prohibit the multiplicity of pre-registration checks in the case of Member States auctioning jointly?
Yes No No
Please comment on your choice.
A:
Question 33
Do you agree that the <i>level</i> of collateral accepted in EUA auctions should be harmonised for all EU ETS auctions? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$
If so, how should they be harmonised?
A:
If not, why not?
A:
Question 34
Do you agree that the <i>type</i> of collateral accepted in EUA auctions should be harmonised for all EU ETS auctions? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$
If so, how should they be harmonised?
A:
If not, why not?
A:
Question 35
Do you agree that 100% collateral in electronic money transfer ought to be deposited up-

front at a central counterparty or credit institution designated by the auctioneer to access

spot auctions? [Y/N] \underline{N}

A:No need if adequate credit checks performed.

If not, why not?

What alternative(s) would you suggest? Please provide arguments to support your case:
A:
Question 36
In case futures are auctioned, should a clearing house be involved to mitigate credit and market risks? [Y/N] \underline{Y}
If so, should specific rules – other than those currently used in exchange clearing houses – apply to:
the level of the initial margin;
the level of variation margin calls;
the daily frequency of variation margin call payments?
If you have answered yes, please justify and elaborate on the rules that should apply and the mechanisms to implement them:
A:
Question 37
What are the most preferable payment and delivery procedures that should be implemented for auctioning EUAs?
Payment before delivery.
Delivery versus payment.
Both.
Please comment on your choice.
A:

Irrespective of the payment procedure, should the Regulation fix a maximum delay of time for payment and delivery to take place? [Y/N] _
If yes; what should it be?
4 working days
5 working days
6 working days
7 working days
Other? Please specify:
Question 39
Should the Regulation provide any specific provisions for the handling of payment and

delivery incidents or failures? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$ If yes, what should they be?

A: Provisions should be equal to what is done on master agreements (standard agreements between two entities for trading), i.e. termination payments according to market/loss methodology.

Question 40

Should the Regulation provide for all matters that are central to the very creation, existence and termination or frustration of the transaction arising from the EUA auctions? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$

If not, why not?

A:

If so, are the matters enumerated below complete? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$

- The designation of the parties' to the trade.
- The characteristics of the auctioned product:
 - o Nature: EUAs or EUAAs, trading period concerned.
 - o <u>Date of delivery: date at which winning bidders will receive the allowances on their registry account.</u>
 - o <u>Date of payment</u>: date at which payment will be required from winning bidders.
 - o Lot size: number of allowances associated with one unit of the auctioned good.
- Events of `force majeure' and resulting consequences.
- Events of default by the auctioneer and/or the bidder and their consequences.

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions

 Applicable remedies or penalties. The regime governing the judicial review of claims across the EU.
If not, what additional matters should be foreseen in the Regulation and why? A:
71.
Question 41
Should the Regulation provide for rules on jurisdiction and the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments? $[Y/N]_{-}$
If so, should these be:
specific to the Regulation;
by reference to the Brussels I Regulation;
by citing exceptions from the Brussels I Regulation;
by citing additions to the Brussels I Regulation?
Please comment on your choice:
A:
If not, why not?
A:
No opinion
Question 42
Which auction model is preferable?
□ Direct bidding?
☐ Indirect bidding?
Both?
Please comment on your choice.
A:In the case of indirect bidding, all participants do not have access to the same market
information at the same time.

Questi	on 43
	ndirect model is used, what share of the total volume of EU allowances could be ned through indirect bidding?
Please	provide arguments to support your case.
A:	
.	
Questi	
	orimary participants model is used, what provisions would be desirable for ting disadvantages of restricting direct access (more than one answer is possible):
	Allow direct access to largest emitters, even if they trade only on their own account?
	If so, who should have direct access and what thresholds should apply?
\boxtimes	Disallow primary participants trading on their own account?
	Impose strict separation of own-account trading from trading on behalf of indirect bidders?
	Other? Please specify:
The Pr	imary participant model should not be used.
	with the Revised EU ETS Directive all auctions must be open to all that fulfill ation requirements.
market allowa Howev comme	e of formal or exclusive intermediaries is not supported. As with other commodity s, e.g. electricity, those who cannot participate directly should be able to access nees through brokers and suppliers who provide this service commercially. The this should not be assumed as the default method for access by participants; the excial decision about how and whether to participate in auctions should be for the large participants.

	primary participants' model is used, what conflict of interest requirements should bosed? (more than one answer possible)
	Separation of client registration and trading on behalf of clients from all own account trading activities.
	Separation of collateral management, payment and delivery on behalf of clients from all own account trading activities.
	Separation of anything else, please specify:
The Pr	rimary participant model should not be used.
Quest	ion 46
What	obligations should apply to primary participants acting in EU-wide auctions as:
•	Intermediaries? A:
•	Market makers? A:
The Pr	rimary participant model should not be used.
Please	provide arguments to support your case.
Quest	ion 47
	what conditions should auctioning through exchanges be allowed (more than one r possible):
	Only for futures auctions open to established members of the exchange?
	Also for spot auctions open to established members of the exchange?
	Only when the exchange-based auction is open to non-established members on a non-discriminatory cost-effective basis?
	Other? Please specify:
Please	provide arguments to support your case.
A:	

Question 48	
Should direct auctions through [mark those that you agree with, ⊠]:	
third party service providers; or	
public authorities be allowed?	
If not, why not?	
A: Need to discourage member states authorities all establishing their own exchanges.	
Question 49	
Do the general rules for auctioning EUAs suffice for ensuring full, fair and equitable access to allowances to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters? [Y/N] _	
If not, why not?	
A:	
Question 50	
Is allowing non-competitive bids necessary for ensuring access to allowances to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters in case of:	
• discriminatory-price auctions? A: Y	
• uniform-price auctions? A: N	
We do not support discrimination price auction.	
Question 51	
If non-competitive bids are provided for in spot auctions, what maximum share of allowances could be allocated through this route?	
<u> </u>	
Other? Please specify:	
Please comment on your choice.	
A:	

Question 52
What rule should apply for accessing non-competitive bids (more than one answer possible):
Participants should only be allowed to use one of the two bidding routes?
Non-competitive bids should be restricted to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters only?
Other? Please specify:
Please comment on your choice.
A:In any individual auction
Question 53
What should be the maximum bid-size allowed for SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters submitting non-competitive bids?
5 000 EUAs
☐ 10 000 EUAs
25 000 EUAs
Over 25 000 EUAs, please specify exact size and give reasons for your answer:
No opinion
Question 54
Are there any other specific measures not mentioned in this consultation that may be necessary for ensuring full, fair and equitable access to allowances for SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters? [Y/N] \underline{N}
If so, please specify:
A:

Quest	ion 55
	should be the minimum period of time before the auction date for the release of the to auction?
2 weel	ks
Other	Please specify:
Please	comment on your proposal.
A:	
No op	inion
Quest	ion 56
	should be the minimum period of time before the auction date for the submission intention to bid?
1 week	k 2 weeks 1 month
Other	Please specify: None
Please	comment on your proposal.
A:Sho registe	uld not have to declare intention to bid for any individual auction if already ered.
Quest	ion 57
Are th	ere any specific provisions that need to be highlighted in:
	The notice to auction?
	The intention to bid?
	Both?
Please	specify what they are.
A:	
Quest	ion 58
What	information should be disclosed after the auction:
	Clearing price (if allowances are awarded on a uniform-price basis or in the case of non-competitive bids being allowed)?
	Average price (if allowances are awarded on a discriminatory-price basis)?
\boxtimes	Any relevant information to solve tied bids?

Total volume of EUAs auctioned? Total volume of bids submitted distinguishing between competitive and non-competitive bids (if applicable)? Total volume of allowances allocated? Anything else? Please specify: Any volume unsold and carried over to subsequent auctions. Member States that bid on their own account Question 59 What should be the maximum delay for the announcement of auction results? 5 minutes	EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions
competitive bids (if applicable)? ☐ Total volume of allowances allocated? ☐ Anything else? Please specify: Any volume unsold and carried over to subsequent auctions. Member States that bid on their own account Question 59 What should be the maximum delay for the announcement of auction results? 5 minutes ☐ 15 minutes ☐ 30 minutes ☐ 1 hour ☐ Other ☐ Please specify: Please comment on your proposal. A:Time taken between placing bids and auction resolution must be minimised to reduce credit costs and price exposure that could deter bidders. Question 60 Do you feel that any specific additional provisions should be adopted in the Regulation for the granting of fair and equal access to auction information? [Y/N] Y If so, what may they be? Relevant information to all potential participants using well established media chanels. Question 61 Should an auction monitor be appointed centrally to monitor all EU auctions? [Y/N] Y If not, why not? A:	☐ Total volume of EUAs auctioned?
Anything else? Please specify: Any volume unsold and carried over to subsequent auctions. Member States that bid on their own account Question 59 What should be the maximum delay for the announcement of auction results? 5 minutes	
Question 59 What should be the maximum delay for the announcement of auction results? 5 minutes	Total volume of allowances allocated?
Question 59 What should be the maximum delay for the announcement of auction results? 5 minutes	
What should be the maximum delay for the announcement of auction results? 5 minutes	detroils. Memor States that our on their own account
What should be the maximum delay for the announcement of auction results? 5 minutes	
5 minutes	Question 59
Other Please specify: Please comment on your proposal. A:Time taken between placing bids and auction resolution must be minimised to reduce credit costs and price exposure that could deter bidders. Question 60 Do you feel that any specific additional provisions should be adopted in the Regulation for the granting of fair and equal access to auction information? [Y/N] Y If so, what may they be? Relevant information to all potential participants using well established media chanels. Question 61 Should an auction monitor be appointed centrally to monitor all EU auctions? [Y/N] Y If not, why not? A:	What should be the maximum delay for the announcement of auction results?
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[Y/N] Y If not, why not? A:	Question 61
If not, why not? A:	Should an auction monitor be appointed centrally to monitor all EU auctions?
A:	$[Y/N] \underline{Y}$
	If not, why not?
Question 62	A:
	Question 62

Do you agree that the Regulation should contain general principles on [mark those that you agree with, \boxtimes]:
the designation and mandate of the auction monitor; and
cooperation between the auctioneer(s) and the auction monitor?
If not, why not?
A:
Should these be supplemented by operational guidance, possibly through Commission guidelines? [Y/N] \underline{Y}
If not, why not?
A:
Question 63
Is there a need for harmonised market abuse provisions in the Regulation to prevent insider dealing and market manipulation? $[Y/N]$
If not, why not?
A:
Please comment on your choice outlining the provisions you deem necessary and stating the reasons why.
A:
No opinion
Question 64
Should the Regulation provide for harmonised enforcement measures to sanction [mark those that you agree with, \square]:
Non-compliance with its provisions?
Market abuse?
Please provide arguments to support your case.
A:

Ques	tion 65
Shou	ld the enforcement measures include [mark those that you agree with, ⊠]:
	The suspension of the auctioneer(s) and/or bidders from the EU-wide auctions? If so, for how long should such suspension last?
	Financial penalties? If so, at what level should such penalties be fixed?
	The power to address binding interim decisions to the auctioneer(s) and/or bidders to avert any urgent, imminent threat of breach of the Regulation with likely irreversible adverse consequences?
	Anything else? Please specify:
Pleas	e provide arguments to support your case.
A: N	o opinion
Ques	tion 66
Shou	ld such enforcement measures apply at:
	EU level?
	National level?
	Both?
Pleas	e comment on your choice.
A:	
Ques	tion 67
Who	should enforce compliance with the Regulation (more than one answer is possible):
	The auction monitor?
	The auctioneer?
	A competent authority at EU level?
	A competent authority at national level?
	Other? Please specify:
Pleas	e provide evidence to support your case.

A:First responsibility for application of rules is the auctioneers. Since application of the Regulation should be consistent across the EU, an EU wide auction monitor may be a simple solution, or a "light" EU wide authority.

Which of the three approaches for an overall EU auction model do you prefer? Please rate the options below (1 being the most preferable, 3 being the least preferable)

- <u>3</u> Limited number of coordinated auction processes.
- <u>1</u> Full centralisation based on a single EU-wide auction process.
- <u>2</u> The hybrid approach where different auction processes are cleared through a centralised system.

Please give arguments to support your case.

A:An auctioning system harmonised on a single electronic auction platform with a single set of contract terms, auction rules and settlement conditions is much more efficient and easier to regulate than individual Member State auctions.

Indeed, as the revenues are guaranteed to be returned to the Member Station auctioning allowances there is little if any justification or need for Member State auctions.

Question 69

If a limited number of coordinated auction processes develops, what should be the maximum number?
☐ 3
<u> </u>
7
more than 7, please specify:
Please give arguments to support your case.
A: We strongly prefer simple process.

Question 70

Is there a need for a transitional phase in order to develop gradually the optimal auction infrastructure? [Y/N]N

If so, what kind of transitional arrangements would you recommend? <u>Flexibility to learn from the start up phase.</u>

Should the Regulation impose the following requirements for the auctioneer(s) and auction processes? [mark those that apply, \boxtimes]:		
Techni	ical capabilities of auctioneers:	
	capacity and experience to conduct auctions (or a specific part of the auction process) in an open, fair, transparent, cost-effective and non-discriminatory manner;	
	appropriate investment in keeping the system up-to-date and in line with ongoing market and technological developments; and	
	relevant professional licences, high ethical and quality control standards, compliance with financial and market integrity rules.	
Integri	ity:	
	guarantee confidentiality of bids, ability to manage market sensitive information in an appropriate manner;	
	duly protected electronic systems and appropriate security procedures with regards to identification and data transmission;	
	appropriate rules on avoiding and monitoring conflicts of interest; and	
\boxtimes	full cooperation with the auction monitor.	
Reliab	ility:	
	robust organisation and IT systems;	
\boxtimes	adequate fallback measures in case of unexpected events;	
	minimisation of the risk of cancelling an individual auction once announced;	
	minimisation of the risk of failing functionalities (e.g. access to the bidding platform for certain potential bidders); and	
	fallback system in case of IT problems on the bidder side.	
Access	ribility and user friendliness:	

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) -Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions \mathbb{M} fair, concise, comprehensible and easily accessible information on how to participate in auctions; \boxtimes short and simple pre-registration forms; \boxtimes clear and simple electronic tools; \boxtimes (option of) accessibility of platforms through a dedicated internet interface; ability of the auction platform to connect to and communicate with proprietary trading systems used by bidders; adequate and regular training (including mock auctions); \boxtimes detailed user guidance on how to participate in the auction; and \boxtimes ability to test identification and access to the auction. Please elaborate if any of these requirements need not be included. A:Full service but at reasonable cost - do not open door to potential interfaces with many user systems. Please elaborate what additional requirements would be desirable. A: **Ouestion 72** What provisions on administrative fees should the Regulation include (more than one answer is possible)? General principles on proportionality, fairness and non-discrimination. Rules on fee structure. Rules on the amount of admissible fees. \boxtimes Other? Please specify: Fees payable by Member States from auction revenues Please provide arguments to support your case.

A:Provides strong incentive for cost effective adminstration

Ouestion 73

Should there be provisions for public disclosure of material steps when introducing new (or adapted) auction processes?

A:Yes of course

Should new (or adapted) auction process be notified to and authorised by the Commission before inclusion in the auction calendar?

A:Yes - harmonisation across EU

Quest	ion 74
	n one of the following options is the most appropriate in case a Member State does old auctions (on time)?
\boxtimes	Auctions by an auctioneer authorised by the Commission.
	Automatic addition of the delayed quantities to those foreseen for the next two or three auctions.
What	other option would you envisage? Please specify:
A:	
Quest	ion 75
its cor	d a sanction apply to a Member State that does not auction allowances in line with mmitments? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$ what form should that sanction take?
	is matter is for EU and MS to agree but it could include loss of part of allowances shared amongst other MSs for auction by them.
Quest	ion 76
_	general rule throughout the trading period, in your opinion, are early auctions sary? $[Y/N]_{-}$
If so, v	what should the profile of EUAA auctions be:
	5-10% in year n-2, 10-20% in year n-1, remainder in year n
	10-20% in year n-2, 20-30% in year n-1, remainder in year n
	20-30% in year n-2, 30-35% in year n-2, remainder in year n
	Other? Please specify:
No op	<u>inion</u>

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions

Do you think there is a need to auction EUAA futures? $[Y/N]_{-}$ If so, why?

A:No opinion

This page contains two questions that will not be made public. These questions cannot be completed on this document

Request for potentially confidential information 3	Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-52/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will no be disclosed publicly.
	For aircraft operators covered by the EU ETS:
	Have you determined a corporate hedging strategy for carbon needs? Yes [] No []

If so, what share of your expected emissions covered by the EU ETS in a given year n do you (intend to) hedge and how much in advance?

•	year n	:	%
•	year n-1	:	%
•	year n-2	:	%

Request for potentially confidential information 4

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What share of the annual quantity of allowances you intend to purchase *via* auctions would you wish to buy spot or futures respectively?

		SPOT	FUTURES
•	year n	:%	%
•	year n-1	:%	%
•	year n-2	:%	%

Questi	on 78
What s	hould be the optimal frequency and size of EUAA auctions:
	2 auctions per year of around 15 million EUAAs?
	3 auctions per year of around 10 million EUAAs?
	More than 3 auctions per year? Please specify:
Please	comment on your choice.
A: No	opinion
0 4	70
Questi	
w nat v	vould be your preferred timing for EUAA auctions:
	Equally spread throughout the year?
	November – March?
	Other? Please specify: No opinion
Questi	on 80
	any of the EUAA auction design elements be different compared to EUA as (see section 3)? [Y/N] _
If so, p	lease specify and comment on your choice.
A:No c	ppinion
-	on 81 If agree there is no need for a maximum bid-size? [Y/N] _ why not?
A:No c	ppinion
Questi	on 82
regulat	e any information regarding aircraft operators made available as part of the ory process to the competent authorities that could facilitate the KYC checks ned by the auctioneer(s)? $[Y/N]$

A:

No opinion

If so, please describe what information is concerned and whether it should be referred to in the Regulation or any operational guidance published by the Commission. A:No opinion **Question 83** In your opinion, is there a specific need to allow for non-competitive bids in EUAA auctions? A: Would this be the case even when applying a uniform clearing price format? A: No opinion Please provide arguments to support your case. **Question 84** Do you agree that there is no need for any specific provisions for EUAA auctions as regards [mark those that you agree with, \boxtimes]: Involvement of primary participants, exchanges or third party service providers? Guarantees and financial assurance? Payment and delivery? Information disclosure? Auction monitoring? Preventing anti-competitive behaviour and/or market manipulation? **Enforcement?** If not, please describe in detail what rules would be needed and why.

Taking into account the smaller volume of EUAA allowances to be auctioned compared to EUAs, which of the three approaches for an overall EUAA auctioning model do you prefer? Please rate the options below (1 being the most preferable, 3 being the least preferable)

_	Limited number of coordinated auction processes.
_	Full centralisation based on a single EU-wide auction process.
_	Hybrid approach where different auction processes are cleared through a centralised system.
Does y	our choice differ from the approach preferred for EUAs? [Y/N]_
Please	provide arguments to support your case.
A:	
No opi	nion
Questi	on 86
	agree that there is no need for any specific provisions for EUAA auctions as . [mark those that you agree with, \boxtimes]:
	Requirements for the auctioneer(s) and auction processes?
	Administrative fees?
	Rules to ensure appropriate and timely preparation of the auctions?
If not, p	blease describe in detail what rules would be needed and why.
A:	
No opi	nion