EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions

This document is the questionnaire for this consultation. The survey contains 4 initial questions (A-D) to identify respondents, 86 questions for which responses will be made public and 4 questions that are classified confidential, must be sent directly to the European Commission and will not be made public. The questions that are classified potentially confidential are on two separate pages (2 questions on each page) and highlighted in green boxes.

Period of consultation

From 3 June 2009 to 3 August 2009 inclusive

How to submit your contribution

This consultation seeks to obtain feedback from all categories of stakeholders regarding the different aspects of auction design and implementation covered in the Consultation Paper.

We are sorry for the inconvenience, but the web-based survey is not available yet. If participants wish to complete the survey on this document and send their contributions back to **contact ets auctions consultation@icfi.com** their responses can be accepted in this format. The web-based survey will be available as soon as possible if participants wish to wait till that is available.

Received contributions will be published on the Internet. It is important to read the specific privacy statement attached to this consultation for information on how your personal data and contribution will be dealt with.

Specific privacy statement

"Received contributions, together with the identity of the contributor, will be published on the Internet, unless the contributor objects to publication of his or her personal data on the grounds that such publication would harm his or her legitimate interests. In such cases the contribution may be published in an anonymous form. Otherwise, the contribution will not be published nor will, in principle, its content be taken into account. Responses for questions deemed confidential in the consultation will not be available for view on the website irrespective of contributor objecting or not."

Instructions to filling out the questionnaire

•	Questions may only be answered in designated response fields
•	For certain multiple choice questions, simply click on box to indicate choice
•	Answer [Y/N] questions by typing "y" / "Y" or "n" / "N" on underlined area ()
•	Some responses require explanations, additional comments and detailed answers. These will either by identified by underline () or an answer section (A:). The amount of text that can be entered here is unlimited.
•	After completing the survey, please save and send to contact_ets_auctions_consultation@icfi.com
•	If any questions seem unclear in context or for method of response, please mail contact_ets_auctions_consultation@icfi.com to clarify

Thank you

Section 1: Questions to categorize participants

Question A

Name of Company/Organization: Industrievereinigung Chemiefaser e.V., short: IVC (German Man-Made Fibres Industry Association)

Principal nature of activities: The IVC incorporates the politico-economic interests of 19 German and Austrian man-made fibres producers in contacts with politicians, public authorities, other industries, the world of science and the media. IVC represents over 90% of the entire German man-made fibres industry and almost 30 % of the European man-made fibres producers.

Numbe	er of employees in 2008:	
World-	-wide	Europe-wide
Turnov	ver in 2008:	
World-	-wide	Europe-wide
Questi	ion B	
Type o	of respondent:	
	Member State	
	Electricity generators	ther than electricity generators
	Intermediary Financial institution Trading arm of non-y Other Please specific	

Contact details will not be made public.

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Question D

Questions relating to the "Specific privacy statement" above.

O Do you object to publication of your personal data because it would harm your legitimate interests? [Y/N] N

If so, please provide an explanation of the legitimate interests that you think will be harmed:

A:

o Are any of your responses confidential? [Y/N] \underline{N}

If so, please indicate which ones and provide an explanation:

A:

Section 2: Survey questions (86) and potentially confidential questions (4)

Question 1

As a general rule throughout the trading period, in your opinion, are early auctions necessary? [Y/N] N

If so, what should the profile of EUA auctions be?

5-10% in year n-2, 10-20% in year n-1, remainder in year n

10-20% in year n-2, 20-30% in year n-1, remainder in year n

20-30% in year n-2, 30-35% in year n-1, remainder in year n

Other? Please specify:

Other?

Question 2

Do you think there is a need to auction futures? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$

If so, why?

A:Both, spot as well as futures should be an option for auctioning.

Ouestion 3

What share of allowances should be auctioned spot and what share should be auctioned as futures for each year?

			SPOT		FUTURES
•	year n	:	<u>30</u> %		<u>70</u> %
•	year n-1	:	<u>30</u> %		<u>70</u> %
•	year n-2	:	<u>30</u> %	1	<u>70</u> %

Please provide evidence to support your case.

A: The ammount of futures should always be higher than for spot, just in order to increase the planning dependability and to decrease the possible speculative influence on trade.

NB: The answer to this question will be published as part of the public consultation. Please do not submit confidential information as part of your answer to this question.

Should the common maturity date used in futures auctions be in December (so the maturity date would be December in year n, both when auctioning in year n-2 as when auctioning in year n-1)? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$

If not, please suggest alternative maturity dates and provide evidence to support your view.

A:

This page contains two questions that will not be made public. These questions cannot be completed on this document

Request for
potentially
confidential
information 1

Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.

For ETS operators: what share of your expected emissions covered by the EU ETS in a given year n do you hedge and how much in advance?

•	year n	:	%
•	year n-1	:	%
•	year n-2	:	
•	earlier years (please specify)		0/0

Request for potentially confidential information 2

Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.

What share of the annual quantity of allowances you intend to purchase *via* auctions would you wish to buy spot or futures respectively?

		SPOT		FUT	URES
•	year n	: <u></u>	%	_	%
•	year n-1	: <u></u>	%	_	%
•	year n-2	: <u></u>	%	T _	%

Please specify whether you are an:

- ETS operator; or
- Other participant.

For spo	ot auctions:		
What s	What should be the optimum frequency of auctions?		
	Weekly?		
	Fortnightly?		
	Monthly?		
	Quarterly?		
	Other? Please specify:		
What s	hould be the minimum frequency of auctions?		
	Weekly?		
	Fortnightly?		
	Monthly?		
	Quarterly?		
	Other? Please specify:		
What s	hould be the maximum frequency of auctions?		
	Weekly?		
	Fortnightly?		
	Monthly?		
	Quarterly?		
	Other? Please specify:		
Please	provide arguments to support your case.		
	rder to minimize speculative effects by purchasing a great number of certificates at ne auctions should be helt as often as possible.		

Question 6

For spot auctions, what should be the:

- Optimum auction size? 1/52
- Minimum auction size? 1/52
- Maximum auction size? 1/52

If deemed appropriate, please indicate a range and/or distribution over different sizes.

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A:Auction sizes should be split according to frequency (see above).

Question 7
For futures auctions:
What should be the optimum frequency of auctions?
Weekly?
Fortnightly?
Monthly?
Quarterly?
Other? Please specify:
What should be the minimum frequency of auctions?
Weekly?
Fortnightly?
Monthly?
Quarterly?
Other? Please specify:
What should be the maximum frequency of auctions?
Weekly?
Fortnightly?
Monthly?
Quarterly?
Other? Please specify:
Please provide arguments to support your case.
A:In order to minimize speculative effects by purchasing a great number of certificates at one time auctions should be helt as often as possible.

Question 8

For futures auctions, what should be the:

- Optimum auction size? 1/52
- Minimum auction size? 1/52
- Maximum auction size? $\frac{1/52}{}$

Please provide evidence to support your case.
A:Auction sizes should be split according to frequency (see above).
Question 9
Should volumes of spot allowances be auctioned evenly throughout the year? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$
If not, how should volumes be distributed? (more than one answer possible) Please specify:
A larger proportion in the first 4 months of the year?
A larger proportion in December?
A smaller proportion in July and August?
Other? Please specify:
Question 10
In case futures are auctioned, should the volumes for spot and futures auctions be spread over the year in the same manner? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$
If not, how should they differ? (more than one answer possible)
No futures auctions less than six months before the maturity date.
A larger proportion in December.
A smaller proportion in July and August.
Otherwise? Please specify how and comment:
Question 11
Does the Regulation need to have provisions to avoid holding auctions during a short period of time before the surrendering date (30 April each year)? $[Y/N] N$
If yes, how long should this period be:
One week
In case futures are auctioned, should there be similar provisions with respect to the period immediately prior to the maturity date? [Y/N] \underline{N}
If yes, how long should this period be:

If deemed appropriate, please indicate a range and/or distribution over different sizes.

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One week
0 4 12
Question 12
Which dates should be avoided? (more than one answer possible)
Public holidays common in most Member States?
Days where important relevant economic data is released?
Days where emissions data are released? Other? Please specify: None: selection of avoided dates not necessary if auctions
Other? Please specify: None; selection of avoided dates not necessary if auctions will always be helt on fix week-day for example wednesdays.
Please specify the dates you have in mind in your answers.
Question 13
Is a harmonised 10-12 hrs CET auction slot desirable? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$
If not, what alternative(s) would you suggest?
A:
Question 14
How long in advance should each element of the calendar be determined?
Annual volumes to be auctioned:
1 year in advance
2 years in advance
3 years in advance
more years in advance
Distribution of annual volumes over spot and futures (if applicable):
1 year in advance
2 years in advance
3 years in advance
more years in advance
Dates of individual auctions:
☐ 1 year in advance

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	2 years in advance
	3 years in advance
	more years in advance
Volum	e and product type for individual auctions:
\boxtimes	1 year in advance
	2 years in advance
	3 years in advance
	more years in advance
Each a	uctioneer carrying out auction process (if more than one):
\boxtimes	1 year in advance
	2 years in advance
	3 years in advance
	more years in advance
Please	provide arguments to support your case.

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What should be the volume of allowances to be auctioned in 2011 and 2012?

• in 2011: - % of the 2013 volume and -% of the 2014 volume

A:Yearly determination of elements above is sufficient.

• in 2012:-% of the 2013 volume and -% of the 2014 volume

What percentage of these shares should be auctioned as futures?

- in 2011: -\% of the 2013 share and -\% of the 2014 share
- in 2012: -% of the 2013 share and -% of the 2014 share

Please provide evidence to support your case.

A:No anticipation of following years necessary, allow market to develop.

Questi	on 16
What s	should be the rule with respect to allowances not auctioned due to force majeure?
	They should automatically be added to the next auction on the calendar, irrespective of the auction process.
	They should be auctioned within one month, though leaving flexibility as to which auction(s) the EUAs should be added.
	They should be auctioned within three months, though leaving flexibility as to which auction(s) the EUAs should be added.
	Other? Please specify:
Questi	on 17
Is 1,00	0 allowances the most appropriate lot size? [Y/N] \underline{Y}
If not,	why not?
A:	
Questi	on 18
	gle-round sealed-bid auction the most appropriate auction format for auctioning owances? [Y/N] \underline{N}
If not,	please comment on your alternative proposal?
	sparency concerning bids/spreading should be increased; overview of bids mized) desirable.
Questi	on 19
What i	s the most appropriate pricing rule for the auctioning of EU allowances?
	Uniform-pricing.
	Discriminatory-pricing.
	Indifferent.
Please	provide arguments to support your case.

A:Uniform-pricing will help setting clear prices and prevent speculation activities.

Should the rules for solving ties in the Regulation be:

random selection; or

pro-rata re-scaling of bids?

Please comment on your choice.

A:Only the second option is fair and foreseeable.

Question 21

Should a reserve price apply?

A:No. No minimum price should be set, could otherwise be instrumentalized by authorities following own financial interests.

Question 22

In case a reserve price would apply, should the methodology/formula for calculating it be kept secret? [Y/N] N

Please comment on your choice.

A: If the formula will be kept secret, open and transparent auction rules couldn't be guaranteed anymore.

Question 23

Is a maximum bid-size per single entity desirable in a Uniform-price auction?

[Y/N] <u>N</u>

Is a maximum bid-size per single entity desirable in a discriminatory-price auction? [Y/N] N

Please comment on your choice.

A:Unnecessary regulation should be avoided.

Question 24

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	what is the desirable bid-size limit (as a percentage of the volume of allowances ned per auction – only one choice is possible):
10%:	☐ 15%: ☐ 20%: ☐
25%:	☐ 30%: ☐ More than 30%: ☐ Please specify:
Please	comment on your choice.
A:	vide supra!
Quest	ion 25
	e only one of the two following options would be chosen, to limit the risk of market ulation or collusion, which one would be preferable?
	A discriminatory-price auction format?
\boxtimes	A maximum bid-size per single entity?
Please	comment on your choice.
	h alternatives should be avoided (see above), only if one option has to be chosen cond is favored.
Quest	ion 26
Are th	e following pre-registration requirements appropriate and adequate?
Identii	ty:
\boxtimes	Natural or legal person;
	Name, address, whether publicly listed, whether licensed and supervised under the AML rules; membership of a professional association; membership of a chamber of commerce; VAT and/or tax number;
	Contact details of authorised representatives and proof of authorisation; and
	CITL-Registry account details.
\boxtimes	Anything else? Please specify:name, address

Declar	rations with respect to the past 5 years on absence of:
	Indictment or conviction of serious crimes: check corporate officers, directors, principals, members or partners;
	Infringement of the rules of any regulated or unregulated market;
	Permits to conduct business being revoked or suspended;
	Infringement of procurement rules; and
	Infringement of disclosure of confidential information.
	Anything else? Please specify:
Declar	rations and submission of documentation relating to:
	Proof of identity;
	Type of business;
	Participation in EU ETS or not;
	EU ETS registered installations, if any;
	Bank account contact details;
	Intended auctioning activity;
	Whether bidding on own account or on behalf of another beneficial owner;
	Corporate and business affiliations;
	Creditworthiness;
	Collateral; and
	Whether it carries out transactions subject to VAT or transactions exempted from VAT.
	Anything else? Please specify:
Question 27	
Do you agree that the pre-registration requirements for admittance to EU auctions should be harmonised throughout the EU?	
Yes 🔀	No
Please	comment on your choice.
A:Harmonisation throughout the EU in any matter is favorable.	

Should the amount of information to be supplied in order to satisfy the pre-registration requirements for admittance to EU auctions depend on the:	
means of establishing the trading relationship;	
identity of bidder;	
whether auctioning spot or futures;	
size of bid;	
means of payment and delivery;	
anything else? Please specify: None	
If so, what should the differences be?	
A:All information should be made accessible to each registred party without any constraints.	
Question 29	
Should the bidder pre-registration requirements under the Regulation apply in the same manner irrespective of whether or not the auctioneer is covered by the MiFID or AML rules? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$	
A:Equal conditions have to be met by any participant.	
If not, why not?	
A:	
Please provide arguments to support your case.	
Question 30	
Do you agree that the auctioneer(s) should be allowed to rely on pre-registration checks carried out by reliable third parties including: $[Y/N] \underline{N}$	
Other auctioneers?	
Credit and/or financial institutions?	
Other? Please specify: None	
Please comment on your choice.	

A: Misinformation, which can influence and above all manipulate the auction, should be avoided!

Question 31
In order to facilitate bidder pre-registration in their home country, should the auctioneer(s) be allowed to provide for pre-registration by potential bidders in other (or all) Member States than the auctioneer's home country e.g. by outsourcing this to a reliable third party?
Yes ⊠ No □
Please comment on your choice:
A:Harmonisation is supported.
If so, should such entities be:
Covered by the AML rules?
Covered by MiFID?
Covered by both?
Other? Please specify: None
Please comment on your choice:
A:Administrative burdens should be minimized as much as possible.
Question 32
Should the Regulation prohibit the multiplicity of pre-registration checks in the case of Member States auctioning jointly?
Yes No No
Please comment on your choice.
A:Not necessary.
Question 33

Do you agree that the <i>level</i> of collateral accepted in EUA auctions should be harmonised for all EU ETS auctions? $[Y/N] N$	
If so, how should they be harmonised?	
A:	
If not, why not?	
A:Not necessary, part of creditworthiness.	
Question 34	
Do you agree that the $type$ of collateral accepted in EUA auctions should be harmonised for all EU ETS auctions? [Y/N] \underline{N}	
If so, how should they be harmonised?	
A:	
If not, why not?	
A:Not necessary, part of creditworthiness.	
Question 35	
Do you agree that 100% collateral in electronic money transfer ought to be deposited upfront at a central counterparty or credit institution designated by the auctioneer to access spot auctions? [Y/N] \underline{N}	
If not, why not?	
A:Part of creditworthiness, such procedure would not comply with standards of commercial transactions.	
What alternative(s) would you suggest? Please provide arguments to support your case:	
A:	
Question 36	
In case futures are auctioned, should a clearing house be involved to mitigate credit and market risks? [Y/N] \underline{N}	
If so, should specific rules – other than those currently used in exchange clearing houses – apply to:	
the level of the initial margin;	
the level of variation margin calls;	

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the daily frequency of variation margin call payments?	
If you have answered yes, please justify and elaborate on the rules that should apply and the mechanisms to implement them:	
A:	
Question 37	
What are the most preferable payment and delivery procedures that should be implemented for auctioning EUAs?	
Payment before delivery.	
Delivery versus payment.	
Both.	
Please comment on your choice.	
A:If possible, a delivery before payment should be preferred.	
Question 38	
Irrespective of the payment procedure, should the Regulation fix a maximum delay of time for payment and delivery to take place? [Y/N] _	
If yes; what should it be?	
4 working days	
5 working days	
6 working days	
☐ 7 working days	
Other? Please specify: <u>Maximum delay should be fixed as flexible as possible in order to allow the market to develop.</u>	
Question 39	
Should the Regulation provide any specific provisions for the handling of payment and delivery incidents or failures? [Y/N] \underline{Y}	
If yes, what should they be?	
A:Regulation should be harmonised throughout the EU.	

Should the Regulation provide for all matters that are central to the very creation, existence and termination or frustration of the transaction arising from the EUA auctions? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$

If not, why not?

A:

If so, are the matters enumerated below complete? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$

- The designation of the parties' to the trade.
- The characteristics of the auctioned product:
 - o Nature: EUAs or EUAAs, trading period concerned.
 - o <u>Date of delivery: date at which winning bidders will receive the allowances on</u> their registry account.
 - o <u>Date of payment: date at which payment will be required from winning</u> bidders.
 - o Lot size: number of allowances associated with one unit of the auctioned good.
- Events of `force majeure' and resulting consequences.
- Events of default by the auctioneer and/or the bidder and their consequences.
- Applicable remedies or penalties.
- The regime governing the judicial review of claims across the EU.

If not, what additional matters should be foreseen in the Regulation and why?

A:

Question 41

Should the Regulation provide for rules on jurisdiction and the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$		
If so, should these be:		
specific to the Regulation;		
by reference to the Brussels I Regulation;		
by citing exceptions from the Brussels I Regulation;		
by citing additions to the Brussels I Regulation?		
Please comment on your choice:		
A:The Regulation should be harmonised throughout the EU.		
If not, why not?		
A:		
Question 42		
Which auction model is preferable?		
□ Direct bidding?		
Indirect bidding?		
Both?		
Please comment on your choice.		
A:Direct bidding is understood as the option to auction for every operator registred under the EU ETS; no indirect bidding necessary.		
Question 43		
If an indirect model is used, what share of the total volume of EU allowances could be auctioned through indirect bidding? <u>-</u>		
Please provide arguments to support your case.		
A:		

-	rimary participants model is used, what provisions would be desirable for ing disadvantages of restricting direct access (more than one answer is possible):
	Allow direct access to largest emitters, even if they trade only on their own account?
	If so, who should have direct access and what thresholds should apply?
	Disallow primary participants trading on their own account?
	Impose strict separation of own-account trading from trading on behalf of indirect bidders?
	Other? Please specify: None. The primary participants model is against the idea monised and equal access to the auction.
Question 45	
	rimary participants' model is used, what conflict of interest requirements should osed? (more than one answer possible)
	Separation of client registration and trading on behalf of clients from all own account trading activities.
	Separation of collateral management, payment and delivery on behalf of clients from all own account trading activities.
	Separation of anything else, please specify:

Question 46

What obligations should apply to primary participants acting in EU-wide auctions as:

- Intermediaries? A:
- Market makers? A:

Please provide arguments to support your case.

Ouestion	47
Oucsuon	T /

	what conditions should auctioning through exchanges be allowed (more than one possible):
	Only for futures auctions open to established members of the exchange?
	Also for spot auctions open to established members of the exchange?
	Only when the exchange-based auction is open to non-established members on a non-discriminatory cost-effective basis?
	Other? Please specify:
Please p	provide arguments to support your case.
A:	
Questio	on 48
Should	direct auctions be allowed through:
1) Tł	nird party service providers? [Y/N] N
2) Pu	ablic authorities? $[Y/N] \underline{N}$
Please o	comment on your selection:
A:Direc	et approach is preferential (see above).
Questio	on 49
	general rules for auctioning EUAs suffice for ensuring full, fair and equitable to allowances to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$
If not, v	why not?
A:	

Is allowing non-competitive bids necessary for ensuring access to allowances to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters in case of:

- discriminatory-price auctions? A:No.
- uniform-price auctions? A:No.


Que	estion 51
	on-competitive bids are provided for in spot auctions, what maximum share of wances could be allocated through this route?
	5%
	10%
	Other? Please specify:
Plea	ase comment on your choice.
A:	
Que	estion 52
	at rule should apply for accessing non-competitive bids (more than one answer sible):
	Participants should only be allowed to use one of the two bidding routes?
	Non-competitive bids should be restricted to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters only?
	Other? Please specify:
Plea	ase comment on your choice.
A:	
Que	estion 53
	at should be the maximum bid-size allowed for SMEs covered by the EU ETS and all emitters submitting non-competitive bids?
	5 000 EUAs
	10 000 EUAs
	25 000 EUAs
	Over 25 000 EUAs, please specify exact size and give reasons for your answer:

Question 54
Are there any other specific measures not mentioned in this consultation that may be necessary for ensuring full, fair and equitable access to allowances for SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters? $[Y/N]_{-}$
If so, please specify:
A:
Question 55
What should be the minimum period of time before the auction date for the release of the notice to auction?
2 weeks 1 month 2 months
Other Please specify: weekly
Please comment on your proposal.
A:A weekly notification would be consistent with weekly auctioning.
Question 56
What should be the minimum period of time before the auction date for the submission of the intention to bid?
1 week
Other Please specify: None
Please comment on your proposal.
A:Not necessary if auctions take place weekly.
Question 57
Are there any specific provisions that need to be highlighted in:
The notice to auction?
The intention to bid?
Both?
Please specify what they are.

A:	
Question	n 58
•	Formation should be disclosed after the auction:
	Clearing price (if allowances are awarded on a uniform-price basis or in the case f non-competitive bids being allowed)?
\boxtimes A	average price (if allowances are awarded on a discriminatory-price basis)?
	any relevant information to solve tied bids?
\square T	otal volume of EUAs auctioned?
	Total volume of bids submitted distinguishing between competitive and non-ompetitive bids (if applicable)?
\square T	otal volume of allowances allocated?
	anything else? Please specify: <u>Transparent distribution of pricing/ bids.</u>
5 minute 1 hour Other Please co	ould be the maximum delay for the announcement of auction results? 15 minutes 30 minutes
Question	n 60
2	feel that any specific additional provisions should be adopted in the Regulation ranting of fair and equal access to auction information? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$
If so, wh	nat may they be? Provisions of transparency as to pricing/ bids should be part of on.
Question	n 61
_	an auction monitor be appointed centrally to monitor all EU auctions?

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 $[Y/N]\,\underline{Y}$



A:	
Ones	stion 65
_	
	ald the enforcement measures include [mark those that you agree with, \(\subseteq \)]:
	The suspension of the auctioneer(s) and/or bidders from the EU-wide auctions? If so, for how long should such suspension last?
\boxtimes	Financial penalties?
	If so, at what level should such penalties be fixed? This level depends on the size of the auctioneer's company.
	The power to address binding interim decisions to the auctioneer(s) and/or bidders to avert any urgent, imminent threat of breach of the Regulation with likely irreversible adverse consequences?
	Anything else? Please specify:
Pleas	se provide arguments to support your case.
A:	
Ques	stion 66
Shou	ald such enforcement measures apply at:
	EU level?
	National level?
	Both?
Pleas	se comment on your choice.
A:St	rong enforcement measures will help preventing misuse in the market.
Ques	stion 67
Who	should enforce compliance with the Regulation (more than one answer is possible):
	The auction monitor?
	The auctioneer?
	A competent authority at EU level?
	A competent authority at national level?

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Other? Please specify: _____

Please provide evidence to support your case.

A:An auction monitor would help to assure harmonisation of the auctioning.

Question 68

Which of the three approaches for an overall EU auction model do you prefer? Please rate the options below (1 being the most preferable, 3 being the least preferable)

- <u>2</u> Limited number of coordinated auction processes.
- <u>1</u> Full centralisation based on a single EU-wide auction process.
- <u>3</u> The hybrid approach where different auction processes are cleared through a centralised system.

Please give arguments to support your case.

A:One single EU-wide auction process seems to be the best option in order to achieve harmonisation; in addition it causes the least administrative effort.

Question 69 If a limited number of coordinated auction processes develops, what should be the maximum number? 2 3 5 7 more than 7, please specify: 27 Please give arguments to support your case. A: Auction must be open to every member state.

Question 70

Is there a need for a transitional phase in order to develop gradually the optimal auction infrastructure? [Y/N] \underline{N}

If so, what kind of transitional arrangements would you recommend?

Question 71

Should the Regulation impose the following requirements for the auctioneer(s) and auction processes? [mark those that apply, \boxtimes]: *Technical capabilities of auctioneers:* \boxtimes capacity and experience to conduct auctions (or a specific part of the auction process) in an open, fair, transparent, cost-effective and non-discriminatory manner; \boxtimes appropriate investment in keeping the system up-to-date and in line with ongoing market and technological developments; and \boxtimes relevant professional licences, high ethical and quality control standards, compliance with financial and market integrity rules. Integrity: \boxtimes guarantee confidentiality of bids, ability to manage market sensitive information in an appropriate manner; \boxtimes duly protected electronic systems and appropriate security procedures with regards to identification and data transmission: \boxtimes appropriate rules on avoiding and monitoring conflicts of interest; and \boxtimes full cooperation with the auction monitor. Reliability: \boxtimes robust organisation and IT systems; \boxtimes adequate fallback measures in case of unexpected events: \boxtimes minimisation of the risk of cancelling an individual auction once announced; \boxtimes minimisation of the risk of failing functionalities (e.g. access to the bidding

Accessibility and user friendliness:

 \boxtimes

platform for certain potential bidders); and

fallback system in case of IT problems on the bidder side.

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) -Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions \boxtimes fair, concise, comprehensible and easily accessible information on how to participate in auctions; \boxtimes short and simple pre-registration forms; \boxtimes clear and simple electronic tools; \boxtimes (option of) accessibility of platforms through a dedicated internet interface; \boxtimes ability of the auction platform to connect to and communicate with proprietary trading systems used by bidders; \boxtimes adequate and regular training (including mock auctions); \boxtimes detailed user guidance on how to participate in the auction; and Xability to test identification and access to the auction. Please elaborate if any of these requirements need not be included. A: Please elaborate what additional requirements would be desirable. A: **Ouestion 72** What provisions on administrative fees should the Regulation include (more than one answer is possible)? \boxtimes General principles on proportionality, fairness and non-discrimination. Rules on fee structure.

 \boxtimes

 \boxtimes Rules on the amount of admissible fees.

Other? Please specify:

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A:Harmonisation.

Ouestion 73

Should there be provisions for public disclosure of material steps when introducing new (or adapted) auction processes?

A:

Should new (or adapted) auction process be notified to and authorised by the Commission before inclusion in the auction calendar?

A:	
Question 7	4
	of the following options is the most appropriate in case a Member State does ctions (on time)?
⊠ Auc	tions by an auctioneer authorised by the Commission.
	omatic addition of the delayed quantities to those foreseen for the next two or e auctions.
What other	option would you envisage? Please specify:
A:	
Question 7	5
its commitr	Inction apply to a Member State that does not auction allowances in line with ments? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$ form should that sanction take?
A:	
Question 7	6
As a general necessary?	al rule throughout the trading period, in your opinion, are early auctions $[Y/N]_{-}$
If so, what	should the profile of EUAA auctions be:
<u> </u>	0% in year n-2, 10-20% in year n-1, remainder in year n
10-2	20% in year n-2, 20-30% in year n-1, remainder in year n
20-3	30% in year n-2, 30-35% in year n-1, remainder in year n
Oth	er? Please specify:
Question 7	7
Do you thir If so, why?	nk there is a need to auction EUAA futures? [Y/N] _
A:	

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions

This page contains two questions that will not be made public. These questions cannot be completed on this document

Request for	
potentially	
confidential	
information	3

Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.

For aircraft operators covered by the EU ETS:

Have you determined a corporate hedging strategy for carbon needs? Yes [] No []

If so, what share of your expected emissions covered by the EU ETS in a given year n do you (intend to) hedge and how much in advance?

year n
 year n-1
 year n-2
 %

Request for potentially confidential information 4

Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.

What share of the annual quantity of allowances you intend to purchase *via* auctions would you wish to buy spot or futures respectively?

		SPOT	FUTURES
•	year n	:%	%
•	year n-1	:%	%
•	year n-2	:%	

Question 78
What should be the optimal frequency and size of EUAA auctions:
2 auctions per year of around 15 million EUAAs?
3 auctions per year of around 10 million EUAAs?
More than 3 auctions per year? Please specify:
Please comment on your choice.
A:
Question 79
What would be your preferred timing for EUAA auctions:
Equally spread throughout the year?
November – March?
Other? Please specify:
Question 80
Should any of the EUAA auction design elements be different compared to EUA auctions (see section 3)? [Y/N] _
If so, please specify and comment on your choice.
A:
Question 81 Do you agree there is no need for a maximum bid-size? [Y/N] _ If not, why not?
A:
Question 82
Is there any information regarding aircraft operators made available as part of the regulatory process to the competent authorities that could facilitate the KYC checks performed by the auctioneer(s)? $[Y/N]_{-}$

	please describe what information is concerned and whether it should be referred to e Regulation or any operational guidance published by the Commission.
A:	
Ques	stion 83
In yo auctio	our opinion, is there a specific need to allow for non-competitive bids in EUAA ons?
A:	
Woul	ld this be the case even when applying a uniform clearing price format?
A:	
Pleas	se provide arguments to support your case.
Ques	stion 84
	ou agree that there is no need for any specific provisions for EUAA auctions as rds [mark those that you agree with, \boxtimes]:
	Involvement of primary participants, exchanges or third party service providers?
	Guarantees and financial assurance?
	Payment and delivery?
	Information disclosure?
	Auction monitoring?
	Preventing anti-competitive behaviour and/or market manipulation?
	Enforcement?
If not	t, please describe in detail what rules would be needed and why.
A:	

A:

Taking into account the smaller volume of EUAA allowances to be auctioned compared to EUAs, which of the three approaches for an overall EUAA auctioning model do you prefer? Please rate the options below (1 being the most preferable, 3 being the least preferable)

_	Limited number of coordinated auction processes.
_	Full centralisation based on a single EU-wide auction process.
_	Hybrid approach where different auction processes are cleared through a centralised system.
Does yo	our choice differ from the approach preferred for EUAs? [Y/N] _
Please 1	provide arguments to support your case.
A:	
Questic	on 86
_	agree that there is no need for any specific provisions for EUAA auctions as . [mark those that you agree with, \boxtimes]:
	Requirements for the auctioneer(s) and auction processes?
	Administrative fees?
	Rules to ensure appropriate and timely preparation of the auctions?
If not, p	blease describe in detail what rules would be needed and why.