

# Impact of suboptimal design features in the EU ETS

- Allocation in the electricity market -


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[www.eaea.dk](http://www.eaea.dk)




# ETS: Impact on spot market dispatch



# ETS: Impact on investments

*Long-run marginal costs of electricity generation*



# Impacts of emissions trading on the electricity sector (optimal design)

- Spot market
  - Ensures efficient CO2 reduction
- Investments
  - Provides incentive to invest in low carbon technologies



# Project outline

- **Goal:** Assess **impact of free allocation to new entrants** in the EU ETS
- **Scope:** Investments in the North European Electricity Market in years 2006 – 2022
- **Methodology:** Use of Partial Equilibrium model
- **Output:** Investment impact, emissions, electricity prices, welfare economy
- **Funded by:** Danish Environmental Protection Agency

*NAPs for 2005-7*

# Allocation to new entrants


.... is an investment subsidy potentially affecting investors' decisions regarding:

- What technology to choose
- Where investments are situated
- When investments are made

Market distortion => Welfare economic losses

# What technology?


*Long-run marginal costs of electricity generation*




Modelling results

# Investments by fuel

Reference



New entrants




WIND NAT\_GAS COAL Already existing





# Where investments are made?




Coal CHP: Share of total capital cost covered by CO2-allocation


Modelling results

# Geographical distribution of investments (1)

Reference - 2022



New\_entrants - 2022




WIND NAT\_GAS COAL


Modelling results

# Geographical distribution of investments (2)

Reference - 2022



New\_entrants - 2022




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# When investments are made?

*Rule of thumb:*

*In an underinvested market the electricity price will increase until it reaches the LRMC of a new power plant*




# Allocation to new entrants distorts the market

- Spot market
  - Ensures efficient CO2 reduction
- Investments
  - What? Incentive towards coal/lignite
  - Where? Investment move to countries allocating generously
  - When? Investments are moved forward in time



Modelling results

# Welfare economic consequences




Mill. Euro

Modelling results

# CO2-price with fixed cap

no allocation to new entrants



# Conclusions on new entrant allocation

- Even more investments in coal power capacity
- Investments move to Germany
- Lower electricity prices
  - Consumers benefit in the short term
  - Existing electricity producers lose
- CO<sub>2</sub>- prices will increase to an extent where the subsidy-effect exceeds the total cost.
- Welfare-economic loss 25% of investment
- 2<sup>nd</sup> order effects not analysed, e.g. impacts on the carbon price