# EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions

This document is the questionnaire for this consultation. The survey contains 4 initial questions (A-D) to identify respondents, 86 questions for which responses will be made public and 4 questions that are classified confidential, must be sent directly to the European Commission and will not be made public. The questions that are classified potentially confidential are on two separate pages (2 questions on each page) and highlighted in green boxes.

#### **Period of consultation**

From 3 June 2009 to 3 August 2009 inclusive

#### How to submit your contribution

This consultation seeks to obtain feedback from all categories of stakeholders regarding the different aspects of auction design and implementation covered in the Consultation Paper.

We are sorry for the inconvenience, but the web-based survey is not available yet. If participants wish to complete the survey on this document and send their contributions back to **contact ets auctions consultation@icfi.com** their responses can be accepted in this format. The web-based survey will be available as soon as possible if participants wish to wait till that is available.

Received contributions will be published on the Internet. It is important to read the specific privacy statement attached to this consultation for information on how your personal data and contribution will be dealt with.

#### Specific privacy statement

"Received contributions, together with the identity of the contributor, will be published on the Internet, unless the contributor objects to publication of his or her personal data on the grounds that such publication would harm his or her legitimate interests. In such cases the contribution may be published in an anonymous form. Otherwise, the contribution will not be published nor will, in principle, its content be taken into account. Responses for questions deemed confidential in the consultation will not be available for view on the website irrespective of contributor objecting or not."

# Instructions to filling out the questionnaire

•	Questions may only be answered in designated response fields
•	For certain multiple choice questions, simply click on box to indicate choice
•	Answer [Y/N] questions by typing "y" / "Y" or "n" / "N" on underlined area ()
•	Some responses require explanations, additional comments and detailed answers. These will either by identified by underline ( ) or an answer section (A: ). The amount of text that can be entered here is unlimited.
•	After completing the survey, please save and send to contact_ets_auctions_consultation@icfi.com
•	If any questions seem unclear in context or for method of response, please mail <a href="mailto:contact_ets_auctions_consultation@icfi.com">contact_ets_auctions_consultation@icfi.com</a> to clarify

Thank you

#### **Section 1: Questions to categorize participants**

# **Question A** Name of Company/Organization: Ministry of the Environment Principal nature of activities: Number of employees in 2008: World-wide \_\_\_\_\_ Europe-wide \_\_\_\_\_ Turnover in 2008: World-wide \_\_\_\_\_ Europe-wide \_\_\_\_\_ **Question B** Type of respondent: $\boxtimes$ Member State Company operating one or more installations covered by the EU ETS Electricity generators Energy companies other than electricity generators Industrial sectors Aviation Other. Please specify: Approx Annual Emissions: \_\_\_\_\_tCO<sub>2</sub> Intermediary Financial institution Trading arm of non-financial institution Other. Please specify \_\_\_\_\_ Trader on own account Financial institution Trading arm of non-financial institution Other. Please specify

Contact details will not be made public.

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) -

### **Question D**

Questions relating to the "Specific privacy statement" above.

O Do you object to publication of your personal data because it would harm your legitimate interests? [Y/N] N

If so, please provide an explanation of the legitimate interests that you think will be harmed:

A:

o Are any of your responses confidential? [Y/N]  $\underline{N}$ 

If so, please indicate which ones and provide an explanation:

A:

#### Section 2: Survey questions (86) and potentially confidential questions (4)

#### **Question 1**

As a general rule throughout the trading period, in your opinion, are early auctions necessary? [Y/N] Y

If so, what should the profile of EUA auctions be?

5-10% in year n-2, 10-20% in year n-1, remainder in year n

10-20% in year n-2, 20-30% in year n-1, remainder in year n

20-30% in year n-2, 30-35% in year n-1, remainder in year n

Other? Please specify: \_\_\_\_\_

#### **Question 2**

Do you think there is a need to auction futures?  $[Y/N] \underline{N}$  If so, why?

A:

#### **Ouestion 3**

What share of allowances should be auctioned spot and what share should be auctioned as futures for each year?

			SPOT	I	FUTURES
•	year n	:	<u>100</u> %	1	<u>0</u> %
•	year n-1	:	<u>100</u> %		<u>0</u> %
•	year n-2	:	<u>100</u> %		<u>0</u> %

Please provide evidence to support your case.

A: Comments: The future contracts shall be traded on the secondary market which is capable to deal with all the risks and calculation complexity built-in this kind of financial instruments.

*NB*: The answer to this question will be published as part of the public consultation. Please do not submit confidential information as part of your answer to this question.

## **Question 4**

Should the common maturity date used in futures auctions be in December (so the maturity date would be December in year n, both when auctioning in year n-2 as when auctioning in year n-1)?  $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$ 

If not, please suggest alternative maturity dates and provide evidence to support your view.

A:

# This page contains two questions that will not be made public. These questions cannot be completed on this document

<b>Request for</b>
potentially
confidential
information 1

Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.

For ETS operators: what share of your expected emissions covered by the EU ETS in a given year n do you hedge and how much in advance?

•	year n	:	%
•	year n-1	:	%
•	year n-2	:	
•	earlier years (please specify)		0/0

# Request for potentially confidential information 2

Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.

What share of the annual quantity of allowances you intend to purchase *via* auctions would you wish to buy spot or futures respectively?

		SPOT		FUTURES	
•	year n	: <u></u>	%	_	%
•	year n-1	: <u></u>	%	_	%
•	year n-2	: <u></u>	%	T _	%

Please specify whether you are an:

- ETS operator; or
- Other participant.

Questi	ion 5
For spe	ot auctions:
What s	should be the <b>optimum</b> frequency of auctions?
	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?
$\boxtimes$	Monthly?
	Quarterly?
	Other? Please specify:
What s	should be the <b>minimum</b> frequency of auctions?
	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?
	Monthly?
$\boxtimes$	Quarterly?
	Other? Please specify:
What s	should be the <b>maximum</b> frequency of auctions?
	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?
	Monthly?
	Quarterly?
	Other? Please specify:
Please	provide arguments to support your case.
auction period approp	mments: With the assumed even spread of volume of allowances offered at as during a year, the monthly frequency of the auctions seems to be optimal - a of one month is short enough for an installation, which did not offer an oriate price at a given tender and did not manage to get allowances, to wait for r tender.
<b>Questi</b> For spe	ot auctions, what should be the:
•	Optimum auction size?
•	Minimum auction size?
•	Maximum auction size?

If deemed appropriate, please indicate a range and/or distribution over different sizes.

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A: Comments: We have not strong opinions on the issue in question.

Quest	ion 7
For fu	tures auctions:
What	should be the <b>optimum</b> frequency of auctions?
	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?
	Monthly?
	Quarterly?
	Other? Please specify:
What :	should be the <b>minimum</b> frequency of auctions?
	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?
	Monthly?
	Quarterly?
	Other? Please specify:
What	should be the <b>maximum</b> frequency of auctions?
	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?
	Monthly?
	Quarterly?
	Other? Please specify:
Please	provide arguments to support your case.

A: Comments: We would like to stress one more time that we against futures' trading in auction but if this choice is made we believe that all the issues connected with futures' auctions should be regular copies of solutions proposed in the case of spots.

#### **Question 8**

For futures auctions, what should be the:

Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions Optimum auction size? Minimum auction size? Maximum auction size? If deemed appropriate, please indicate a range and/or distribution over different sizes. Please provide evidence to support your case. A: Comments: See question 5 & 7 **Question 9** Should volumes of spot allowances be auctioned evenly throughout the year? [Y/N] Y If not, how should volumes be distributed? (more than one answer possible) Please specify: A larger proportion in the first 4 months of the year? A larger proportion in December? A smaller proportion in July and August? Other? Please specify: Comments: Volumes of spot allowances be auctioned evenly throughout the year although we discuss currently the possibility of some season-based distribution over the year. **Ouestion 10** In case futures are auctioned, should the volumes for spot and futures auctions be spread over the year in the same manner? [Y/N] YIf not, how should they differ? (more than one answer possible) No futures auctions less than six months before the maturity date. A larger proportion in December. A smaller proportion in July and August. Otherwise? Please specify how and comment: Comments: See question 5 & 7

#### **Question 11**

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Does the Regulation need to have provisions to avoid holding auctions during a short period of time before the surrendering date (30 April each year)? [Y/N] N

If yes, how lon	g should this perio	d be:		
One week	2 weeks	3 weeks	1 month	
	are auctioned, sho		ar provisions with respect to the	e period
If yes, how lon	g should this perio	d be:		
One week	2 weeks	3 weeks	1 month	
Question 12				
Which dates sh	ould be avoided?	more than one ar	iswer possible)	
Public l	nolidays common	in most Member S	States?	
Days w	here important rele	evant economic d	ata is released?	
Days w	here emissions dat	a are released?		
Other?	Please specify:			
	articipate in an auc		throughout the EU will have a tenders should be working days	s in all
	the dates you have	in mind in your a	answers.	
Question 13				
Is a harmonised	d 10-12 hrs CET a	uction slot desiral	ole? [Y/N] <u>Y</u>	
If not, what alto	ernative(s) would	you suggest?		
A:				
Question 14				
How long in ac	lvance should each	element of the c	alendar be determined?	
Annual volume	es to be auctioned:			
1 year i	n advance			
2 years	in advance			
	in advance			

	sions Trading Scheme (ETS) – tion on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions
	more years in advance
Distrib	oution of annual volumes over spot and futures (if applicable):
	1 year in advance
	2 years in advance
	3 years in advance
	more years in advance
Dates o	of individual auctions:
$\boxtimes$	1 year in advance
	2 years in advance
	3 years in advance
	more years in advance
Volum	e and product type for individual auctions:
	1 year in advance
	2 years in advance
	3 years in advance
	more years in advance
Each a	uctioneer carrying out auction process (if more than one):
	1 year in advance
	2 years in advance
	3 years in advance
	more years in advance
Please	provide arguments to support your case.
possibl	mments: Time perspective longer than one year seems to be too long to make it le for auction organisers to precisely establish the amount of allowances at uent auctions (excluding determined annual volumes to be auctioned)
Questi	
wnat s	should be the volume of allowances to be auctioned in 2011 and 2012?
•	in 2011:% of the 2013 volume and% of the 2014 volume
•	in 2012:% of the 2013 volume and% of the 2014 volume

What percentage of these shares should be auctioned as futures?

in 2011: \_\_\_\_\_\_% of the 2013 share and \_\_\_\_\_\_% of the 2014 share in 2012: % of the 2013 share and % of the 2014 share Please provide evidence to support your case. A: Comments: See question 1 **Question 16** What should be the rule with respect to allowances not auctioned due to *force majeure*?  $\boxtimes$ They should automatically be added to the next auction on the calendar, irrespective of the auction process. They should be auctioned within one month, though leaving flexibility as to which auction(s) the EUAs should be added. They should be auctioned within three months, though leaving flexibility as to which auction(s) the EUAs should be added. Other? Please specify: **Question 17** Is 1,000 allowances the most appropriate lot size? [Y/N] Y If not, why not? A: Comments: As a general rule we support above mentioned limit as a common market standard but we would like to stress here that smaller entities may have problems with fulfilling it in a single auction bid. We would like regulation to guarantee the possibility for smaller emitters to place the smaller lots (100 Mg for instance).

#### **Question 18**

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Is a single-round sealed-bid auction the most appropriate auction format for auctioning EU allowances?  $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$ 

If not, please comment on your alternative proposal?

A: Comments: This type of a tender is standard at auction emission of treasuries and there is no need to propose a new tender format, significantly different than the applied and widely proven solutions, to entities engaged in the emission trading system.

Question 19
What is the most appropriate pricing rule for the auctioning of EU allowances?
□ Uniform-pricing.
Discriminatory-pricing.
Indifferent.
Please provide arguments to support your case.
A: Comments: The suggested auction format is less costly at the stage of preparing an offer, does not require the participants to have specialist knowledge on the functioning of financial markets.
Question 20 Should the rules for solving ties in the Regulation be:
random selection; or
pro-rata re-scaling of bids?
Please comment on your choice.
A: Comments: Proportional reduction of offers submitted at a minimum price is a fairer solution. A tender participant fulfils at least part of the reported demand and has a chance to buy the rest of allowances on the secondary market.
Question 21
Should a reserve price apply?
A: Yes


In case a reservent kept secret? [Y	-	apply, should the methodology/formula for calculating it be
Please comme	nt on your choi	ce.
A:		
<b>Question 23</b>		
Is a maximum	bid-size per sii	ngle entity desirable in a Uniform-price auction?
[Y/N] <u>Y</u>		
Is a maximum [Y/N] <u>Y</u>	bid-size per sir	ngle entity desirable in a discriminatory-price auction?
Please comme	nt on your choi	ce.
it more difficu	lt for larger pla	e maximum value of a single offer with one price will make yers to monopolise auctions by buying out most or even all urpose of selling them at inflated prices on the secondary
<b>Question 24</b> If so, what is t	he desirable bio	d-size limit (as a percentage of the volume of allowances
auctioned per	auction – only	one choice is possible):
10%: 🔀	15%: 🗌	20%:
25%:	30%: 🗌	More than 30%: Please specify:
Please comme	nt on your choi	ce.
strengthen con	npetition betwe	to "fragment" offers (each must have a different price) will en the participants of an auction and it may even influence ender's organiser.
Question 25		
-		illowing options would be chosen, to limit the risk of market nich one would be preferable?
A discr	riminatory-price	e auction format?
A max	imum bid-size j	per single entity?
Please comme	nt on your choi	ce.

A: Comments: The necessity to "fragment" offers (each must have a different price) will strengthen competition between the participants of an auction and it may even influence the increase in revenues of a tender's organiser.

#### **Question 26**

Are the following pre-registration requirements appropriate and adequate?

Identity:



- Name, address, whether publicly listed, whether licensed and supervised under the AML rules; membership of a professional association; membership of a chamber of commerce; VAT and/or tax number;
- Contact details of authorised representatives and proof of authorisation; and
- ☐ CITL-Registry account details.
- Anything else? Please specify: e-mail adress

Decla	rations with respect to the past 5 years on absence of:
	Indictment or conviction of serious crimes: check corporate officers, directors, principals, members or partners;
	Infringement of the rules of any regulated or unregulated market;
$\boxtimes$	Permits to conduct business being revoked or suspended;
	Infringement of procurement rules; and
	Infringement of disclosure of confidential information.
	Anything else? Please specify:
Decla	rations and submission of documentation relating to:
	Proof of identity;
$\boxtimes$	Type of business;
$\boxtimes$	Participation in EU ETS or not;
$\boxtimes$	EU ETS registered installations, if any;
	Bank account contact details;
$\boxtimes$	Intended auctioning activity;
$\boxtimes$	Whether bidding on own account or on behalf of another beneficial owner;
$\boxtimes$	Corporate and business affiliations;
$\boxtimes$	Creditworthiness;
	Collateral; and
	Whether it carries out transactions subject to VAT or transactions exempted from VAT.
	Anything else? Please specify:
	nents: Operators which have account in the registry - no need any other ement. Other - only in case when the additional information are necessary.
Quest	ion 27
-	ou agree that the pre-registration requirements for admittance to EU auctions should rmonised throughout the EU?
Yes 🛭	No □
Please	e comment on your choice.
	mments: All elements of a tender procedure throughout the Community should be ardised as much as possible - participants should be qualified according to the same

procedure everywhere. Different types of documents which identify a business

entity/persons in various countries should be taken into account.

Should the amount of information to be supplied in order to satisfy the pre-registration requirements for admittance to EU auctions depend on the:
means of establishing the trading relationship;
identity of bidder;
whether auctioning spot or futures;
size of bid;
means of payment and delivery;
anything else? Please specify:
If so, what should the differences be?
A: Comments: See question 27
Question 29
Should the bidder pre-registration requirements under the Regulation apply in the same manner irrespective of whether or not the auctioneer is covered by the MiFID or AML rules? [Y/N] $\underline{N}$
A:

Please provide arguments to support your case.

# **Question 30**

If not, why not?

A: Comments: See question 27

Do you agree that the auctioneer(s) should be allowed to rely on pre-registration checks
carried out by reliable third parties including: [Y/N] _
Other? Please specify:
Please comment on your choice.
A: Comments: See question 27
Question 31
In order to facilitate bidder pre-registration in their home country, should the auctioneer(s) be allowed to provide for pre-registration by potential bidders in other (or all) Member States than the auctioneer's home country e.g. by outsourcing this to a reliable third party?
Yes No No
Please comment on your choice:
A:
If so, should such entities be:
Covered by the AML rules?
Covered by MiFID?
Covered by both?
Other? Please specify:
Please comment on your choice:
A: Comments: See question 27

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Should the Regulation prohibit the multiplicity of pre-registration checks in the case of Member States auctioning jointly?
Yes No No
Please comment on your choice.
A: Comments: See question 27
Question 33
Do you agree that the <i>level</i> of collateral accepted in EUA auctions should be harmonised for all EU ETS auctions? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$
If so, how should they be harmonised?
A:
If not, why not?
A:
Question 34
Do you agree that the <i>type</i> of collateral accepted in EUA auctions should be harmonised for all EU ETS auctions? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$
If so, how should they be harmonised?
A:
If not, why not?
A:

#### **Question 35**

Do you agree that 100% collateral in electronic money transfer ought to be deposited upfront at a central counterparty or credit institution designated by the auctioneer to access spot auctions? [Y/N] N

If not, why not?

A: Comments: Necessary payment of 100% cash coverage before an auction may be a problem for some participants. We think that relations among the participants of an auction should be based on mutual trust confirmed by in-depth analysis of a participant's reliability on the basis of documents listed in p. 26. We think that the regulation should contain a severe sanction, e.g. one-year suspension from participating in tenders if a given entity (in spite of, for example, the fact that an auction's organiser has cautioned

this participant twice) did not make a payment for allowances for which it had submitted an offer. Excluding an entity from the group of auction participants will force it to purchase on the secondary market or at other auctions (access to them may be also made more difficult - as the result of publishing information about the suspension in a given system, other auction organisers may also be reluctant to enter into business relations with a participant which reputation has been damaged). Moreover, necessary management of paid in securities (releasing, completing them) is a process which increases the operating costs of an auction organiser.

What alternative(s) would you suggest? Please provide arguments to support your case: A:

#### **Question 36**

	e futures are auctioned, should a clearing house be involved to mitigate credit and t risks? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$
If so, s – appl	should specific rules – other than those currently used in exchange clearing houses y to:
	the level of the initial margin;
	the level of variation margin calls;

If you have answered yes, please justify and elaborate on the rules that should apply and the mechanisms to implement them:

the daily frequency of variation margin call payments?

A: Comments: The same mechanisms and standards already functioning on the markets of futures contracts in particular countries should be applied here - STANDARDIZATION.

#### **Question 37**

What are the most preferable payment and delivery procedures that should be implemented for auctioning EUAs?

Payment before delivery.

Delivery versus payment.

Please comment on your choice.

Both.

A: Comments: The chosen settlement method is commonly applied in case of auction sales of treasury bonds - STANDARDIZATION.

#### **Question 38**

time fo	r payment and delivery to take place? [Y/N] Y
If yes;	what should it be?
	4 working days
	5 working days
	6 working days
$\boxtimes$	7 working days
Other?	Please specify:

Irrespective of the payment procedure, should the Regulation fix a maximum delay of

#### **Question 39**

Should the Regulation provide any specific provisions for the handling of payment and delivery incidents or failures?  $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$ 

If yes, what should they be?

A: Comments: Specification of cases where the lack of payment by a participant is justified, together with the remedial procedure and detailed description of applying sanctions mentioned in p. 35. Prohibition of participating in auctions for a certain time period, entering onto a black list.

#### **Ouestion 40**

Should the Regulation provide for all matters that are central to the very creation, existence and termination or frustration of the transaction arising from the EUA auctions?  $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$ 

If not, why not?

A:

If so, are the matters enumerated below complete?  $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$ 

- The designation of the parties' to the trade.
- The characteristics of the auctioned product:
  - o Nature: EUAs or EUAAs, trading period concerned.
  - o <u>Date of delivery: date at which winning bidders will receive the allowances on their registry account.</u>
  - o <u>Date of payment: date at which payment will be required from winning bidders.</u>
  - o Lot size: number of allowances associated with one unit of the auctioned good.

- Events of 'force majeure' and resulting consequences.
- Events of default by the auctioneer and/or the bidder and their consequences.
- Applicable remedies or penalties.
- The regime governing the judicial review of claims across the EU.

If not, what additional matters should be foreseen in the Regulation and why?

$\sim$	estion	4 1
	IDCTION	4
<b>\</b> /		

Please comment on your choice.

Quesi	non 41
	d the Regulation provide for rules on jurisdiction and the mutual recognition and cement of judgments? [Y/N] $\underline{Y}$
If so,	should these be:
	specific to the Regulation;
	by reference to the Brussels I Regulation;
	by citing exceptions from the Brussels I Regulation;
	by citing additions to the Brussels I Regulation?
Please	e comment on your choice:
A:	
If not,	why not?
A:	
Quest	tion 42
Which	h auction model is preferable?
	Direct bidding?
	Indirect bidding?
$\boxtimes$	Both?

A: Comments: This solution is the best way from the point of view of an auction's organiser who may cooperate with a few/several entities and with numbers of representatives of small installations directly submitting offers which give the chance to participate in the auction.

Quest	ion 43
	ndirect model is used, what share of the total volume of EU allowances could be ned through indirect bidding?
Please	provide arguments to support your case.
A:	
Quest	ion 44
-	primary participants model is used, what provisions would be desirable for thing disadvantages of restricting direct access (more than one answer is possible):
	Allow direct access to largest emitters, even if they trade only on their own account?
	If so, who should have direct access and what thresholds should apply?
	Disallow primary participants trading on their own account?
	Impose strict separation of own-account trading from trading on behalf of indirect bidders?
	Other? Please specify:
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

	primary participants' model is used, what conflict of interest requirements should posed? (more than one answer possible)
	Separation of client registration and trading on behalf of clients from all own account trading activities.
	Separation of collateral management, payment and delivery on behalf of clients from all own account trading activities.
	Separation of anything else, please specify:
Quest	cion 46
What	obligations should apply to primary participants acting in EU-wide auctions as:
•	Intermediaries? A:
•	Market makers? A:
Comn	nents: We currently do not have a strong opinion on the issue in question
Please	e provide arguments to support your case.
-	tion 47
	what conditions should auctioning through exchanges be allowed (more than one possible):
	Only for futures auctions open to established members of the exchange?
	Also for spot auctions open to established members of the exchange?
	Only when the exchange-based auction is open to non-established members on a non-discriminatory cost-effective basis?
	Other? Please specify:
Please	e provide arguments to support your case.
	mments: Selection of an auction platform should not impose any limitation at access.

<b>Question 48</b>	
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Should direct auctions b	be allowed through:
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- 1) Third party service providers?  $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$
- 2) Public authorities? [Y/N] Y

Please comment on your selection:

A:

#### **Question 49**

Do the general rules for auctioning EUAs suffice for ensuring full, fair and equitable access to allowances to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters?  $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$ 

If not, why not?

A:

#### **Question 50**

Is allowing non-competitive bids necessary for ensuring access to allowances to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters in case of:

- discriminatory-price auctions? A: YES
- uniform-price auctions? A: YES
- Comments: See question 19

#### **Question 51**

If non-competitive bids are provided for in spot auctions, what maximum share of allowances could be allocated through this route?

	5%
$\boxtimes$	10%
	Other? Please specify:

Please comment on your choice.

A: Comments: Non-competitive offers should be dedicated to smaller installations without specialised personnel familiar with the complexities of the operation of financial

markets. Therefore, the share of non-competitive offers should match the share of small installations in the entire allowance demand at least.

Question 52
What rule should apply for accessing non-competitive bids (more than one answer possible):
Participants should only be allowed to use one of the two bidding routes?
Non-competitive bids should be restricted to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters only?
Other? Please specify:
Please comment on your choice.
A: Comments: See question 51
Question 53
What should be the maximum bid-size allowed for SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters submitting non-competitive bids?
5 000 EUAs
☐ 10 000 EUAs
25 000 EUAs
Over 25 000 EUAs, please specify exact size and give reasons for your answer:
Comments: We currently do not have a strong opinion on the issue in question

#### **Question 54**

Are there any other specific measures not mentioned in this consultation that may be necessary for ensuring full, fair and equitable access to allowances for SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters? [Y/N] N

If so, please specify:

A: Comments: See question 17

Ques	tion 55						
	t should be e to auction	-	eriod of time before the auction date for the release of the				
2 wee	2 weeks ☐ 1 month ☐ 2 months ⊠						
Othe	Other Please specify:						
Pleas	e commen	t on your propos	sal.				
A:							
Ques	tion 56						
	t should be intention	-	eriod of time before the auction date for the submission				
1 wee	ek 🗌	2 weeks	1 month 🖂				
Othe	r 🗌 Please	e specify:					
Pleas	e commen	t on your propos	sal.				
A:							
Ques	tion 57						
Are t	here any sp	pecific provision	ns that need to be highlighted in:				
	The noti	ce to auction?					
	The inte	ntion to bid?					
	Both?						
Pleas	e specify v	what they are.					
			and settlement, date of submitting offers, value of of a tender, organiser's address.				
Ques	tion 58						
What	tinformation	on should be dis	closed after the auction:				
	Clearing price (if allowances are awarded on a uniform-price basis or in the case of non-competitive bids being allowed)?						
	Average	price (if allowa	inces are awarded on a discriminatory-price basis)?				

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) -Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions  $\boxtimes$ Any relevant information to solve tied bids?  $\boxtimes$ Total volume of EUAs auctioned?  $\boxtimes$ Total volume of bids submitted distinguishing between competitive and noncompetitive bids (if applicable)?  $\boxtimes$ Total volume of allowances allocated? Anything else? Please specify: Comments: In case of a competitive tender, it is necessary to publish the MINIMUM price. **Question 59** What should be the maximum delay for the announcement of auction results? 5 minutes 15 minutes 30 minutes  $\boxtimes$ 1 hour Other Please specify: Please comment on your proposal. A: Comments: For most issuers of treasuries, 30 minutes is enough to publish auction results - the same should apply in case of EUA tenders. **Question 60** Do you feel that any specific additional provisions should be adopted in the Regulation for the granting of fair and equal access to auction information? [Y/N] N If so, what may they be? **Question 61** Should an auction monitor be appointed centrally to monitor all EU auctions?  $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$ If not, why not? A:

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions

Do you agree that the Regulation should contain general principles on [mark those that you agree with, $\boxtimes$ ]:
the designation and mandate of the auction monitor; and
cooperation between the auctioneer(s) and the auction monitor?
If not, why not?
A:
Should these be supplemented by operational guidance, possibly through Commission guidelines? $[Y/N]_{-}$
If not, why not?
A:
Question 63
Is there a need for harmonised market abuse provisions in the Regulation to prevent insider dealing and market manipulation? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$
If not, why not?
A:
Please comment on your choice outlining the provisions you deem necessary and stating the reasons why.
A:
Question 64
Should the Regulation provide for harmonised enforcement measures to sanction [mark those that you agree with, $\boxtimes$ ]:
Non-compliance with its provisions?
Market abuse?
Please provide arguments to support your case.
A:

Shou	ld the enforcement measures include [mark those that you agree with, ⊠]:			
	The suspension of the auctioneer(s) and/or bidders from the EU-wide auctions? If so, for how long should such suspension last? <u>3-6 months</u>			
	Financial penalties? If so, at what level should such penalties be fixed? <u>Comments: Specified percent of an entity's yearly turnover.</u>			
	The power to address binding interim decisions to the auctioneer(s) and/or bidders to avert any urgent, imminent threat of breach of the Regulation with likely irreversible adverse consequences?			
	Anything else? Please specify:			
Pleas	e provide arguments to support your case.			
A:				
Ques	ction 66			
Shou	ld such enforcement measures apply at:			
	EU level?			
	National level?			
$\boxtimes$	Both?			
Pleas	e comment on your choice.			
A:				
0				
_	etion 67			
Who	should enforce compliance with the Regulation (more than one answer is possible):			
	The auction monitor?			
	The auctioneer?			
	A competent authority at EU level?			
	A competent authority at national level?			
	Other? Please specify:			
Pleas	e provide evidence to support your case.			
A:				

Which of the three approaches for an overall EU auction model do you prefer? Please rate the options below (1 being the most preferable, 3 being the least preferable)

- <u>1</u> Limited number of coordinated auction processes.
- <u>3</u> Full centralisation based on a single EU-wide auction process.
- 2 The hybrid approach where different auction processes are cleared through a centralised system.

Please give arguments to support your case.

A: Comments: Establishment of several auction systems which are independently managed by larger issuers (DE, PL, UK, SP) and by groups of smaller ones seems to be the most rational - such approach should cause allowance amounts emitted at particular auctions not to be excessively fragmented and to be significant enough to make it difficult to manipulate their prices. Furthermore, the existence of several auction centres will positively influence the operation of market mechanisms, facilitating development of prices by supply and demand.

#### **Question 69**

If a limited number of coordinated auction processes develops, what should be the maximum number?
$\square$ 2
<u> </u>
<u> </u>
$\boxtimes$ 7
more than 7, please specify:
Please give arguments to support your case.

A: Comments: Establishment of several auction systems which are independently managed by larger issuers (DE, PL, UK, SP) and by groups of smaller ones seems to be the most rational - such approach should cause allowance amounts emitted at particular auctions not to be excessively fragmented and to be significant enough to make it difficult to manipulate their prices. Furthermore, the existence of several auction centres will positively influence the operation of market mechanisms, facilitating development of prices by supply and demand.

#### **Ouestion 70**

Is there a need for a transitional phase in order to develop gradually the optimal auction infrastructure?  $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$ 

If so, what kind of transitional arrangements would you recommend?

#### Comments: Cooperation in groups of experts, exchanging experiences

#### **Question 71** Should the Regulation impose the following requirements for the auctioneer(s) and auction processes? [mark those that apply, $\boxtimes$ ]: Technical capabilities of auctioneers: $\boxtimes$ capacity and experience to conduct auctions (or a specific part of the auction process) in an open, fair, transparent, cost-effective and non-discriminatory manner; $\boxtimes$ appropriate investment in keeping the system up-to-date and in line with ongoing market and technological developments; and $\boxtimes$ relevant professional licences, high ethical and quality control standards, compliance with financial and market integrity rules. Integrity: $\boxtimes$ guarantee confidentiality of bids, ability to manage market sensitive information in an appropriate manner; $\bowtie$ duly protected electronic systems and appropriate security procedures with regards to identification and data transmission; $\boxtimes$ appropriate rules on avoiding and monitoring conflicts of interest; and $\boxtimes$ full cooperation with the auction monitor. Reliability: $\boxtimes$ robust organisation and IT systems; $\boxtimes$ adequate fallback measures in case of unexpected events;

- $\boxtimes$ minimisation of the risk of cancelling an individual auction once announced;
- $\boxtimes$ minimisation of the risk of failing functionalities (e.g. access to the bidding platform for certain potential bidders); and
- $\boxtimes$ fallback system in case of IT problems on the bidder side.

Accessibility and user friendliness:

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) -Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions  $\boxtimes$ fair, concise, comprehensible and easily accessible information on how to participate in auctions;  $\boxtimes$ short and simple pre-registration forms;  $\boxtimes$ clear and simple electronic tools;  $\boxtimes$ (option of) accessibility of platforms through a dedicated internet interface;  $\boxtimes$ ability of the auction platform to connect to and communicate with proprietary trading systems used by bidders;  $\boxtimes$ adequate and regular training (including mock auctions);  $\boxtimes$ detailed user guidance on how to participate in the auction; and Xability to test identification and access to the auction. Please elaborate if any of these requirements need not be included. A: Please elaborate what additional requirements would be desirable. A: **Ouestion 72** What provisions on administrative fees should the Regulation include (more than one answer is possible)?

$\boxtimes$	General principles	on proportionality,	fairness and	non-discrimination.
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 $\boxtimes$ Rules on fee structure.

 $\boxtimes$ Rules on the amount of admissible fees.

Other? Please specify:

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A:

#### **Ouestion 73**

Should there be provisions for public disclosure of material steps when introducing new (or adapted) auction processes?

A: YES

Should new (or adapted) auction process be notified to and authorised by the Commission before inclusion in the auction calendar?

## A: YES

Question 74				
Which one of the following options is the most appropriate in case a Member State does not hold auctions (on time)?				
Auctions by an auctioneer authorised by the Commission.				
Automatic addition of the delayed quantities to those foreseen for the next two or three auctions.				
What other option would you envisage? Please specify:				
A: Comments: Repeating of an auction on the next working day				
Question 75				
Should a sanction apply to a Member State that does not auction allowances in line with its commitments? [Y/N] $\underline{N}$ If so, what form should that sanction take?				
A:				
Overtion 76				
Question 76				
As a general rule throughout the trading period, in your opinion, are early auctions necessary? [Y/N] _				
If so, what should the profile of EUAA auctions be:				
5-10% in year n-2, 10-20% in year n-1, remainder in year n				
10-20% in year n-2, 20-30% in year n-1, remainder in year n				
20-30% in year n-2, 30-35% in year n-1, remainder in year n				
Other? Please specify:				
Question 77				
Do you think there is a need to auction EUAA futures? [Y/N] $\underline{N}$ If so, why?				

A:Comments: See question 2

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions

# This page contains two questions that will not be made public. These questions cannot be completed on this document

<b>Request for</b>
potentially
confidential
information 3

Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.

For aircraft operators covered by the EU ETS:

Have you determined a corporate hedging strategy for carbon needs? Yes [ ] No [ ]

If so, what share of your expected emissions covered by the EU ETS in a given year n do you (intend to) hedge and how much in advance?

year n
year n-1
year n-2
%

# Request for potentially confidential information 4

Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.

What share of the annual quantity of allowances you intend to purchase *via* auctions would you wish to buy spot or futures respectively?

			SPOT		FUTURES
•	year n	:	%	-	
•	year n-1	:	%		
•	year n-2	:			

Questi	ion 78			
What s	should be the optimal frequency and size of EUAA auctions:			
	2 auctions per year of around 15 million EUAAs?			
	3 auctions per year of around 10 million EUAAs?			
	More than 3 auctions per year? Please specify:			
Please	comment on your choice.			
A:				
Questi	ion 79			
What v	would be your preferred timing for EUAA auctions:			
$\boxtimes$	Equally spread throughout the year?			
	November – March?			
	Other? Please specify:			
Questi	ion 80			
	If any of the EUAA auction design elements be different compared to EUA as (see section 3)? $[Y/N] N$			
If so, p	please specify and comment on your choice.			
A:				
-	tion 81 agree there is no need for a maximum bid-size? [Y/N] Y why not?			
A: See	answer to point 23			
Questi	ion 82			
regulat	e any information regarding aircraft operators made available as part of the tory process to the competent authorities that could facilitate the KYC checks med by the auctioneer(s)? $[Y/N]_{-}$			

If so, please describe what information is concerned and whether it should be referred to in the Regulation or any operational guidance published by the Commission.

A: Comments: We currently do not have a strong opinion on the issue in question.

O	uestion	83
v	ucsuon	$\mathbf{o}_{\mathcal{I}}$

In your opinion,	is there a specific	need to allow	for non-compe	etitive bids in	EUAA
auctions?					
A:					

Would this be the case even when applying a uniform clearing price format?

A: YES (See question 51)

Please provide arguments to support your case.

#### **Question 84**

2	a agree that there is no need for any specific provisions for EUAA auctions as $[mark those that you agree with, \square]:$
	Involvement of primary participants, exchanges or third party service providers?
	Guarantees and financial assurance?
	Payment and delivery?
	Information disclosure?
	Auction monitoring?
	Preventing anti-competitive behaviour and/or market manipulation?
	Enforcement?

If not, please describe in detail what rules would be needed and why.

A: Comments: EUAA auction system should be as similar as possible to EUA tenders, so the above requirements should also be met.

#### **Question 85**

Taking into account the smaller volume of EUAA allowances to be auctioned compared to EUAs, which of the three approaches for an overall EUAA auctioning model do you prefer? Please rate the options below (1 being the most preferable, 3 being the least preferable)

- <u>1</u> Limited number of coordinated auction processes.
- <u>3</u> Full centralisation based on a single EU-wide auction process.
- 2 Hybrid approach where different auction processes are cleared through a centralised system.

Does your choice differ from the approach preferred for EUAs? [Y/N] \_

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A: See question 68

#### **Question 86**

-	agree that there is no need for any specific provisions for EUAA auctions as
regards	. [mark those that you agree with, $\square$ ]:
	Requirements for the auctioneer(s) and auction processes?
	Administrative fees?
	Rules to ensure appropriate and timely preparation of the auctions?
If not, r	blease describe in detail what rules would be needed and why.

A: Comments: EUAA auction system should be as similar as possible to EUA tenders, so the above requirements should also be met.