

In-between the Global Deal and Exclusive Clubs of the willing:

Climate partnership groups

Global Goal – Each group's common strategy – Each state's own development strategy

Need for **all States** to participate in and take legally binding obligations according to the principle of common but shared responsibility

-> focus on **state's self-interest** in pursuing a climate-friendly development, focussing as well on multiple **spill-over effects**, taking into account **different** economic/financial resources, technologies and different (historic) responsibilities

-> **Global Framework/narrative (2°-goal) but regional self-determined measures and means for mitigation and adaptation**

The idea:

(The idea refers to former models of „bubble-abatement“ and bilateral so-called „development-partnerships“, however it should avoid any perception of paternalism or „north-south“ narrative)

- **A global legally binding deal** sets the framework, the overall legally binding goal (2°) and obliges **all states** to contribute concretely to the goal in **smaller groups**. (The constitution of these groups has to be specified, see below for a purpose)
- **These groups have the obligation under international law to reduce their common GHG emissions** by a certain amount (amount equal for all groups?)
- **These groups consist of different heterogenous states** in order to ensure a cost-efficient abatement, technology transfer, financial capacities etc.
- **Each of these groups negotiates internally the way how to reach the group's common abatement goal** (burden sharing, instruments, financing etc.) and notifies the results the UNFCCC climate secretary the common **strategy** (steps with concrete deadlines) how to meet the group's obligation until 2020, 2050 and 2080
- Besides the overall common group's strategy, **the group identifies for each member state an individual „sustainable development roadmap“** with concrete steps and goals until 2020, 2050 and 2080, including rights and obligations towards the other members of the group.
- **The groups might be constituted as follows:**
A group consists of 7 states with one state of type A (see below), one of type B, two of type C and three states of type D. The EU will be handled as one state.
Type A: high GDP, high GHG emissions
Type B: high GDP, low GHG emissions
Type C: low GDP, high GHG emissions
Type D: low GDP, low GHG emissions
It may be advantageous to enable groups of states **which already have official partnerships**, e.g. in the field of so-called „development aid“, however the definite group's constitution needs to be discussed and worked out with due diligence.

Advantages of this approach: Legal obligations and maximum freedom

- 1. Concrete obligations for each state within a small group**, where the acteurs coordinate their actions with a few but steady partners.
- 2. Global coordination** will be reached by rapports to the UNFCCC and regular review conferences (maybe yearly rapports and conference each second year)
- 3. Pursuing of a comprehensive economic, social, environmental development concept for each state** within the group and within the international framework (no more globally and nation-wide uncoordinated punctual measures). This is not only beneficial for each state, but provides planning security especially for investors in green technology etc.
- 4. Constant, comprehensive cooperation in diverse fields between the group's member states.** This creates mutual trust and liabilities, which is a pre-condition for a successful sustainable development of each state.
- 5. Incentives for free-riding are reduced:** first, each state has to join a group and second, a small group might exert higher pressure on a non-cooperating state. Further, it is in many state's self-interest to pursue a sustainable development concept which would be easier and more effective to achieve in cooperation within a certain states' group. The individual development strategy allows for recognizing each state's special needs and wishes which further makes cooperation attractive. Finally, states from type A and B should profit from more cost-efficient abatement measures, whereas states from type C and D would profit from financial support and technology transfer.
- 6. The Carbon Leakage problem should be minimized** because even though each group pursues its own strategy, there will be no more „pollution heavens“ as each state/group will have to achieve the internationally legally binding group's GHG reduction goal, so each group will have to somehow adress the problem of polluting companies

Open Questions:

- How to best design the groups (type of states, size etc)
- How to really ensure that all group members meet their obligations (how likely is the danger that if one member tries free-riding, the whole group is likely to stop every action which might bring to death the whole system; how could this be avoided?)
- How often should the states write their report? How often should they meet at global level?
- Should there be a common strategy/framework principles that all groups should rely on or would it be better to leave each group the maximum freedom?
- Is there still a need for sectoral approaches and if yes, how could they be triggered (attractive incentives) and coordinated within this new architecture?