EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions

This document contains the responses for the survey. The survey contains 4 initial questions (A-D) to identify respondents and 86 questions for which responses will be made public. Contact details provided in Question C, are not made public and therefore are not in this document.

Period of consultation

From 3 June 2009 to 3 August 2009 inclusive

Specific privacy statement

"Received contributions, together with the identity of the contributor, will be published on the Internet, unless the contributor objects to publication of his or her personal data on the grounds that such publication would harm his or her legitimate interests. In such cases the contribution may be published in an anonymous form. Otherwise, the contribution will not be published nor will, in principle, its content be taken into account. Responses for questions deemed confidential in the consultation will not be available for view on the website irrespective of contributor objecting or not."

Thank you

Note: Zero's on the right hand side of page reflect Non-Applicable questions in the survey response.

Section 1: Questions to categorize participants

Question A

Name of Company/Organization: ROMAVIA

Principal nature of activities: -STATE/GOVERNMENTAL FLIGHTS

-REGULAR/HOLIDAY CHARTER FLIGHTS

-ACMI FLIGHTS

Number of employees in 2008:

World-wide:

Europe-wide: 250

Turnover in 2008:

World-wide: Europe-wide:

Question B

Type of respondent:

Company operating one or more installations covered by the EU ETS Aviation

Approx Annual Emissions: 15000 tCO2

Question C

Contact details will not be made public.

Question D

Do you object to publication of your personal data because it would harm your legitimate interests?

Νo

If so, please provide an explanation of the legitimate interests that you think will be harmed:

Ans:

Are any of your responses confidential?

No

If so, please indicate which ones and provide an explanation:

Ans:

Section 2: Survey questions (86)

Question 1

As a general rule throughout the trading period, in your opinion, are early auctions necessary?

Yes

If so, what should the profile of EUA auctions be?

Ans: 5-10% in year n-2, 10-20% in year n-1, remainder in year n

Question 2

Do you think there is a need to auction futures?

Yes

If so, why?

Ans: Seasonal holliday schedules with aircraft usually operated on dignitaries flights have a high level of impredictibility,irregular cash flows wich impose to activate on the second market either as buyer or seller of EUAAs at a future date,for extra cash when in recession or high kerosene price or prepare for transferring allowances.

Question 3

What share of allowances should be auctioned spot and what share should be auctioned as futures for each year?

	SPOT	FUTURES
Year n	60	20
Year n-1		15
Year n-2		5

Please provide evidence to support your case.

Ans:

NB: The answer to this question will be published as part of the public consultation. Please do not submit confidential information as part of your answer to this question.

Question 4

Should the common maturity date used in futures auctions be in December (so the maturity date would be December in year n, both when auctioning in year n-2 as when auctioning in year n-1)?

No

If not, please suggest alternative maturity dates and provide evidence to support your view.

Ans: January

Do not interfere CO2 emmisions mitigation purpose with accountability year closing needs

Question 5

For spot auctions:

What should be the optimum frequency of auctions?

Ans: Monthly

0

What should be the minimum frequency of auctions?

Ans: Quarterly

0

What should be the maximum frequency of auctions?

Ans: Fortnightly

0

Please provide arguments to support your case.

Ans:

Question 6

For spot auctions, what should be the:

If deemed appropriate, please indicate a range and/or distribution over different sizes.

Optimum auction size?

Ans: 80 million EUAs

Minimum auction size?

Ans: 40 million EUAs

Maximum auction size?

Ans: 200 million EUAs

Please provide evidence to support your case.

Que	stion 7	
	futures auctions: It should be the optimum frequency of auctions?	
	Fortnightly	0
		U
	nt should be the minimum frequency of auctions? Monthly	
		0
	t should be the maximum frequency of auctions?	
Ans:	Weekly	0
Plea	se provide arguments to support your case.	
Ans:		
_		
	stion 8 futures auctions, what should be the:	
	emed appropriate, please indicate a range and/or distribution over different sizes.	
-	mum auction size?	
Ans: millic	30 on EUAs	
Mini	mum auction size?	
Ans:	15	
millic	on EUAs	
<i>Max</i> Ans:	imum auction size?	
	on EUAs	
Plea	se provide evidence to support your case.	
Ans:		
•		
	stion 9 uld volumes of spot allowances be auctioned evenly throughout the year?	
No		
	ot, how should volumes be distributed? (more than one answer possible) Please	
spec [X]	A larger proportion in the first 4 months of the year	
[]	A larger proportion in December	
[X] []	A smaller proportion in July and August Other.	

In case futures are auctioned, should the volumes for spot and futures auctions be
spread over the year in the same manner?
No

If not, how should they differ? (more than one answer possible) [] No futures auctions less than six months before the maturity date. [X] A larger proportion in December. [X] A smaller proportion in July and August. [] Otherwise?
Question 11 Does the Regulation need to have provisions to avoid holding auctions during a short period of time before the surrendering date (30 April each year)? Yes
If yes, how long should this period be: Ans: Two weeks
In case futures are auctioned, should there be similar provisions with respect to the period immediately prior to the maturity date? Yes
If yes, how long should this period be: Ans: Two weeks
Question 12 Which dates should be avoided? Please specify the dates you have in mind in your answers.
[X] Public holidays common in most Member States? Ans:
[X] Days where important relevant economic data is released? Ans:
[X] Days where emissions data are released? Ans:
[] Other? Ans:
Question 13 Is a harmonised 10-12 hrs CET auction slot desirable? Yes
If not, what alternative(s) would you suggest? Ans:

How long in advance should each element of the calendar be determined? Please provide arguments to support your case.

Annual volumes to be auctioned:

3 years in advance

Ans:

Distribution of annual volumes over spot and futures (if applicable):

2 years in advance

Ans:

Dates of individual auctions:

1 year in advance

Ans:

Volume and product type for individual auctions:

2 years in advance

Ans:

Each auctioneer carrying out auction process (if more than one):

2 years in advance

Ans:

Question 15

What should be the volume of allowances to be auctioned in 2011 and 2012?

in 2011: 15% of the 2013 volume and 10% of the 2014 volume in 2012: 20% of the 2013 volume and 15% of the 2014 volume

Please provide evidence to support your case.

Ans:

What percentage of these shares should be auctioned as futures?

in 2011: 80% of the 2013 share and 80% of the 2014 share in 2012: 50% of the 2013 share and 80% of the 2014 share

Please provide evidence to support your case.

What should be the rule with respect to allowances not auctioned due to force majeure?

Ans: They should be auctioned within one month, though leaving flexibility as to which auction(s) the EUAs should be added.

0

Question 17

Is 1,000 allowances the most appropriate lot size?

Yes

If not, why not?

Ans:

Question 18

Is a single-round sealed-bid auction the most appropriate auction format for auctioning EU allowances?

Yes

If not, please comment on your alternative proposal?

Ans:

Question 19

What is the most appropriate pricing rule for the auctioning of EU allowances?

Ans: Discriminatory-pricing.

Please provide arguments to support your case.

Ans:

Question 20

Should the rules for solving ties in the Regulation be:

Ans: pro-rata re-scaling of bids

Please comment on your choice.

Ans:

Question 21

Should a reserve price apply?

Yes

Question 22

In case a reserve price would apply, should the methodology/formula for calculating it be kept secret?

	ns Trading Scheme (ETS) – on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions
No	
Please o Ans:	comment on your choice.
Question Is a max Yes	n 23 imum bid-size per single entity desirable in a Uniform-price auction?
Please of Ans:	comment on your choice.
Is a max Yes	imum bid-size per single entity desirable in a discriminatory-price auction?
Please of Ans:	comment on your choice.
	rat is the desirable bid-size limit (as a percentage of the volume of allowances ed per auction):
Please of Ans:	comment on your choice.
manipul	n 25 conly one of the two following options would be chosen, to limit the risk of market ation or collusion, which one would be preferable? scriminatory-price auction format?
Please of Ans:	comment on your choice.
Question Are the lidentity:	following pre-registration requirements appropriate and adequate?
[X]	Natural or legal person;
	Name, address, whether publicly listed, whether licensed and supervised under the s; membership of a professional association; membership of a chamber of commerce; /or tax number;
[X] [X] []	Contact details of authorised representatives and proof of authorisation; and CITL-Registry account details. Anything else?

		0
Declar	rations with respect to the past 5 years on absence of:	
[X]	Indictment or conviction of serious crimes: check corporate officers, directors,	
princip	als, members or partners;	
[X]	Infringement of the rules of any regulated or unregulated market;	
[X]	Permits to conduct business being revoked or suspended;	
[X]	Infringement of procurement rules; and	
[X]	Infringement of disclosure of confidential information.	
[]	Anything else?	0
Dagla		
	rations and submission of documentation relating to:	
[X] [X]	Proof of identity; Type of business;	
[X]	Participation in EU ETS or not;	
[X]	EU ETS registered installations, if any;	
[X]	Bank account contact details;	
[X]	Intended auctioning activity;	
[X]	Whether bidding on own account or on behalf of another beneficial owner;	
[X]	Corporate and business affiliations;	
[X]	Creditworthiness;	
[X]	Collateral; and	
[X] VAT.	Whether it carries out transactions subject to VAT or transactions exempted from	
[]	Anything else?	0
	u agree that the pre-registration requirements for admittance to EU auctions	
should Yes	d be harmonised throughout the EU?	
Please Ans:	e comment on your choice.	
Questi	ion 28	
Should	d the amount of information to be supplied in order to satisfy the pre-registration demonstrated in the contract of the contraction of the demonstration of the contract of th	on
[X]	means of establishing the trading relationship;	
[X]	identity of bidder;	
[X]	whether auctioning spot or futures;	
[X] [X]	size of bid; means of payment and delivery;	
[]	anything else?	
LJ	a,	0

-	el of trust,KYC checking procedure	
	n <u>29</u> the bidder pre-registration requirements under the Regulation apply in the sam irrespective of whether or not the auctioneer is covered by the MiFID or AML	ıe
		0 0
<i>Please p</i> Ans:	provide arguments to support your case.	
	n 30 agree that the auctioneer(s) should be allowed to rely on pre-registration checl out by reliable third parties including:	ks
[] [X] []	Other auctioneers? Credit and/or financial institutions? Other	0
<i>Please c</i> Ans:	comment on your choice.	
auctione all) Mem	n 31 to facilitate bidder pre-registration in their home country, should the eer(s) be allowed to provide for pre-registration by potential bidders in other (o aber States than the auctioneer's home country e.g. by outsourcing this to a third party?	r
Please c Ans:	comment on your choice:	
<i>If so, sho</i> [] [] [X] []	Covered by the AML rules? Covered by MiFID? Covered by both? Other	0

Please comment on your choice:

Should the Regulation prohibit the multiplicity of pre-registration checks in the case of Member States auctioning jointly?

Yes

Please comment on your choice.

Ans:

Question 33

Do you agree that the level of collateral accepted in EUA auctions should be harmonised for all EU ETS auctions?

Yes

If so, how should they be harmonised?

Ans: Central clearing house

If not, why not?

Ans:

Question 34

Do you agree that the type of collateral accepted in EUA auctions should be harmonised for all EU ETS auctions?

Yes

If so, how should they be harmonised?

Ans: Unique procedure

If not, why not?

Ans:

Question 35

Do you agree that 100% collateral in electronic money transfer ought to be deposited upfront at a central counterparty or credit institution designated by the auctioneer to access spot auctions?

Yes

If not, why not?

Ans:

What alternative(s) would you suggest? Please provide arguments to support your case:

Ans:

Question 36

In case futures are auctioned, should a clearing house be involved to mitigate credit and market risks?

Yes

	ould specific rules – other than those currently used in exchange clearing - apply to:
[X]	the level of the initial margin;
[]	the level of variation margin calls;
[]	the daily frequency of variation margin call payments?
	ve answered yes, please justify and elaborate on the rules that should apply and nanisms to implement them:
Question	137
What are	the most preferable payment and delivery procedures that should be nted for auctioning EUAs?
[]	Payment before delivery.
[X]	Delivery versus payment.
[]	Both.
Please c Ans:	omment on your choice.
	n 38 tive of the payment procedure, should the Regulation fix a maximum delay of payment and delivery to take place?
If ves: w	hat should it be?
•	orking days
Question	
	he Regulation provide any specific provisions for the handling of payment and incidents or failures?
If vas wi	hat should they be?
	ncial insurance instruments on Force Majeure cases
	he Regulation provide for all matters that are central to the very creation, e and termination or frustration of the transaction arising from the EUA
If not, wh	ny not?
Ans:	
If so, are	the matters enumerated below complete?

- The designation of the parties' to the trade.
- The characteristics of the auctioned product:
 - o Nature: EUAs or EUAAs, trading period concerned.

- o Date of delivery: date at which winning bidders will receive the allowances on their registry account
 - o Date of payment: date at which payment will be required from winning bidders.
 - o Lot size: number of allowances associated with one unit of the auctioned good.
- Events of `force majeure' and resulting consequences.
- Events of default by the auctioneer and/or the bidder and their consequences.
- Applicable remedies or penalties.
- The regime governing the judicial review of claims across the EU.

Ans: Yes

If not, what additional matters should be foreseen in the Regulation and why? Ans:

Question 41

Should the Regulation provide for rules on jurisdiction and the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments?

Yes

If so, should these be:				
[]	specific to the Regulation;			
[]	by reference to the Brussels I Regulation;			
[]	by citing exceptions from the Brussels I Regulation;			
[X]	by citing additions to the Brussels I Regulation?			
Please comment on your choice: Ans:				
If not, why not? Ans:				
Question 42				
Which au	ction model is preferable?			
[]	Direct bidding?			
[]	Indirect bidding?			
[X]	Both?			

Question 43

If an indirect model is used, what share of the total volume of EU allowances could be auctioned through indirect bidding?

Ans: 20%

Please provide arguments to support your case.

Please comment on your choice.

Ans:

If the primary participants model is used, what provisions would be desirable for mitigating disadvantages of restricting direct access:

[X] If so, who	Allow direct access to largest emitters, even if they trade only on their own account? should have direct access and what thresholds should apply?	
Ans: ETS 10%	Operators	
[] [X] bidders?	Disallow primary participants trading on their own account? Impose strict separation of own-account trading from trading on behalf of indirect Other	^
		0
be impos	mary participants' model is used, what conflict of interest requirements should sed?	
	Separation of collateral management, payment and delivery on behalf of clients from count trading activities.	
[]	Separation of anything else.	0
Question What ob [] [X]	n 46 ligations should apply to primary participants acting in EU-wide auctions as: Intermediaries Market makers	
Please p Ans:	rovide arguments to support your case.	
[] [] [X]	hat conditions should auctioning through exchanges be allowed: Only for futures auctions open to established members of the exchange? Also for spot auctions open to established members of the exchange? Only when the exchange-based auction is open to non-established members on a iminatory cost-effective basis? Other.	
		0
Please p Ans:	rovide arguments to support your case.	

Should	direct	auctions	be al	lowed	tl	hrougl	า :
--------	--------	----------	-------	-------	----	--------	------------

Third party service providers?
 Yes

2) Public authorities?

Yes

Please comment on your selection:

Ans:

Question 49

Do the general rules for auctioning EUAs suffice for ensuring full, fair and equitable access to allowances to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters?

Yes

If not, why not?

Ans:

Question 50

Is allowing non-competitive bids necessary for ensuring access to allowances to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters in case of:

discriminatory-price auctions?

Yes

uniform-price auctions?

Question 51

If non-competitive bids are provided for in spot auctions, what maximum share of allowances could be allocated through this route?

Ans: 10%

0

Please comment on your choice.

Ans:

Question 52

What rule should apply for accessing non-competitive bids:

[] Participants should only be allowed to use one of the two bidding routes?
[X] Non-competitive bids should be restricted to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters only?

[] Other?

0

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Please comment on your choice.

Ans:

Question 53

What should be the maximum bid-size allowed for SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters submitting non-competitive bids?

Ans: 10 000 EUAs

0

Question 54

Are there any other specific measures not mentioned in this consultation that may be necessary for ensuring full, fair and equitable access to allowances for SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters?

No

If so, please specify:

Ans:

Question 55

What should be the minimum period of time before the auction date for the release of the notice to auction?

Ans: One month

0

Please comment on your proposal.

Ans:

Question 56

What should be the minimum period of time before the auction date for the submission of the intention to bid?

Ans: Two weeks

0

Please comment on your proposal.

Ans:

Question 57

Are there any specific provisions that need to be highlighted in:

Ans: No Response

Please specify what they are.

Ans:

Question 58

What information should be disclosed after the auction:

[X] Clearing price (if allowances are awarded on a uniform-price basis or in the case of non-competitive bids being allowed)?

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[X] [X] [X] [X] competitiv [X] []	Average price (if allowances are awarded on a discriminatory-price basis)? Any relevant information to solve tied bids? Total volume of EUAs auctioned? Total volume of bids submitted distinguishing between competitive and non-ve bids (if applicable)? Total volume of allowances allocated? Anything else?	0		
Question	ı 59			
	ould be the maximum delay for the announcement of auction results?			
[]	5 minutes			
	15 minutes			
[X]	30 minutes			
[]	1 hour			
[]	Other.	^		
		0		
Please co Ans:	omment on your proposal.			
	60 eel that any specific additional provisions should be adopted in the Regulation ranting of fair and equal access to auction information?			
If so, who	at may they be?			
Question 61 Should an auction monitor be appointed centrally to monitor all EU auctions? Yes				
If not, wh Ans:	ny not?			
Question Do you a [X] [X]	gree that the Regulation should contain general principles on: the designation and mandate of the auction monitor; and cooperation between the auctioneer(s) and the auction monitor? Neither			
If not, wh Ans:	ny not?			

Should these be supplemented by operational guidance, possibly through Commission guidelines? [Y/N] Yes
If not, why not? Ans:
Question 63 Is there a need for harmonised market abuse provisions in the Regulation to prevent insider dealing and market manipulation? Yes
If not, why not? Ans:
Please comment on your choice outlining the provisions you deem necessary and stating the reasons why. Ans:
Question 64 Should the Regulation provide for harmonised enforcement measures to sanction: [X] Non-compliance with its provisions? [X] Market abuse?
Please provide arguments to support your case. Ans:
Question 65 Should the enforcement measures include: [X] The suspension of the auctioneer(s) and/or bidders from the EU-wide auctions? If so, for how long should such suspension last? Ans: 1 year
[X] Financial penalties? If so, at what level should such penalties be fixed? Ans: Particular trading bid size
[X] The power to address binding interim decisions to the auctioneer(s) and/or bidders to avert any urgent, imminent threat of breach of the Regulation with likely irreversible adverse consequences? [] Anything else?
Please provide arguments to support your case. Ans:
Question 66 Should such enforcement measures apply at: [] EU level?

	ons Trading Scheme (ETS) – on on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions	
[] [X]	National level? Both?	
Please Ans:	comment on your choice.	
Questi Who si	on 67 hould enforce compliance with the Regulation:	
[X]	The auction monitor?	
[] [X]	The auctioneer? A competent authority at EU level?	
[]	A competent authority at national level?	
[]	Other?	0
		U
	provide evidence to support your case.	
Ans:		
rate the [3] [2] [1] centrali	of the three approaches for an overall EU auction model do you prefer? Please e options below (1 being the most preferable, 3 being the least preferable) Limited number of coordinated auction processes. Full centralisation based on a single EU-wide auction process. The hybrid approach where different auction processes are cleared through a sed system. give arguments to support your case.	
If a lim	ited number of coordinated auction processes develops, what should be the um number?	
7 1110. 0		0
Please Ans:	give arguments to support your case.	
	on 70 e a need for a transitional phase in order to develop gradually the optimal auction ructure?	n
<i>lf so,</i> พ Ans:	hat kind of transitional arrangements would you recommend?	
Questi	on 71	

Should the Regulation impose the following requirements for the auctioneer(s) and auction processes? [mark those that apply]:

Technical capabilities of auctioneers:

- [X] capacity and experience to conduct auctions (or a specific part of the auction process) in an open, fair, transparent, cost-effective and non-discriminatory manner;
- [X] appropriate investment in keeping the system up-to-date and in line with ongoing market and technological developments; and
- [X] relevant professional licences, high ethical and quality control standards, compliance with financial and market integrity rules.

Integrity:

- [X] guarantee confidentiality of bids, ability to manage market sensitive information in an appropriate manner;
- [X] duly protected electronic systems and appropriate security procedures with regards to identification and data transmission;
- [X] appropriate rules on avoiding and monitoring conflicts of interest; and
- [X] full cooperation with the auction monitor.

Reliability:

- [X] robust organisation and IT systems;
- [X] adequate fallback measures in case of unexpected events;
- [X] minimisation of the risk of cancelling an individual auction once announced;
- [X] minimisation of the risk of failing functionalities (e.g. access to the bidding platform for certain potential bidders); and
- [X] fallback system in case of IT problems on the bidder side.

Accessibility and user friendliness:

- [X] fair, concise, comprehensible and easily accessible information on how to participate in auctions;
- [X] short and simple pre-registration forms;
- [X] clear and simple electronic tools;
- [X] (option of) accessibility of platforms through a dedicated internet interface;
- [X] ability of the auction platform to connect to and communicate with proprietary trading systems used by bidders;
- [X] adequate and regular training (including mock auctions);
- [X] detailed user guidance on how to participate in the auction; and
- [X] ability to test identification and access to the auction.

Please elaborate if any of these requirements need not be included.

Ans:

Please elaborate what additional requirements would be desirable.

Ans:

Question 72

What provisions on administrative fees should the Regulation include?

[X] General principles on proportionality, fairness and non-discrimination.

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[X] Rules on fee structure.[] Rules on the amount of admissible fees.[] Other?
Please provide arguments to support your case. Ans:
Question 73 Should there be provisions for public disclosure of material steps when introducing new (or adapted) auction processes? Yes
Should new (or adapted) auction process be notified to and authorised by the Commission before inclusion in the auction calendar? Yes
 Question 74 Which one of the following options is the most appropriate in case a Member State does not hold auctions (on time)? [X] Auctions by an auctioneer authorised by the Commission. [X] Automatic addition of the delayed quantities to those foreseen for the next two or three auctions.
What other option would you envisage? Please specify: Ans:
Question 75 Should a sanction apply to a Member State that does not auction allowances in line with its commitments? Yes
If so, what form should that sanction take? Ans: 0.2%
Question 76 As a general rule throughout the trading period, in your opinion, are early auctions necessary? Yes

If so, what should the profile of EUAA auctions be:

Ans: 5-10% in year n-2, 10-20% in year n-1, remainder in year n

0

Question 77

Do you think there is a need to auction EUAA futures?

No

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If so, why?

Ans:

Question 78

What should be the optimal frequency and size of EUAA auctions:

Ans: 3 auctions per year of around 10 million EUAAs?

0

Please comment on your choice.

Ans:

Question 79

What would be your preferred timing for EUAA auctions:

Ans: November - March?

0

Question 80

Should any of the EUAA auction design elements be different compared to EUA auctions (see section 3)?

No

If so, please specify and comment on your choice.

Ans

Question 81

Do you agree there is no need for a maximum bid-size?

No

If not, why not?

Ans:

Question 82

Is there any information regarding aircraft operators made available as part of the regulatory process to the competent authorities that could facilitate the KYC checks performed by the auctioneer(s)?

Yes

If so, please describe what information is concerned and whether it should be referred to in the Regulation or any operational guidance published by the Commission.

Ans: EC JAA issued Airline Operators Certificates EC EASA black list of Alirline operators

Question 83

In your opinion, is there a specific need to allow for non-competitive bids in EUAA auctions?

Yes

Would this be the case even when applying a uniform clearing price format?

Please provide arguments to support your case.

Ans:

Question 84

Do you agree that there is no need for any specific provisions for EUAA auctions as regards:

- [X] Involvement of primary participants, exchanges or third party service providers?
- [X] Guarantees and financial assurance?
- [X] Payment and delivery?
- [X] Information disclosure?
- [X] Auction monitoring?
- [X] Preventing anti-competitive behaviour and/or market manipulation?
- [X] Enforcement?
- [] None of the above?

If not, please describe in detail what rules would be needed and why.

Ans:

Question 85

Taking into account the smaller volume of EUAA allowances to be auctioned compared to EUAs, which of the three approaches for an overall EUAA auctioning model do you prefer? Please rate the options below (1 being the most preferable, 3 being the least preferable)

- [1] Limited number of coordinated auction processes.
- [2] Full centralisation based on a single EU-wide auction process.
- [3] Hybrid approach where different auction processes are cleared through a centralised system.

Does your choice differ from the approach preferred for EUAs?

No

Please provide arguments to support your case.

Ans:

Question 86

Do you agree that there is no need for any specific provisions for EUAA auctions as regards:

- [X] Requirements for the auctioneer(s) and auction processes?
- [X] Administrative fees?

	ions Trading Scheme (ETS) – ion on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions
[X]	Rules to ensure appropriate and timely preparation of the auctions? None of the above?
If not,	please describe in detail what rules would be needed and why.