EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions

This document contains the responses for the survey. The survey contains 4 initial questions (A-D) to identify respondents and 86 questions for which responses will be made public. Contact details provided in Question C, are not made public and therefore are not in this document.

Period of consultation

From 3 June 2009 to 3 August 2009 inclusive

Specific privacy statement

"Received contributions, together with the identity of the contributor, will be published on the Internet, unless the contributor objects to publication of his or her personal data on the grounds that such publication would harm his or her legitimate interests. In such cases the contribution may be published in an anonymous form. Otherwise, the contribution will not be published nor will, in principle, its content be taken into account. Responses for questions deemed confidential in the consultation will not be available for view on the website irrespective of contributor objecting or not."

Thank you

Note: Zero's on the right hand side of page reflect Non-Applicable questions in the survey response.

Section 1: Questions to categorize participants

Question A

Name of Company/Organization: Solvay

Principal nature of activities: Chemical, Plastics and Pharmaceuticals

Number of employees in 2008:

World-wide: 29 433 Europe-wide: 20 183

Turnover in 2008:

World-wide: 9 490 000 000 Europe-wide: 4 839 000 000

Question B

Type of respondent:

Company operating one or more installations covered by the EU ETS Industrial sectors

Approx Annual Emissions: 4000000 tCO2

Question C

Contact details will not be made public.

Question D

Do you object to publication of your personal data because it would harm your legitimate interests?

No

If so, please provide an explanation of the legitimate interests that you think will be harmed:

Ans:

Are any of your responses confidential?

No

If so, please indicate which ones and provide an explanation:

Ans:

Section 2: Survey questions (86)

Question 1

As a general rule throughout the trading period, in your opinion, are early auctions necessary?

Yes

If so, what should the profile of EUA auctions be?

Ans: Other? Please specify:

15-20% in year n-2, 15-20% in year n-1

Question 2

Do you think there is a need to auction futures?

No

0

Question 3

What share of allowances should be auctioned spot and what share should be auctioned as futures for each year?

	SPOT	FUTURES
Year n	70	0
Year n-1	15	0
Year n-2	15	0

Please provide evidence to support your case.

Ans: There should not be any futures trading within the primary market. The role of the primary market should be to enable companies affected by ETS to source their allowances in order to meet their legal obligations under ETS. It is not up to public authorities to create a futures market, the secondary market will take care of it. Futures trading within the primary market risks giving too much weight to non-industrial actors with a financial logic rather than an industrial one. This could lead to speculation and destabalise the market.

NB: The answer to this question will be published as part of the public consultation. Please do not submit confidential information as part of your answer to this question.

Question 4

Should the common maturity date used in futures auctions be in December (so the
maturity date would be December in year n, both when auctioning in year n-2 as when
auctioning in year n-1)?

Yes

If not, please suggest alternative maturity dates and provide evidence to support your view.

Ans:

Question 5

For spot auctions:

What should be the optimum frequency of auctions?

Ans: Monthly

0

What should be the minimum frequency of auctions?

Ans: Quarterly

0

What should be the maximum frequency of auctions?

Ans: Weekly

0

Please provide arguments to support your case.

Ans: As a key objective of the auctioning system is to avoid speculation it is important to have regular auctions (predictability is key) without making them too frequent. The ideal would be for them to follow the industrial cycle.

Question 6

For spot auctions, what should be the:

If deemed appropriate, please indicate a range and/or distribution over different sizes.

Optimum auction size?

Ans:

Minimum auction size?

Ans:

Maximum auction size?

Ans:

Please provide evidence to support your case.

Ans: The qantity of allowances auctioned must be evenly spread over the trading period.

Question 7 For futures auctions:	
What should be the optimum frequency of auctions? Ans: No Response	0
What should be the minimum frequency of auctions? Ans: No Response	
What should be the maximum frequency of auctions? Ans: No Response	0
Alls. No Response	0
Please provide arguments to support your case. Ans: There should be no futures auctions within the primary market.	
Question 8 For futures auctions, what should be the: If deemed appropriate, please indicate a range and/or distribution over different siz	es.
Optimum auction size? Ans:	
Minimum auction size? Ans:	
Maximum auction size? Ans:	
Please provide evidence to support your case. Ans:	
Question 9 Should volumes of spot allowances be auctioned evenly throughout the year? Yes	
If not, how should volumes be distributed? (more than one answer possible) Pleas specify:	е
 A larger proportion in the first 4 months of the year A larger proportion in December A smaller proportion in July and August 	
[] Other.	

In case futures are auctioned, should the volumes for spot and futures auctions be spread over the year in the same manner?

No Response
If not, how should they differ? (more than one answer possible)
[] No futures auctions less than six months before the maturity date.
[] A larger proportion in December.
[] A smaller proportion in July and August.
[] Otherwise?
Question 11
Does the Regulation need to have provisions to avoid holding auctions during a short period of time before the surrendering date (30 April each year)? No
If yes, how long should this period be:
Ans: No Response

In case futures are auctioned, should there be similar provisions with respect to the period immediately prior to the maturity date?

No Response

If yes, how long should this period be:

Ans: No Response

Question 12

Which dates should be avoided?

Please specify the dates you have in mind in your answers.

[X] Public holidays common in most Member States? Ans: Christmas day

[X] Days where important relevant economic data is released? Ans:

[X] Days where emissions data are released? Ans:

[X] Other?

Ans: Early December because this is normally the clearing period.

The 30th of April

Question 13

Is a harmonised 10-12 hrs CET auction slot desirable?

Yes

Distribution of annual values are sent and follows (if a militable)

Ans: The further in advance industry can plan, the better prepared it will be for the auctions.

Distribution of annual volumes over spot and futures (if applicable): more years in advance

Ans:

Dates of individual auctions:

more years in advance

Ans:

Volume and product type for individual auctions:

more years in advance

Ans:

Each auctioneer carrying out auction process (if more than one):

more years in advance

Ans:

Question 15

What should be the volume of allowances to be auctioned in 2011 and 2012?

in 2011: 10% of the 2013 volume and 7% of the 2014 volume in 2012: 15% of the 2013 volume and 10% of the 2014 volume

Please provide evidence to support your case.

Ans:

What percentage of these shares should be auctioned as futures?

in 2011:	_% of the 2013 share and _	% of the 2014 share
in 2012:	$_\%$ of the 2013 share and $_$	% of the 2014 share

Please provide evidence to support your case.

Ans:

Question 16

What should be the rule with respect to allowances not auctioned due to force majeure?

Ans: They should automatically be added to the next auction on the calendar, irrespective of the auction process.

0

Question 17

Is 1,000 allowances the most appropriate lot size?

No

If not, why not?

Ans: A 1000 allowances lot size will be too small given the vastly increased size of the primary market and operators need to source much larger amounts on the primary market. Lot sizes of 5000 to 10 000 allowances would be more appropriate.

Question 18

Is a single-round sealed-bid auction the most appropriate auction format for auctioning EU allowances?

No

If not, please comment on your alternative proposal?

Ans: This system would depend on lot sizes (1000 allowance lot is too small) and therefore the number of sealed bids to be placed within a limited time frame. The workable alternative would be a single round, open book, pay-as-you-bid system which would best guarantee openness and simplicity thereby avoiding risks of market manipulation and keeping costs of the auctioning process to a minimum.

Question 19

What is the most appropriate pricing rule for the auctioning of EU allowances?

Ans: Discriminatory-pricing.

Please provide arguments to support your case.

Ans: This would ensure greater transparency and fairness in the bidding process.

Question 20

Should the rules for solving ties in the Regulation be:

Ans: pro-rata re-scaling of bids

Please comment on your choice.

Ans: This would be fairer.

Should a reserve price apply?

No

Question 22

In case a reserve price would apply, should the methodology/formula for calculating it be kept secret?

No

Please comment on your choice.

Ans: Transparency is key.

Question 23

Is a maximum bid-size per single entity desirable in a Uniform-price auction?

Please comment on your choice.

Ans:

Is a maximum bid-size per single entity desirable in a discriminatory-price auction?

Please comment on your choice.

Ans: There should not be a maximum bid-size as it is impossible to forecast the market's demand/needs and the system should allow a late bidder to be able to meet its needs.

Question 24

If so, what is the desirable bid-size limit (as a percentage of the volume of allowances auctioned per auction):

Ans: No Response

Please comment on your choice.

Ans:

Question 25

In case only one of the two following options would be chosen, to limit the risk of market manipulation or collusion, which one would be preferable?

Ans: A discriminatory-price auction format?

Please comment on your choice.

Ans: Because the price is the determinant factor in market manipulation and it would be very easy for new entities to be created to get round the maximum-bid-size restriction.

Are the following pre-registration requirements appropriate and adequate? Identity:

- [X] Natural or legal person;
- [X] Name, address, whether publicly listed, whether licensed and supervised under the AML rules; membership of a professional association; membership of a chamber of commerce; VAT and/or tax number;
- [X] Contact details of authorised representatives and proof of authorisation; and
- [X] CITL-Registry account details.
- [] Anything else?

0

Declarations with respect to the past 5 years on absence of:

- [X] Indictment or conviction of serious crimes: check corporate officers, directors, principals, members or partners;
- [X] Infringement of the rules of any regulated or unregulated market;
- [X] Permits to conduct business being revoked or suspended;
- [X] Infringement of procurement rules; and
- [X] Infringement of disclosure of confidential information.
- [] Anything else?

0

Declarations and submission of documentation relating to:

- [X] Proof of identity;
- [X] Type of business;
- [X] Participation in EU ETS or not;
- [X] EU ETS registered installations, if any:
- [X] Bank account contact details;
- [X] Intended auctioning activity;
- [X] Whether bidding on own account or on behalf of another beneficial owner;
- [X] Corporate and business affiliations;
- [X] Creditworthiness:
- [X] Collateral; and
- [] Whether it carries out transactions subject to VAT or transactions exempted from

VAT.

[] Anything else?

0

Question 27

Do you agree that the pre-registration requirements for admittance to EU auctions should be harmonised throughout the EU?

Yes

Please comment on your choice.

Ans: In the interest of uniformity and simplicity, especially for companies present in different Member States.

Should the amount of information to be supplied in order to satisfy the pre-registration requirements for admittance to EU auctions depend on the:

	means of establishing the trading relationship; identity of bidder; whether auctioning spot or futures; size of bid; means of payment and delivery; anything else? pecify: No differences should be admitted between bidders and the means of payment exclusively done through "SEPA" transfer and the delivery should only occur through
If so, wh Ans:	at should the differences be?
	the bidder pre-registration requirements under the Regulation apply in the same irrespective of whether or not the auctioneer is covered by the MiFID or AML
<i>Please p</i> Ans:	orovide arguments to support your case.
	n 30 agree that the auctioneer(s) should be allowed to rely on pre-registration checks out by reliable third parties including:
[] [] []	Other auctioneers? Credit and/or financial institutions? Other

Please comment on your choice.

Ans: There should be only one auctioneer (under a European Institution umbrella) to ensure a level playing field and no checks by thrid parties, especially financial insitutions as it might lead to collusion/manipulation.

Question 31

In order to facilitate bidder pre-registration in their home country, should the auctioneer(s) be allowed to provide for pre-registration by potential bidders in other (or all) Member States than the auctioneer's home country e.g. by outsourcing this to a reliable third party?

No

Please comment on your choice:

Ans: There should be a uniform set of bidder pre-registration criteria for the whole EU. Financial institutions who take part in the auctions should not be able to offer other related services to the auctioneers such as pre-registration checks on potential bidders: risk of collusion, manipulation.

If so, si	hould such entities be:
[]	Covered by the AML rules?
[]	Covered by MiFID?
[]	Covered by both?
[]	Other
	0
Please	comment on your choice:
Ans:	
Questic	on 32
Should	the Regulation prohibit the multiplicity of pre-registration checks in the case of states auctioning jointly?
162	
Please	comment on your choice.
Ans: Th	ere should be only one database, one auctioneer and no duplication of work.
Questic	on 33
•	agree that the level of collateral accepted in EUA auctions should be harmonised EU ETS auctions?
Yes	
If so, h	ow should they be harmonised?
Ans: .	
If not, v	why not?
Ans:	
Questic	on 34
-	agree that the type of collateral accepted in EUA auctions should be harmonised EU ETS auctions?

If so, how should they be harmonised?

Yes

Ans: The collateral should not involve blocking cash. The solvency of the company could be a guarantee or failing that bank guarantees.

Ans:
Question 35 Do you agree that 100% collateral in electronic money transfer ought to be deposited upfront at a central counterparty or credit institution designated by the auctioneer to access spot auctions? No
If not, why not? Ans: This is not regular practice in the market.
What alternative(s) would you suggest? Please provide arguments to support your case: Ans: Delivery after receipt of payment.
Question 36 In case futures are auctioned, should a clearing house be involved to mitigate credit and market risks? No
If so, should specific rules – other than those currently used in exchange clearing houses – apply to: [] the level of the initial margin; [] the level of variation margin calls; [] the daily frequency of variation margin call payments? If you have answered yes, please justify and elaborate on the rules that should apply and the mechanisms to implement them:
Ans: Question 37 What are the most preferable payment and delivery procedures that should be implemented for auctioning EUAs? [X] Payment before delivery. [] Delivery versus payment. [] Both.
Please comment on your choice. Ans:
Question 38 Irrespective of the payment procedure, should the Regulation fix a maximum delay of time for payment and delivery to take place? Yes
If yes; what should it be? Ans: 4 working days

Should the Regulation provide any specific provisions for the handling of payment and delivery incidents or failures?

Yes

If yes, what should they be?

Ans:

Question 40

Should the Regulation provide for all matters that are central to the very creation, existence and termination or frustration of the transaction arising from the EUA auctions?

Yes

If not, why not?

Ans:

If so, are the matters enumerated below complete?

- The designation of the parties' to the trade.
- The characteristics of the auctioned product:
 - Nature: EUAs or EUAAs, trading period concerned.
- Date of delivery: date at which winning bidders will receive the allowances on their registry account
 - o Date of payment: date at which payment will be required from winning bidders.
 - o Lot size: number of allowances associated with one unit of the auctioned good.
- Events of `force majeure' and resulting consequences.
- Events of default by the auctioneer and/or the bidder and their consequences.
- Applicable remedies or penalties.
- The regime governing the judicial review of claims across the EU.

Ans: Yes

If not, what additional matters should be foreseen in the Regulation and why? Ans:

Question 41

Should the Regulation provide for rules on jurisdiction and the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments?

Yes

lf	so,	should	these	be:
Γ.	ı	spe	cific to	the

[] specific to the Regulation;[X] by reference to the Brussels I Regulation;

[] by citing exceptions from the Brussels I Regulation;

[] by citing additions to the Brussels I Regulation?

Please comment on your choice:

Ans:

If not, wh Ans:	hy not?
Question Which at [X] []	n 42 uction model is preferable? Direct bidding? Indirect bidding? Both?
	omment on your choice. os ensure openness and simplicity
	n <u>43</u> irect model is used, what share of the total volume of EU allowances could be add through indirect bidding?
Please p Ans:	rovide arguments to support your case.
	n 44 mary participants model is used, what provisions would be desirable for ng disadvantages of restricting direct access:
[]	Allow direct access to largest emitters, even if they trade only on their own account?
r 1	Dicallow primary participants trading on their own account?
[] bidders?	Disallow primary participants trading on their own account? Impose strict separation of own-account trading from trading on behalf of indirect
[]	Other (
Question If the pri be impos	mary participants' model is used, what conflict of interest requirements should
[] trading a	
[] all own a	Separation of collateral management, payment and delivery on behalf of clients from count trading activities. Separation of anything else.
	Coparation of anything close.

Wha	at obligations should apply to primary participants acting in EU-wide auctions as:
[]	Intermediaries
[]	Market makers
Plea Ans:	ase provide arguments to support your case.
7 (110)	
Que	estion 47
	ler what conditions should auctioning through exchanges be allowed:
[]	Only for futures auctions open to established members of the exchange?
[]	Also for spot auctions open to established members of the exchange?
[]	Only when the exchange-based auction is open to non-established members on a
	-discriminatory cost-effective basis?
[X]	Other.
riea	ase specify: There should be no auctioning through Exchanges in the interest of simplicty
Plea	ase provide arguments to support your case.
Ans	
0	estion 48
	ould direct auctions be allowed through:
0	and an oot adottone se another an ough
1)	Third party service providers?
2)	Public authorities?
2)	Yes
	। एउ

Please comment on your selection:

Ans: This is a tool of general economic management that is of very high strategic value for Europe, only public authorities should be allowed to take on such an important role.

Question 49

Do the general rules for auctioning EUAs suffice for ensuring full, fair and equitable access to allowances to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters?

No

If not, why not?

Ans: An auctioing system by itself is not a system designed for SMEs. Barriers such as HR resources, time constraints, management issues and competences will make it difficult for SME's to handle. As in the financial markets, SMEs will probably source their needs on the secondary market.

Question 50

Is allowing non-competitive bids necessary for ensuring access to allowances to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters in case of:

discriminatory-price auctions?

uniform-price auctions?

Question 51

If non-competitive bids are provided for in spot auctions, what maximum share of allowances could be allocated through this route?

Ans: Other

Please Specify: 0%

Please comment on your choice.

Ans: We cannot accept the principle of of non-competitive bids as it distorts the market

Question 52

What rule should apply for accessing non-competitive bids:

[]	Participants should only be allowed to use one of the two bidding routes?
[]	Non-competitive bids should be restricted to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small
emitters o	nly?

[X] Other?

Please specify: Non competitive bids should not be allowed.

Please comment on your choice.

Ans:

Question 53

What should be the maximum bid-size allowed for SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters submitting non-competitive bids?

Ans: No Response

0

Question 54

Are there any other specific measures not mentioned in this consultation that may be necessary for ensuring full, fair and equitable access to allowances for SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters?

No Response

If so, please specify:

Ans:

Question 55

What should be the minimum period of time before the auction date for the release of the notice to auction?

Ans: Other

Please Specify: 3 months

Please	comment on	your	pro	posal.

Ans: This is line with the minimum auction freequency suggested.

Question 56

What should be the minimum period of time before the auction date for the submission of the intention to bid?

Ans: Other

Please Specify: the bidding should be on-line and without such an obligation

Please comment on your proposal.

Ans:

Question 57

Are there any specific provisions that need to be highlighted in:

Ans: No Response

Please specify what they are.

Ans:

Question 58

What information should be disclosed after the auction:

- [X] Clearing price (if allowances are awarded on a uniform-price basis or in the case of non-competitive bids being allowed)?
- [X] Average price (if allowances are awarded on a discriminatory-price basis)?
- [X] Any relevant information to solve tied bids?
- [X] Total volume of EUAs auctioned?
- [X] Total volume of bids submitted distinguishing between competitive and non-competitive bids (if applicable)?
- [X] Total volume of allowances allocated?

[1	Anything	else?

0

Question 59

What should be the maximum delay for the announcement of auction results?

[] 5 minutes [] 15 minutes [] 30 minutes [] 1 hour

[X] Other.

Please specify: Immediate within the on-line system

Please comment on your proposal.

Ans:

Question 60

Do you feel that any specific additional provisions should be adopted in the Regulation for the granting of fair and equal access to auction information? No Response
If so, what may they be? Ans:
Question 61 Should an auction monitor be appointed centrally to monitor all EU auctions? Yes
If not, why not? Ans:
Question 62 Do you agree that the Regulation should contain general principles on: [X] the designation and mandate of the auction monitor; and [X] cooperation between the auctioneer(s) and the auction monitor? [] Neither
If not, why not? Ans:
Should these be supplemented by operational guidance, possibly through Commission guidelines? [Y/N] Yes
If not, why not? Ans:

Is there a need for harmonised market abuse provisions in the Regulation to prevent insider dealing and market manipulation?

Yes

If not, why not?

Ans:

Please comment on your choice outlining the provisions you deem necessary and stating the reasons why.

Ans: Disclosure of information related to specific bidders should be avoided. Bidders should be accredited and must be representatives of ETS players (with accreditation number).

Question 64

Should the Regulation provide for harmonised enforcement measures to sanction:

[X] Non-compliance with its provisions?

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[X]	Market abuse?
Ans: This	rovide arguments to support your case. would prevent "forum shopping" to find the most lenient judicial framework. In a ed auctioning system, there should also be harmonised enforcement measures.
[X]	he enforcement measures include: The suspension of the auctioneer(s) and/or bidders from the EU-wide auctions? how long should such suspension last?
Ans: At le [] avert any conseque	
[]	Anything else?
Please p	rovide arguments to support your case.
Ans: The	penalties could include fines which should be at least as big as the gains made ne market abuse/manipulation as well as suspencion from the primary market for more
Question Should s [X]	nuch enforcement measures apply at: EU level? National level? Both?
	omment on your choice. e the authority should be at EU level, the enforcement measures should be taken at as well.
Question	<u>167</u>

Who	should	enforce	compli	ance	with t	the Re	egulation	1:
				_				

[X] The auction monitor? [] The auctioneer?

[X] A competent authority at EU level? [] A competent authority at national level?

Other?

0

Please provide evidence to support your case.

Ans:

Which of the three approaches for an overall EU auction model do you prefer? Please rate the options below (1 being the most preferable, 3 being the least preferable)

- [2] Limited number of coordinated auction processes.
- [1] Full centralisation based on a single EU-wide auction process.
- [3] The hybrid approach where different auction processes are cleared through a centralised system.

Please give arguments to support your case.

Ans: Centralisation is key to ensure harmonisation and consistency.

Question 69

If a limited number of coordinated auction processes develops, what should be the maximum number?

Ans: 2

0

Please give arguments to support your case.

Ans: This scenario should not be adopted. It should be a centralised system

Question 70

Is there a need for a transitional phase in order to develop gradually the optimal auction infrastructure?

No

If so, what kind of transitional arrangements would you recommend? Ans:

Question 71

Should the Regulation impose the following requirements for the auctioneer(s) and auction processes? [mark those that apply]:

Technical capabilities of auctioneers:

- [X] capacity and experience to conduct auctions (or a specific part of the auction process) in an open, fair, transparent, cost-effective and non-discriminatory manner;
- [X] appropriate investment in keeping the system up-to-date and in line with ongoing market and technological developments; and
- [X] relevant professional licences, high ethical and quality control standards, compliance with financial and market integrity rules.

Integrity:

- [X] guarantee confidentiality of bids, ability to manage market sensitive information in an appropriate manner;
- [X] duly protected electronic systems and appropriate security procedures with regards to identification and data transmission;
- [X] appropriate rules on avoiding and monitoring conflicts of interest; and
- [X] full cooperation with the auction monitor.

Reliability:

- [X] robust organisation and IT systems;
- [X] adequate fallback measures in case of unexpected events;
- [X] minimisation of the risk of cancelling an individual auction once announced;
- [X] minimisation of the risk of failing functionalities (e.g. access to the bidding platform for certain potential bidders); and
- [X] fallback system in case of IT problems on the bidder side.

Accessibility and user friendliness:

- [X] fair, concise, comprehensible and easily accessible information on how to participate in auctions:
- [X] short and simple pre-registration forms;
- [X] clear and simple electronic tools;
- [X] (option of) accessibility of platforms through a dedicated internet interface;
- [X] ability of the auction platform to connect to and communicate with proprietary trading systems used by bidders;
- [X] adequate and regular training (including mock auctions);
- [X] detailed user guidance on how to participate in the auction; and
- [X] ability to test identification and access to the auction.

Please elaborate if any of these requirements need not be included.

Ans

Please elaborate what additional requirements would be desirable.

Ans: The ITL system should be imporved: it should be connectable to an ERP system, allow for a scheduled delivery of rights (like a normal cash management system would do) and provide a connection between ITL and the auctioing system.

Question 72

What provisions on administrative fees should the Regulation include?

[] General principles on proportionality, fairness and non-discrimination.

[] Rules on fee structure.

[] Rules on the amount of admissible fees.

[X] Other?

Please specify: No fee

Please provide arguments to support your case.

Ans: No fee should apply. Respecting the law should not generate the payment of fees. Costs can be covered from the proceeds of the auctions.

Question 73

Should there be provisions for public disclosure of material steps when introducing new (or adapted) auction processes?

Yes

Should new (or adapted) auction process be notified to and authorised by the Commission before inclusion in the auction calendar?

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Yes

Question 74

Which one of the following options is the most appropriate in case a Member State does not hold auctions (on time)?

[] Auctions by an auctioneer authorised by the Commission.

[X] Automatic addition of the delayed quantities to those foreseen for the next two or three auctions.

What other option would you envisage? Please specify:

Ans:

Question 75

Should a sanction apply to a Member State that does not auction allowances in line with its commitments?

Yes

If so, what form should that sanction take?

Ans:

Question 76

As a general rule throughout the trading period, in your opinion, are early auctions necessary?

Yes

If so, what should the profile of EUAA auctions be:

Ans: 5-10% in year n-2, 10-20% in year n-1, remainder in year n

0

Question 77

Do you think there is a need to auction EUAA futures?

No Response

If so, why?

Ans:

Question 78

What should be the optimal frequency and size of EUAA auctions:

Ans: No Response

0

Please comment on your choice.

Ans:

Question 79

What would be your preferred timing for EUAA auctions:

Ans: No Response

0

Question 80

Should any of the EUAA auction design elements be different compared to EUA auctions (see section 3)?

No Response

If so, please specify and comment on your choice.

Ans:

Question 81

Do you agree there is no need for a maximum bid-size?

No Response

If not, why not?

Ans:

Question 82

Is there any information regarding aircraft operators made available as part of the regulatory process to the competent authorities that could facilitate the KYC checks performed by the auctioneer(s)?

No Response

If so, please describe what information is concerned and whether it should be referred to in the Regulation or any operational guidance published by the Commission.

Ans:

Question 83

In your opinion, is there a specific need to allow for non-competitive bids in EUAA auctions?

No Response

Would this be the case even when applying a uniform clearing price format? No Response

Please provide arguments to support your case.

Ans:

Question 84

Do you agree that there is no need for any specific provisions for EUAA auctions as regards:

-	
[]	Involvement of primary participants, exchanges or third party service providers?
[]	Guarantees and financial assurance?
[]	Payment and delivery?

Consultation	on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions
[] [] [] []	Information disclosure? Auction monitoring? Preventing anti-competitive behaviour and/or market manipulation? Enforcement? None of the above?
If not, ple Ans:	ease describe in detail what rules would be needed and why.
to EUAs,	nto account the smaller volume of EUAA allowances to be auctioned compared which of the three approaches for an overall EUAA auctioning model do you Please rate the options below (1 being the most preferable, 3 being the least
[1] [2] [3] system.	Limited number of coordinated auction processes. Full centralisation based on a single EU-wide auction process. Hybrid approach where different auction processes are cleared through a centralised
Does you No Respo	ur choice differ from the approach preferred for EUAs?
Please p Ans:	rovide arguments to support your case.
regards:	gree that there is no need for any specific provisions for EUAA auctions as
[] [] []	Requirements for the auctioneer(s) and auction processes? Administrative fees? Rules to ensure appropriate and timely preparation of the auctions? None of the above?
If not, ple Ans:	ease describe in detail what rules would be needed and why.

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) -