EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions

This document is the questionnaire for this consultation. The survey contains **4** initial questions (A-D) to identify respondents, **86** questions for which responses will be made public and **4** questions that are classified confidential, must be sent directly to the European Commission and will not be made public. The questions that are classified potentially confidential are on two separate pages (2 questions on each page) and highlighted in green boxes.

Period of consultation

From 3 June 2009 to 3 August 2009 inclusive

How to submit your contribution

This consultation seeks to obtain feedback from all categories of stakeholders regarding the different aspects of auction design and implementation covered in the Consultation Paper.

We are sorry for the inconvenience, but the web-based survey is not available yet. If participants wish to complete the survey on this document and send their contributions back to <u>contact_ets_auctions_consultation@icfi.com</u> their responses can be accepted in this format. The web-based survey will be available as soon as possible if participants wish to wait till that is available.

Received contributions will be published on the Internet. It is important to read the specific privacy statement attached to this consultation for information on how your personal data and contribution will be dealt with.

Specific privacy statement

"Received contributions, together with the identity of the contributor, will be published on the Internet, unless the contributor objects to publication of his or her personal data on the grounds that such publication would harm his or her legitimate interests. In such cases the contribution may be published in an anonymous form. Otherwise, the contribution will not be published nor will, in principle, its content be taken into account. Responses for questions deemed confidential in the consultation will not be available for view on the website irrespective of contributor objecting or not. "

Instructions to filling out the questionnaire

- Questions may only be answered in designated response fields
- For certain multiple choice questions, simply click on box to indicate choice
- Answer [Y/N] questions by typing "y" / "Y" or "n" / "N" on underlined area (____)
- Some responses require explanations, additional comments and detailed answers. These will either by identified by underline (_____) or an answer section (A:_____). The amount of text that can be entered here is unlimited.
- After completing the survey, please save and send to <u>contact_ets_auctions_consultation@icfi.com</u>
- If any questions seem unclear in context or for method of response, please mail <u>contact_ets_auctions_consultation@icfi.com</u> to clarify

Thank you

Section 1: Questions to categorize participants

Question A

Name of Company/Organization: French Federation of Tiles and Bricks

Principal nature of activities: Professional Association

Number of employees in 2008: 11

World-wide	Europe-wide

Turnover in 2008: 1,7 M€

World-wide _____

Europe-wide

Question B

Type of respondent:

Member State

Company	operating one	or more installations	covered by the EU ETS
e e inpuny	op on a cine		

- Electricity generators
- Energy companies other than electricity generators
- Industrial sectors
- Aviation
- Other. Please specify:

Approx Annual Emissions: _____ tCO₂

- *Financial institution*
-] Trading arm of non-financial institution
-] Other. Please specify _____
- Trader on own account
 - *Financial institution*
 - Trading arm of non-financial institution
 - Other. Please specify_____

Regula	ated mar	ted market		
	Carbo	n only		
	Carbo	n and electricity		
	Carbo	n and other energy products		
Other	carbon	market		
	Multil	ateral trading facility trading carbon derivatives		
	Carbo	n exchange trading spot carbon		
	Other.	Please specify		
Clearin	ring house			
Centra	tral counterparty			
Other (multiple choices apply)				
		Non-governmental organisation		
	X	Trade association		
		Carbon analyst		
		Carbon publication		
		Academic		
		Other. Please specify		

Question C

Contact details will not be made public.

Question D

Questions relating to the "Specific privacy statement" above.

• Do you object to publication of your personal data because it would harm your legitimate interests? <u>No</u>

If so, please provide an explanation of the legitimate interests that you think will be harmed:

A:

• Are any of your responses confidential? <u>No</u>

If so, please indicate which ones and provide an explanation:

Section 2: Survey questions (86) and potentially confidential questions (4)

Question 1

As a general rule throughout the trading period, in your opinion, are early auctions necessary? $[Y/N]_{-}$

Yes. Auctioning for phase III should begin as early as 2011 (frontloading) in order to provide for a sufficient supply of allowances at the beginning of that phase.

If so, what should the profile of EUA auctions be?

5-10% in year n-2, 10-20% in year n-1, remainder in year n

10-20% in year n-2, 20-30% in year n-1, remainder in year n

20-30% in year n-2, 30-35% in year n-1, remainder in year n

Other? Please specify: <u>The percentage should be established after a</u> comprehensive assessment of all actors involved.

Question 2

Do you think there is a need to auction futures? [Y/N] _

The decision to determine if futures should be auctioned should be assessed by Member States, considering their financial and accounting impacts.

If so, why?

A:

Question 3

What share of allowances should be auctioned spot and what share should be auctioned as futures for each year?

<u>100 % spot auctions appear technically feasible. Depending of answers given by</u> <u>Member States on question 2, mixed auctions could be envisaged.</u>

		SPOT		FUTURES	
•	year n	:	%	%	
•	year n-1	:	%	%	
•	year n-2		%	%	

Please provide evidence to support your case.

A:

NB: The answer to this question will be published as part of the public consultation. Please do not submit confidential information as part of your answer to this question.

Should the common maturity date used in futures auctions be in December (so the maturity date would be December in year n, both when auctioning in year n-2 as when auctioning in year n-1)? <u>No comment</u>

If not, please suggest alternative maturity dates and provide evidence to support your view.

This page contains two questions that will not be made public. These questions cannot be completed on this document

Request for potentially confidential information 1	marke consu Direc 2/1, 1	se send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, ced on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning sultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, ctorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not isclosed publicly. <u>No comment</u>		and Confidential – Auctioning mmission, DG ENV, the Head of Unit, Office BU-5
		TS operators: what share of your expected emissions covered by U ETS in a given year n do you hedge and how much in advance?		
	•	year n :%		%
	•	year n-1 :%		%
	•	year n-2 :		%
	•	earlier years (please specify)	:	%

Request for	Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format,		
potentially	marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning		
confidential	consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV,		
information 2 Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office			
	2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not		
	be disclosed publicly. <u>No comment</u>		

What share of the annual quantity of allowances you intend to purchase *via* auctions would you wish to buy spot or futures respectively?

		SPOT	FUTURES
•	year n	:%) <u> </u>
•	year n-1	:%	o <u> </u>
•	year n-2	:%	o %

Please specify whether you are an:

- ETS operator; or
- Other participant.

For spot auctions:

What should be the **optimum** frequency of auctions?

X	Weekly? Yes (at EU level with a single platform).
	Fortnightly?
	Monthly?
	Quarterly?
	Other? Please specify:
What s	hould be the minimum frequency of auctions?
	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?
X	Monthly? Yes (at EU level with a single platform).
	Quarterly?
	Other? Please specify:
What s	hould be the maximum frequency of auctions?
X	Weekly ? Yes (at EU level with a single platform)
	Fortnightly?
	Monthly?
	Quarterly?
	Other? Please specify:
Please	provide arguments to support your case.

Weekly auctions at EU level :

- Reduce the impact of the auction on the market
- Prevent the emergence of dominant positions and market abuse behaviours,
- <u>Minimize the attractiveness of the auctions and of the market for players with high speculative profiles.</u>

Question 6

For spot auctions, what should be the: No comment

- Optimum auction size? _____
- Minimum auction size?
- Maximum auction size? _____

If deemed appropriate, please indicate a range and/or distribution over different sizes.

Please provide arguments to support your case.

Question 7

For futures auctions:

What should be the **optimum** frequency of auctions?

X	Weekly? Yes (at EU level)
	Fortnightly?
	Monthly?
	Quarterly?
	Other? Please specify:
What s	hould be the minimum frequency of auctions?
	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?
X	Monthly? Yes (at EU level)
	Quarterly?
	Other? Please specify:
What s	hould be the maximum frequency of auctions?
X	Weekly? Yes (at EU level)
	Fortnightly?
	Monthly?
	Quarterly?
	Other? Please specify:
Please	provide arguments to support your case.

A:

Question 8

For futures auctions, what should be the: no comments

- Optimum auction size?
- Minimum auction size?
- Maximum auction size?

If deemed appropriate, please indicate a range and/or distribution over different sizes.

Please provide evidence to support your case.

A:

Question 9

Should volumes of spot allowances be auctioned evenly throughout the year? <u>Spot</u> volumes should be auctioned evenly but no auctions should be held in August and the last two weeks of each year.

If not, how should volumes be distributed? (more than one answer possible) Please specify:

- A larger proportion in the first 4 months of the year?
- A larger proportion in December?
- \square
- A smaller proportion in July and August?

	-	-	-

Other? Please specify:

Question 10

In case futures are auctioned, should the volumes for spot and futures auctions be spread over the year in the same manner? <u>No comments.</u>

If not, how should they differ? (more than one answer possible)

- No futures auctions less than six months before the maturity date.
- A larger proportion in December.
- A smaller proportion in July and August.
- Otherwise? Please specify how and comment:

Question 11

Does the Regulation need to have provisions to avoid holding auctions during a short period of time before the surrendering date (30 April each year)? <u>No comment.</u>

If yes, how long should this period be:

One week	2 weeks 🗌	3 weeks
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1 month

In case futures are auctioned, should there be similar provisions with respect to the period immediately prior to the maturity date? $[Y/N]_{-}$

If yes, how long should this period be:

One week 🗌	2 weeks	3 weeks	1 month
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Question 12

Which dates should be avoided? (more than one answer possible)

\times	Public holidays	common in mos	st Member States?
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Days where important relevant economic data is released?

Days where emissions data are released?

Other? Please specify:

Please specify the dates you have in mind in your answers.

Question 13

Is a harmonised 10-12 hrs CET auction slot desirable? Yes, it seems appropriate.

If not, what alternative(s) would you suggest?

A:_____

Question 14

How long in advance should each element of the calendar be determined? <u>All annual</u> volumes should be known before the start of period 3 (end 2010). Then for each year, the annual scheduled quantities and dates of auctions should be known 1 year in advance. The system needs to be predictable for the companies to be placed in a reliable environment for investment decision making.

Annual volumes to be auctioned:

Annual volumes to be auctioned:

- 2 years in advance <u>Yes, it is a minimum.</u>
- 3 years in advance
- more years in advance <u>This is the optimum.</u>

Distribution of annual volumes over spot and futures (if applicable):

	1 year in advance
X	2 years in advance Yes, it is a minimum.
	3 years in advance
X	more years in advance This is the optimum.
Dates of	of individual auctions:
X	1 year in advance Yes, it is a minimum.
X	2 years in advance This is the optimum.
	3 years in advance
	more years in advance
Volum	e and product type for individual auctions:
X	1 year in advance Yes, it is a minimum.
X	2 years in advance This is the optimum.
	3 years in advance
	more years in advance
Each a	uctioneer carrying out auction process (if more than one):
X	1 year in advance Yes, it is a minimum.
	2 years in advance
	3 years in advance
	more years in advance
Please	provide arguments to support your case.

A:

Question 15

What should be the volume of allowances to be auctioned in 2011 and 2012?

No comments

- in 2011:_____% of the 2013 volume and _____% of the 2014 volume
- in 2012:____% of the 2013 volume and ____% of the 2014 volume

What percentage of these shares should be auctioned as futures?

- in 2011: ____% of the 2013 share and ____% of the 2014 share
- in 2012: ____% of the 2013 share and ___% of the 2014 share

Please provide evidence to support your case.

A:

Question 16

What should be the rule with respect to allowances not auctioned due to *force majeure*?

They should automatically be added to the next auction on the calendar,
irrespective of the auction process.

- They should be auctioned within one month, though leaving flexibility as to which auction(s) the EUAs should be added.
- They should be auctioned within three months, though leaving flexibility as to which auction(s) the EUAs should be added.

Other? Please specify: Force majeure should be defined and rules should be part of the European Regulation on auctions.

Question 17

Is 1,000 allowances the most appropriate lot size? Yes.

If not, why not?

A:

Question 18

Is a single-round sealed-bid auction the most appropriate auction format for auctioning EU allowances? <u>Yes.</u>

If not, please comment on your alternative proposal?

A:

Question 19

What is the most appropriate pricing rule for the auctioning of EU allowances?

Uniform-pricing. <u>Yes. This system enables the generation of a unique carbon price</u> which will enhance smooth reconciliation of the auction with the market and will support investments in low carbon technologies. It is also more accessible and easy to deal with for <u>SMEs.</u>



Discriminatory-pricing.

Indifferent.

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A:

Question 20

Should the rules for solving ties in the Regulation be:

random selection; or

pro-rata re-scaling of bids? <u>This solution seems more appropriate because it takes</u> into account all needs of different actors.

Please comment on your choice.

A:

Question 21

Should a reserve price apply? <u>A reserve price seems very risky because it would create</u> <u>uncertainty especially in the case different platforms are implemented instead of a</u> <u>unique platform. Its use could be however examined by Member States in case of major</u> <u>dysfunction of the auction.</u>

A:

Question 22

In case a reserve price would apply, should the methodology/formula for calculating it be kept secret? $[Y/N]_{-}$

Please comment on your choice.

A:

Question 23

Is a maximum bid-size per single entity desirable in a Uniform-price auction?

Yes, a maximum bid size per entity could prevent market manipulation and collusion by actors not covered by the EU ETS system. However, it should be compatible with the fact that some companies use a signle entity to manage the allowance needs of all their facilities participation in the EU ETS.

Is a maximum bid-size per single entity desirable in a discriminatory-price auction? $[Y/N]_{-}$

Please comment on your choice.

A:

Question 24

If so, what is the desirable bid-size limit (as a percentage of the volume of allowances auctioned per auction – only one choice is possible):

<u>10%: [X]</u>	15%:	20%:
25%:	30%:	More than 30%: Please specify:

Please comment on your choice.

10 % seems already very important.

Question 25

In case only one of the two following options would be chosen, to limit the risk of market manipulation or collusion, which one would be preferable?

A discriminatory-price auction format?

A maximum bid-size per single entity? <u>This option appears interesting because it is</u> predictable but its practical feasibility should be ensured.

Please comment on your choice.

A:

Question 26

Are the following pre-registration requirements appropriate and adequate?

Identity: Yes

- Natural or legal person;
- Name, address, whether publicly listed, whether licensed and supervised under the AML rules; membership of a professional association; membership of a chamber of commerce; VAT and/or tax number;
- Contact details of authorised representatives and proof of authorisation; and
- CITL-Registry account details.
- Anything else? Please specify:

Declarations with respect to the past 5 years on absence of: Yes

- Indictment or conviction of serious crimes: check corporate officers, directors, principals, members or partners;
- Infringement of the rules of any regulated or unregulated market;
- Permits to conduct business being revoked or suspended;
- Infringement of procurement rules; and
- Infringement of disclosure of confidential information.
- Anything else? Please specify:

Declarations and submission of documentation relating to: <u>Yes</u>

- \boxtimes Proof of identity;
- ☑ Type of business;
- Participation in EU ETS or not;
- EU ETS registered installations, if any;
- Bank account contact details;
- Intended auctioning activity;
- Whether bidding on own account or on behalf of another beneficial owner;
- Corporate and business affiliations;
- ☑ Creditworthiness;
- \boxtimes Collateral; and
- Whether it carries out transactions subject to VAT or transactions exempted from VAT.
- Anything else? Please specify:

Do you agree that the pre-registration requirements for admittance to EU auctions should be harmonised throughout the EU?

<u>Yes [X]</u>

No

Please comment on your choice.

It is of utmost importance to prevent discriminatory access to auctions in EU.

Should the amount of information to be supplied in order to satisfy the pre-registration requirements for admittance to EU auctions depend on the:

 \boxtimes means of establishing the trading relationship;

 \boxtimes identity of bidder;

whether auctioning spot or futures;

 \boxtimes size of bid;

 \boxtimes means of payment and delivery;

anything else? Please specify:

If so, what should the differences be?

A:

Question 29

Should the bidder pre-registration requirements under the Regulation apply in the same manner irrespective of whether or not the auctioneer is covered by the MiFID or AML rules? <u>Yes</u>

A:

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If not, why not?
```

A:

Please provide arguments to support your case.

Question 30

Do you agree that the auctioneer(s) should be allowed to rely on pre-registration checks carried out by reliable third parties including:

Other auctioneers? Yes if the procedures for pre-registration are defined at EU level and are subject to control.

Credit and/or financial institutions? <u>Yes if the procedures for pre-registration are defined at EU level and are subject to control.</u>

Other? Please specify:

Please comment on your choice.

A:

In order to facilitate bidder pre-registration in their home country, should the auctioneer(s) be allowed to provide for pre-registration by potential bidders in other (or all) Member States than the auctioneer's home country e.g. by outsourcing this to a reliable third party? <u>No comments.</u>

Yes No

Please comment on your choice:

A:

If so, should such entities be:

Covered by the AML rules?

Covered by MiFID?

Covered by both?

 \square

Other? Please specify:

Please comment on your choice:

A:

Question 32

Should the Regulation prohibit the multiplicity of pre-registration checks in the case of Member States auctioning jointly?

<u>Yes [X]</u>

No 🗌

Please comment on your choice.

Yes : only if the pre-registration procedure are established at EU level and are subject to control.

Question 33

Do you agree that the *level* of collateral accepted in EUA auctions should be harmonised for all EU ETS auctions? [Y/N]_

If so, how should they be harmonised? Yes, through the FCD and SFD Directives.

A:

If not, why not?

Do you agree that the *type* of collateral accepted in EUA auctions should be harmonised for all EU ETS auctions? [Y/N]_

If so, how should they be harmonised? Yes, through the FCD and SFD Directives.

A:

If not, why not?

A:

Question 35

Do you agree that 100% collateral in electronic money transfer ought to be deposited upfront at a central counterparty or credit institution designated by the auctioneer to access spot auctions? $[Y/N]_{-}$

If not, why not? No comments.

A:

What alternative(s) would you suggest? Please provide arguments to support your case:

A:

Question 36

In case futures are auctioned, should a clearing house be involved to mitigate credit and market risks? <u>Yes, it seems appropriate.</u>

If so, should specific rules – other than those currently used in exchange clearing houses – apply to:

the	level	of the	initial	margin
une	10,01	or the	mmuu	margin

 \square

the level of variation margin calls;

 \square

the daily frequency of variation margin call payments?

If you have answered yes, please justify and elaborate on the rules that should apply and the mechanisms to implement them:

What are the most preferable payment and delivery procedures that should be implemented for auctioning EUAs? <u>No comments.</u>

Payment before delivery.



Delivery versus payment.

Both.

Please comment on your choice.

A:

Question 38

Irrespective of the payment procedure, should the Regulation fix a maximum delay of time for payment and delivery to take place? $[Y/N]_{-}$

If yes; what should it be?

4 working days
5 working days

(6 wor	king	days
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7 w	orking	days
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Other? Please specify:

Question 39

Should the Regulation provide any specific provisions for the handling of payment and delivery incidents or failures? <u>Yes</u>

If yes, what should they be?

A:

 \square

Question 40

Should the Regulation provide for all matters that are central to the very creation, existence and termination or frustration of the transaction arising from the EUA auctions? <u>Yes</u>.

If not, why not?

If so, are the matters enumerated below complete? Yes

- The designation of the parties' to the trade.
- The characteristics of the auctioned product:
 - o <u>Nature</u>: EUAs or EUAAs, trading period concerned.
 - Date of delivery: date at which winning bidders will receive the allowances on their registry account.
 - Date of payment: date at which payment will be required from winning bidders.
 - Lot size: number of allowances associated with one unit of the auctioned good.
- Events of `force majeure' and resulting consequences.
- Events of default by the auctioneer and/or the bidder and their consequences.
- Applicable remedies or penalties.
- The regime governing the judicial review of claims across the EU.

If not, what additional matters should be foreseen in the Regulation and why?

A:

Question 41

Should the Regulation provide for rules on jurisdiction and the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments? <u>Yes</u>

If so, should these be:

- specific to the Regulation;
- by reference to the Brussels I Regulation;
- by citing exceptions from the Brussels I Regulation;
- by citing additions to the Brussels I Regulation? This may be also necessary.

Please comment on your choice:

A:

If not, why not?

Which auction model is preferable?

Direct bidding? <u>Direct bidding has to be chosen in case there is no single EU</u> platform and no EU regulation of the carbon market because it enables actors which are subject to the EU ETS constraints to participate directly in the auctions without transiting via unregulated intermediaries.

Indirect bidding?

Both? A mix of direct and indirect bidding is acceptable only if there is a single EU platform and an EU Regulation of the market

Please comment on your choice.

A:

Question 43

If an indirect model is used, what share of the total volume of EU allowances could be auctioned through indirect bidding ? In the context of mixed direct and indirect bidding, there should not be ceilings established for each category.

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A:


Question 44

If the primary participants model is used, what provisions would be desirable for mitigating disadvantages of restricting direct access (more than one answer is possible):

\mathbf{X}	Allow direct access to largest emitters, even if they trade only on their own account?
	If so, who should have direct access and what thresholds should apply?
	Disallow primary participants trading on their own account?
	Impose strict separation of own-account trading from trading on behalf of indirect bidders?
	Other? Please specify:

Question 45

If the primary participants' model is used, what conflict of interest requirements should be imposed? (more than one answer possible) <u>No comment.</u>



Separation of collateral management, payment and delivery on behalf of clients from all own account trading activities.

Separation of anything else, please specify:

Question 46

What obligations should apply to primary participants acting in EU-wide auctions as:


No comment.

- Intermediaries? A:
- Market makers? A:

Please provide arguments to support your case.

Question 47

Under what conditions should auctioning through exchanges be allowed (more than one answer possible): <u>No comment</u>



Also for spot auctions open to established members of the exchange?



Only when the exchange-based auction is open to non-established members on a non-discriminatory cost-effective basis?



Other? Please specify:

Please provide arguments to support your case.

Should direct auctions be allowed through:

1) Third party service providers? [Y/N]_

2) Public authorities? <u>Public authorities seem preferable because they are subject to</u> <u>public control. Third party services providers could intervene only of they are subject</u> <u>to strict regulations and controls.</u>

Please comment on your selection:

A:

Question 49

Do the general rules for auctioning EUAs suffice for ensuring full, fair and equitable access to allowances to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters? <u>Yes</u>.

If not, why not?

A:

Question 50

Is allowing non-competitive bids necessary for ensuring access to allowances to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters in case of:

- discriminatory-price auctions? <u>No. Such system has not proven to be efficient</u> enough through the past experiences (eg : in 2009, only 5050 tons allocated in Austria via this system while 100.000 tons were set aside for this purpose).
- uniform-price auctions ? No (same reasons).

Question 51

If non-competitive bids are provided for in spot auctions, what maximum share of allowances could be allocated through this route ? <u>No comment.</u>

10%

Other? Please specify:	
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Please comment on your choice.

What rule should apply for accessing non-competitive bids (more than one answer possible): <u>No comment.</u>

Participants should only be allowed to use one of the two bidding routes?

Non-competitive bids should be restricted to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters only?



Other? Please specify:

Please comment on your choice.

5 000 EUAs

A:

Question 53

What should be the maximum bid-size allowed for SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters submitting non-competitive bids? <u>No comment.</u>

Γ	٦	

 \Box

10 000 EUAs 25 000 EUAs

Over 25 000 EUAs, please specify exact size and give reasons for your answer:

Question 54

Are there any other specific measures not mentioned in this consultation that may be necessary for ensuring full, fair and equitable access to allowances for SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters? <u>No comment.</u>

If so, please specify:

A:

Question 55

What should be the minimum period of time before the auction date for the release of the notice to auction?

2 weeks 1 month 2 months [X]

Other Please specify:

Please comment on your proposal. The agenda for the whole year should be published at least 2 months before the beginning of the year so as to ensure good predictability.

A:

Question 56

What should be the minimum period of time before the auction date for the submission of the intention to bid?

<u>1 week [X]</u>	2 weeks	1 month 🗌
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Other Please specify:

Please comment on your proposal. It is important to enable actors to intervene as late as possible in case they have to face sudden changes in their needs due to the fluctuations of the market.

Question 57

Are there any specific provisions that need to be highlighted in:

The notice to auction?

The intention to bid?

Both?

Please specify what they are. No comment.

Question 58

What information should be disclosed after the auction:

Clearing price (if allowances are awarded on a uniform-price basis or in the case of non-competitive bids being allowed)?

- Average price (if allowances are awarded on a discriminatory-price basis)?
- Any relevant information to solve tied bids?
- Total volume of EUAs auctioned?
- Total volume of bids submitted distinguishing between competitive and non-competitive bids (if applicable)?
- Total volume of allowances allocated?
- Anything else? <u>Yes.</u> Please specify:
 - <u>Number of participants</u>
 - <u>Number of participants served</u>
 - Ratio supply/demand
 - <u>% served for the marginal band</u>

• <u>indicator of the relative concentration of the amounts served to the participants.</u>

Question 59

What should be the maximum delay for the announcement of auction results?

5 minutes 15 minutes 30 minutes [X]

1 hour

Other Please specify:

Please comment on your proposal. <u>15 minutes seems technically possible.</u>

Question 60

Do you feel that any specific additional provisions should be adopted in the Regulation for the granting of fair and equal access to auction information? <u>No comment.</u>

If so, what may they be?

Question 61

Should an auction monitor be appointed centrally to monitor all EU auctions?

Yes. It is of utmost importance in order to ensure that no distorsive and anticompetitive behaviours arise in the EU.

If not, why not?

A:

Question 62

Do you agree that the Regulation should contain general principles on [mark those that you agree with, [X]]:

the designation and mandate of the auction monitor; and

cooperation between the auctioneer(s) and the auction monitor?

Yes. The Regulation should be very precise.

If not, why not?

A:

Should these be supplemented by operational guidance, possibly through Commission guidelines? [Y/N] $_$

If not, why not?

Those provisions should be adopted through comitology with scrutiny because guidelines are not legally enforceable.

Question 63

Is there a need for harmonised market abuse provisions in the Regulation to prevent insider dealing and market manipulation?

Yes. It is absolutely necessary to define clear rules so as to discourage free riders. The provisions should be as pragmatic as those adopted in title VIII (additional greenhouse gases standards) –section D (Carbon market assurance) and section E (Additional carbon market assurance) of the Waxman/Markey bill at the House of Representatives. The Regulation should define provisions applicable for the spot market and the derivatives.

If not, why not?

A:

Please comment on your choice outlining the provisions you deem necessary and stating the reasons why.

A:

Question 64

Should the Regulation provide for harmonised enforcement measures to sanction [mark those that you agree with, [X]]:

Non-compliance with its provisions?

Market abuse?

Please provide arguments to support your case. <u>Sanctions are absolutely necessary in</u> order to maintain the credibility of the EU ETS and to foster confidence on the market. <u>Otherwise, financial investors will focus their attention on more reliable markets such as the future US system.</u>

Question 65

Should the enforcement measures include : <u>The sanctions should be based on the already existing EU legislation and should converge as close as possible to other legislation such as the Waxman/Markey bill.</u>



The suspension of the auctioneer(s) and/or bidders from the EU-wide auctions? If so, for how long should such suspension last? _____

Financial penalties?

If so, at what level should such penalties be fixed?



The power to address binding interim decisions to the auctioneer(s) and/or bidders to avert any urgent, imminent threat of breach of the Regulation with likely irreversible adverse consequences?



Anything else? Please specify:

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A:

Question 66

Should such enforcement measures apply at:

EU level? For better visibility and to avoid discrimination, those measures should best apply at EU level.

X	Nationa	al level ? <u>P</u>	ossible c	oordinat	on with	alread	dy exis	sting r	national	requ	ulatory
bodi	es may b	e possible	after en	suring th	e meas	ures a	re equ	iivaler	nt from	one	Member
State	<u>e to añot</u>	<u>her.</u>		Ŭ							

Both?

Please comment on your choice.

A:

Question 67

Who should enforce compliance with the Regulation (more than one answer is possible):



The auction monitor?

A competent authority at EU level ? <u>Such an authority seems the best solution to</u> avoid distorsions. To apply operational measures, national autorities may intervene as long as those measures are equivalent from one Member State to another.



A competent authority at national level?



Other? Please specify:

Please provide evidence to support your case.

Which of the three approaches for an overall EU auction model do you prefer? Please rate the options below (1 being the most preferable, 3 being the least preferable)

- _ Limited number of coordinated auction processes.
- _ Full centralisation based on a single EU-wide auction process. [X]
- _ The hybrid approach where different auction processes are cleared through a centralised system.

Please give arguments to support your case.

Full centralisation is preferred by far because it would create a level playing mechanism that would prevent distortions throughout EU. It is also important to remind the will of the Commission (see Communication of 23rd January 2009) to link different carbon schemes across OECD for year 2015. In this perspective, it is absolutely essential to create visibility and reliability of the EU ETS scheme through one single platform.

Question 69

If a limited number of coordinated auction processes develops, what should be the maximum number ? <u>No comment given answer to question 68.</u>

2
3
5
7
more than 7, please specify: _____
Please give arguments to support your case.

A:

Question 70

Is there a need for a transitional phase in order to develop gradually the optimal auction infrastructure? $[Y/N]_{-}$

If so, what kind of transitional arrangements would you recommend? <u>The system for phase III needs to established right now (3 years in advance) so as to</u> <u>create predictability, credibility and confidence. Phase II experimental auctions in</u> <u>Member States should be designed in order to fit with the Phase III target system and</u> <u>not the contrary: Phase III system must not be designed depending on Phase II</u> <u>auctioning systems' constraints because the characteristics of the markets will be</u> <u>completely different between Phase II and Phase III.</u>

Should the Regulation impose the following requirements for the auctioneer(s) and auction processes? <u>Yes for all those items.</u>

Technical capabilities of auctioneers:

- ☑ capacity and experience to conduct auctions (or a specific part of the auction process) in an open, fair, transparent, cost-effective and non-discriminatory manner;
- appropriate investment in keeping the system up-to-date and in line with ongoing market and technological developments; and
- relevant professional licences, high ethical and quality control standards, compliance with financial and market integrity rules.

Integrity:

- guarantee confidentiality of bids, ability to manage market sensitive information in an appropriate manner;
- duly protected electronic systems and appropriate security procedures with regards to identification and data transmission;
- appropriate rules on avoiding and monitoring conflicts of interest; and
- \boxtimes full cooperation with the auction monitor.

Reliability:

- robust organisation and IT systems;
- adequate fallback measures in case of unexpected events;
- minimisation of the risk of cancelling an individual auction once announced;
- minimisation of the risk of failing functionalities (e.g. access to the bidding platform for certain potential bidders); and
- fallback system in case of IT problems on the bidder side.

Accessibility and user friendliness:

- ☑ fair, concise, comprehensible and easily accessible information on how to participate in auctions;
- \boxtimes short and simple pre-registration forms;
- \boxtimes clear and simple electronic tools;
- (option of) accessibility of platforms through a dedicated internet interface;
- ability of the auction platform to connect to and communicate with proprietary trading systems used by bidders;
- adequate and regular training (including mock auctions);
- detailed user guidance on how to participate in the auction; and
- ability to test identification and access to the auction.

Please elaborate if any of these requirements need not be included.

A:

Please elaborate what additional requirements would be desirable.

A:

Question 72

What provisions on administrative fees should the Regulation include (more than one answer is possible)?

General principles on proportionality, fairness and non-discrimination.

Rules on fee structure.

Rules on the amount of admissible fees.

Other? Please specify:

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A:

Question 73

Should there be provisions for public disclosure of material steps when introducing new (or adapted) auction processes? <u>Yes.</u>

A:

Should new (or adapted) auction process be notified to and authorised by the Commission before inclusion in the auction calendar ? <u>Yes.</u>

Which one of the following options is the most appropriate in case a Member State does not hold auctions (on time)?



Auctions by an auctioneer authorised by the Commission.

Automatic addition of the delayed quantities to those foreseen for the next two or three auctions.

What other option would you envisage? Please specify:

A:

Question 75

Should a sanction apply to a Member State that does not auction allowances in line with its commitments? <u>Yes.</u>

If so, what form should that sanction take?

Transfer of part of the fees from actors under the scope of the EU ETS Directive to the Member State.

Question 76

As a general rule throughout the trading period, in your opinion, are early auctions necessary? <u>No comment.</u>

If so, what should the profile of EUAA auctions be:

- 5-10% in year n-2, 10-20% in year n-1, remainder in year n
- 10-20% in year n-2, 20-30% in year n-1, remainder in year n
- 20-30% in year n-2, 30-35% in year n-1, remainder in year n
- Other? Please specify:

Question 77

Do you think there is a need to auction EUAA futures? <u>No comment</u>. If so, why?


This page contains two questions that will not be made public. These questions cannot be completed on this document

Request for potentially confidential information 3	Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.					
	For aircraft operators covered by the EU ETS: No comment.					
	Have you determined a corporate hedging strategy for carbon needs? Yes [] No []					
	If so, what share of your expected emissions covered by the EU ETS in a given year n do you (intend to) hedge and how much in advance?					
	• year n :%					
	• year n-1 :%					
	• year n-2 :%					

Request for potentially confidential information 4	Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-					
	No comment.					
	2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.					
	What share of the annual quantity of allowances you intend to purchase <i>via</i> auctions would you wish to buy spot or futures respectively? <u>No comment.</u>					
			SI	РОТ	FUTURES	
	• y	ear n	: _	%	9⁄0	
	• y	ear n-1	: _	%	%	
	• y	ear n-2	: _	%	%	

What should be the optimal frequency and size of EUAA auctions:

2 auctions per year of around 15 million EUAAs?



More than 3 auctions per year? Please specify:

Please comment on your choice. <u>No comment.</u>

A:

Question 79

What would be your preferred timing for EUAA auctions:

	Equally	spread	throughout	the year?
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November – March?

Question 80

Should any of the EUAA auction design elements be different compared to EUA auctions (see section 3)? <u>No comment.</u>

If so, please specify and comment on your choice.

A:

Question 81

Do you agree there is no need for a maximum bid-size? <u>No comment.</u> If not, why not?

A:

Question 82

Is there any information regarding aircraft operators made available as part of the regulatory process to the competent authorities that could facilitate the KYC checks performed by the auctioneer(s)? $[Y/N]_{-}$

If so, please describe what information is concerned and whether it should be referred to in the Regulation or any operational guidance published by the Commission.

No comment.

Question 83

In your opinion, is there a specific need to allow for non-competitive bids in EUAA auctions? <u>No comment.</u>

A:

Would this be the case even when applying a uniform clearing price format?

A:

Please provide arguments to support your case.

Question 84

Do you agree that there is no need for any specific provisions for EUAA auctions as regards <u>No comment.</u>

- Involvement of primary participants, exchanges or third party service providers?
- Guarantees and financial assurance?
- Payment and delivery?
- Information disclosure?
- Auction monitoring?
- Preventing anti-competitive behaviour and/or market manipulation?
- Enforcement?

If not, please describe in detail what rules would be needed and why.

A:

Question 85

Taking into account the smaller volume of EUAA allowances to be auctioned compared to EUAs, which of the three approaches for an overall EUAA auctioning model do you prefer? <u>No comment</u>. Please rate the options below (1 being the most preferable, 3 being the least preferable)

- _ Limited number of coordinated auction processes.
- _ Full centralisation based on a single EU-wide auction process.
- _ Hybrid approach where different auction processes are cleared through a centralised system.

Does your choice differ from the approach preferred for EUAs? [Y/N] _

Please provide arguments to support your case.

Do you agree that there is no need for any specific provisions for EUAA auctions as regards. [mark those that you agree with, [mark]]:

Requirements for the auctioneer(s) and auction processes?



Administrative fees?

Rules to ensure appropriate and timely preparation of the auctions?

If not, please describe in detail what rules would be needed and why.