EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions

This document is the questionnaire for this consultation. The survey contains 4 initial questions (A-D) to identify respondents, 86 questions for which responses will be made public and 4 questions that are classified confidential, must be sent directly to the European Commission and will not be made public. The questions that are classified potentially confidential are on two separate pages (2 questions on each page) and highlighted in green boxes.

Period of consultation

From 3 June 2009 to 3 August 2009 inclusive

How to submit your contribution

This consultation seeks to obtain feedback from all categories of stakeholders regarding the different aspects of auction design and implementation covered in the Consultation Paper.

We are sorry for the inconvenience, but the web-based survey is not available yet. If participants wish to complete the survey on this document and send their contributions back to **contact ets auctions consultation@icfi.com** their responses can be accepted in this format. The web-based survey will be available as soon as possible if participants wish to wait till that is available.

Received contributions will be published on the Internet. It is important to read the specific privacy statement attached to this consultation for information on how your personal data and contribution will be dealt with.

Specific privacy statement

"Received contributions, together with the identity of the contributor, will be published on the Internet, unless the contributor objects to publication of his or her personal data on the grounds that such publication would harm his or her legitimate interests. In such cases the contribution may be published in an anonymous form. Otherwise, the contribution will not be published nor will, in principle, its content be taken into account. Responses for questions deemed confidential in the consultation will not be available for view on the website irrespective of contributor objecting or not."

Instructions to filling out the questionnaire

Questions may only be answered in designated response fields

•	For certain multiple choice questions, simply click on box to indicate choice
•	Answer [Y/N] questions by typing "y" / "Y" or "n" / "N" on underlined area ()
•	Some responses require explanations, additional comments and detailed answers These will either by identified by underline () or an answer section (A:). The amount of text that can be entered here is unlimited.
•	After completing the survey, please save and send to contact_ets_auctions_consultation@icfi.com
•	If any questions seem unclear in context or for method of response, please mail contact_ets_auctions_consultation@icfi.com to clarify

Thank you

Section 1: Questions to categorize participants

Quest	tion A			
Name of Company/Organization: Fortum Corporation				
Princi	pal natu	are of activities:		
Numb	er of en	nployees in 2008:		
World	l-wide _	Europe-wide		
Turno	ver in 2	0008:		
World	l-wide _	Europe-wide		
_	cion B			
Type	of respo	ondent:		
	Memb	per State		
	Comp	any operating one or more installations covered by the EU ETS		
		Electricity generators		
		Energy companies other than electricity generators		
		Industrial sectors		
		Aviation		
		Other. Please specify:		
	Appro	ox Annual Emissions: <u>18 million</u> tCO ₂		
	Interr	mediary		
		Financial institution		
		Trading arm of non-financial institution		

Contact details will not be made public.

Question D

Questions relating to the "Specific privacy statement" above.

2	end remains to the Experience provides a server
0	Do you object to publication of your personal data because it would harm your legitimate interests? $[Y/N]_{-}$
	If so, please provide an explanation of the legitimate interests that you think will be harmed:
	A:
0	Are any of your responses confidential? [Y/N] _
	If so, please indicate which ones and provide an explanation:
	A:

Section 2: Survey questions (86) and potentially confidential questions (4)

As a general rule throughout the trading period, in your opinion, are early auctions necessary? [Y/N] \underline{Y}				
If so, what should the profile of EUA auctions be?				
	5-10% in year n-2, 10-20% in year n-1, remainder in year n			

10-20% in year n-2, 20-30% in year n-1, remainder in year n

20-30% in year n-2, 30-35% in year n-2, remainder in year n

Other? Please specify: three year forwards should be available as well, at least 5% in year n-3, EUA2013 and EUA2014 should be available already in 2011

Question 2

X

Question 1

Do you think there is a need to auction futures? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$

If so, why so?

A: Market participants need to be able to hedge their positions. Especially power market participants shall be able to reduce risk of the higher EUA price, since they may have electricity sales contracts with fixed prices. Auctioning futures also enables the start of the EUA auction before 2013, which is also important for the continuity of the market from the Kyoto priod to the period 2013-2020. Auctioning of forwards before 2013 is more straightforward and simple than auctioning of spot, because delivery and payments take place in the future.

Starting 2013 the volumes of the emission allowances companies need to purchase will increase drastically and market participants should be allowed to choose the trading and hedging profile most suitable for them.

What share of allowances should be auctioned spot and what share should be auctioned as futures for each year?

		SPOT		FUTURES	
•	year n	:	<u>50</u> %	<u>50</u> %	
•	year n-1	:	<u>30</u> %	<u>70</u> %	
•	year n-2	:	<u>20</u> %	<u>80</u> %	

Please provide evidence to support your case.

A: This auctioning profile would allow sufficient hedging possibilities.

NB: The answer to this question will be published as part of the public consultation. Please do not submit confidential information as part of your answer to this question.

Question 4

Should the common maturity date used in futures auctions be in December (so the maturity date would be December in year n, both when auctioning in year n-2 as when auctioning in year n-1)? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$

If not, please suggest alternative maturity dates and provide evidence to support your view.

A:

This page contains two questions that will not be made public. These questions cannot be completed on this document

Request for	
potentially	
confidential	
information	1

Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.

For ETS operators: what share of your expected emissions covered by the EU ETS in a given year n do you hedge and how much in advance?

• year n : _____%

• year n-1 : _____%

• year n-2 : _____%

• earlier years (please specify) : %

Request for potentially confidential information 2

Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.

What share of the annual quantity of allowances you intend to purchase *via* auctions would you wish to buy spot or futures respectively?

		SPOT	FUTURES
•	year n	:%	<u> </u>
•	year n-1	:%	<u> </u>
•	year n-2	:%	ó %

Please specify whether you are an:

ETS operator; or

• other participant.

For spot auctions:			
What should be the optimum frequency of auctions?			
	Weekly?		
	Fortnightly?		
	Monthly?		
	Quarterly?		
	Other? Please specify:		
What s	should be the minimum frequency of auctions?		
	Weekly?		
	Fortnightly?		
	Monthly?		
	Quarterly?		
	Other? Please specify:		
What s	should be the maximum frequency of auctions?		
	Weekly?		
	Fortnightly?		
	Monthly?		
	Quarterly?		
	Other? Please specify:		

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A: Number of auctions shall remain reasonable. If there is only one common platform in use, auctions should be arranged monthly or even more often. If there are several auctioning places, quarterly auctions on each market place is a suitable frequency. To avoid disturbance on the secondary market there should be an auction at least monthly.

Having fairly frequent auctions reduces the risk of market manipulation, since the lot sizes will be smaller and there will be auctions on both high and low EUA market price levels. For market participants it is good that there are frequent auctions so they can freely choose when they wish to participate. Frequent auctions also enable distribution of costs of allowances into smaller portions.

Quest	ion 6
For sp	ot auctions, what should be the:
•	Optimum auction size? <u>Annual volume divided by 12</u>
•	Minimum auction size? <u>10 million EUA</u>
•	Maximum auction size?
If deer	med appropriate, please indicate a range and/or distribution over different sizes.
Please	provide arguments to support your case.
A:Eac	h auction should be equal in size so they are equally interesting for the market.
Quest	ion 7
For fu	tures auctions:
What	should be the optimum frequency of auctions?
	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?
\boxtimes	Monthly?
	Quarterly?
	Other? Please specify:
What	should be the minimum frequency of auctions?
	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?

	ssions Trading Scheme (ETS) – ation on design and organisation of er	missions allowance auctions	
	Monthly?		
\boxtimes	Quarterly?		
	Other? Please specify:		
What	should be the maximum from	equency of auctions?	
	Weekly?		
\boxtimes	Fortnightly?		
	Monthly?		
	Quarterly?		
	Other? Please specify:	<u></u>	
Please	e provide arguments to supp	port your case.	
A:The frequency should be the same as for the SPOT auctions. Frequent auctions enable distribution of costs of allowances into smaller portions.			
Quest	ion 8		
For fu	tures auctions, what should	be the:	
•	Optimum auction size?	Annual volume divided by 12	
•	Minimum auction size?	10 million EUA	
•	Maximum auction size?		
If deemed appropriate, please indicate a range and/or distribution over different sizes.			
Please provide evidence to support your case.			
A:Each auction should be equal in size so they are equally interesting for the market.			
Quest			
Should	d volumes of spot allowanc	es be auctioned evenly throughout the year? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$	

If not, specify	how should volumes be distributed? (more than one answer possible) Please		
	A larger proportion in the first 4 months of the year?		
	A larger proportion in December?		
	A smaller proportion in July and August?		
	Other? Please specify:		
Questi	ion 10		
	e futures are auctioned, should the volumes for spot and futures auctions be spread as year in the same manner? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$		
If not,	how should they differ? (more than one answer possible)		
	No futures auctions less than six months before the maturity date.		
	A larger proportion in December.		
	A smaller proportion in July and August.		
	Otherwise? Please specify how and comment:		
Questi	ion 11		
	he Regulation need to have provisions to avoid holding auctions during a short of time before the surrendering date (30 April each year)? $[Y/N] N$		
If yes,	how long should this period be:		
One w	eek 2 weeks 1 month 1		
	e futures are auctioned, should there be similar provisions with respect to the period liately prior to the maturity date?		
If yes,	how long should this period be:		

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions			
One w	week 2 weeks 3 weeks		1 month
Questi	stion 12		
Which	ch dates should be avoided? (more than o	one answ	er possible)
	Public holidays common in most Mer	nber Stat	es?
	Days where important relevant econo	mic data	is released?
	Days where emissions data are release	ed?	_
	Other? Please specify: All public holi	days in a	ll Member States
Please	se specify the dates you have in mind in	your ansv	wers.
Questi	stion 13		
Is a ha	narmonised 10-12 hrs CET auction slot of	lesirable?	Y [Y/N] <u>Y</u>
If not,	t, what alternative(s) would you suggest	?	
A:	<u> </u>		
Questi	stion 14		
How lo	long in advance should each element of	the cale	ndar be determined?
Annua	ual volumes to be auctioned:		
	1 year in advance		
	2 years in advance		
	3 years in advance		
	more years in advance		

Distrib	oution of annual volumes over spot and futures (if applicable):		
	1 year in advance		
	2 years in advance		
	3 years in advance		
	more years in advance		
Dates	of individual auctions:		
	1 year in advance		
	2 years in advance		
\boxtimes	3 years in advance		
	more years in advance		
Volum	ne and product type for individual auctions:		
	1 year in advance		
	2 years in advance		
	3 years in advance		
	more years in advance		
Each a	nuctioneer carrying out auction process (if more than one):		
	1 year in advance		
	2 years in advance		
	3 years in advance		
	more years in advance		
Please	provide arguments to support your case.		
A:The frequency and volumes must be known for the whole ETS period 2013-2020 in advance.			

What should be the volume of allowances to be auctioned in 2011 and 2012?

- in 2011:30 % of the 2013 volume and 10% of the 2014 volume
- in 2012:30% of the 2013 volume and 20% of the 2014 volume

What percentage of these shares should be auctioned as futures?

- in 2011: 20% of the 2013 share and 0% of the 2014 share
- in 2012: 30% of the 2013 share and 20% of the 2014 share

Please provide evidence to support your case.

A: We prefer forward auctions, but SPOT products could also be available. For small participants in the ETS spot auctions are more straightforward, as they may not have the processes in place for futures.

There should be SPOT + 2 years futures auctions and SPOT auctions can start in 2013, before that auctions will be future auctions.

What s	should be the rule with respect to allowances not auctioned due to <i>force majeure</i> ?			
	They should automatically be added to the next auction on the calendar, irrespective of the auction process.			
	They should be auctioned within one month, though leaving flexibility as to which auction(s) the EUAs should be added.			
	They should be auctioned within three months, though leaving flexibility as to which auction(s) the EUAs should be added.			
	Other? Please specify:			
Questi	ion 17			
Is 1,000 allowances the most appropriate lot size? [Y/N] \underline{N}				
If not,	why not?			
A: it should be possible to purchase even 1 allowance				
Questi	ion 18			
Is a single-round sealed-bid auction the most appropriate auction format for auctioning EU allowances? [Y/N] \underline{Y}				
If not,	please comment on your alternative proposal?			
A:In addition it must be possible to leave in several bids by same bidder.				
Questi	ion 19			
What i	is the most appropriate pricing rule for the auctioning of EU allowances?			
\boxtimes	Uniform-pricing.			
	Discriminatory-pricing.			

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions
Indifferent.
Please provide arguments to support your case.
A: EUA is a homogenous product and a reference price exists in the secondary market, uniform pricing is transparent
Question 20
Should the rules for solving ties in the Regulation be:
random selection; or
pro-rata re-scaling of bids?
Please comment on your choice.
A:This is more fair and simpler to organise.
Question 21
Should a reserve price apply?
A:No, there shall be no intervention to price setting mechanism, as any reserve price would distort the market. A reference price for EUA does exist in the secondary market.
Question 22
In case a reserve price would apply, should the methodology/formula for calculating it be kept secret? $[Y/N]$
Please comment on your choice.
A:

Question 23				
Is a maximum	Is a maximum bid-size per single entity desirable in a Uniform-price auction?			
[Y/N] <u>N</u>				
Is a maximum [Y/N] N	Is a maximum bid-size per single entity desirable in a discriminatory-price auction? $[Y/N] \underline{N}$			
Please comme	Please comment on your choice.			
A: Bidding should not be limited in any way except the requirements for pre-registration and warranties.				
Question 24				
		d-size limit (as a percentage of the volume of allowances one choice is possible):		
10%:	15%: 🗌	20%:		
25%: 🗌	30%: 🗌	More than 30%: Please specify:		
Please comment on your choice.				
A:				
Question 25				

In case only one of the two following options would be chosen, to limit the risk of market manipulation or collusion, which one would be preferable?

	A discriminatory-price auction format?
\boxtimes	A maximum bid-size per single entity?

Please comment on your choice.

A:

Are th	e following pre-registration requirements appropriate and adequate?
Identit	y:
\boxtimes	Natural or legal person;
	Name, address, whether publicly listed, whether licensed and supervised under the AML rules; membership of a professional association; membership of a chamber of commerce; VAT and/or tax number;
\boxtimes	Contact details of authorised representatives and proof of authorisation; and
	CITL-Registry account details.
	Anything else? Please specify:

Declar	rations with respect to the past 5 years on absence of:		
	Indictment or conviction of serious crimes: check corporate officers, directors, principals, members or partners;		
	Infringement of the rules of any regulated or unregulated market;		
	Permits to conduct business being revoked or suspended;		
	Infringement of procurement rules; and		
	Infringement of disclosure of confidential information.		
	Anything else? Please specify:		
Declarations and submission of documentation relating to:			
\boxtimes	Proof of identity;		
\boxtimes	Type of business;		
	Participation in EU ETS or not;		
	EU ETS registered installations, if any;		
	Bank account contact details;		
	Intended auctioning activity;		
	Whether bidding on own account or on behalf of another beneficial owner;		
\boxtimes	Corporate and business affiliations;		
	Creditworthiness;		
	Collateral; and		
	Whether it carries out transactions subject to VAT or transactions exempted from VAT.		
	Anything else? Please specify:		

Do you agree that the pre-regist be harmonised throughout the E	ration requirements for admittance to EU auctions should EU?		
Yes 🖂 N	o 🗌		
Please comment on your choice			
A:To keep the auction transaction costs as low as possible, there should be only one common EU-wide registry. Then participants only need to declare their registration number and sufficient warraties for each auction.			
Question 28			
Should the amount of informatic requirements for admittance to l	on to be supplied in order to satisfy the pre-registration EU auctions depend on the:		
means of establishing the	e trading relationship;		
identity of bidder;			
whether auctioning spot	or futures;		
size of bid;			
means of payment and d	elivery;		
anything else? Please sp	pecify:		
If so, what should the difference	es be?		
A:			
0 4 20			

Should the bidder pre-registration requirements under the Regulation apply in the same manner irrespective of whether or not the auctioneer is covered by the MiFID or AML rules? $[Y/N]_{-}$

A:	
If not, wh	y not?
A:	
Please pro	ovide arguments to support your case.
Question	30
	gree that the auctioneer(s) should be allowed to rely on pre-registration checks at by reliable third parties including: $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$
Ot	her auctioneers?
Cr	edit and/or financial institutions?
⊠ Ot	her? Please specify: Common EU-wide registry
Please cor	mment on your choice.
A:	
Question	31

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions

In order to facilitate bidder pre-registration in their home country, should the auctioneer(s) be allowed to provide for pre-registration by potential bidders in other (or all) Member States than the auctioneer's home country e.g. by outsourcing this to a reliable third party?			
Yes	No 🗌		
Please comm	nent on your choice:		
A:			
If so, should	such entities be:		
Cover	red by the AML rules?		
Cover	red by MiFID?		
Cover	red by both?		
Other	? Please specify:		
Please comm	ent on your choice:		
A:			
Question 32			
	egulation prohibit the multiplicity of pre-registration checks in the case of the auctioning jointly?		
Yes 🗌	No 🗌		
Please comm	ent on your choice.		
A: As mentioned, there must be a common EU-wide registry.			

Do you agree that the *level* of collateral accepted in EUA auctions should be harmonised for all EU ETS auctions? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$

If so, how should they be harmonised?

A:All Member States must participate in common auctions.

If not, why not?

A:

Question 34

Do you agree that the type of collateral accepted in EUA auctions should be harmonised for all EU ETS auctions? [Y/N] Y

If so, how should they be harmonised?

A:All Member States must participate in common auctions.

If not, why not?

A:

Question 35

Do you agree that 100% collateral in electronic money transfer ought to be deposited upfront at a central counterparty or credit institution designated by the auctioneer to access spot auctions? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$

If not, why not?

A:

What alternative(s) would you suggest? Please provide arguments to support your case:

A:

Question 36
In case futures are auctioned, should a clearing house be involved to mitigate credit and market risks? [Y/N] \underline{Y}
If so, should specific rules – other than those currently used in exchange clearing houses – apply to:
the level of the initial margin;
the level of variation margin calls;
the daily frequency of variation margin call payments?
If you have answered yes, please justify and elaborate on the rules that should apply and the mechanisms to implement them:
A: clearing house shall request suitable margin calls based their risk exposure model
Question 37
What are the most preferable payment and delivery procedures that should be implemented for quotioning ELLA c?

implemented for auctioning EUAs?

Payment before delivery.

 \boxtimes Delivery versus payment.

Both.

Please comment on your choice.

A:

Irrespective of the payment procedure, should the Regulation fix a maximum delay of time for payment and delivery to take place? [Y/N] Y If yes; what should it be? \boxtimes 4 working days 5 working days 6 working days 7 working days Other? Please specify: _____ Question 39 Should the Regulation provide any specific provisions for the handling of payment and delivery incidents or failures? [Y/N] Y If yes, what should they be? A: **Ouestion 40** Should the Regulation provide for all matters that are central to the very creation, existence and termination or frustration of the transaction arising from the EUA auctions? [Y/N]_ If not, why not? A: If so, are the matters enumerated below complete? [Y/N] _ The designation of the parties' to the trade. The characteristics of the auctioned product: Nature: EUAs or EUAAs, trading period concerned. Date of delivery: date at which winning bidders will receive the allowances on

their registry account.

- o <u>Date of payment: date at which payment will be required from winning bidders.</u>
- o Lot size: number of allowances associated with one unit of the auctioned good.
- Events of `force majeure' and resulting consequences.
- Events of default by the auctioneer and/or the bidder and their consequences.
- Applicable remedies or penalties.
- The regime governing the judicial review of claims across the EU.

If not, what additional matters should be foreseen in the Regulation and why?

A:

Question 41

Should the Regulation pro	ovide for rules or	i jurisdiction and	d the mutual	recognition	and
enforcement of judgment	s? [Y/N] _				

If so, should these be:

specific to the Regulation;
by reference to the Brussels I Regulation;
by citing exceptions from the Brussels I Regulation;
by citing additions to the Brussels I Regulation?

Please comment on your choice:

A:

If not, why not?

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions	
A:	
Ougst	ion 42
Which	a auction model is preferable?
\boxtimes	Direct bidding?
	Indirect bidding?
	Both?
Please	comment on your choice.
A:Mai	rket participants must be allowed to choose the way they wish to take part in ns.
Quest	ion 43
	ndirect model is used, what share of the total volume of EU allowances could be ned through indirect bidding?
Please	provide arguments to support your case.
A:	

If the primary participants model is used, what provisions would be desirable for mitigating disadvantages of restricting direct access (more than one answer is possible):	
	Allow direct access to largest emitters, even if they trade only on their own account?
	If so, who should have direct access and what thresholds should apply?
	Disallow primary participants trading on their own account?
	Impose strict separation of own-account trading from trading on behalf of indirect bidders?
	Other? Please specify:
Quest	ion 45
If the primary participants' model is used, what conflict of interest requirements should be imposed? (more than one answer possible)	
	Separation of client registration and trading on behalf of clients from all own account trading activities.
	Separation of collateral management, payment and delivery on behalf of clients from all own account trading activities.
	Separation of anything else, please specify:
Question 46	
What	obligations should apply to primary participants acting in EU-wide auctions as:
•	Intermediaries? A:
•	Market makers? A:
Please	provide arguments to support your case.

Question 47	
	what conditions should auctioning through exchanges be allowed (more than one r possible):
	Only for futures auctions open to established members of the exchange?
	Also for spot auctions open to established members of the exchange?
	Only when the exchange-based auction is open to non-established members on a non-discriminatory cost-effective basis?
	Other? Please specify:
Please provide arguments to support your case.	
A:	
Questi	ion 48
Should	d direct auctions through [mark those that you agree with, []:
	third party service providers; or
	public authorities be allowed?
If not,	why not?
A:	

Do the general rules for auctioning EUAs suffice for ensuring full, fair and equitable access to allowances to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters? [Y/N] _	
If not, why not?	
A:	
Question 50	
Is allowing non-competitive bids necessary for ensuring access to allowances to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters in case of:	
• discriminatory-price auctions? A:	
• uniform-price auctions? A:	
Question 51	
If non-competitive bids are provided for in spot auctions, what maximum share of allowances could be allocated through this route?	
<u> </u>	
<u> </u>	
Other? Please specify:	
Please comment on your choice.	
A:	
Question 52	
What rule should apply for accessing non-competitive bids (more than one answer possible):	
Participants should only be allowed to use one of the two bidding routes?	

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions
Non-competitive bids should be restricted to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters only?
Other? Please specify:
Please comment on your choice.
A:
Question 53
What should be the maximum bid-size allowed for SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters submitting non-competitive bids?
5 000 EUAs
☐ 10 000 EUAs
25 000 EUAs
Over 25 000 EUAs, please specify exact size and give reasons for your answer:
Question 54
Are there any other specific measures not mentioned in this consultation that may be necessary for ensuring full, fair and equitable access to allowances for SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters? [Y/N] _
If so, please specify:
A:

Question 55
What should be the minimum period of time before the auction date for the release of the notice to auction?
2 weeks 1 month 2 months
Other Please specify:
Please comment on your proposal.
A: auction date shall be informed as early as possible, because decisionmaking in companies takes time
Question 56
What should be the minimum period of time before the auction date for the submission of the intention to bid?
1 week 2 weeks 1 month
Other Please specify:
Please comment on your proposal.
A:
Question 57
Are there any specific provisions that need to be highlighted in:
The notice to auction?
The intention to bid?
Both?
Please specify what they are.

A:	
Question 58	
What information should be disclosed after the auction:	
Clearing price (if allowances are awarded on a uniform-price basis or in the case of non-competitive bids being allowed)?	
Average price (if allowances are awarded on a discriminatory-price basis)?	
Any relevant information to solve tied bids?	
☐ Total volume of EUAs auctioned?	
Total volume of bids submitted distinguishing between competitive and non-competitive bids (if applicable)?	
Total volume of allowances allocated?	
Anything else? Please specify: <u>transparency requirements should be aligned with the corresponding rules in trading of other commodities</u>	
Question 59	
What should be the maximum delay for the announcement of auction results?	
5 minutes ☐ 30 minutes ☐	
1 hour	
Other Please specify:	
Please comment on your proposal.	
A:	
Question 60	

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions

Do you feel that any specific additional provisions should be adopted in the Regulation for the granting of fair and equal access to auction information? [Y/N] \underline{N}	
If so, what may they be?	
Quest	tion 61
Shoul	d an auction monitor be appointed centrally to monitor all EU auctions?
[Y/N]	$\underline{\mathbf{Y}}$
If not,	, why not?
A:	
Quest	tion 62
	ou agree that the Regulation should contain general principles on [mark those that gree with, \boxtimes]:
	the designation and mandate of the auction monitor; and
	cooperation between the auctioneer(s) and the auction monitor?
If not,	why not?
A:	
	d these be supplemented by operational guidance, possibly through Commission lines? [Y/N] \underline{Y}
If not,	why not?
A:	

Is there a need for harmonised market abuse provisions in the Regulation to prevent insider dealing and market manipulation? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$	
If not, why not?	
A:	
Please comment on your choice outlining the provisions you deem necessary and stating the reasons why.	
A:	
Question 64	
Should the Regulation provide for harmonised enforcement measures to sanction [mark those that you agree with, \boxtimes]:	
Non-compliance with its provisions?	
Market abuse?	
Please provide arguments to support your case.	
A:Since the compliance with the rules is essential, also sanctions must be known ahead. There is no reason why sanctions should be different in member states, in fact different sanctions might make some auctions more interesting than others.	
Question 65	
Should the enforcement measures include [mark those that you agree with, []]:	
The suspension of the auctioneer(s) and/or bidders from the EU-wide auctions? If so, for how long should such suspension last? 6 months	
Financial penalties? If so, at what level should such penalties be fixed?	

	issions Trading Scheme (ETS) – tation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions
	The power to address binding interim decisions to the auctioneer(s) and/or bidders to avert any urgent, imminent threat of breach of the Regulation with likely irreversible adverse consequences?
	Anything else? Please specify:
Pleas	e provide arguments to support your case.
A:	
Ques	tion 66
Shoul	ld such enforcement measures apply at:
	EU level?
	National level?
	Both?
Pleas	e comment on your choice.
A:	
Ques	tion 67
Who	should enforce compliance with the Regulation (more than one answer is possible):
	The auction monitor?
	The auctioneer?
	A competent authority at EU level?
	A competent authority at national level?
	Other? Please specify:
Pleas	e provide evidence to support your case.
A:	

Which of the three approaches for an overall EU auction model do you prefer? Please rate the options below (1 being the most preferable, 3 being the least preferable)

- 3 Limited number of coordinated auction processes.
- <u>1</u> Full centralisation based on a single EU-wide auction process.
- <u>2</u> The hybrid approach where different auction processes are cleared through a centralised system.

Please give arguments to support your case.

A: A centralised EU wide process promotes EU internal market, lowers administration costs and makes the system more simple. Also for all participants it is easiest to be involved in one system only. Also the required information management is best carried out by a single system.

Question 69

If a limited number of coordinated auction processes develops, what should be the maximum number?
☐ 3
☐ 5
□ 7
more than 7, please specify:
Please give arguments to support your case.
A:Please see previous answer.

Is there a need for a transitional phase in order to develop gradually the optimal auction infrastructure? $[Y/N] \underline{N}$		
If so, what kind of transitional arrangements would you recommend?		
Quest	ion 71	
Should the Regulation impose the following requirements for the auctioneer(s) and auction processes? [mark those that apply, \square]:		
Techn	ical capabilities of auctioneers:	
	capacity and experience to conduct auctions (or a specific part of the auction process) in an open, fair, transparent, cost-effective and non-discriminatory manner;	
	appropriate investment in keeping the system up-to-date and in line with ongoing market and technological developments; and	
	relevant professional licences, high ethical and quality control standards, compliance with financial and market integrity rules.	
Integr	ity:	
	guarantee confidentiality of bids, ability to manage market sensitive information in an appropriate manner;	
	duly protected electronic systems and appropriate security procedures with regards to identification and data transmission;	
	appropriate rules on avoiding and monitoring conflicts of interest; and	
	full cooperation with the auction monitor.	
Reliab	pility:	
	robust organisation and IT systems;	
	adequate fallback measures in case of unexpected events;	
	minimisation of the risk of cancelling an individual auction once announced;	
	minimisation of the risk of failing functionalities (e.g. access to the bidding platform for certain potential bidders); and	
	fallback system in case of IT problems on the bidder side.	
Access	Accessibility and user friendliness:	

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions
fair, concise, comprehensible and easily accessible information on how to participate in auctions;
short and simple pre-registration forms;
clear and simple electronic tools;
Option of) accessibility of platforms through a dedicated internet interface;
ability of the auction platform to connect to and communicate with proprietary trading systems used by bidders;
adequate and regular training (including mock auctions);
detailed user guidance on how to participate in the auction; and
ability to test identification and access to the auction.
Please elaborate if any of these requirements need not be included.
A:
Please elaborate what additional requirements would be desirable. A:
Question 72
What provisions on administrative fees should the Regulation include (more than one answer is possible)?
General principles on proportionality, fairness and non-discrimination.
Rules on fee structure.
Rules on the amount of admissible fees.
Other? Please specify:
Please provide arguments to support your case.
A: the same rules should apply

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions

Should there be provisions for public disclosure of material steps when introducing new (or adapted) auction processes?
A: Y
Should new (or adapted) auction process be notified to and authorised by the Commission before inclusion in the auction calendar?
A: Y
Question 74
Which one of the following options is the most appropriate in case a Member State does not hold auctions (on time)?
Auctions by an auctioneer authorised by the Commission.
Automatic addition of the delayed quantities to those foreseen for the next two or three auctions.
What other option would you envisage? Please specify:
A:
Question 75
Should a sanction apply to a Member State that does not auction allowances in line with
its commitments? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$ If so, what form should that sanction take?
A: Financial sanction
Question 76
As a general rule throughout the trading period, in your opinion, are early auctions necessary? $[Y/N]_{-}$
If so, what should the profile of EUAA auctions be:
5-10% in year n-2, 10-20% in year n-1, remainder in year n
10-20% in year n-2, 20-30% in year n-1, remainder in year n

	sions Trading Scheme (ETS) – tion on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions			
	20-30% in year n-2, 30-35% in year n-2, remainder in year n			
	Other? Please specify:			
Question 77				
Do you If so, v	u think there is a need to auction EUAA futures? [Y/N] _ why?			
A:				

This page contains two questions that will not be made public. These questions cannot be completed on this document

Request for	
potentially	
confidential	
information 3	3

Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.

For aircraft operators covered by the EU ETS:

Have you determined a corporate hedging strategy for carbon needs? Yes [] No []

If so, what share of your expected emissions covered by the EU ETS in a given year n do you (intend to) hedge and how much in advance?

• year n : _____%

• year n-1 : _____%

• year n-2 : _____%

Request for potentially confidential information 4

Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.

What share of the annual quantity of allowances you intend to purchase *via* auctions would you wish to buy spot or futures respectively?

		SPOT			FUTURES	
•	year n	: _	%		%	
•	year n-1	: _	%		%	
•	year n-2	: _	%		%	

Question 78
What should be the optimal frequency and size of EUAA auctions:
2 auctions per year of around 15 million EUAAs?
3 auctions per year of around 10 million EUAAs?
More than 3 auctions per year? Please specify: Monthly
Please comment on your choice.
A:
Question 79
What would be your preferred timing for EUAA auctions:
Equally spread throughout the year?
November – March?
Other? Please specify:
Question 80
Should any of the EUAA auction design elements be different compared to EUA auctions (see section 3)? [Y/N] _
If so, please specify and comment on your choice.
A:
Question 81 Do you agree there is no need for a maximum bid-size? [Y/N] _ If not, why not? A:
Question 82

Is there any information regarding aircraft operators made available as part of the regulatory process to the competent authorities that could facilitate the KYC checks performed by the auctioneer(s)? $[Y/N]_{-}$			
If so, please describe what information is concerned and whether it should be referred to in the Regulation or any operational guidance published by the Commission. A:			
Question 83			
In your opinion, is there a specific need to allow for non-competitive bids in EUAA auctions?			
A:			
Would this be the case even when applying a uniform clearing price format?			
A:			
Please provide arguments to support your case.			
Question 84			
Do you agree that there is no need for any specific provisions for EUAA auctions as regards [mark those that you agree with, \boxtimes]:			
☐ Involvement of primary participants, exchanges or third party service providers?			
Guarantees and financial assurance?			
Payment and delivery?			
☐ Information disclosure?			
Auction monitoring?			
Preventing anti-competitive behaviour and/or market manipulation?			
Enforcement?			
If not, please describe in detail what rules would be needed and why.			
A:			

Taking into account the smaller volume of EUAA allowances to be auctioned compared to EUAs, which of the three approaches for an overall EUAA auctioning model do you prefer? Please rate the options below (1 being the most preferable, 3 being the least preferable)

-	
_	Limited number of coordinated auction processes.
_	Full centralisation based on a single EU-wide auction process.
_	Hybrid approach where different auction processes are cleared through a centralised system.
Does y	our choice differ from the approach preferred for EUAs? [Y/N]_
Please]	provide arguments to support your case.
A:	
Questi	on 86
-	agree that there is no need for any specific provisions for EUAA auctions as . [mark those that you agree with, \boxtimes]:
	Requirements for the auctioneer(s) and auction processes?
	Administrative fees?
	Rules to ensure appropriate and timely preparation of the auctions?
If not, p	blease describe in detail what rules would be needed and why.
۸.	