# EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions

This document contains the responses for the survey. The survey contains 4 initial questions (A-D) to identify respondents and 86 questions for which responses will be made public. Contact details provided in Question C, are not made public and therefore are not in this document.

#### Period of consultation

From 3 June 2009 to 3 August 2009 inclusive

# Specific privacy statement

"Received contributions, together with the identity of the contributor, will be published on the Internet, unless the contributor objects to publication of his or her personal data on the grounds that such publication would harm his or her legitimate interests. In such cases the contribution may be published in an anonymous form. Otherwise, the contribution will not be published nor will, in principle, its content be taken into account. Responses for questions deemed confidential in the consultation will not be available for view on the website irrespective of contributor objecting or not."

#### Thank you

**Note:** Zero's on the right hand side of page reflect Non-Applicable questions in the survey response.

# **Section 1: Questions to categorize participants**

### **Question A**

Name of Company/Organization: Climex

Principal nature of activities: Exchange

#### Number of employees in 2008:

World-wide: 10 Europe-wide: 10

#### Turnover in 2008:

World-wide: Europe-wide:

#### **Question B**

# Type of respondent:

Other carbon market
Carbon exchange trading spot carbon

# **Question C**

Contact details will not be made public.

# **Question D**

Do you object to publication of your personal data because it would harm your legitimate interests?

No

If so, please provide an explanation of the legitimate interests that you think will be harmed:

Ans:

Are any of your responses confidential?

No

If so, please indicate which ones and provide an explanation:

Ans:

# Section 2: Survey questions (86)

#### **Question 1**

As a general rule throughout the trading period, in your opinion, are early auctions necessary?

Yes

#### If so, what should the profile of EUA auctions be?

Ans: Other? Please specify:

In line with what utilities need to hedge their exposure

#### **Question 2**

#### Do you think there is a need to auction futures?

No Response

0

#### **Question 3**

What share of allowances should be auctioned spot and what share should be auctioned as futures for each year?

	SPOT	FUTURES
Year n	50	
Year n-1		30
Year n-2		20

# Please provide evidence to support your case.

Ans: In principle hedging exposure can be adequately done in the existing secondary markets. However in the the transition from phase 2 to phase 3 it will be necessary to auction a certain proportion futures before 2013 to bridge the gap and reduce cash cost. As soon as possible the secondary market should take over again.

NB: The answer to this question will be published as part of the public consultation. Please do not submit confidential information as part of your answer to this question.

# **Question 4**

Should the common maturity date used in futures auctions be in December (so the maturity date would be December in year n, both when auctioning in year n-2 as when auctioning in year n-1)?

Yes

If not, please suggest alternative maturity dates and provide evidence to support your view.

Ans:

#### **Question 5**

For spot auctions:

What should be the optimum frequency of auctions?

Ans: Weekly

0

What should be the minimum frequency of auctions?

Ans: Fortnightly

0

What should be the maximum frequency of auctions?

Ans: Other.

Please Specify: daily

Please provide arguments to support your case.

Ans:

#### **Question 6**

For spot auctions, what should be the:

If deemed appropriate, please indicate a range and/or distribution over different sizes.

# Optimum auction size?

Ans:

Total annual volume divided by number of auctions

#### Minimum auction size?

Ans:

5 - 10 mln

# Maximum auction size?

Ans:

15 - 30 mln

### Please provide evidence to support your case.

Ans: Minimum volume should be sufficient to attract interest and the volume should be large enough to ensure that the total volume can still be covered in the total number of auctions held. The maximum volume should be a volume which does not disturb the secondary market too much, so is to a certain extent dependent on secondary market volumes

#### **Question 7**

For futures auctions:

If not, how should volumes be distributed? (more than one answer possible) Please specify:

[ ]	A larger proportion in the first 4 months of the year
[]	A larger proportion in December
[ ]	A smaller proportion in July and August
[]	Other.

#### **Question 10**

spread over the year in the same manner? Yes		
If not, how should they differ? (more than one answer possible)  [ ] No futures auctions less than six months before the maturity date.  [ ] A larger proportion in December.  [ ] A smaller proportion in July and August.  [ ] Otherwise?		
Question 11  Does the Regulation need to have provisions to avoid holding auctions during a short period of time before the surrendering date (30 April each year)?  No		
If yes, how long should this period be: Ans: No Response		
In case futures are auctioned, should there be similar provisions with respect to the period immediately prior to the maturity date?  No		
If yes, how long should this period be: Ans: No Response		
Question 12 Which dates should be avoided? Please specify the dates you have in mind in your answers.		
[X] Public holidays common in most Member States? Ans:		
[ ] Days where important relevant economic data is released? Ans:		
[ ] Days where emissions data are released? Ans:		
[ ] Other? Ans:		
Question 13 Is a harmonised 10-12 hrs CET auction slot desirable? Yes		
If not, what alternative(s) would you suggest? Ans:		

How long in advance should each element of the calendar be determined? Please provide arguments to support your case.

#### Annual volumes to be auctioned:

1 year in advance

Ans:

# Distribution of annual volumes over spot and futures (if applicable):

1 year in advance

Ans:

#### Dates of individual auctions:

1 year in advance

Ans:

#### Volume and product type for individual auctions:

1 year in advance

Ans: Many of these points could also be communicated less than a year in advance

# Each auctioneer carrying out auction process (if more than one):

1 year in advance

Ans:

# **Question 15**

What should be the volume of allowances to be auctioned in 2011 and 2012?

in 2011: 40% of the 2013 volume and \_\_\_\_% of the 2014 volume in 2012: 30% of the 2013 volume and 30% of the 2014 volume

#### Please provide evidence to support your case.

Ans:

#### What percentage of these shares should be auctioned as futures?

in 2011: 100% of the 2013 share and \_\_\_\_% of the 2014 share in 2012: 100% of the 2013 share and 100% of the 2014 share

#### Please provide evidence to support your case.

Ans: Volumes auctioned in advance can best be auctioned as futures because of efficient use of capital.

What should be the rule with respect to allowances not auctioned due to force majeure?

Ans: They should automatically be added to the next auction on the calendar, irrespective of the auction process.

0

# **Question 17**

Is 1,000 allowances the most appropriate lot size?

Yes

If not, why not?

Ans:

#### **Question 18**

Is a single-round sealed-bid auction the most appropriate auction format for auctioning EU allowances?

No

#### If not, please comment on your alternative proposal?

Ans: Single-round sealed-bid is most appropriate, but only if uniform pricing is used. If discriminatory pricing is used it is not the most appropriate format.

#### **Question 19**

What is the most appropriate pricing rule for the auctioning of EU allowances? Ans: Uniform-pricing.

#### Please provide arguments to support your case.

Ans: Fair, accessible, simpler to understand and to participate

#### **Question 20**

# Should the rules for solving ties in the Regulation be:

Ans: pro-rata re-scaling of bids

#### Please comment on your choice.

Ans: We believe time of entry would be a more appropriate way.

In case the auction is an open order book auction it should certainly be time of entry.

#### **Question 21**

Should a reserve price apply?

No

In case a reserve price would apply, should the methodology/formula for calculating it be kept secret?

Nο

#### Please comment on your choice.

Ans: However, our experience is that governments want a reserve price to control their risk. In such a case it should be clear how the reserve price is calculated and what happens with the volume in case this price is not met. In case of an open order book auction the choice might be to keep the formally secret to avoid collusion.

#### **Question 23**

Is a maximum bid-size per single entity desirable in a Uniform-price auction?

#### Please comment on your choice.

Ans: It will be virtually impossible to enforce this, because market participants can participate under different entities and/or intermdiaries.

Is a maximum bid-size per single entity desirable in a discriminatory-price auction?

#### Please comment on your choice.

Ans: It will be virtually impossible to enforce this, because market participants can participate under different entities and/or intermdiaries.

#### **Question 24**

If so, what is the desirable bid-size limit (as a percentage of the volume of allowances auctioned per auction):

Ans: No Response

Please comment on your choice.

Ans:

#### **Question 25**

In case only one of the two following options would be chosen, to limit the risk of market manipulation or collusion, which one would be preferable?

Ans: No Response

#### Please comment on your choice.

Ans: We think both options are not the right solution for trying to limit this risk. Other regulation should be used to limit this type of risk and the time of order entry would probably be a better option to use in the auction itself.

When having to choose between the above two we would select 'maximum bid-size per single entity'.

Are the following pre-registration requirements appropriate and adequate?		
Identity:		
[X]	Natural or legal person;	

[X] Name, address, whether publicly listed, whether licensed and supervised under the AML rules; membership of a professional association; membership of a chamber of commerce; VAT and/or tax number;

[X] Contact details of authorised representatives and proof of authorisation; and

[X] CITL-Registry account details.

[ ] Anything else?

0

#### Declarations with respect to the past 5 years on absence of:

[]	Indictment or conviction of serious crimes: check corporate officers, directors,
principals	s, members or partners;
[]	Infringement of the rules of any regulated or unregulated market;
[]	Permits to conduct business being revoked or suspended;
[]	Infringement of procurement rules; and
[]	Infringement of disclosure of confidential information.
[X]	Anything else?

Please specify: Generally used KYC (Know your Customer) procedures and selection criteria which are used in regulated market should apply. Only for installations with an operator holding account certain exceptions can be made to the criteria which apply in the regulated markets.

#### Declarations and submission of documentation relating to:

- [X] Proof of identity;
- [X] Type of business;
- [X] Participation in EU ETS or not;
- [X] EU ETS registered installations, if any;
- [X] Bank account contact details;
- [ ] Intended auctioning activity;
- [ ] Whether bidding on own account or on behalf of another beneficial owner;
- [X] Corporate and business affiliations;
- [X] Creditworthiness;
- [X] Collateral; and
- [X] Whether it carries out transactions subject to VAT or transactions exempted from

VĀT.

[X] Anything else?

Please specify: Bidding on own account or on behalf of another is only relevant in case an auction is only accessible to intermediaries

#### **Question 27**

Do you agree that the pre-registration requirements for admittance to EU auctions should be harmonised throughout the EU?

Yes

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) -Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions Please comment on your choice. Ans: This is crucial. **Question 28** Should the amount of information to be supplied in order to satisfy the pre-registration requirements for admittance to EU auctions depend on the: [] means of establishing the trading relationship; [] identity of bidder; whether auctioning spot or futures; [X] size of bid; [ ] means of payment and delivery; [ ] anything else? [ ] 0 If so, what should the differences be? Ans: The futures market is a fully regulated market and therewith a market which is not accessible for many compliance parties. These compliance parties should have access to the Spot market. The regulated market regime should therefore not one on one apply to the spot market. The registration requirements for the Spot market should leave room for direct participation of compliance parties. **Question 29** Should the bidder pre-registration requirements under the Regulation apply in the same manner irrespective of whether or not the auctioneer is covered by the MiFID or AML rules? No If not, why not? Ans: See answer to previous question Please provide arguments to support your case. Ans: **Question 30** Do you agree that the auctioneer(s) should be allowed to rely on pre-registration checks carried out by reliable third parties including:

Yes

[]	Other auctioneers?
[X]	Credit and/or financial institutions?

[X]

Please specify: Specially accredited pre-registration parties

Please comment on your choice.

Ans: This is however very difficult in practice and will probably not work. The party running the risk (clearing party) will probably not accept registration executed by other parties other than its own clearing members.

#### **Question 31**

In order to facilitate bidder pre-registration in their home country, should the auctioneer(s) be allowed to provide for pre-registration by potential bidders in other (or all) Member States than the auctioneer's home country e.g. by outsourcing this to a reliable third party?

Yes

#### Please comment on your choice:

Ans: If all apply the same criteria.

#### If so, should such entities be:

[X] Covered by the AML rules?

[X] Covered by MiFID?

[ ] Covered by both?

[X] Other

Please specify: Regulated market rules should apply, but again with exceptions for (smaller) compliance companies participating in Spot auctions only

#### Please comment on your choice:

Ans:

#### **Question 32**

Should the Regulation prohibit the multiplicity of pre-registration checks in the case of Member States auctioning jointly?

Yes

#### Please comment on your choice.

Ans: This will create unnecessary barriers of entry and pre-registration criteria should be harmonised and should therefore only have to be checked once.

#### **Question 33**

Do you agree that the level of collateral accepted in EUA auctions should be harmonised for all EU ETS auctions?

Yes

### If so, how should they be harmonised?

Ans: Ideally this should be harmonised, because it reduces the risk of price differences between different auctions related to the amount of cash needed upfront. This is however not the most crucial harmonisation point.

If not, why not?

Ans:

#### **Question 34**

# Do you agree that the type of collateral accepted in EUA auctions should be harmonised for all EU ETS auctions?

Yes

#### If so, how should they be harmonised?

Ans: Ideally yes. This is much less of an issue in the futures market, where this is organised based on the creditworthiness of a company than in the spot market where this influences the accessibility especially for SMEs

#### If not, why not?

Ans:

#### **Question 35**

Do you agree that 100% collateral in electronic money transfer ought to be deposited upfront at a central counterparty or credit institution designated by the auctioneer to access spot auctions?

No

#### If not, why not?

Ans: 100% collateral can be the general standard to start from. However, exceptions to this might be made:

- for futures auctions, because in the regulated futures market place tailored measures already exist
- for utilities and other large compliance buyers, because 100% collateral would force them to have a lot of cash available upfront

#### What alternative(s) would you suggest? Please provide arguments to support your case:

Ans: For futures (auctions) there is a well functioning infrastructure already in place. For spot auctions it should be up to the clearing house to judge is they allow a certain partipant to participate with a bank guarentee.

#### **Question 36**

In case futures are auctioned, should a clearing house be involved to mitigate credit and market risks?

Yes

If so, sho	ould specific rules – other than those currently used in exchange clearing
houses -	– apply to:
	the level of the initial require.

[]	the level of the initial margin;
[]	the level of variation margin calls;
[]	the daily frequency of variation margin call payments?

If you have answered yes, please justify and elaborate on the rules that should apply and the mechanisms to implement them:

Ans: general market practice should suffice

#### **Question 37**

What are the most preferable payment and delivery procedures that should be implemented for auctioning EUAs?

[]	Payment before delivery.
[X]	Delivery versus payment.
[ ]	Both.

#### Please comment on your choice.

Ans: Depends on type of auction and platform.

If existing platforms are used delivery versus payment is technically possible and the most efficient and secure way to automatically process the large auction volumes.

Payment before delivery is an easy way to reduce/avoid credit risk, but requires more checks and work

Depending on the model chosen some flexibility in these procedures might be recommended.

#### **Question 38**

Irrespective of the payment procedure, should the Regulation fix a maximum delay of time for payment and delivery to take place?

Yes

If yes; what should it be?

Ans: 4 working days

0

#### **Question 39**

Should the Regulation provide any specific provisions for the handling of payment and delivery incidents or failures?

Yes

#### If yes, what should they be?

Ans: Only very high level/general ones. The remainder should be left to the auction provider and in line with general market practice.

#### **Question 40**

Should the Regulation provide for all matters that are central to the very creation, existence and termination or frustration of the transaction arising from the EUA auctions?

No

# If not, why not?

Ans: This is part of the service which the auction provider should deliver. However, the more harmonised the easier it becomes for participants.

# If so, are the matters enumerated below complete?

- The designation of the parties' to the trade.
- The characteristics of the auctioned product:
  - Nature: EUAs or EUAAs, trading period concerned.
- o Date of delivery: date at which winning bidders will receive the allowances on their registry account
  - o Date of payment: date at which payment will be required from winning bidders.
  - o Lot size: number of allowances associated with one unit of the auctioned good.
- Events of `force majeure' and resulting consequences.

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- Events of default by the auctioneer and/or the bidder and their consequences.
- Applicable remedies or penalties.
- The regime governing the judicial review of claims across the EU.

Ans: No Response

If not, what additional matters should be foreseen in the Regulation and why? Ans:

# **Question 41**

Should the Regulation provide for rules on jurisdiction and the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments?

Yes

If so, should these be:		
[]	specific to the Regulation;	
[]	by reference to the Brussels I Regulation;	
[]	by citing exceptions from the Brussels I Regulation;	
[]	by citing additions to the Brussels I Regulation?	

#### Please comment on your choice:

Ans: Ideally one jurisdiction will apply to all auctions. The more harmonised the easier. Alternatively the jurisdiction of the auction provider will have to apply. The situation where 27 MS auction all under their own country jurisdiction will have to be avoided, because this would mean participants have to sign up seperately for every jurisdiction. If pre-registration requirements are harmonised, this should also be harmonised.

If not, why not?
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Ans:

#### **Question 42**

Which auction model is preferable?

[]	Direct bidding?
[]	Indirect bidding?
[X]	Both?

# Please comment on your choice.

Ans:

#### **Question 43**

If an indirect model is used, what share of the total volume of EU allowances could be auctioned through indirect bidding?

Ans: Direct and indirect bidding should both be available in each auction and should not be seperated.

Please provide arguments to support your case.

Ans:

If the primary participants model is used, what provisions would be desirable for mitigating disadvantages of restricting direct access:

[]	Allow direct access to largest emitters, even if they trade only on their own account?	0
		0
[ ] [X] bidders?	Disallow primary participants trading on their own account?  Impose strict separation of own-account trading from trading on behalf of indirect	
[ ]	Other	0
Question	<u>n 45</u> mary participants' model is used, what conflict of interest requirements should	
be impos		
[X] trading a	Separation of client registration and trading on behalf of clients from all own account ctivities.	
[X] all own ad	Separation of collateral management, payment and delivery on behalf of clients from count trading activities. Separation of anything else.	1
		0
Question What ob	<u>n 46</u> ligations should apply to primary participants acting in EU-wide auctions as:	
[ ] [ ]	Intermediaries Market makers	
<b>Please p</b> Ans:	rovide arguments to support your case.	
Question Under w	<u>n 47</u> hat conditions should auctioning through exchanges be allowed:	
[ ] [X]	Only for futures auctions open to established members of the exchange? Also for spot auctions open to established members of the exchange?	
[X] non-discr [ ]	Only when the exchange-based auction is open to non-established members on a iminatory cost-effective basis?  Other.	
		0
<b>Please p</b> Ans:	rovide arguments to support your case.	

**Question 48** 

#### Should direct auctions be allowed through:

- Third party service providers?
   Yes
- 2) Public authorities? Yes

# Please comment on your selection:

Ans: If they live up to all the requirements

#### **Question 49**

Do the general rules for auctioning EUAs suffice for ensuring full, fair and equitable access to allowances to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters?

No

# If not, why not?

Ans: Yes for Spot auctions if the Pre-registration criteria leave room for SMEs. Not for futures, but this should not be seen as a problem. The futures market is too knowledge intensive and risk related for most SMEs, which is why if there are futures auctions only indirect access should be possible.

#### **Question 50**

Is allowing non-competitive bids necessary for ensuring access to allowances to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters in case of:

discriminatory-price auctions?

uniform-price auctions?

#### **Question 51**

If non-competitive bids are provided for in spot auctions, what maximum share of allowances could be allocated through this route?

Ans: No Response

0

# Please comment on your choice.

Ans: Non-competitive auctions should not be necessary if auctions are kept simple and straightforward.

Only if a very complex auction model with multiple rounds and/or complicated price forming mechanisms is chosen this might become an option to consider, but even then...

#### **Question 52**

What rule should apply for accessing non-competitive bids:

[ ]	Participants should only be allowed to use one of the two bidding routes?
[]	Non-competitive bids should be restricted to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small
emitters of	only?
[]	Other?
	0

#### Please comment on your choice.

Ans: We think non-competitive auctions are not necessary and so far when investigated in the market there was also no interest from compliance companies or SMEs. The reaction was that they rather purchased in the secondary market where they did know what price they would pay when bidding.

If you do organise non-competitive auctions and you want to restrict participation, it could be restricted to compliance companies with a cap < 25,000

#### **Question 53**

What should be the maximum bid-size allowed for SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters submitting non-competitive bids?

Ans: Over 25 000 EUAs.

Please specify exact size and give reasons for your answer: As stated earlier, we think non-competitive auctions should not be organised, but if they are there: At the start small emitters still receive part of their allowances for free, so a maximum of 5,000 should be applied at the start, which can then grow to a maximum of 25,000 over the years.

# **Question 54**

Are there any other specific measures not mentioned in this consultation that may be necessary for ensuring full, fair and equitable access to allowances for SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters?

Yes

### If so, please specify:

Ans: Harmonise as much as possible on a central level, but educate and inform on a local level preferably in each countries language!

We have experienced that SMEs and small emitters do participate in auctions throughout Europe, but only in the cases where we organised local workshops. These participants then also in general become more active market participants incorporating carbon more in their policy process.

# **Question 55**

What should be the minimum period of time before the auction date for the release of the notice to auction?

Ans: Other

Please Specify: The earlier the better

Please comment on your proposal.

Ans:

# **Question 56**

What should be the minimum period of time before the auction date for the submission of the intention to bid?

Ans: No Response

0

#### Please comment on your proposal.

Ans: We think the submission of the intention to bid is not necessary and only complicates things without adding value.

If you are registered and fulfilling all requirements you can partipate.

#### **Question 57**

Are there any specific provisions that need to be highlighted in:

Ans: No Response

# Please specify what they are.

Ans: We don't think either of these are necessary.

#### **Question 58**

#### What information should be disclosed after the auction:

vviiat iiii	ormation should be disclosed after the auction.	
[X]	Clearing price (if allowances are awarded on a uniform-price basis or in the case of	f
non-com	petitive bids being allowed)?	
[X]	Average price (if allowances are awarded on a discriminatory-price basis)?	
[ ]	Any relevant information to solve tied bids?	
[X]	Total volume of EUAs auctioned?	
[X]	Total volume of bids submitted distinguishing between competitive and non-	
competiti	ve bids (if applicable)?	
[X]	Total volume of allowances allocated?	
[]	Anything else?	
		0
Questio	<u>n 59</u>	
<u> questioi</u>	100	

# What should be the maximum delay for the announcement of auction results?

[X]	5 minutes
[]	15 minutes
[]	30 minutes
[]	1 hour
[ ]	Other.

0

#### Please comment on your proposal.

Ans: Ideally the information should be published immediately when the auction result is available and this should be possible.

# **Question 60**

Do you feel that any specific additional provisions should be adopted in the Regulation for the granting of fair and equal access to auction information? No

If so, what may they be?

Ans: **Question 61** Should an auction monitor be appointed centrally to monitor all EU auctions? Yes If not, why not? Ans: **Question 62** Do you agree that the Regulation should contain general principles on: the designation and mandate of the auction monitor; and [] cooperation between the auctioneer(s) and the auction monitor? [X] Neither If not, why not? Ans: If auctions are organised centrally and/or on regulated platforms an auction monitor is not necessary. If auctions are organised on Member State level and/or in different ways and auction monitor is necessary and in such a case the Regulation should contain general principles on the designation and mandate of the auction monitor and the cooperation between the auctioneer(s) and the auction monitor. Should these be supplemented by operational guidance, possibly through Commission guidelines? [Y/N] Yes If not, why not? Ans: **Question 63** Is there a need for harmonised market abuse provisions in the Regulation to prevent insider dealing and market manipulation? No Response If not, why not? Ans:

# Please comment on your choice outlining the provisions you deem necessary and stating the reasons why.

Ans: Depends on how the auctions will be executed. The market abuse provisions need to be exactly in line with those in the secondary market.

If the auctions are executed on existing exchanges these provisions are already in place.

#### **Question 64**

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Should t	he Regulation provide for harmonised enforcement measures to sanction:	
[X]	Non-compliance with its provisions?	
[X]	Market abuse?	
<b>Please p</b> Ans:	provide arguments to support your case.	
Question	<u>n 65</u>	
Should t	he enforcement measures include:	
[ ] If so, for Ans:	The suspension of the auctioneer(s) and/or bidders from the EU-wide auctions? how long should such suspension last?	
[]	Financial penalties?	
	what level should such penalties be fixed?	
Ans:		
[] avert any conseque	The power to address binding interim decisions to the auctioneer(s) and/or bidders to urgent, imminent threat of breach of the Regulation with likely irreversible adverse ences?	)
[]	Anything else?	
		0
Ans: This	provide arguments to support your case.  Is we find difficult to answer at this stage, without knowing if we are dealing with one auction, 27 auctions or another model.	
Question Should s [X] [ ]	n 66 such enforcement measures apply at: EU level? National level? Both?	
Planca a	omment on your choice.	
Ans: If en	of forcement measures apply it would be good if they are harmonised and not open to lifferences.	
Question	n 67	
	ould enforce compliance with the Regulation: The auction monitor?	
[X]	The auctioneer?	
[X]	A competent authority at EU level?	
[]	A competent authority at national level?  Other?	
		0
Please p Ans:	rovide evidence to support your case.	

Which of the three approaches for an overall EU auction model do you prefer? Please rate the options below (1 being the most preferable, 3 being the least preferable)

- [2] Limited number of coordinated auction processes.
- [1] Full centralisation based on a single EU-wide auction process.
- [3] The hybrid approach where different auction processes are cleared through a centralised system.

#### Please give arguments to support your case.

Ans:

#### **Question 69**

If a limited number of coordinated auction processes develops, what should be the maximum number?

Ans: 3

0

#### Please give arguments to support your case.

Ans: The less differences between how auctions are organised and operated, the better.

#### **Question 70**

Is there a need for a transitional phase in order to develop gradually the optimal auction infrastructure?

No

If so, what kind of transitional arrangements would you recommend?

Ans:

#### **Question 71**

Should the Regulation impose the following requirements for the auctioneer(s) and auction processes? [mark those that apply]:

#### Technical capabilities of auctioneers:

- [X] capacity and experience to conduct auctions (or a specific part of the auction process) in an open, fair, transparent, cost-effective and non-discriminatory manner;
- [X] appropriate investment in keeping the system up-to-date and in line with ongoing market and technological developments; and
- [X] relevant professional licences, high ethical and quality control standards, compliance with financial and market integrity rules.

# Integrity:

- [X] guarantee confidentiality of bids, ability to manage market sensitive information in an appropriate manner;
- [X] duly protected electronic systems and appropriate security procedures with regards to identification and data transmission;
- [X] appropriate rules on avoiding and monitoring conflicts of interest; and
- [X] full cooperation with the auction monitor.

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- [X] robust organisation and IT systems;
- [X] adequate fallback measures in case of unexpected events;
- [X] minimisation of the risk of cancelling an individual auction once announced;
- [X] minimisation of the risk of failing functionalities (e.g. access to the bidding platform for certain potential bidders); and
- [X] fallback system in case of IT problems on the bidder side.

### Accessibility and user friendliness:

- [X] fair, concise, comprehensible and easily accessible information on how to participate in auctions:
- [X] short and simple pre-registration forms;
- [X] clear and simple electronic tools;
- [X] (option of) accessibility of platforms through a dedicated internet interface;
- [X] ability of the auction platform to connect to and communicate with proprietary trading systems used by bidders;
- [X] adequate and regular training (including mock auctions);
- [X] detailed user guidance on how to participate in the auction; and
- [X] ability to test identification and access to the auction.

#### Please elaborate if any of these requirements need not be included.

Ans

Please elaborate what additional requirements would be desirable.

Ans:

#### **Question 72**

# What provisions on administrative fees should the Regulation include?

[X] General principles on proportionality, fairness and non-discrir	nination.
---------------------------------------------------------------------	-----------

[ ] Rules on fee structure.

[ ] Rules on the amount of admissible fees.

[] Other?

0

#### Please provide arguments to support your case.

Ans:

#### **Question 73**

Should there be provisions for public disclosure of material steps when introducing new (or adapted) auction processes?

Yes

Should new (or adapted) auction process be notified to and authorised by the Commission before inclusion in the auction calendar?

Yes

#### **Question 74**

# Which one of the following options is the most appropriate in case a Member State does not hold auctions (on time)?

[X] Auctions by an auctioneer authorised by the Commission.

[X] Automatic addition of the delayed quantities to those foreseen for the next two or three auctions.

# What other option would you envisage? Please specify:

Ans:

#### **Question 75**

Should a sanction apply to a Member State that does not auction allowances in line with its commitments?

No Response

#### If so, what form should that sanction take?

Ans:

#### **Question 76**

As a general rule throughout the trading period, in your opinion, are early auctions necessary?

Yes

#### If so, what should the profile of EUAA auctions be:

Ans: 5-10% in year n-2, 10-20% in year n-1, remainder in year n

0

# **Question 77**

Do you think there is a need to auction EUAA futures?

No

If so, why?

Ans:

### **Question 78**

# What should be the optimal frequency and size of EUAA auctions:

Ans: 3 auctions per year of around 10 million EUAAs?

0

# Please comment on your choice.

Ans:

#### **Question 79**

# What would be your preferred timing for EUAA auctions:

Ans: Equally spread throughout the year?

0

# **Question 80** Should any of the EUAA auction design elements be different compared to EUA auctions (see section 3)? No If so, please specify and comment on your choice. Ans: **Question 81** Do you agree there is no need for a maximum bid-size? If not, why not? Ans: **Question 82** Is there any information regarding aircraft operators made available as part of the regulatory process to the competent authorities that could facilitate the KYC checks performed by the auctioneer(s)? No Response If so, please describe what information is concerned and whether it should be referred to in the Regulation or any operational guidance published by the Commission. Ans: **Question 83** In your opinion, is there a specific need to allow for non-competitive bids in EUAA auctions? Would this be the case even when applying a uniform clearing price format? Yes Please provide arguments to support your case. Ans: see reasoning for EUA auctions **Question 84** Do you agree that there is no need for any specific provisions for EUAA auctions as

regards:

Involvement of primary participants, exchanges or third party service providers?

Guarantees and financial assurance?

Payment and delivery?

Information disclosure?

Auction monitoring?

Preventing anti-competitive behaviour and/or market manipulation?

	on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions
[]	Enforcement?
[X]	None of the above?
If not, pla Ans:	ease describe in detail what rules would be needed and why.
Question	<u>n 85</u>
to EUAs,	nto account the smaller volume of EUAA allowances to be auctioned compared which of the three approaches for an overall EUAA auctioning model do you Please rate the options below (1 being the most preferable, 3 being the least le)
[2]	Limited number of coordinated auction processes.
[1]	Full centralisation based on a single EU-wide auction process.
[3] system.	Hybrid approach where different auction processes are cleared through a centralised
<b>Does yo</b> No	ur choice differ from the approach preferred for EUAs?
Please p Ans:	rovide arguments to support your case.
Question	
Do you a regards:	rigree that there is no need for any specific provisions for EUAA auctions as
[]	Requirements for the auctioneer(s) and auction processes?  Administrative fees?
[]	Rules to ensure appropriate and timely preparation of the auctions?
[X]	None of the above?
If not, pla Ans:	ease describe in detail what rules would be needed and why.