# EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions

This document is the questionnaire for this consultation. The survey contains **4** initial questions (A-D) to identify respondents, **86** questions for which responses will be made public and **4** questions that are classified confidential, must be sent directly to the European Commission and will not be made public. The questions that are classified potentially confidential are on two separate pages (2 questions on each page) and highlighted in green boxes.

#### **Period of consultation**

From 3 June 2009 to 3 August 2009 inclusive

#### How to submit your contribution

This consultation seeks to obtain feedback from all categories of stakeholders regarding the different aspects of auction design and implementation covered in the Consultation Paper.

We are sorry for the inconvenience, but the web-based survey is not available yet. If participants wish to complete the survey on this document and send their contributions back to <u>contact\_ets\_auctions\_consultation@icfi.com</u> their responses can be accepted in this format. The web-based survey will be available as soon as possible if participants wish to wait till that is available.

Received contributions will be published on the Internet. It is important to read the specific privacy statement attached to this consultation for information on how your personal data and contribution will be dealt with.

#### Specific privacy statement

"Received contributions, together with the identity of the contributor, will be published on the Internet, unless the contributor objects to publication of his or her personal data on the grounds that such publication would harm his or her legitimate interests. In such cases the contribution may be published in an anonymous form. Otherwise, the contribution will not be published nor will, in principle, its content be taken into account. Responses for questions deemed confidential in the consultation will not be available for view on the website irrespective of contributor objecting or not. "

# Instructions to filling out the questionnaire

• Questions may only be answered in designated response fields

- For certain multiple choice questions, simply click on box to indicate choice
- Answer [Y/N] questions by typing "y" / "Y" or "n" / "N" on underlined area ( \_\_\_\_)
- Some responses require explanations, additional comments and detailed answers. These will either by identified by underline ( \_\_\_\_\_ ) or an answer section (A:\_\_\_\_\_). The amount of text that can be entered here is unlimited.
- After completing the survey, please save and send to <u>contact ets auctions consultation@icfi.com</u>
- If any questions seem unclear in context or for method of response, please mail <u>contact\_ets\_auctions\_consultation@icfi.com</u> to clarify

#### Thank you

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions

#### Section 1: Questions to categorize participants

#### Question A

Name of Company/Organization: KfW Bankengruppe

Principal nature of activities: Finance

Number of employees in 2008:

World-wide <u>4200</u>

Europe-wide 4100

Turnover in 2008:

World-wide \_\_\_\_\_

Europe-wide \_\_\_\_\_

#### **Question B**

Type of re	espondent:
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Member State

Company operating one or more installations covered by the EU ETS

- Electricity generators
  - Energy companies other than electricity generators
- Industrial sectors
- Aviation
- Other. Please specify:

Approx Annual Emissions: \_\_\_\_\_ tCO<sub>2</sub>

#### Intermediary

**Financial institution** 

Trading arm of non-financial institution

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	Other.	Please specify			
Trader	on owr	account			
	Financial institution				
	Tradin	g arm of non-financial institution			
	Other.	Please specify			
Regula	ated man	rket			
	Carbor	ı only			
	Carbor	and electricity			
	Carbor	and other energy products			
Other carbon market					
	Multilateral trading facility trading carbon derivatives				
	Carbon exchange trading spot carbon				
	Other.	Please specify			
Clearin	ng hous	e			
Centra	l counte	erparty			
Other	(multipl	e choices apply)			
		Non-governmental organisation			
		Trade association			
		Carbon analyst			
		Carbon publication			
		Academic			
		Other. Please specify			

# Question C

# Contact details will not be made public.

# **Question D**

Questions relating to the "Specific privacy statement" above.

• Do you object to publication of your personal data because it would harm your legitimate interests? [Y/N] <u>N</u>

If so, please provide an explanation of the legitimate interests that you think will be harmed:

A:

• Are any of your responses confidential? [Y/N] <u>N</u>

If so, please indicate which ones and provide an explanation:

#### Section 2: Survey questions (86) and potentially confidential questions (4)

#### Question 1

As a general rule throughout the trading period, in your opinion, are early auctions necessary?  $[Y/N]_{-}$ 

If so, what should the profile of EUA auctions be?

5-10% in year n-2, 10-20% in year n-1, remainder in year n

10-20% in year n-2, 20-30% in year n-1, remainder in year n

20-30% in year n-2, 30-35% in year n-2, remainder in year n

Other? Please specify:

#### Question 2

Do you think there is a need to auction futures? [Y/N] <u>Y</u>

If so, why?

A: Futures help players (especially power companies) to cover their financial and compliance risk, ensuring they will be able to acquire the allowances they need in a given year for a price set in advance. Futures are commonly used on current CO2 markets. This shows that it has become a familiar tool used by many players. Thus it seems prudent for the EU to auction futures.

#### Question 3

What share of allowances should be auctioned spot and what share should be auctioned as futures for each year?

			SPOT	FUTU	RES
•%	year n <mark>variable /depe</mark>	nding	g on volumes trade	<mark>ed on sec</mark>	ondary market %
•	year n-1	:	variable%		0⁄_0
•	year n-2	:	variable%		0⁄/0

Please provide evidence to support your case.

A: It is important to be flexible regarding the volume of Spot and Futures depending on market development. The Auctioneer should observe the development of the volumes tradet on the carbon market and should respectively adjust the relation Spot versus Future contracts.

*NB: The answer to this question will be published as part of the public consultation. Please do not submit confidential information as part of your answer to this question.* 

#### **Question 4**

Should the common maturity date used in futures auctions be in December (so the maturity date would be December in year n, both when auctioning in year n-2 as when auctioning in year n-1)?  $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$ 

If not, please suggest alternative maturity dates and provide evidence to support your view.

# This page contains two questions that will not be made public. These questions cannot be completed on this document

Request for potentially confidential information 1	mark const Direc 2/1, 2	Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.				
		For ETS operators: what share of your expected emissions covered by the EU ETS in a given year n do you hedge and how much in advance?				
	•	<ul> <li>year n</li> <li>year n-1</li> <li>year n-2</li> <li></li></ul>				
	•					
	•					
	•	earlier years (please spec	cify) :	%		

Request for potentially confidential information 2	marked on the envelope consultation", directly to Directorate C, Unit C2, 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belg be disclosed publicly. What share of the annua	t share of the annual quantity of allowances you intend to purchase uctions would you wish to buy spot or futures respectively?			
		SPOT	FUTURES		
	• year n	:	%  %		
	• year n-1	:	_%  %		
	• year n-2	:	_%  %		
	Please specify whethe	er you are an:			
	• ETS operator;	or			

•

# Other participant.

For spot auctions:

What should be the **optimum** frequency of auctions?

	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?
	Monthly?
	Quarterly?
$\square$	Other? Please specify: <u>Daily</u>
What s	should be the <b>minimum</b> frequency of auctions?
	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?
	Monthly?
	Quarterly?
$\square$	Other? Please specify: <u>Daily</u>
What s	should be the <b>maximum</b> frequency of auctions?
$\boxtimes$	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?

Monthly?

- Quarterly?
- Other? Please specify:

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A: KfW experience shows that up to 10 per cent of the daily screen traded volumes can be easily sold without distorting the market. To avoid market distortion is very important. Given the huge amount of allowances to be auctioned in ETS3, this can be done by carrying out auctions daily or even several times daily (continuous auction). Secondary market prices on a liquid exchange which show real scarcity prices can be used as benchmark.

For spot auctions, what should be the:

• Optimum auction size? <u>variable /depending on volumes traded on secondary</u> <u>market</u>

- Minimum auction size?
- Maximum auction size?

If deemed appropriate, please indicate a range and/or distribution over different sizes.

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A: The size of auctions at the European level should be determined so as to minimise any disturbance caused to the secondary market. KfW experience shows that up to 10 per cent of the daily screen traded volumes can be easily sold without distorting the market. To avoid market distortion is very important. Given the huge amount of allowances to be auctioned in ETS3, this can be done by carrying out auctions daily or even several times daily (continuous auction). Secondary market prices on a liquid exchange which show real scarcity prices can be used as benchmark.

#### **Question 7**

For futures auctions:

What should be the **optimum** frequency of auctions?

Weekly?
Fortnightly?
Monthly?

Quarterly?

Other? Please specify: daily

What should be the **minimum** frequency of auctions?

Weekly?Fortnightly?

Monthly?

Quarterly?

Other? Please specify: daily

What should be the **maximum** frequency of auctions?

$\boxtimes$	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?
	Monthly?
	Quarterly?
	Other? Please specify:

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A:KfW experience shows, that up to 10 per cent of the daily screen traded volumes can be easyly sold without distorting the market. To avoid market distortion is very important. Given the huge amount of allowances to be auctioned in ETS3, this can be done by carrying out auctions daily or even several times daily (continuous auction). Secondary market prices on a liquid exchange wich show real scarcity prices can be used as benchmark.

#### **Question 8**

For futures auctions, what should be the:

• Optimum auction size? <u>variable /depending on volumes traded on secondary</u> market

- Minimum auction size?
- Maximum auction size?

If deemed appropriate, please indicate a range and/or distribution over different sizes.

Please provide evidence to support your case.

A: The size of auctions at the European level should be determined so as to minimise any disturbance caused to the secondary market. KfW experience shows that up to 10 per cent of the daily screen traded volumes can be easily sold without distorting the market.

Given the huge amount of allowances to be auctioned in ETS3, this can be done by carrying out auctions daily or even several times daily (continuous auction). Secondary market prices on a liquid exchange which show real scarcity prices can be used as benchmark.

#### Question 9

Should volumes of spot allowances be auctioned evenly throughout the year? [Y/N] N

If not, how should volumes be distributed? (more than one answer possible) Please specify:

$\boxtimes$	A larger proportion in the first 4 months of the year?
$\boxtimes$	A larger proportion in December?
	A smaller proportion in July and August?
	Other? Please specify:

### Question 10

In case futures are auctioned, should the volumes for spot and futures auctions be spread over the year in the same manner?  $[Y/N]_{-}$ 

If not, how should they differ? (more than one answer possible)

No futures auctions less than six months before the maturity date.



A larger proportion in December.



A smaller proportion in July and August.

Otherwise? Please specify how and comment:

#### Question 11

Does the Regulation need to have provisions to avoid holding auctions during a short period of time before the surrendering date (30 April each year)? [Y/N] \_

If yes, how long should this period be:

One week	2 weeks	3 weeks	1 month
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In case futures are auctioned, should there be similar provisions with respect to the period immediately prior to the maturity date?  $[Y/N]_{-}$ 

If yes, how long should this period be:

One week	2 weeks	3 weeks	1 month
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#### Question 12

Which dates should be avoided? (more than one answer possible)

Public holidays common in most Member States? <u>Christmas Holidays, Easter</u> <u>Holidays, 01.05 and 03.10.</u>

Days where important relevant economic data is released?



Days where emissions data are released?

Other? Please specify:

Please specify the dates you have in mind in your answers.

#### Question 13

Is a harmonised 10-12 hrs CET auction slot desirable? [Y/N]

If not, what alternative(s) would you suggest?

A:\_\_\_\_

#### Question 14

How long in advance should each element of the calendar be determined?

Annual volumes to be auctioned:



1 year in advance



- 2 years in advance
- 3 years in advance


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
#### 🗌 m

#### more years in advance

Distribution of annual volumes over spot and futures (if applicable):

1 year in advance







more years in advance

Dates of individual auctions:


1 year in advance
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more years in advance

Volume and product type for individual auctions:





2 years in advance





3 years in advance

more years in advance

Each auctioneer carrying out auction process (if more than one):

	1 year	in	advance
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more years in advance

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A: Distribution of annual volumes over spot and futures: It is important to be flexible regarding the volume of Spot and Futures depending on market development. The Auctioneer should observe the development of the volumes tradet on the carbon market and should be able to respectively adjust the relation Spot versus Future contracts.

What should be the volume of allowances to be auctioned in 2011 and 2012?

- in 2011: \_\_\_\_\_% of the 2013 volume and \_\_\_\_\_% of the 2014 volume
- in 2012:\_\_\_\_% of the 2013 volume and \_\_\_\_% of the 2014 volume

What percentage of these shares should be auctioned as futures?

- in 2011: \_\_\_\_% of the 2013 share and \_\_\_\_% of the 2014 share
- in 2012: \_\_\_\_% of the 2013 share and \_\_\_\_% of the 2014 share

Please provide evidence to support your case.

#### A:

#### Question 16

What should be the rule with respect to allowances not auctioned due to *force majeure*?

They should automatically be added to the next auction on the calendar,
irrespective of the auction process.

- They should be auctioned within one month, though leaving flexibility as to which auction(s) the EUAs should be added.
- They should be auctioned within three months, though leaving flexibility as to which auction(s) the EUAs should be added.
- Other? Please specify:

#### Question 17

Is 1,000 allowances the most appropriate lot size? [Y/N] <u>Y</u>

If not, why not?

Is a single-round sealed-bid auction the most appropriate auction format for auctioning EU allowances?  $[Y/N] \frac{Y}{2}$ 

If not, please comment on your alternative proposal?


A:

# Question 19

What is the most appropriate pricing rule for the auctioning of EU allowances?



Uniform-pricing.



Indifferent.

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A:

# **Question 20**

Should the rules for solving ties in the Regulation be:



random selection; or



pro-rata re-scaling of bids?

Please comment on your choice.

A:

# Question 21

Should a reserve price apply?

A:

In case a reserve price would apply, should the methodology/formula for calculating it be kept secret?  $[Y/N]_{-}$ 

Please comment on your choice.

A:

# **Question 23**

Is a maximum bid-size per single entity desirable in a Uniform-price auction?

[Y/N]\_

Is a maximum bid-size per single entity desirable in a discriminatory-price auction?  $[Y/N]\_$ 

Please comment on your choice.

A:

# Question 24

If so, what is the desirable bid-size limit (as a percentage of the volume of allowances auctioned per auction – only one choice is possible):

10%:	15%:	20%:
25%:	30%:	More than 30%: Please specify:

Please comment on your choice.

A:

# **Question 25**

In case only one of the two following options would be chosen, to limit the risk of market manipulation or collusion, which one would be preferable?



A discriminatory-price auction format?



A maximum bid-size per single entity?

Please comment on your choice.

A:

# **Question 26**

Are the following pre-registration requirements appropriate and adequate?

Identity:

Natural or legal person;
Name, address, whether publicly listed, whether licensed and supervised under the AML rules; membership of a professional association; membership of a chamber of commerce; VAT and/or tax number;
Contact details of authorised representatives and proof of authorisation; and
CITL-Registry account details.
Anything else? Please specify:

# Declarations with respect to the past 5 years on absence of:

	Indictment or conviction of serious crimes: check corporate officers, directors, principals, members or partners;
	Infringement of the rules of any regulated or unregulated market;
	Permits to conduct business being revoked or suspended;
	Infringement of procurement rules; and
	Infringement of disclosure of confidential information.
	Anything else? Please specify:
Declar	rations and submission of documentation relating to:
	Proof of identity;
	Type of business;
	Participation in EU ETS or not;
	EU ETS registered installations, if any;
	Bank account contact details;
	Intended auctioning activity;
	Whether bidding on own account or on behalf of another beneficial owner;
	Corporate and business affiliations;
	Creditworthiness;
	Collateral; and
	Whether it carries out transactions subject to VAT or transactions exempted from VAT.
	Anything else? Please specify:

Do you agree that the pre-registration requirements for admittance to EU auctions should be harmonised throughout the EU?

Yes

No

Please comment on your choice.

A:

# **Question 28**

Should the amount of information to be supplied in order to satisfy the pre-registration requirements for admittance to EU auctions depend on the:

	means of establishing the trading relationship;
	identity of bidder;
	whether auctioning spot or futures;
	size of bid;
	means of payment and delivery;
	anything else? Please specify:
If so, v	vhat should the differences be?

A:

# Question 29

Should the bidder pre-registration requirements under the Regulation apply in the same manner irrespective of whether or not the auctioneer is covered by the MiFID or AML rules?  $[Y/N]_{-}$ 

A:

If not, why not?

A:

Please provide arguments to support your case.

Do you agree that the auctioneer(s) should be allowed to rely on pre-registration checks carried out by reliable third parties including: [Y/N]

Other auctioneers?

Credit and/or financial institutions?

L		
L		

Other? Please specify:

Please comment on your choice.

A:

# Question 31

In order to facilitate bidder pre-registration in their home country, should the auctioneer(s) be allowed to provide for pre-registration by potential bidders in other (or all) Member States than the auctioneer's home country e.g. by outsourcing this to a reliable third party?

Yes 🗌

No

Please comment on your choice:

A:

If so, should such entities be:

Covered by the AM	IL rules?
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Covered by MiFID?

Other? Please specify:

Please comment on your choice:

Should the Regulation prohibit the multiplicity of pre-registration checks in the case of Member States auctioning jointly?

Yes

No

Please comment on your choice.

A:

#### Question 33

Do you agree that the *level* of collateral accepted in EUA auctions should be harmonised for all EU ETS auctions? [Y/N]\_

If so, how should they be harmonised?

A:

If not, why not?

A:

#### **Question 34**

Do you agree that the *type* of collateral accepted in EUA auctions should be harmonised for all EU ETS auctions? [Y/N]\_

If so, how should they be harmonised?

A:

If not, why not?

A:

Do you agree that 100% collateral in electronic money transfer ought to be deposited upfront at a central counterparty or credit institution designated by the auctioneer to access spot auctions?  $[Y/N]_{-}$ 

If not, why not?

A:

What alternative(s) would you suggest? Please provide arguments to support your case:

A:

# **Question 36**

In case futures are auctioned, should a clearing house be involved to mitigate credit and market risks?  $[Y/N] \frac{Y}{V}$ 

If so, should specific rules – other than those currently used in exchange clearing houses – apply to:



the level of the initial margin;

the the

the level of variation margin calls;

the daily frequency of variation margin call payments?

If you have answered yes, please justify and elaborate on the rules that should apply and the mechanisms to implement them:

A: Auctions should be carried our on (existing) carbon exchange platforms. For auctions the same clearing rules should apply than for EUA Futures traded on the exchange.

#### Question 37

What are the most preferable payment and delivery procedures that should be implemented for auctioning EUAs?



Payment before delivery.



Delivery versus payment.

Both.

Please comment on your choice.

#### A:

# Question 38

Irrespective of the payment procedure, should the Regulation fix a maximum delay of time for payment and delivery to take place?  $[Y/N]_{-}$ 

If yes; what should it be?

	4 working days
	5 working days
	6 working days
	7 working days
Other?	Please specify:

# Question 39

Should the Regulation provide any specific provisions for the handling of payment and delivery incidents or failures?  $[Y/N]_{-}$ 

If yes, what should they be?

A:

#### Question 40

Should the Regulation provide for all matters that are central to the very creation, existence and termination or frustration of the transaction arising from the EUA auctions?  $[Y/N]_{-}$ 

If not, why not?

A:

If so, are the matters enumerated below complete? [Y/N] \_

- The designation of the parties' to the trade.
- The characteristics of the auctioned product:

- <u>Nature</u>: EUAs or EUAAs, trading period concerned.
- Date of delivery: date at which winning bidders will receive the allowances on their registry account.
- Date of payment: date at which payment will be required from winning bidders.
- Lot size: number of allowances associated with one unit of the auctioned good.
- Events of `force majeure' and resulting consequences.
- Events of default by the auctioneer and/or the bidder and their consequences.
- Applicable remedies or penalties.
- The regime governing the judicial review of claims across the EU.

If not, what additional matters should be foreseen in the Regulation and why?

A:

#### Question 41

Should the Regulation provide for rules on jurisdiction and the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments?  $[Y/N]_{-}$ 

If so, should these be:

	S

specific to the Regulation;



by reference to the Brussels I Regulation;



by citing exceptions from the Brussels I Regulation;



by citing additions to the Brussels I Regulation?

Please comment on your choice:

#### A:

If not, why not?

A:

#### Which auction model is preferable?

$\boxtimes$	Direct bidding?

Indirect bidding?

Both?

Please comment on your choice.

A: Auctions should be carried our on (existing) carbon exchange platforms. Therefore all exchange members have direct access to the auction. Others can use intermediaries to get access.

#### Question 43

If an indirect model is used, what share of the total volume of EU allowances could be auctioned through indirect bidding?

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A:

#### **Question 44**

If the primary participants model is used, what provisions would be desirable for mitigating disadvantages of restricting direct access (more than one answer is possible):


Allow direct access to largest emitters, even if they trade only on their own account?

If so, who should have direct access and what thresholds should apply?\_\_\_\_\_

Disallow primary participants trading on their own account		Disallow	primary	participants	trading or	n their own	account?
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- Impose strict separation of own-account trading from trading on behalf of indirect bidders?
- Other? Please specify:

If the primary participants' model is used, what conflict of interest requirements should be imposed? (more than one answer possible)



Separation of collateral management, payment and delivery on behalf of clients from all own account trading activities.

Separation of anything else, please specify:

#### Question 46


What obligations should apply to primary participants acting in EU-wide auctions as:

- Intermediaries? A:
- Market makers? A:

Please provide arguments to support your case.

# Question 47

Under what conditions should auctioning through exchanges be allowed (more than one answer possible):



 $\boxtimes$ 

Also for spot auctions open to established members of the exchange?

Only when the exchange-based auction is open to non-established members on a non-discriminatory cost-effective basis?

Other? Please specify: It should be allow to auction <u>and to sell</u> Spot and Futures via existing carbon exchanges

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A: •Existing exchanges are well established trading markets for CO2 products with a high market acceptance. Auctioning <u>or selling</u> allowances via exchanges over the course of the day is a very efficient procedure for non-free allocation (as Germany is currently doing). This is a proven and reliable method with a high market acceptance which can be implemented immediately.

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#### Question 48

Should direct auctions be allowed through:

- 1) Third party service providers? [Y/N]
- 2) Public authorities? [Y/N]\_

Please comment on your selection:

A:

#### Question 49

Do the general rules for auctioning EUAs suffice for ensuring full, fair and equitable access to allowances to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters? [Y/N]\_

If not, why not?

A:

#### Question 50

Is allowing non-competitive bids necessary for ensuring access to allowances to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters in case of:

- discriminatory-price auctions? A:
- uniform-price auctions? A:

#### Question 51

If non-competitive bids are provided for in spot auctions, what maximum share of allowances could be allocated through this route?

5%

10%

Other? Please specify:

Please comment on your choice.

A:

# **Question 52**

What rule should apply for accessing non-competitive bids (more than one answer possible):

Participants should only be allowed to use one of the two bidding routes?

Non-competitive bids should be restricted to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters only?

_	-	-	-

Other? Please specify:

Please comment on your choice.

A:

#### **Question 53**

What should be the maximum bid-size allowed for SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters submitting non-competitive bids?

5 000 EUAs
10 000 EUAs
25 000 EUAs
Over 25 000 EUAs, please specify exact size and give reasons for your answer:

#### **Question 54**

Are there any other specific measures not mentioned in this consultation that may be necessary for ensuring full, fair and equitable access to allowances for SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters? [Y/N]

If so, please specify:

A:

What should be the minimum period of time before the auction date for the release of the notice to auction?

2 weeks	1 month	2 months
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Please comment on your proposal.

A:

# Question 56

What should be the minimum period of time before the auction date for the submission of the intention to bid?

1 week 2 weeks 1 month

Other Please specify:

Please comment on your proposal.

A:

#### Question 57

Are there any specific provisions that need to be highlighted in:



The notice to auction?



The intention to bid?

Both?

Please specify what they are.

A:

What information should be disclosed after the auction:

Clearing price (if allowances are awarded on a uniform-price basis or in the case of non-competitive bids being allowed)?
Average price (if allowances are awarded on a discriminatory-price basis)?
Any relevant information to solve tied bids?
Total volume of EUAs auctioned?
Total volume of bids submitted distinguishing between competitive and non- competitive bids (if applicable)?
Total volume of allowances allocated?
Anything else? Please specify:

#### **Question 59**

What should be the maximum delay for the announcement of auction results?

5 minutes	15 minutes	30 minutes	
1 hour			
Other 🗌 Please spe	cify:		
Please comment on	your proposal.		
A:			

### **Question 60**

Do you feel that any specific additional provisions should be adopted in the Regulation for the granting of fair and equal access to auction information?  $[Y/N]_{-}$ 

If so, what may they be? \_\_\_\_\_

# Should an auction monitor be appointed centrally to monitor all EU auctions?

[Y/N]

If not, why not?

A:

# Question 62

Do you agree that the Regulation should contain general principles on [mark those that you agree with, [X]]:



the designation and mandate of the auction monitor; and



cooperation between the auctioneer(s) and the auction monitor?

If not, why not?

A:

Should these be supplemented by operational guidance, possibly through Commission guidelines?  $[Y/N]_{-}$ 

If not, why not?

A:

# **Question 63**

Is there a need for harmonised market abuse provisions in the Regulation to prevent insider dealing and market manipulation?  $[Y/N]_{-}$ 

If not, why not?

A:

Please comment on your choice outlining the provisions you deem necessary and stating the reasons why.

A:

Should the Regulation provide for harmonised enforcement measures to sanction [mark those that you agree with, [X]]:



Non-compliance with its provisions?

 $\square$ 

Market abuse?

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A:

# **Question 65**

Should the enforcement measures include [mark those that you agree with,  $\boxtimes$ ]:

The suspension of the auctioneer(s) and/or bidders from the EU-wide auctions?
If so, for how long should such suspension last?

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I		

Financial penalties? If so, at what level should such penalties be fixed?

- The power to address binding interim decisions to the auctioneer(s) and/or bidders to avert any urgent, imminent threat of breach of the Regulation with likely irreversible adverse consequences?
  - Anything else? Please specify:

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A:

# Question 66

Should such enforcement measures apply at:



National level?



Please comment on your choice.

Who should enforce compliance with the Regulation (more than one answer is possible):

The auction monitor?
The auctioneer?
A competent authority at EU level?
A competent authority at national level?
Other? Please specify:

Please provide evidence to support your case.

A:

#### Question 68

Which of the three approaches for an overall EU auction model do you prefer? Please rate the options below (1 being the most preferable, 3 being the least preferable)

- \_ Limited number of coordinated auction processes.
- \_ Full centralisation based on a single EU-wide auction process.
- \_ The hybrid approach where different auction processes are cleared through a centralised system.

Please give arguments to support your case.

A:

If a limited number of coordinated auction processes develops, what should be the maximum number?

more than 7, please specify:

Please give arguments to support your case.

A:

#### Question 70

Is there a need for a transitional phase in order to develop gradually the optimal auction infrastructure?  $[Y/N]\_$ 

If so, what kind of transitional arrangements would you recommend?

#### **Question 71**

Should the Regulation impose the following requirements for the auctioneer(s) and auction processes? [mark those that apply,  $\boxtimes$ ]:

Technical capabilities of auctioneers:

- capacity and experience to conduct auctions (or a specific part of the auction process) in an open, fair, transparent, cost-effective and non-discriminatory manner;
  - appropriate investment in keeping the system up-to-date and in line with ongoing market and technological developments; and
  - relevant professional licences, high ethical and quality control standards, compliance with financial and market integrity rules.

Integrity:

	guarantee confidentiality of bids, ability to manage market sensitive information in an appropriate manner;						
	duly protected electronic systems and appropriate security procedures with regards to identification and data transmission;						
	appropriate rules on avoiding and monitoring conflicts of interest; and						
	full cooperation with the auction monitor.						
Reliability:							
	robust organisation and IT systems;						
	adequate fallback measures in case of unexpected events;						
	minimisation of the risk of cancelling an individual auction once announced;						
	minimisation of the risk of failing functionalities (e.g. access to the bidding platform for certain potential bidders); and						
	fallback system in case of IT problems on the bidder side.						
Access	vibility and user friendliness:						
	fair, concise, comprehensible and easily accessible information on how to participate in auctions;						
	short and simple pre-registration forms;						
	clear and simple electronic tools;						
	(option of) accessibility of platforms through a dedicated internet interface;						
	ability of the auction platform to connect to and communicate with proprietary trading systems used by bidders;						
	adequate and regular training (including mock auctions);						
	detailed user guidance on how to participate in the auction; and						
	ability to test identification and access to the auction.						
Please	elaborate if any of these requirements need not be included.						

A:

Please elaborate what additional requirements would be desirable.

A:

# Question 72

What provisions on administrative fees should the Regulation include (more than one answer is possible)?



General principles on proportionality, fairness and non-discrimination.



Rules on fee structure.



Rules on the amount of admissible fees.

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A:

#### **Question 73**

Should there be provisions for public disclosure of material steps when introducing new (or adapted) auction processes?

A:

Should new (or adapted) auction process be notified to and authorised by the Commission before inclusion in the auction calendar?

A:

# Question 74

Which one of the following options is the most appropriate in case a Member State does not hold auctions (on time)?



Auctions by an auctioneer authorised by the Commission.



Automatic addition of the delayed quantities to those foreseen for the next two or three auctions.

What other option would you envisage? Please specify:

Should a sanction apply to a Member State that does not auction allowances in line with its commitments?  $\rm [Y/N]$  \_

If so, what form should that sanction take?

A:

### **Question 76**

As a general rule throughout the trading period, in your opinion, are early auctions necessary?  $\rm [Y/N]\_$ 

If so, what should the profile of EUAA auctions be:

5-10% in year n-2, 10-20% in year n-1, remainder in year n
10-20% in year n-2, 20-30% in year n-1, remainder in year n
20-30% in year n-2, 30-35% in year n-2, remainder in year n
Other? Please specify:

# **Question 77**


Do you think there is a need to auction EUAA futures? [Y/N] \_ If so, why?

# This page contains two questions that will not be made public. These questions cannot be completed on this document

Request for potentially confidential information 3	Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.					
	For aircraft operators covered by the EU ETS:					
	Have you determined a corporate hedging strategy for carbon needs? Yes [] No []					
	If so, what share of your expected emissions covered by the EU ETS in a given year n do you (intend to) hedge and how much in advance?					
	• year n :%					
	• year n-1 :%					
	• year n-2 :%					

Request for potentially confidential information 4	<ul> <li>Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.</li> <li>What share of the annual quantity of allowances you intend to purchase <i>via</i> auctions would you wish to buy spot or futures respectively?</li> </ul>						
				SPOT		FUTURES	
	•	year n	:	%	I	%	
	•	year n-1	:	%		%	
	•	year n-2	:	%		%	

What should be the optimal frequency and size of EUAA auctions:





3 auctions per year of around 10 million EUAAs?

More than 3 auctions per year? Please specify:

Please comment on your choice.

A:

#### **Question 79**

What would be your preferred timing for EUAA auctions:



Equally spread throughout the year?



November – March?

Other? Please specify:

#### **Question 80**

Should any of the EUAA auction design elements be different compared to EUA auctions (see section 3)?  $[Y/N]_{-}$ 

If so, please specify and comment on your choice.

A:

#### Question 81

Do you agree there is no need for a maximum bid-size?  $[Y/N]_I$  If not, why not?

A:

#### **Question 82**

Is there any information regarding aircraft operators made available as part of the regulatory process to the competent authorities that could facilitate the KYC checks performed by the auctioneer(s)?  $[Y/N]_{-}$ 

If so, please describe what information is concerned and whether it should be referred to in the Regulation or any operational guidance published by the Commission.

In your opinion, is there a specific need to allow for non-competitive bids in EUAA auctions?

A:

Would this be the case even when applying a uniform clearing price format?

A:

Please provide arguments to support your case.

#### Question 84

Do you agree that there is no need for any specific provisions for EUAA auctions as regards [mark those that you agree with, [X]]:

Involvement of primary participants, exchanges or third party service providers?
 Guarantees and financial assurance?
 Payment and delivery?
 Information disclosure?
 Auction monitoring?
 Preventing anti-competitive behaviour and/or market manipulation?
 Enforcement?
 Information detail what rules would be needed and why.

A:

#### Question 85

Taking into account the smaller volume of EUAA allowances to be auctioned compared to EUAs, which of the three approaches for an overall EUAA auctioning model do you prefer? Please rate the options below (1 being the most preferable, 3 being the least preferable)

- \_ Limited number of coordinated auction processes.
- \_ Full centralisation based on a single EU-wide auction process.
- \_ Hybrid approach where different auction processes are cleared through a centralised system.

Does your choice differ from the approach preferred for EUAs? [Y/N] \_

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A:

#### **Question 86**

Do you agree that there is no need for any specific provisions for EUAA auctions as regards. [mark those that you agree with, [mark]]:



Requirements for the auctioneer(s) and auction processes?



Administrative fees?

Rules to ensure appropriate and timely preparation of the auctions?

If not, please describe in detail what rules would be needed and why.