EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions

This document is the questionnaire for this consultation. The survey contains 4 initial questions (A-D) to identify respondents, 86 questions for which responses will be made public and 4 questions that are classified confidential, must be sent directly to the European Commission and will not be made public. The questions that are classified potentially confidential are on two separate pages (2 questions on each page) and highlighted in green boxes.

Period of consultation

From 3 June 2009 to 3 August 2009 inclusive

How to submit your contribution

This consultation seeks to obtain feedback from all categories of stakeholders regarding the different aspects of auction design and implementation covered in the Consultation Paper.

We are sorry for the inconvenience, but the web-based survey is not available yet. If participants wish to complete the survey on this document and send their contributions back to **contact_ets_auctions_consultation@icfi.com** their responses can be accepted in this format. The web-based survey will be available as soon as possible if participants wish to wait till that is available.

Received contributions will be published on the Internet. It is important to read the specific privacy statement attached to this consultation for information on how your personal data and contribution will be dealt with.

Specific privacy statement

"Received contributions, together with the identity of the contributor, will be published on the Internet, unless the contributor objects to publication of his or her personal data on the grounds that such publication would harm his or her legitimate interests. In such cases the contribution may be published in an anonymous form. Otherwise, the contribution will not be published nor will, in principle, its content be taken into account. Responses for questions deemed confidential in the consultation will not be available for view on the website irrespective of contributor objecting or not."

Instructions to filling out the questionnaire

•	Questions may only be answered in designated response fields
•	For certain multiple choice questions, simply click on box to indicate choice
•	Answer [Y/N] questions by typing "y" / "Y" or "n" / "N" on underlined area ()
•	Some responses require explanations, additional comments and detailed answers. These will either by identified by underline () or an answer section (A:). The amount of text that can be entered here is unlimited.
•	After completing the survey, please save and send to contact_ets_auctions_consultation@icfi.com
•	If any questions seem unclear in context or for method of response, please mail contact_ets_auctions_consultation@icfi.com to clarify

Thank you

Section 1: Questions to categorize participants

Quest	on A
Name	of Company/Organization:
Deutso	he Lufthansa AG
	al nature of activities: ortation, Maintainance, Repair & Overhaul, Catering
Numb	er of employees in 2008:
World	wide <u>107,800</u> Europe-wide <u>83,710</u>
Turno	ver in 2008:
World	wide <u>24,870 Mio.</u> € Europe-wide
Quest	on B
Type o	f respondent:
	Member State
	Company operating one or more installations covered by the EU ETS Electricity generators Energy companies other than electricity generators
	Industrial sectors
	Aviation
	Other. Please specify:
	Approx Annual Emissions: 24,170,394 (2008, whole company) tCO ₂
	Intermediary
	Financial institution
	Trading arm of non-financial institution
	Other. Please specify
	Trader on own account
	Financial institution

Academic

Other. Please specify _____

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions

Question D

Questions relating to the "Specific privacy statement" above.

O Do you object to publication of your personal data because it would harm your legitimate interests? [Y/N] _

If so, please provide an explanation of the legitimate interests that you think will be harmed:

A:

o Are any of your responses confidential? [Y/N] N

If so, please indicate which ones and provide an explanation:

A:

Section 2: Survey questions (86) and potentially confidential questions (4)

Question 1

As a general rule throughout the trading period, in your opinion, are early auctions necessary? [Y/N] _

If so, what should the profile of EUA auctions be?

5-10% in year n-2, 10-20% in year n-1, remainder in year n

10-20% in year n-2, 20-30% in year n-1, remainder in year n

20-30% in year n-2, 30-35% in year n-2, remainder in year n

Other? Please specify: in year n-1 (printerror?) in order to spread the risk

Question 2

Do you think there is a need to auction futures? [Y/N] y

If so, why?

A:credit and cash flow issue

Question 3

What share of allowances should be auctioned spot and what share should be auctioned as futures for each year?

			SPOT	FUTURES
•	year n	:	<u>0</u> %	<u>99</u> %
•	year n-1	:	<u>0</u> %	<u>99</u> %
•	year n-2	:	<u>0</u> %	<u>99</u> %

Please provide evidence to support your case.

A:allwas 100 % futures not 99 % which was the highest number which could be used in your tic box, credit and cash flow issue

NB: The answer to this question will be published as part of the public consultation. Please do not submit confidential information as part of your answer to this question.

Should the common maturity date used in futures auctions be in December (so the maturity date would be December in year n, both when auctioning in year n-2 as when auctioning in year n-1)? $[Y/N] \underline{y}$

If not, please suggest alternative maturity dates and provide evidence to support your view.

A:

This page contains two questions that will not be made public. These questions cannot be completed on this document

Request for
potentially
confidential
information 1

Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.

For ETS operators: what share of your expected emissions covered by the EU ETS in a given year n do you hedge and how much in advance?

year n
 year n-1
 year n-2
 earlier years (please specify)

Request for potentially confidential information 2

Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.

What share of the annual quantity of allowances you intend to purchase *via* auctions would you wish to buy spot or futures respectively?

		SPOT	FUTURES
•	year n	:%	%
•	year n-1	:%	%
•	year n-2	:%	%

Please specify whether you are an:

- ETS operator; or
- Other participant.

Questi	ion 5
For spe	ot auctions:
What s	should be the optimum frequency of auctions?
\boxtimes	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?
	Monthly?
	Quarterly?
	Other? Please specify:
What s	should be the minimum frequency of auctions?
	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?
\boxtimes	Monthly?
	Quarterly?
	Other? Please specify:
What s	should be the maximum frequency of auctions?
	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?
\boxtimes	Monthly?
	Quarterly?
	Other? Please specify:
Please	provide arguments to support your case.
A:min	imal market impact
Questi	ion 6
For spe	ot auctions, what should be the:
•	Optimum auction size? $\underline{\mathbf{x}}$
•	Minimum auction size?
•	Maximum auction size?
If deen	ned appropriate, please indicate a range and/or distribution over different sizes
Please	provide arguments to support your case.
A:	

Questi	on 7
For fut	ures auctions:
What s	hould be the optimum frequency of auctions?
	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?
	Monthly?
	Quarterly?
	Other? Please specify:
What s	hould be the minimum frequency of auctions?
	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?
\boxtimes	Monthly?
	Quarterly?
	Other? Please specify:
What s	hould be the maximum frequency of auctions?
\boxtimes	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?
	Monthly?
	Quarterly?
	Other? Please specify:
Please	provide arguments to support your case.
A:	
Questi	on 8
For fut	ures auctions, what should be the:
•	Optimum auction size? $\underline{\mathbf{x}}$
•	Minimum auction size?
•	Maximum auction size?
If deem	ned appropriate, please indicate a range and/or distribution over different sizes
Please	provide evidence to support your case.

If yes, how long should this period be:

One week 🛚	2 weeks	3 weeks	1 month
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In case futures are auctioned, should there be similar provisions with respect to the period immediately prior to the maturity date? [Y/N] _

If yes, how long should this period be:

One week 🖂	2 weeks	3 weeks	1 month
------------	---------	---------	---------

Ques	tion 12		
Whic	h dates should be avoided? (more than one answer possible)		
	Public holidays common in most Member States?		
	Days where important relevant economic data is released?		
	Days where emissions data are released?		
	Other? Please specify:		
Please	e specify the dates you have in mind in your answers.		
Ques	tion 13		
Is a h	armonised 10-12 hrs CET auction slot desirable? [Y/N] <u>y</u>		
If not	, what alternative(s) would you suggest?		
A:			
Ques	tion 14		
How	long in advance should each element of the calendar be determined?		
Annu	al volumes to be auctioned:		
	1 year in advance		
	2 years in advance		
\boxtimes	3 years in advance		
	more years in advance		
Distri	bution of annual volumes over spot and futures (if applicable):		
	1 year in advance		
	2 years in advance		
	3 years in advance		
	more years in advance		
Dates	of individual auctions:		
	1 year in advance		
	2 years in advance		
	3 years in advance		
	more years in advance		

Volum	e and product type for individual auctions:
	1 year in advance
	2 years in advance
	3 years in advance
	more years in advance
Each a	uctioneer carrying out auction process (if more than one):
	1 year in advance
	2 years in advance
	3 years in advance
	more years in advance
Please	provide arguments to support your case.
A: for l	long term planning necessary

What should be the volume of allowances to be auctioned in 2011 and 2012?

- in 2011:33,3 % of the 2013 volume and 33,3% of the 2014 volume
- in 2012:<u>33,3</u>% of the 2013 volume and <u>33,3</u>% of the 2014 volume

What percentage of these shares should be auctioned as futures?

- in 2011: <u>100</u>% of the 2013 share and <u>100</u>% of the 2014 share
- in 2012: <u>100</u>% of the 2013 share and <u>100</u>% of the 2014 share

Please provide evidence to support your case.

A:credit and cashflow issue

Questi	on 16
What s	should be the rule with respect to allowances not auctioned due to force majeure?
	They should automatically be added to the next auction on the calendar, irrespective of the auction process.
	They should be auctioned within one month, though leaving flexibility as to which auction(s) the EUAs should be added.
	They should be auctioned within three months, though leaving flexibility as to which auction(s) the EUAs should be added.
	Other? Please specify:
Questi	on 17
Is 1,00	0 allowances the most appropriate lot size? [Y/N] <u>y</u>
If not,	why not?
A:	
Questi	on 18
	igle-round sealed-bid auction the most appropriate auction format for auctioning owances? [Y/N] \underline{n}
If not,	please comment on your alternative proposal?
A:neve	er, like ebay pls otherwise to risky
Questi	on 19
•	s the most appropriate pricing rule for the auctioning of EU allowances?
	Uniform-pricing.
	Discriminatory-pricing.
	Indifferent.
 Please	provide arguments to support your case.
	er ,none above, like ebay pls
1 1. IIC V	or mone accite, like coup pio

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) -

Please comment on your choice.

	A:	
	Quest	ion 25
In case only one of the two following options would be chosen, to manipulation or collusion, which one would be preferable?		e only one of the two following options would be chosen, to limit the risk of market ulation or collusion, which one would be preferable?
	\boxtimes	A discriminatory-price auction format?
		A maximum bid-size per single entity?
	Please	comment on your choice.
	A:	
	Quest	ion 26
	Are th	e following pre-registration requirements appropriate and adequate?
	Identity:	
	\boxtimes	Natural or legal person;
		Name, address, whether publicly listed, whether licensed and supervised under the AML rules; membership of a professional association; membership of a chamber of commerce; VAT and/or tax number;
		Contact details of authorised representatives and proof of authorisation; and
		CITL-Registry account details.
		Anything else? Please specify:

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) - Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions $\,$

Declarations with respect to the past 5 years on absence of:		
	Indictment or conviction of serious crimes: check corporate officers, directors, principals, members or partners;	
	Infringement of the rules of any regulated or unregulated market;	
	Permits to conduct business being revoked or suspended;	
	Infringement of procurement rules; and	
	Infringement of disclosure of confidential information.	
	Anything else? Please specify:	
Declar	rations and submission of documentation relating to:	
	Proof of identity;	
	Type of business;	
	Participation in EU ETS or not;	
	EU ETS registered installations, if any;	
	Bank account contact details;	
	Intended auctioning activity;	
	Whether bidding on own account or on behalf of another beneficial owner;	
	Corporate and business affiliations;	
	Creditworthiness;	
	Collateral; and	
	Whether it carries out transactions subject to VAT or transactions exempted from VAT.	
	Anything else? Please specify:	
Questi		
Do you agree that the pre-registration requirements for admittance to EU auctions should be harmonised throughout the EU?		
Yes No 🗌		
Please comment on your choice.		
A:		

Should the amount of information to be supplied in order to satisfy the pre-registration requirements for admittance to EU auctions depend on the:	
means of establishing the trading relationship;	
identity of bidder;	
whether auctioning spot or futures;	
size of bid;	
means of payment and delivery;	
anything else? Please specify:	
If so, what should the differences be?	
A:everybody should submit the same information otherwise it is getting confusing	
Question 29	
Should the bidder pre-registration requirements under the Regulation apply in the same manner irrespective of whether or not the auctioneer is covered by the MiFID or AML rules? [Y/N] y	
A:same information only otherwise it is getting confusing	
If not, why not?	
A:	
Please provide arguments to support your case.	
Question 30	
Do you agree that the auctioneer(s) should be allowed to rely on pre-registration checks carried out by reliable third parties including: $[Y/N] \underline{y}$	
☐ Credit and/or financial institutions?	
Other? Please specify:	
Please comment on your choice.	

A:full transparency of related informations has to be granted in order to be able to ask for corrections

Question 31	
auctioneer(s) be allowed	der pre-registration in their home country, should the I to provide for pre-registration by potential bidders in other (or the auctioneer's home country e.g. by outsourcing this to a
Yes 🖂	No 🗌
Please comment on your	r choice:
A:	
If so, should such entitie	es be:
Covered by the A	
Covered by MiF	
Covered by both	
Other? Please sp	
Please comment on your	· ——
A:no coverage by any fi fullfill the request	ncial rule like MIFIF etc, small bidders would not be able to
Question 32	
Should the Regulation p Member States auctioning	prohibit the multiplicity of pre-registration checks in the case of ng jointly?
Yes 🔀	No 🗌
Please comment on your	choice.
A:	
Question 33	

Do you agree that the <i>level</i> of collateral accepted in EUA auctions should be harmonised for all EU ETS auctions? $[Y/N]$ \underline{y}	
If so, how should they be harmonised?	
A: no collateral at all,	
If not, why not?	
A:	
Question 34	
Do you agree that the $type$ of collateral accepted in EUA auctions should be harmonised for all EU ETS auctions? [Y/N] _	
If so, how should they be harmonised?	
A:no collateral at all cash drain issue	
If not, why not?	
A:,	
Question 35	
Do you agree that 100% collateral in electronic money transfer ought to be deposited up front at a central counterparty or credit institution designated by the auctioneer to access spot auctions? [Y/N] \underline{n}	
If not, why not?	
A:no collateral at all cash drain issue	
What alternative(s) would you suggest? Please provide arguments to support your case:	
A:	
Question 36	
In case futures are auctioned, should a clearing house be involved to mitigate credit and market risks? [Y/N] \underline{n}	
If so, should specific rules – other than those currently used in exchange clearing houses – apply to:	
the level of the initial margin;	
the level of variation margin calls;	

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions	
the daily frequency of variation margin call payments?	
If you have answered yes, please justify and elaborate on the rules that should apply and the mechanisms to implement them:	
A:	
Question 37	
What are the most preferable payment and delivery procedures that should be implemented for auctioning EUAs?	
Payment before delivery.	
Delivery versus payment.	
Both.	
Please comment on your choice.	
A:as in the open market	
Question 38	
Irrespective of the payment procedure, should the Regulation fix a maximum delay of time for payment and delivery to take place? [Y/N] \underline{n}	
If yes; what should it be?	
4 working days	
∑ 5 working days	
6 working days	
7 working days	
Other? Please specify:	
Question 39	
Should the Regulation provide any specific provisions for the handling of payment and delivery incidents or failures? [Y/N] \underline{n}	
If yes, what should they be?	
A:none, no late payment charges	

Should the Regulation provide for all matters that are central to the very creation, existence and termination or frustration of the transaction arising from the EUA auctions? [Y/N] ?

If not, why not?

A:do not understand your question, clear and straight forward terms and conditions should be in place

If so, are the matters enumerated below complete? [Y/N] _

- The designation of the parties' to the trade.
- The characteristics of the auctioned product:
 - o Nature: EUAs or EUAAs, trading period concerned.
 - o <u>Date of delivery: date at which winning bidders will receive the allowances on</u> their registry account.
 - o <u>Date of payment: date at which payment will be required from winning</u> bidders.
 - o Lot size: number of allowances associated with one unit of the auctioned good.
- Events of `force majeure' and resulting consequences.
- Events of default by the auctioneer and/or the bidder and their consequences.
- Applicable remedies or penalties.
- The regime governing the judicial review of claims across the EU.

If not, what additional matters should be foreseen in the Regulation and why?

A:

Question 41

enforcement of judgments? [Y/N] y If so, should these be: \boxtimes specific to the Regulation; by reference to the Brussels I Regulation; by citing exceptions from the Brussels I Regulation; by citing additions to the Brussels I Regulation? Please comment on your choice: A: If not, why not? A: **Question 42** Which auction model is preferable? \boxtimes Direct bidding? Indirect bidding? Both? Please comment on your choice. A:clear forward, direct contact

Should the Regulation provide for rules on jurisdiction and the mutual recognition and

Question 43

If an indirect model is used, what share of the total volume of EU allowances could be auctioned through indirect bidding? <u>none</u>

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A:lear forward, direct contact, no need for intermediaries

-	orimary participants model is used, what provisions would be desirable for ing disadvantages of restricting direct access (more than one answer is possible):
	Allow direct access to largest emitters, even if they trade only on their own account?
	If so, who should have direct access and what thresholds should apply?
\boxtimes	Disallow primary participants trading on their own account?
	Impose strict separation of own-account trading from trading on behalf of indirect bidders?
	Other? Please specify:
Questi	on 45
-	orimary participants' model is used, what conflict of interest requirements should osed? (more than one answer possible)
	Separation of client registration and trading on behalf of clients from all own account trading activities.
	Separation of collateral management, payment and delivery on behalf of clients from all own account trading activities.
	Separation of anything else, please specify:

Question 46

What obligations should apply to primary participants acting in EU-wide auctions as:

- Intermediaries? A:as intermediaries only otherwise conflict of interest
- Market makers? A:conflict of interest

Please provide arguments to support your case.

	er what conditions should auctioning through exchanges be allowed (more than one ver possible):
	Only for futures auctions open to established members of the exchange?
	Also for spot auctions open to established members of the exchange?
	Only when the exchange-based auction is open to non-established members on a non-discriminatory cost-effective basis?
	Other? Please specify:
Pleas	se provide arguments to support your case.
A:on	aly when exchange-based auction is open to every participant, how else?
Que	stion 48
Shou	ald direct auctions be allowed through:
1)	Third party service providers? [Y/N] _
2)	Public authorities? $[Y/N] \underline{y}$
Pleas	se comment on your selection:
A:pu	ablic authorities only, because of legal impact
Que	stion 49
	he general rules for auctioning EUAs suffice for ensuring full, fair and equitable ss to allowances to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters? [Y/N] <u>y</u>
If no	t, why not?
A:	

Question 50

Is allowing non-competitive bids necessary for ensuring access to allowances to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters in case of:

- discriminatory-price auctions? A:none at all
- uniform-price auctions? A:none at all

Ouestion 51 If non-competitive bids are provided for in spot auctions, what maximum share of allowances could be allocated through this route? 5% 10% Other? Please specify: _____ Please comment on your choice. A: **Question 52** What rule should apply for accessing non-competitive bids (more than one answer possible): Participants should only be allowed to use one of the two bidding routes? Non-competitive bids should be restricted to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters only? Other? Please specify: zero Please comment on your choice. A: same rules for everybody **Question 53** What should be the maximum bid-size allowed for SMEs covered by the EU ETS and

What should be the maximum bid-size allowed for SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters submitting non-competitive bids?

oman v	conficers submitting non-competitive ords:
	5 000 EUAs
	10 000 EUAs
	25 000 EUAs
	Over 25 000 EUAs, please specify exact size and give reasons for your answer: none at all

Are there any other specific measures not mentioned in this consultation that may be necessary for ensuring full, fair and equitable access to allowances for SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters? [Y/N] _		
If so, please specify:		
A:not yet identified, not enough time available		
Question 55		
What should be the minimum period of time before the auction date for the release of the notice to auction?		
2 weeks 1 month 2 months 2		
Other Please specify:		
Please comment on your proposal.		
A:to spread it		
Question 56		
What should be the minimum period of time before the auction date for the submission of the intention to bid?		
1 week 2 weeks 1 month		
Other Please specify: on auction day		
Please comment on your proposal.		
A:highest flexibilty necessary		
Question 57		
Are there any specific provisions that need to be highlighted in:		
The notice to auction?		
The intention to bid?		
Both?		
Please specify what they are.		
A: key informations about typ, amount, time frame		

What	information should be disclosed after the auction:
	Clearing price (if allowances are awarded on a uniform-price basis or in the case of non-competitive bids being allowed)?
\boxtimes	Average price (if allowances are awarded on a discriminatory-price basis)?
\boxtimes	Any relevant information to solve tied bids?
\boxtimes	Total volume of EUAs auctioned?
	Total volume of bids submitted distinguishing between competitive and non-competitive bids (if applicable)?
\boxtimes	Total volume of allowances allocated?
	Anything else? Please specify:
Quest	tion 59
What	should be the maximum delay for the announcement of auction results?
5 min	utes \boxtimes 15 minutes \square 30 minutes \square
1 hou	r 🗌
Other	Please specify:
Please	e comment on your proposal.
A:	
Quest	tion 60
•	bu feel that any specific additional provisions should be adopted in the Regulation e granting of fair and equal access to auction information? $[Y/N]$ \underline{n}
If so,	what may they be?
0	
_	tion 61
	d an auction monitor be appointed centrally to monitor all EU auctions?
[Y/N]	
	, why not?
A:	

Question 62		
•	Do you agree that the Regulation should contain general principles on [mark those that you agree with, $\boxed{\boxtimes}$]:	
\boxtimes	the designation and mandate of the auction monitor; and	
\boxtimes	cooperation between the auctioneer(s) and the auction monitor?	
If not,	why not?	
A:		
	d these be supplemented by operational guidance, possibly through Commission ines? [Y/N] \underline{y}	
If not,	why not?	
A:		
Quest	ion 63	
	re a need for harmonised market abuse provisions in the Regulation to prevent r dealing and market manipulation? $[Y/N] \underline{y}$	
If not,	why not?	
A:		
	comment on your choice outlining the provisions you deem necessary and stating asons why.	
A:		
Quest	ion 64	
	d the Regulation provide for harmonised enforcement measures to sanction [mark that you agree with, $\boxed{\boxtimes}$]:	
	Non-compliance with its provisions?	
	Market abuse?	

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A:

Ques	suon 65
Shou	lld the enforcement measures include [mark those that you agree with, ⊠]:
	The suspension of the auctioneer(s) and/or bidders from the EU-wide auctions? If so, for how long should such suspension last?
	Financial penalties? If so, at what level should such penalties be fixed?
	The power to address binding interim decisions to the auctioneer(s) and/or bidders to avert any urgent, imminent threat of breach of the Regulation with likely irreversible adverse consequences?
	Anything else? Please specify:
Pleas	se provide arguments to support your case.
A:	
Ques	stion 66
Shou	ld such enforcement measures apply at:
\boxtimes	EU level?
	National level?
	Both?
Pleas	se comment on your choice.
A:	
Ques	stion 67
Who	should enforce compliance with the Regulation (more than one answer is possible):
\boxtimes	The auction monitor?
	The auctioneer?
	A competent authority at EU level?
	A competent authority at national level?
	Other? Please specify:
Pleas	se provide evidence to support your case.
A:ke	ep it flexible

Which of the three approaches for an overall EU auction model do you prefer? Please rate the options below (1 being the most preferable, 3 being the least preferable)

- <u>3</u> Limited number of coordinated auction processes.
- <u>1</u> Full centralisation based on a single EU-wide auction process.
- The hybrid approach where different auction processes are cleared through a centralised system.

Please give arguments to support your case.

A:

A	-
Question	hч
Oucsuon	\mathbf{v}

Question 07
If a limited number of coordinated auction processes develops, what should be the maximum number?
<u> </u>
<u> </u>
☐ 7
more than 7, please specify: weekly
Please give arguments to support your case.
A:to ensure that the market is least influenced by the auctions

Question 70

Is there a need for a transitional phase in order to develop gradually the optimal auction infrastructure? [Y/N] \underline{y}

If so, what kind of transitional arrangements would you recommend? _____

Question 71

Should the Regulation impose the following requirements for the auctioneer(s) and auction processes? [mark those that apply, \boxtimes]:

Technical capabilities of auctioneers:

	capacity and experience to conduct auctions (or a specific part of the auction process) in an open, fair, transparent, cost-effective and non-discriminatory manner;
	appropriate investment in keeping the system up-to-date and in line with ongoing market and technological developments; and
\boxtimes	relevant professional licences, high ethical and quality control standards, compliance with financial and market integrity rules.
Integri	ty:
	guarantee confidentiality of bids, ability to manage market sensitive information in an appropriate manner;
	duly protected electronic systems and appropriate security procedures with regards to identification and data transmission;
\boxtimes	appropriate rules on avoiding and monitoring conflicts of interest; and
	full cooperation with the auction monitor.
Reliabi	ility:
	robust organisation and IT systems;
	adequate fallback measures in case of unexpected events;
	minimisation of the risk of cancelling an individual auction once announced;
	minimisation of the risk of failing functionalities (e.g. access to the bidding platform for certain potential bidders); and
	fallback system in case of IT problems on the bidder side.
Access	ibility and user friendliness:
	fair, concise, comprehensible and easily accessible information on how to participate in auctions;
	short and simple pre-registration forms;
	clear and simple electronic tools;
	(option of) accessibility of platforms through a dedicated internet interface;
	ability of the auction platform to connect to and communicate with proprietary trading systems used by bidders;
	adequate and regular training (including mock auctions);
\boxtimes	detailed user guidance on how to participate in the auction; and
	ability to test identification and access to the auction.
Please	elaborate if any of these requirements need not be included.

A:

Please elaborate what additional requirements would be desirable. A:
Question 72 What provisions on administrative fees should the Regulation include (more than one answer is possible)? General principles on proportionality, fairness and non-discrimination. Rules on fee structure. Rules on the amount of admissible fees. Other? Please specify: no fees at all Please provide arguments to support your case. A:it is a tax collection which have not be paid for twice
Question 73 Should there be provisions for public disclosure of material steps when introducing new (or adapted) auction processes? A:of course Should new (or adapted) auction process be notified to and authorised by the Commission before inclusion in the auction calendar? A:no, to be done by auction monitor
 Question 74 Which one of the following options is the most appropriate in case a Member State does not hold auctions (on time)? ☐ Auctions by an auctioneer authorised by the Commission. ☐ Automatic addition of the delayed quantities to those foreseen for the next two or three auctions. What other option would you envisage? Please specify: A:

Should a sanction apply to a Member State that does not auction allowances in line with its commitments? [Y/N] \underline{y}

If so, what form should that sanction take?

A:financial

Question 76

U	eneral rule throughout the trading period, in your opinion, are early auctions ary? [Y/N]_
If so, v	what should the profile of EUAA auctions be:
	5-10% in year n-2, 10-20% in year n-1, remainder in year n
	10-20% in year n-2, 20-30% in year n-1, remainder in year n
	20-30% in year n-2, 30-35% in year n-2, remainder in year n
	Other? Please specify:

Question 77

Do you think there is a need to auction EUAA futures? [Y/N] y If so, why?

A:credit and cash flow issue

This page contains two questions that will not be made public. These questions cannot be completed on this document

Request for	
potentially	
confidential	
information	3

Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.

For aircraft operators covered by the EU ETS:

Have you determined a corporate hedging strategy for carbon needs? Yes [] No []

If so, what share of your expected emissions covered by the EU ETS in a given year n do you (intend to) hedge and how much in advance?

year n
year n-1
year n-2
year n-2

Request for potentially confidential information 4

Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.

What share of the annual quantity of allowances you intend to purchase *via* auctions would you wish to buy spot or futures respectively?

		:	SPOT		FUTURES
•	year n	:	%	1	%
•	year n-1	:	%	-1	%
•	year n-2	:	%	-1	%

Ques	tion 78			
What	should be the optimal frequency and size of EUAA auctions:			
	2 auctions per year of around 15 million EUAAs?			
	3 auctions per year of around 10 million EUAAs?			
\boxtimes	More than 3 auctions per year? Please specify: weekly			
Please	e comment on your choice.			
A:to 1	minimise price/market impact			
Ques	tion 79			
What	would be your preferred timing for EUAA auctions:			
\boxtimes	Equally spread throughout the year?			
	November – March?			
	Other? Please specify:			
Ques	tion 80			
	Id any of the EUAA auction design elements be different compared to EUA ons (see section 3)? $[Y/N]$ \underline{n}			
If so,	please specify and comment on your choice.			
A:to 1	minimise confusion			
Do yo	tion 81 ou agree there is no need for a maximum bid-size? [Y/N] n , why not?			
A:wh	y should there be one?			
Oues	tion 82			
-	re any information regarding aircraft operators made available as part of the			
	atory process to the competent authorities that could facilitate the KYC checks			

performed by the auctioneer(s)? [Y/N] _

If so, please describe what information is concerned and whether it should be referred to in the Regulation or any operational guidance published by the Commission.
A:
Question 83
In your opinion, is there a specific need to allow for non-competitive bids in EUAA auctions?
A:no, same rules for everyone
Would this be the case even when applying a uniform clearing price format?
A:yes
Please provide arguments to support your case.
Overtion 94
Question 84
Do you agree that there is no need for any specific provisions for EUAA auctions as regards [mark those that you agree with, \boxtimes]:
Involvement of primary participants, exchanges or third party service providers?
Guarantees and financial assurance?
Payment and delivery?
☐ Information disclosure?
Auction monitoring?
Preventing anti-competitive behaviour and/or market manipulation?
Enforcement?
If not places describe in detail what rules would be needed and why

If not, please describe in detail what rules would be needed and why.

A: primary participants as intermediaries only

no guarantees at all

Taking into account the smaller volume of EUAA allowances to be auctioned compared to EUAs, which of the three approaches for an overall EUAA auctioning model do you prefer? Please rate the options below (1 being the most preferable, 3 being the least preferable)

- <u>3</u> Limited number of coordinated auction processes.
- <u>1</u> Full centralisation based on a single EU-wide auction process.
- <u>2</u> Hybrid approach where different auction processes are cleared through a centralised system.

Does your choice differ from the approach preferred for EUAs? [Y/N] _

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A:

Question 86

•	bu agree that there is no need for any specific provisions for EUAA auctions as ls. [mark those that you agree with, \boxtimes]:
	Requirements for the auctioneer(s) and auction processes?
	Administrative fees?
\boxtimes	Rules to ensure appropriate and timely preparation of the auctions?
If not	please describe in detail what rules would be needed and why

A:no admistrative fees for a quasi tax collection at all, otherwise same rules as for EUA's