EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions

This document is the questionnaire for this consultation. The survey contains 4 initial questions (A-D) to identify respondents, 86 questions for which responses will be made public and 4 questions that are classified confidential, must be sent directly to the European Commission and will not be made public. The questions that are classified potentially confidential are on two separate pages (2 questions on each page) and highlighted in green boxes.

Period of consultation

From 3 June 2009 to 3 August 2009 inclusive

How to submit your contribution

This consultation seeks to obtain feedback from all categories of stakeholders regarding the different aspects of auction design and implementation covered in the Consultation Paper.

We are sorry for the inconvenience, but the web-based survey is not available yet. If participants wish to complete the survey on this document and send their contributions back to **contact ets auctions consultation@icfi.com** their responses can be accepted in this format. The web-based survey will be available as soon as possible if participants wish to wait till that is available.

Received contributions will be published on the Internet. It is important to read the specific privacy statement attached to this consultation for information on how your personal data and contribution will be dealt with.

Specific privacy statement

"Received contributions, together with the identity of the contributor, will be published on the Internet, unless the contributor objects to publication of his or her personal data on the grounds that such publication would harm his or her legitimate interests. In such cases the contribution may be published in an anonymous form. Otherwise, the contribution will not be published nor will, in principle, its content be taken into account. Responses for questions deemed confidential in the consultation will not be available for view on the website irrespective of contributor objecting or not."

Instructions to filling out the questionnaire

•	Questions may only be answered in designated response fields
•	For certain multiple choice questions, simply click on box to indicate choice
•	Answer [Y/N] questions by typing "y" / "Y" or "n" / "N" on underlined area ()
•	Some responses require explanations, additional comments and detailed answers. These will either by identified by underline () or an answer section (A:). The amount of text that can be entered here is unlimited.
•	After completing the survey, please save and send to contact ets auctions consultation@icfi.com
•	If any questions seem unclear in context or for method of response, please mail contact ets auctions consultation@icfi.com to clarify

Thank you

Section 1: Questions to categorize participants

Questi	ion A	
Name	of Comp	pany/Organization: Flybe Ltd
Princip	pal natur	e of activities: Airline
Numb	er of em	ployees in 2008:
World	-wide _	Europe-wide <u>3000+</u>
Turno	ver in 20	008:
World	-wide	Europe-wide £650m
Questi	ion B	
Гуре с	of respor	ndent:
	Membe	er State
\boxtimes	Compa	ny operating one or more installations covered by the EU ETS
		Electricity generators
		Energy companies other than electricity generators
		Industrial sectors
	\boxtimes	Aviation
		Other. Please specify:
	Approx	Annual Emissions: tCO ₂
	Interm	ediary
		Financial institution
		Trading arm of non-financial institution
		Other. Please specify
	Trader	on own account
		Financial institution
		Trading arm of non-financial institution
		Other. Please specify

	ing Schem sign and o	e (ETS) – rganisation of emissions allowance auctions	
Regulated market			
	Carbon	only	
	Carbon	and electricity	
	Carbon	and other energy products	
Other	carbon 1	market	
	Multila	ateral trading facility trading carbon derivatives	
	Carbon	n exchange trading spot carbon	
	Other.	Please specify	
Clearin	Clearing house		
Centra	ntral counterparty		
Other (multiple choices apply)			
		Non-governmental organisation	
		Trade association	
		Carbon analyst	
		Carbon publication	
		Academic	
		Other. Please specify	

Question C

Contact details will not be made public.

Question D

Questions relating to the "Specific privacy statement" above.

Do you object to publication of your personal data because it would harm your legitimate interests? [Y/N] N

If so, please provide an explanation of the legitimate interests that you think will be harmed:

A:

• Are any of your responses confidential? [Y/N] N

If so, please indicate which ones and provide an explanation:

Section 2: Survey questions (86) and potentially confidential questions (4)

Question 1

As a general rule throughout the trading period, in your opinion, are early auctions necessary? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$

If so, what should the profile of EUA auctions be?

Other? Please specify: ___

□ ?	5-10% in year n-2, 10-20% in year n-1, remainder in year n
\boxtimes ?	10-20% in year n-2, 20-30% in year n-1, remainder in year r
□?	20-30% in year n-2, 30-35% in year n-2, remainder in year n

Question 2

 \square ?

Do you think there is a need to auction futures? [Y/N] N

If so, why?

A: Leave to the secondary market

Question 3

What share of allowances should be auctioned spot and what share should be auctioned as futures for each year?

			SPOT	FUTURES
•	year n	:	<u>99</u> %	<u>0</u> %
•	year n-1	:	<u>99</u> %	<u>0</u> %
•	year n-2	:	<u>99</u> %	<u>0</u> %

Please provide evidence to support your case.

A: Leave it to the secondary market for hedging forward requirements

NB: The answer to this question will be published as part of the public consultation. Please do not submit confidential information as part of your answer to this question.

Should the common maturity date used in futures auctions be in December (so the maturity date would be December in year n, both when auctioning in year n-2 as when auctioning in year n-1)? $[Y/N]_{-}$

If not, please suggest alternative maturity dates and provide evidence to support your view.

A:N/A

This page contains two questions that will not be made public. These questions cannot be completed on this document

Request for potentially confidential information 1

Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.

For ETS operators: what share of your expected emissions covered by the EU ETS in a given year n do you hedge and how much in advance?

year n
 year n-1
 year n-2
 earlier years (please specify)

Request for potentially confidential information 2

Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.

What share of the annual quantity of allowances you intend to purchase *via* auctions would you wish to buy spot or futures respectively?

		SPOT	FUTURES		
•	year n	:%	%		
•	year n-1	:%	%		
•	year n-2	: %	%		

Please specify whether you are an:

- ETS operator; or
- Other participant.

Questi	ion 5
For spe	ot auctions:
What s	should be the optimum frequency of auctions?
	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?
	Monthly?
	Quarterly?
\boxtimes	Other? Please specify: Hourly
What s	should be the minimum frequency of auctions?
\boxtimes	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?
	Monthly?
	Quarterly?
	Other? Please specify:
What s	should be the maximum frequency of auctions?
	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?
	Monthly?
	Quarterly?
\boxtimes	Other? Please specify: <u>Hourly</u>
Please	provide arguments to support your case.
A:	
Questi	ion 6
For sp	ot auctions, what should be the:
•	Optimum auction size?
•	Minimum auction size?
•	Maximum auction size?
If deer	ned appropriate, please indicate a range and/or distribution over different sizes
Please	provide arguments to support your case.
A: Size	e depends on frequency of auctions (see above)

Questio	on 7
For fut	ures auctions:
What sl	hould be the optimum frequency of auctions?
	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?
	Monthly?
	Quarterly?
	Other? Please specify: N/A
What sl	hould be the minimum frequency of auctions?
	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?
	Monthly?
	Quarterly?
	Other? Please specify: N/A
What sl	hould be the maximum frequency of auctions?
	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?
	Monthly?
	Quarterly?
	Other? Please specify: N/A
Please 1	provide arguments to support your case.
A: Futu	ares should not be auctioned - this should be left to the secondary market
Questio	on 8
For futi	ures auctions, what should be the:
•	Optimum auction size?
•	Minimum auction size?
•	Maximum auction size?
If deem	ned appropriate, please indicate a range and/or distribution over different sizes.
Please	provide evidence to support your case.
A:N/A	

Question 9			
Should volumes of spot allowances be auctioned evenly throughout the year? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$			
If not, how should volumes be distributed? (more than one answer possible) Please specify:			
☐ A larger proportion in the first 4 months of the year?			
A larger proportion in December?			
A smaller proportion in July and August?			
Other? Please specify:			
Question 10			
In case futures are auctioned, should the volumes for spot and futures auctions be spread over the year in the same manner? $[Y/N]$ \underline{Y}			
If not, how should they differ? (more than one answer possible)			
No futures auctions less than six months before the maturity date.			
A larger proportion in December.			
A smaller proportion in July and August.			
Otherwise? Please specify how and comment:			
Question 11			
Does the Regulation need to have provisions to avoid holding auctions during a short period of time before the surrendering date (30 April each year)? [Y/N] _			
If yes, how long should this period be:			
One week 2 weeks 3 weeks 1 month			
In case futures are auctioned, should there be similar provisions with respect to the period immediately prior to the maturity date? $[Y/N]_{-}$			
If yes, how long should this period be:			
One week			
Question 12			

Which	dates should be avoided? (more than one answer possible)
\boxtimes	Public holidays common in most Member States?
\boxtimes	Days where important relevant economic data is released?
\boxtimes	Days where emissions data are released?
	Other? Please specify:
Please	specify the dates you have in mind in your answers.
Questi	on 13
Is a har	rmonised 10-12 hrs CET auction slot desirable? [Y/N] \underline{N}
If not,	what alternative(s) would you suggest?
A: Auc	tion throughout the day
Questi	on 14
How lo	ong in advance should each element of the calendar be determined?
Annua	I volumes to be auctioned:
	1 year in advance
	2 years in advance
	3 years in advance
	more years in advance
Distrib	ution of annual volumes over spot and futures (if applicable):
	1 year in advance
	2 years in advance
	3 years in advance
	more years in advance
Dates o	of individual auctions:
	1 year in advance
	2 years in advance
	3 years in advance
	more years in advance
Volum	e and product type for individual auctions:

	sions Trading Scheme (ETS) – tion on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions
	1 year in advance
	2 years in advance
	3 years in advance
	more years in advance
Each a	auctioneer carrying out auction process (if more than one):
	1 year in advance
	2 years in advance
	3 years in advance
	more years in advance
Please	provide arguments to support your case.
A: All	should be determined as far in the future as the information is known.
Questi	ion 15
What s	should be the volume of allowances to be auctioned in 2011 and 2012?
•	in $2011\underline{20}$ % of the 2013 volume and $\underline{0}$ % of the 2014 volume
•	in $2012\underline{30}\%$ of the 2013 volume and $\underline{20}\%$ of the 2014 volume
What 1	percentage of these shares should be auctioned as futures?
•	in 2011: $\underline{0}\%$ of the 2013 share and $\underline{0}\%$ of the 2014 share
•	in 2012: $\underline{0}\%$ of the 2013 share and $\underline{0}\%$ of the 2014 share
Please	provide evidence to support your case.

What	should be the rule with respect to allowances not auctioned due to force majeure?
\boxtimes	They should automatically be added to the next auction on the calendar, irrespective of the auction process.
	They should be auctioned within one month, though leaving flexibility as to which auction(s) the EUAs should be added.
	They should be auctioned within three months, though leaving flexibility as to which auction(s) the EUAs should be added.
	Other? Please specify:
Ques	tion 17
Is 1,0	00 allowances the most appropriate lot size? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$
If not	, why not?
A:	
Ques	tion 18
	ngle-round sealed-bid auction the most appropriate auction format for auctioning lowances? $[Y/N]\underline{Y}$
If not	, please comment on your alternative proposal?
A:	
Ques	tion 19
What	is the most appropriate pricing rule for the auctioning of EU allowances?
\boxtimes	Uniform-pricing.
	Discriminatory-pricing.
	Indifferent.
Please	e provide arguments to support your case.
A:	
Oues	tion 20

	ading Scheme (ETS design and organisa) – tion of emissions allowance auctions
Should the r	ules for solving	g ties in the Regulation be:
rando	om selection; o	or
pro-r	rata re-scaling o	of bids?
Please comn	nent on your cl	noice.
A:		
Question 21		
Should a res	erve price appl	y?
A:No		
Question 22		
In case a res kept secret?	•	ld apply, should the methodology/formula for calculating it be
Please comn	nent on your cl	noice.
A:N/A		
Question 23	1	
-		single entity desirable in a Uniform-price auction?
[Y/N] N	iii old-size per	single entity desirable in a Uniform-price auction:
·	m hid-size ner	single entity desirable in a discriminatory-price auction?
[Y/N] <u>N</u>	in old old put	onight onits, decimals in a discriminatory prior dataset.
Please comn	nent on your cl	noice.
A: As long a	as frequent auct	tions used
Question 24		
		oid-size limit (as a percentage of the volume of allowances y one choice is possible):
10%: 🗌	15%: 🗌	20%: 🗌
25%: 🗌	30%: □	More than 30%: Please specify:
Please comn	nent on your cl	noice.

A:N/A

Questi	ion 25
	e only one of the two following options would be chosen, to limit the risk of market ulation or collusion, which one would be preferable?
	A discriminatory-price auction format?
	A maximum bid-size per single entity?
Please	comment on your choice.
A: Nei	ther would prevent large scale collusion
Questi	on 26
Are th	e following pre-registration requirements appropriate and adequate?
Identit	y:
\boxtimes	Natural or legal person;
	Name, address, whether publicly listed, whether licensed and supervised under the AML rules; membership of a professional association; membership of a chamber of commerce; VAT and/or tax number;
\boxtimes	Contact details of authorised representatives and proof of authorisation; and
	CITL-Registry account details.
	Anything else? Please specify:

Declar	rations with respect to the past 5 years on absence of:
\boxtimes	Indictment or conviction of serious crimes: check corporate officers, directors, principals, members or partners;
\boxtimes	Infringement of the rules of any regulated or unregulated market;
\boxtimes	Permits to conduct business being revoked or suspended;
\boxtimes	Infringement of procurement rules; and
\boxtimes	Infringement of disclosure of confidential information.
	Anything else? Please specify:
Declar	rations and submission of documentation relating to:
\boxtimes	Proof of identity;
\boxtimes	Type of business;
\boxtimes	Participation in EU ETS or not;
\boxtimes	EU ETS registered installations, if any;
\boxtimes	Bank account contact details;
	Intended auctioning activity;
\boxtimes	Whether bidding on own account or on behalf of another beneficial owner;
\boxtimes	Corporate and business affiliations;
\boxtimes	Creditworthiness;
\boxtimes	Collateral; and
\boxtimes	Whether it carries out transactions subject to VAT or transactions exempted from VAT.
	Anything else? Please specify:
Questi	on 27
-	u agree that the pre-registration requirements for admittance to EU auctions should monised throughout the EU?
Yes 🔀	No □
Please	comment on your choice.
A: Har used.	monised pre-registration requirements are essential if a harmonised process is

Should the amount of information to be supplied in order to satisfy the pre-registration requirements for admittance to EU auctions depend on the:		
means of establishing the trading relationship;		
identity of bidder;		
whether auctioning spot or futures;		
size of bid;		
means of payment and delivery;		
anything else? Please specify:		
If so, what should the differences be?		
A:No		
Question 29		
Should the bidder pre-registration requirements under the Regulation apply in the same manner irrespective of whether or not the auctioneer is covered by the MiFID or AML rules? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$		
A:		
If not, why not?		
A:		
Please provide arguments to support your case.		
Question 30		
Do you agree that the auctioneer(s) should be allowed to rely on pre-registration checks carried out by reliable third parties including: $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$		
☑ Other auctioneers?		
☐ Credit and/or financial institutions?		
Other? Please specify:		
Please comment on your choice.		
A:		

	Ou	estion	31
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In order to facilitate bidder pre-registration in their home country, should the auctioneer(s) be allowed to provide for pre-registration by potential bidders in other (or all) Member States than the auctioneer's home country e.g. by outsourcing this to a reliable third party?
Yes ⊠ No □
Please comment on your choice:
A:
If so, should such entities be:
Covered by the AML rules?
Covered by MiFID?
☐ Covered by both?
Other? Please specify:
Please comment on your choice:
A:
Question 32
Should the Regulation prohibit the multiplicity of pre-registration checks in the case of Member States auctioning jointly?
Yes ⊠ No □
Please comment on your choice.
A:
Question 33
Do you agree that the <i>level</i> of collateral accepted in EUA auctions should be harmonised for all EU ETS auctions? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$

If so, how should they be harmonised?		
A:		
If not, why not?		
A:		
Question 34		
Do you agree that the <i>type</i> of collateral accepted in EUA auctions should be harmonised for all EU ETS auctions? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$		
If so, how should they be harmonised?		
A:		
If not, why not?		
A:		
Question 35		
Do you agree that 100% collateral in electronic money transfer ought to be deposited up front at a central counterparty or credit institution designated by the auctioneer to access spot auctions? $[Y/N]$ \underline{Y}		
If not, why not?		
A:		
What alternative(s) would you suggest? Please provide arguments to support your case:		
A:		
Question 36		
In case futures are auctioned, should a clearing house be involved to mitigate credit and market risks? $[Y/N]$ -		
If so, should specific rules – other than those currently used in exchange clearing houses – apply to:		
the level of the initial margin;		
the level of variation margin calls;		
the daily frequency of variation margin call payments?		

If you have answered yes, please justify and elaborate on the rules that should apply and the mechanisms to implement them:		
A:		
Question 3'	7	
	e most preferable payment and delivery procedures that should be d for auctioning EUAs?	
Payı	ment before delivery.	
☐ Deli	very versus payment.	
⊠ Both	1.	
Please com	ment on your choice.	
	kes little difference if providing collateral for spot auctions with payment ortly after the auction.	
1		
Question 38	3	
Irrespective of the payment procedure, should the Regulation fix a maximum delay of time for payment and delivery to take place? $[Y/N]$ \underline{Y}		
If yes; what should it be?		
⊠ 4 wo	orking days	
□ 5 wo	orking days	
☐ 6 wo	orking days	
□ 7 wo	orking days	
Other? Please specify:		
Question 39		
Should the Regulation provide any specific provisions for the handling of payment and delivery incidents or failures? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$		
If yes, what should they be?		
A: System o	A: System downtime/failure	

Should the Regulation provide for all matters that are central to the very creation, existence and termination or frustration of the transaction arising from the EUA auctions? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$

If not, why not?

A:

If so, are the matters enumerated below complete? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$

- The designation of the parties' to the trade.
- The characteristics of the auctioned product:
 - o Nature: EUAs or EUAAs, trading period concerned.
 - O Date of delivery: date at which winning bidders will receive the allowances on their registry account.
 - O Date of payment: date at which payment will be required from winning bidders.
 - o Lot size: number of allowances associated with one unit of the auctioned good.
- Events of 'force majeure' and resulting consequences.
- Events of default by the auctioneer and/or the bidder and their consequences.
- Applicable remedies or penalties.
- The regime governing the judicial review of claims across the EU.

If not, what additional matters should be foreseen in the Regulation and why?

A:

Should the Regulation provide for rules on jurisdiction and the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments? [Y/N] Y If so, should these be: \boxtimes specific to the Regulation; by reference to the Brussels I Regulation; by citing exceptions from the Brussels I Regulation; by citing additions to the Brussels I Regulation? Please comment on your choice: A: If not, why not? A: **Question 42** Which auction model is preferable? Direct bidding? Indirect bidding? \boxtimes Both? Please comment on your choice. A: Why limit this? **Question 43** If an indirect model is used, what share of the total volume of EU allowances could be auctioned through indirect bidding? _____ Please provide arguments to support your case. A: Why impose restrictions on this?

-	orimary participants model is used, what provisions would be desirable for ing disadvantages of restricting direct access (more than one answer is possible):
	Allow direct access to largest emitters, even if they trade only on their own account?
	If so, who should have direct access and what thresholds should apply?
	Disallow primary participants trading on their own account?
\boxtimes	Impose strict separation of own-account trading from trading on behalf of indirect bidders?
	Other? Please specify:
Questi	on 45
•	orimary participants' model is used, what conflict of interest requirements should osed? (more than one answer possible)
\boxtimes	Separation of client registration and trading on behalf of clients from all own account trading activities.
\boxtimes	Separation of collateral management, payment and delivery on behalf of clients from all own account trading activities.
	Separation of anything else, please specify:

Question 46

What obligations should apply to primary participants acting in EU-wide auctions as:

- Intermediaries? A: MiFID
- Market makers? A: None if frequent auctions are used

Please provide arguments to support your case.

Question	47
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	ler what conditions should auctioning through exchanges be allowed (more than one wer possible):
	Only for futures auctions open to established members of the exchange?
\boxtimes	Also for spot auctions open to established members of the exchange?
	Only when the exchange-based auction is open to non-established members on a non-discriminatory cost-effective basis?
	Other? Please specify:
Plea	se provide arguments to support your case.
A:	
Que	estion 48
Sho	uld direct auctions be allowed through:
1)	Third party service providers? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$
2)	Public authorities? $[Y/N] \underline{N}$
Plea	se comment on your selection:
A:	
Que	estion 49
Do 1	the general rules for auctioning EUAs suffice for ensuring full, fair and equitable ess to allowances to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$
If no	ot, why not?
A:	

Is allowing non-competitive bids necessary for ensuring access to allowances to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters in case of:

- discriminatory-price auctions? A: No
- uniform-price auctions? A: No

Qu	estion 51
	non-competitive bids are provided for in spot auctions, what maximum share of owances could be allocated through this route?
	5%
	10%
	Other? Please specify:
Plea	ase comment on your choice.
A:1	N/A
Qu	estion 52
	at rule should apply for accessing non-competitive bids (more than one answer sible):
	Participants should only be allowed to use one of the two bidding routes?
	Non-competitive bids should be restricted to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters only?
	Other? Please specify:
Plea	ase comment on your choice.
A:1	$N \setminus A$
Qu	estion 53
	at should be the maximum bid-size allowed for SMEs covered by the EU ETS and all emitters submitting non-competitive bids?
	5 000 EUAs
	10 000 EUAs
	25 000 EUAs
	Over 25 000 EUAs, please specify exact size and give reasons for your answer: $\underline{N}\underline{A}$

Are there any other specific measures not mentioned in this consultation that may be necessary for ensuring full, fair and equitable access to allowances for SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters? $[Y/N]$		
If so, please specify:		
A:N\A		
Question 55		
What should be the minimum period of time before the auction date for the release of the notice to auction?		
2 weeks 1 month 2 months		
Other Please specify:		
Please comment on your proposal.		
A: Not applicable if auctions are daily		
Question 56		
What should be the minimum period of time before the auction date for the submission of the intention to bid?		
1 week 2 weeks 1 month		
Other Please specify:		
Please comment on your proposal.		
A: Not applicable if auctions are daily		
Question 57		
Are there any specific provisions that need to be highlighted in:		
☐ The notice to auction?		
☐ The intention to bid?		
Both?		
Please specify what they are.		
A:		

What i	information should be disclosed after the auction:					
	Clearing price (if allowances are awarded on a uniform-price basis or in the case of non-competitive bids being allowed)?					
\boxtimes	Average price (if allowances are awarded on a discriminatory-price basis)?					
\boxtimes	Any relevant information to solve tied bids?					
\boxtimes	Total volume of EUAs auctioned?					
	Total volume of bids submitted distinguishing between competitive and non-competitive bids (if applicable)?					
\boxtimes	Total volume of allowances allocated?					
	Anything else? Please specify:					
Questi						
	should be the maximum delay for the announcement of auction results?					
	ates ☐ 15 minutes ☐ 30 minutes ☐					
1 hour						
Other	Please specify:					
Please	comment on your proposal.					
A: Thi	s should be automated					
Questi	ion 60					
•	u feel that any specific additional provisions should be adopted in the Regulation granting of fair and equal access to auction information? $[Y/N] N$					
If so, v	what may they be?					
Questi	ion 61					
Should	d an auction monitor be appointed centrally to monitor all EU auctions?					
[Y/N]	$\underline{\mathbf{Y}}$					
If not,	why not?					
A:						

Do you agree that the Regulation should contain general principles on [mark those that you agree with, []:

the designation and mandate of the auction monitor; and

ooperation between the auctioneer(s) and the auction monitor?

If not, why not?

A:

Should these be supplemented by operational guidance, possibly through Commission guidelines? [Y/N] \underline{Y}

If not, why not?

A:

Question 63

Is there a need for harmonised market abuse provisions in the Regulation to prevent insider dealing and market manipulation? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$

If not, why not?

A:

Please comment on your choice outlining the provisions you deem necessary and stating the reasons why.

A:

Question 64

Should the Regulation provide for harmonised enforcement measures to sanction [mark those that you agree with, \boxtimes]:

Non-compliance with its provisions?

Market abuse?

Please provide arguments to support your case.

Question 65 Should the enforcement measures include [mark those that you agree with, \boxtimes]: \boxtimes The suspension of the auctioneer(s) and/or bidders from the EU-wide auctions? If so, for how long should such suspension last? \boxtimes Financial penalties? If so, at what level should such penalties be fixed? \boxtimes The power to address binding interim decisions to the auctioneer(s) and/or bidders to avert any urgent, imminent threat of breach of the Regulation with likely irreversible adverse consequences? Anything else? Please specify: _____ Please provide arguments to support your case. A: **Question 66** Should such enforcement measures apply at: EU level? National level? \boxtimes Both? Please comment on your choice. A: **Question 67** Who should enforce compliance with the Regulation (more than one answer is possible): The auction monitor? \boxtimes The auctioneer? A competent authority at EU level? \boxtimes A competent authority at national level?

Other? Please specify:

A:

Please provide evidence to support your case.

Which of the three approaches for an overall EU auction model do you prefer? Please rate the options below (1 being the most preferable, 3 being the least preferable)

- <u>2</u> Limited number of coordinated auction processes.
- <u>1</u> Full centralisation based on a single EU-wide auction process.
- <u>3</u> The hybrid approach where different auction processes are cleared through a centralised system.

Please give arguments to support your case.

A: Frequency fully centralised auctions are the most efficient means of getting allowance to the market, and will not lead to distortions in the secondary market.

Question 69

If a limited number of coordinated auction processes develops, what should be the
maximum number?
☐ 3
☑ 5
□ 7
more than 7, please specify:
Please give arguments to support your case.
A:

Question 70

Is there a need for a transitional phase in order to develop gradually the optimal auction infrastructure? [Y/N] \underline{N}

If so, what kind of transitional arrangements would you recommend?

Question 71

Should the Regulation impose the following requirements for the auctioneer(s) and auction processes? [mark those that apply, \boxtimes]:

Technical capabilities of auctioneers:

- capacity and experience to conduct auctions (or a specific part of the auction process) in an open, fair, transparent, cost-effective and non-discriminatory manner;
- appropriate investment in keeping the system up-to-date and in line with ongoing market and technological developments; and
- relevant professional licences, high ethical and quality control standards, compliance with financial and market integrity rules.

Integrity:

- guarantee confidentiality of bids, ability to manage market sensitive information in an appropriate manner;
- duly protected electronic systems and appropriate security procedures with regards to identification and data transmission;
- appropriate rules on avoiding and monitoring conflicts of interest; and
- full cooperation with the auction monitor.

Reliability:

- robust organisation and IT systems;
- adequate fallback measures in case of unexpected events;
- minimisation of the risk of cancelling an individual auction once announced;
- minimisation of the risk of failing functionalities (e.g. access to the bidding platform for certain potential bidders); and
- fallback system in case of IT problems on the bidder side.

Accessibility and user friendliness:

- fair, concise, comprehensible and easily accessible information on how to participate in auctions;
- short and simple pre-registration forms;
- clear and simple electronic tools;
- (option of) accessibility of platforms through a dedicated internet interface;
- ability of the auction platform to connect to and communicate with proprietary trading systems used by bidders;
- adequate and regular training (including mock auctions);
- detailed user guidance on how to participate in the auction; and
- ability to test identification and access to the auction.

Please elaborate if any of these requirements need not be included.

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions		
Please elaborate what additional requirements would be desirable.		
A:		
Question 72		
What provisions on administrative fees should the Regulation include (more than one answer is possible)?		
General principles on proportionality, fairness and non-discrimination.		
Rules on fee structure.		
Rules on the amount of admissible fees.		
☑ Other? Please specify:		
Please provide arguments to support your case.		
A: Should be paid for by the tax revenue collected		
Out of the F1		
Question 73		
Should there be provisions for public disclosure of material steps when introducing new (or adapted) auction processes?		
A: Yes		
Should new (or adapted) auction process be notified to and authorised by the Commission before inclusion in the auction calendar?		
A: Yes		
Question 74		
Which one of the following options is the most appropriate in case a Member State does not hold auctions (on time)?		
Auctions by an auctioneer authorised by the Commission.		
Automatic addition of the delayed quantities to those foreseen for the next two or three auctions.		
What other option would you envisage? Please specify:		
A:		

Should a sanction apply to a Member State that does not auction allowances in line with
its commitments? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$
If so, what form should that sanction take?
A:

Question 76

As a general rule throughout the trading period, in your opinion, are early auctions necessary? [Y/N] _

If so, what should the profile of EUAA auctions be:

	5-10% in year n-2, 10-20% in year n-1, remainder in year n
\boxtimes	10-20% in year n-2, 20-30% in year n-1, remainder in year n
	20-30% in year n-2, 30-35% in year n-2, remainder in year n
	Other? Please specify:

Question 77

Do you think there is a need to auction EUAA futures? [Y/N] \underline{N} If so, why?

A: Leave to the secondary market, as with EUAs

This page contains two questions that will not be made public. These questions cannot be completed on this document

Request for
potentially
confidential
information 3

Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.

For aircraft operators covered by the EU ETS:

Have you determined a corporate hedging strategy for carbon needs? Yes [] No []

If so, what share of your expected emissions covered by the EU ETS in a given year n do you (intend to) hedge and how much in advance?

year n
 year n-1
 year n-2
 %

Request for potentially confidential information 4

Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.

What share of the annual quantity of allowances you intend to purchase *via* auctions would you wish to buy spot or futures respectively?

			SPOT	FUTURES
•	year n	:	%	
•	year n-1	:	%	
•	year n-2	:	%	%

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) — Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions

Questio	on 78			
What sh	nould be the optimal frequency and size of EUAA auctions:			
	2 auctions per year of around 15 million EUAAs?			
	3 auctions per year of around 10 million EUAAs?			
	More than 3 auctions per year? Please specify: Daily or hourly			
Please c	comment on your choice.			
A: EUA	A auctions should, as far as possible, be the same as auctions for EUAs			
Questio	on 79			
What w	ould be your preferred timing for EUAA auctions:			
	Equally spread throughout the year?			
	November – March?			
	Other? Please specify:			
Questio	on 80			
	any of the EUAA auction design elements be different compared to EUAs (see section 3)? [Y/N] N			
If so, pl	ease specify and comment on your choice.			
A:				
Questio	on 81			
Do you If not, w	agree there is no need for a maximum bid-size? $[Y/N] \underline{N}$ why not?			
A:				
Questio	on 82			
regulato	any information regarding aircraft operators made available as part of the bry process to the competent authorities that could facilitate the KYC checks led by the auctioneer(s)? $[Y/N]$ \underline{Y}			

If so, please describe what information is concerned and whether it should be referred to in the Regulation or any operational guidance published by the Commission.

A: Airlines provide a large quantity of data to the CAA which could be used to facilitate KYC checks

Question 83

In your opinion, is there a specific need to allow for non-competitive bids in EUAA auctions?

A: No, the same rules should apply to EUAA auction as EUA auctions.

Would this be the case even when applying a uniform clearing price format?

A: Yes

Please provide arguments to support your case.

Question 84

•	a agree that there is no need for any specific provisions for EUAA auctions as [mark those that you agree with, []]:
\boxtimes	Involvement of primary participants, exchanges or third party service providers?
\boxtimes	Guarantees and financial assurance?
\boxtimes	Payment and delivery?
\boxtimes	Information disclosure?
\boxtimes	Auction monitoring?
\boxtimes	Preventing anti-competitive behaviour and/or market manipulation?
\boxtimes	Enforcement?
If not,	please describe in detail what rules would be needed and why.

Taking into account the smaller volume of EUAA allowances to be auctioned compared to EUAs, which of the three approaches for an overall EUAA auctioning model do you prefer? Please rate the options below (1 being the most preferable, 3 being the least preferable)

- <u>2</u> Limited number of coordinated auction processes.
- Full centralisation based on a single EU-wide auction process.
- <u>3</u> Hybrid approach where different auction processes are cleared through a centralised system.

Does your choice differ from the approach preferred for EUAs? $[Y/N] \underline{N}$

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A: The auctioning process needs to be simple. There is no need to have a different system for EUAA auctions.

Question 86

Do you agree that there is no need for any specific provisions for EUAA auctions as regards. [mark those that you agree with, \boxtimes]:

- Requirements for the auctioneer(s) and auction processes?
- Administrative fees?
- Rules to ensure appropriate and timely preparation of the auctions?

If not, please describe in detail what rules would be needed and why.