Summary report on the analysis of the debate on the 2015 International Climate Change Agreement: Shaping international climate policy beyond 2020

1. INTRODUCTION

On 26 March 2013 the European Commission launched a public consultation in support of the EU's preparations for the negotiations on the 2015 international climate change Agreement.[1] The purpose of the consultation was to initiate a debate with Member States, other EU institutions and stakeholders on how best to shape the international climate regime for the period after 2020. The consultation was held between 26 March and 26 June 2013.

The consultative communication requested stakeholder input in relation to three main topics:

- Foundations for the 2015 Agreement
- Designing the 2015 Agreement
- Preparing the path for the 2015 Agreement

The stakeholder consultation put forward nine questions to help focus stakeholder input.

2. PROCESS AND QUANTITATIVE RESULTS OF THE PUBLIC CONSULTATION

A high-level stakeholder conference was organised on 17 April 2013. The conference provided an opportunity for an interactive discussion on the issues and questions set out in the consultative communication. More than 220 participants attended the conference and more than 450 persons viewed the live webcast of the event.

In total, 98 responses to the public consultation were received. Responses from professional associations (41%) and companies respectively represented 41% and 15%. There was also strong participation from civil society with citizens representing 13% of the replies and NGOs, mostly climate oriented, 14%. Public authorities represented 11% of the replies. Among the public authorities, five Member States submitted responses – Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Netherlands, and Poland. Think tanks represented 3% of all responses while other stakeholders represented 2%.

Figure 1: Stakeholder affiliations, 98 responses

[1] COM(2013) 167 final



In terms of geographical distribution, European umbrella organisations and institutions represented the majority of responders (37%). Germany and France registered participation rates of 8% and 7%; Poland, Finland and Spain with 5% each. In total, stakeholders from 14 Member States submitted responses. In addition, a small number of stakeholders from outside of Europe submitted responses (3%).

Figure 2: Stakeholder geographical distribution, 98 responses



3. QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT AND MAIN FINDINGS

The following main findings can be drawn from the public consultation.

The need to act, keep warming the below 2°C objective and EU leadership

There is broad agreement among the stakeholders on the need for further action to address the causes and impacts of climate change, with only very few submissions raising questions on the underlying assumptions and science. There is also broad support for the objective to keep the global average temperature increase to below 2°C above pre-industrial levels.

Many stakeholders underline the importance of the EU taking a leadership role in the negotiations. There are however different views on how this should be translated into the EU's position. Some stakeholders call for the adoption of an ambitious EU domestic climate policy for 2030, whereas other caution against the EU taking ambitious unilateral action, without a robust international framework with contributions from all major economies in place.

An inclusive and legally binding agreement
Stakeholders furthermore have broad agreement on the need to ensure that the 2015 Agreement is legally binding and includes at the least all major emitters. Stakeholders also note that less capable countries should receive support through finance, capacity building and technology transfer. There is also general agreement on the need to modernise the application of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the light of developments since 1992. Many stakeholders furthermore underlined the need to ensure the contribution of emerging economies.

Support for market-based mechanisms
Many stakeholders note the importance of market-based mechanisms as a cost-effective way to reach emission reductions. While many also support the need to develop new and build on existing mechanisms for the post-2020 framework, views differ on the role that such mechanisms should be able to play as part of Parties' efforts and targets after 2020, with some advocating a very large role and others arguing for restrictions, or even no role.

Scale up climate finance
Many stakeholders underline the need to scale up climate finance to enable us to meet more ambitious targets. While some stakeholders focus their response on the importance of public finance, many stakeholders also point at the importance of mobilizing the private sector, underlining that it will need to play a critical role both for adaptation and mitigation efforts. Public funds could be utilised to leverage private investments. Innovative sources of finance identified in submissions included auction revenues, market-based mechanisms or even trade tariffs. Some also point at the opportunities offered by crowdfunding. A number of submissions stress the need to balance finance for adaptation and mitigation.

A strengthened role of stakeholders
From the consultation, it emerged that the various stakeholders are seeking to strengthen their involvement in the process of shaping the 2015 Agreement. Stakeholders underline the important role they will play in the global transition to a low carbon economy.

The following chapters focus on the detailed stakeholder views for the specific issues raised in the public consultation.

4. FOUNDATIONS OF THE 2015 AGREEMENT

4.1. *Question 1: How can the 2015 Agreement be designed to ensure that countries can pursue sustainable economic development while encouraging them to do their equitable and fair share in reducing global GHG emissions so that global emissions are put on a pathway that allows us to meet the below 2°C objective? How can we avoid a repeat of the current situation where there is a gap between voluntary*

pledges and the reductions that are required to keep global temperature increase below 2°C?

The vast majority of stakeholders agree with the below 2°C objective and do not question the science behind it. Several stakeholders, including *NGOs,* bring up that further mitigation action should be in line with the results of the 5th assessment report of the IPCC. There is also a broad consensus that the 2015 Agreement should include all major emitters, including both developed and developing countries. Many conclude that the 2015 Agreement should be fair, ambitious and legally binding. The various stakeholders offer differing views on how to ensure the ambition levels can be reached.

Poland notes that countries need to be provided flexibility to accommodate their national circumstances, a view supported by some *energy-intensive companies*. *France* adds that the Agreement needs to be legally binding and make the Parties accountable for achieving their goals. Countries should be given flexibility on the definition and implementation their goals while recognising the need to achieve the overall objective of staying below 2°C. *Belgium* and the *Czech Republic* stress the need for political dialogue and identifying the changes in the geopolitical and economic situation since 1992. The *Netherlands* also supports the view of some *NGOs* and *think tanks* that regular review of commitments is needed, with *NGOs* suggesting review every five years. The *Netherlands* notes that certain indicators could be monitored to pressure the Parties in lowering their emissions or increasing financial contributions.

Belgium underlines the importance of a dialogue on equity and *NGOs* argue that a common understanding of equitable burden sharing is needed as well as increased political will. The 2015 Agreement should revolve around the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) and the right of sustainable development and should ensure that developed countries provide developing countries with financial support, technology transfer and capacity building. In order to reach a meaningful agreement in 2015, they suggest a step-wise approach, including agreeing on typology at the Warsaw climate conference in 2013, setting a deadline for the submission of initial targets in 2014 and proposing adequate targets at the Paris climate conference in 2015 after an international review.

Some *agriculture sector representatives* note that the EU should reinforce a broader sustainable development agenda, while other stakeholders note the focus should be on emission reductions to avoid further complexity. Some *citizens* also agree that the 2015 Agreement should be as simple as possible to ensure its political viability.

Business organisations raise the importance of avoiding extra costs on business, requesting a thorough impact assessment of the effectiveness, costs and positive impact of climate change policies. Policies need to assist economic growth and development in order to be successful and encourage broad participation. They ask for a forum for business sectors to be included in the debate. They request that current technological developments are considered when setting the targets.

Some *business organisations, utilities* and *energy intensive companies* note that the best way for Europe to lead is to show the EU emissions trading system (EU ETS) is functioning properly. Several *utilities* suggest increasing the current ambition level in the short term to revive the carbon markets. They argue that the way to reach an ambitious goal would be through a global carbon market that would reduce the economic burden and improve development prospects for all members of the global community.

Some *NGOs* and *local authorities* note that the EU should adopt an ambitious unilateral target for greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions, arguing that the conditionality within the 2020 framework only created unnecessary uncertainty. On the other hand, some *industry representatives* are opposing unilateral action unless all major emitters make comparable commitments. In case there is no international agreement, several *business organisations* note that the EU should communicate that it may consider trade restrictions.

Local authorities and *NGOs* also point out that additional initiatives for reductions have to be supported. They highlight the Covenant of Mayors initiative[2], for example, that led to higher pledges for 28% reductions by local authorities for 2020 compared to 20% EU target. Several *citizens* also agree that alternative approaches should be explored such as elaborating individual agreements on issues such as finance, forestry, technology transfer, as well as aid related collaborations.

4.2. Question 2: How can the 2015 Agreement best ensure the contribution of all major economies and sectors and minimise the potential risk of carbon leakage between highly competitive economies?

There is a broad consensus that carbon leakage would be best avoided through a legally binding international agreement that covers all major emitters. Some *Member States*, *business associations*, *utilities* and *energy intensive representatives* note the importance of a global unified carbon price to create global level playing field. The majority of *industry representatives* and some *NGOs* bring up the importance of standardised monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) to enable the comparison of targets.

In order to ensure contribution from a large number of countries, the 2015 Agreement, according to *NGOs*, should include incentives for participation and disincentives for non-participation. This could include access to market, trade benefits or barriers. Some *business organisations* and *utilities* highlight that technology transfer and finance should be guaranteed to developing countries through the Technology Transfer Framework, the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and multilateral development banks, with limiting assistance in case commitments are not met. Some *citizens* propose motivational awards as opposed to sanctions – countries can be rewarded to keeping emissions within pledged limits. To ensure broad participation, some *citizens* suggest dividing the Parties into groups based on GDP and emissions and each group should negotiate internally how the abatement goals will be met.

From the perspective of *business organisations*, carbon leakage can be avoided if the EU only takes on an absolute target if all major emitters do so. In case there is no international agreement, carbon leakage protection measures in Europe should remain in place. *Trade unions* note that particular attention should be paid to protecting jobs in the energy intensive industries. Some *industrial representatives* and a *think tank* suggest imposing carbon levies on imported goods. Some *citizens* also suggest import tariffs, revenues of which could be utilized for green projects.

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2 The Covenant of Mayors is a European movement involving local and regional authorities, voluntarily committing to increasing energy efficiency and use of renewable energy sources on their territories.

From the perspective of *NGOs, local authorities* and some *non-energy intensive companies*, there is no evidence of carbon leakage as the energy intensive industries received free allocations under the EU ETS and managed to pass carbon costs related to the ETS to final consumers. *NGOs* point out that there are other factors such as tax, labour costs and market conditions that are more important factors in investment decisions. *NGOs* also note that there is no risk of carbon leakage in case a global agreement is reached. In case no global agreement is reached, an updated list of carbon leakage can be created and it should be ensured that support is earmarked for investments in low carbon technologies.

On particular sectoral strategies, *business organisations* and *energy intensive representatives* note that sectors should be given incentives to reduce emissions in a technology-neutral way. Several *utilities* suggest that an efficient mix of technologies should be covered under the 2015 Agreement such as renewable energy sources (RES), energy efficiency, smart grids, carbon-capture and storage (CCS), liquefied natural gas (LNG), biofuels, nuclear energy, improved agricultural practices and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD). One *NGO* suggests that REDD+ should not be included in emission trading schemes, but should be funded through international climate financing instruments. *Agriculture representatives* highlight that the biggest potential for the sector is in enhanced soil carbon sequestration, along with the use of RES.

To achieve progress in the aviation and shipping sectors, some *NGOs* propose that the impact of the measures should be offset with rebates for poorer countries. *A transport sector representative* notes that aviation emissions should addressed through the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). The emissions should be accounted for in a dedicated, global emissions inventory for the sector to reliably track progress and avoid double counting.

4.3. Question 3: How can the 2015 Agreement most effectively encourage the mainstreaming of climate change in all relevant policy areas? How can it encourage complementary processes and initiatives, including those carried out by non-state actors?

Member States propose various ideas on how to mainstream climate change. According to *the Netherlands*, sectoral approaches could be undertaken and public private partnerships and local initiatives should be encouraged. This view is shared by *local authorities* and some *citizens*. Some *citizens* also note that better media campaigns and communication can contribute to climate mainstreaming. *Belgium* highlights that better coherence of development and climate policies is needed. Several *Member States* also encourage additional initiatives such as through ICAO, IMO, MEF, Global Methane Initiative and Climate and Clean Air Coalition that would have synergies with UNFCCC, but they argue that the UNFCCC should remain the focal point for international climate negotiations. Some *think tanks* note that the 2015 Agreement should provide incentives for the respective countries to mainstream climate change. A suggestion would be that countries make sector and technology specific commitments to help with mainstreaming.

NGOs note that complementary processes and initiatives can help but state-actors must be responsible for the aggregate reductions, as non-compliance by non-state actors would be difficult to enforce. A suggestion on including non-state actors could be to provide accounting specific for non-state actors to ensure there is no double counting. Some *NGOs* raise the point that endorsing action by non-state actors should not be interpreted as endorsement of inadequate mitigation measures.

Several *industry stakeholders* and *Member States* note the need for more private sector involvement to help mainstream climate change. This can be achieved through the introduction of a clear and stable regulatory framework. A few *industry stakeholders* also note that public-private partnerships could be a means to create complementary processes and initiatives. Some *utilities* suggest co-regulation like performance standards for buildings and cars, with the idea of global convergence on such standards in the future.

According to *general business associations, energy intensive companies* and some *utilities,* a market-based approach is required in mainstreaming climate change in order to take the most cost-efficient path that would limit administrative burdens. If climate policies are deployed, they have to be implemented after a careful impact assessment and need to address environmental, social and economic requirements. Some *NGOs* as well as *business representatives* note that countries should be given the flexibility to define the policies that best suit their conditions to deliver reductions.

NGOs raised that an economy-wide emission reduction target is the best way to mainstream climate action. Some *NGOs* highlight that developed countries should produce Zero Carbon Action Plans and developing countries should produce climate resilient Low Carbon Action Plans, which would provide a visionary roadmap for investments. A *think tank* adds that the strategies need to be submitted for international review.

Various stakeholders argue that financial and technological support should be provided to less capable countries. According to *NGOs* and *industry representatives*, promotion of best practices can develop institutional learning and regulatory progress, so the 2015 Agreement can stimulate such process. Several *industry stakeholders* note that the World Bank and other financial institutions could provide support to less capable countries and many stakeholders stress that the GCF should become operational as soon as possible.

One *trade union* proposes that the 2015 Agreement should trigger greening of training and education, suggesting to give a formal mandate of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) to undertake this work.

5. DESIGNING THE 2015 AGREEMENT

5.1. *Question 4: What criteria and principles should guide the determination of an equitable distribution of mitigation commitments of Parties to the 2015 Agreement along a spectrum of commitments that reflect national circumstances, are widely perceived as equitable and fair and that are collectively sufficient avoiding any shortfall in ambition? How can the 2015 Agreement capture particular opportunities with respect to specific sectors?*

Many stakeholders agree that the 2015 Agreement should encompass as many countries as possible, or at the least all major emitters. *Poland*, for example, notes that the universality principle should be guiding the 2015 Agreement. Some *industry stakeholders* bring up that the 2015 Agreement should create a level playing field and not harm the competitiveness of any region or sector, which could be achieved through wide participation. Several stakeholders note that the new framework should be flexible to increase ambition levels without renegotiating the full agreement.

NGOs argue that the core principles of the 2015 Agreement should be equity, adequacy, CBDR-RC, the right to sustainable development and precautionary measures. *Industry stakeholders* and *Member States* agree on the importance of CBDR-RC, but add that the CBDR-RC principle needs to be modernized in view of the emerging economies. Some *Member States* and *NGOs* stress that the groupings should evolve over time. Several *NGOs* propose the creation of an equity index that would contain indicators for per capita income, per capita emissions, standard of living and measures for historical responsibility. A number of *citizens* propose that the guiding principles in determining the 2015 Agreement should be sustainable development, the limited planet resources, efficiency gains and re-industrialisation caused by the green economy.

In order to engage countries that are less developed, the *Netherlands* adds that such countries could choose what type of commitments to make, such as introducing economy wide targets, or sectoral targets, or setting intensity goals, while developed countries should commit to absolute reduction targets. *NGOs* and *some think tanks* support this view, adding that medium capability countries could take economy-wide efficiency targets, while LDCs should take voluntary, action oriented commitments. From a different perspective, some *industry stakeholders* advocate that the targets for all countries have to be agreed based on emissions intensity to allow for economic growth and development.

On determining the equitable burden distributions, some *local authorities* suggest the determination of equitable burden of sharing based on GDP and suggest spending 1-2% of GDP on mitigation actions. In the view of some *utilities*, equitable burden sharing can be achieved if developed countries participate in cap and trade systems, while less developed sectors and regions can employ project-based mechanisms. The *Czech Republic* advocates for a bottom-up approach, combined with linking individual schemes and creating international standards to ensure fair distribution of contributions. Some *citizens* suggest the division of emissions according to population, providing a premium to developing countries based on distance from GDP per capita average for all Parties.

Several stakeholders also note that the 2015 Agreement should include strong accounting, MRV and compliance.

Aruba highlights that all small island overseas countries and territories that are not Parties to the UNFCCC should qualify for assistance under international financing instruments, as they would not qualify for support from foreign sources while they also cannot financially afford to take action on their own.

Sectors

Business organisations support exploring sectoral approaches through setting global sector agreements. Sectors can contribute through operational and best management practices, as well as through the development of products and services that will contribute to climate change mitigation and adaptation. In their view, sectors with most potential are energy intensive industries, international trade, sectors producing commodity products and sectors using similar production technologies. A number of *Energy intensive industries* point out that all sectors should contribute. *Business organisations* view that benchmarking can be useful sometimes, but in certain cases it is difficult to implement due to differing production technologies. *NGOs* also support additional commitments such as renewable energy and energy efficiency targets. However some *NGOs* add that sectoral agreements could also be part of the agreement provided that compliance is ensured.

NGOs note that aviation and maritime sectors should be covered. The UNFCC should provide guidance to the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and ICAO on how to reconcile the principles of various bodies as well as on the use of finance generated through market-based measures for emission reductions in these sectors. On aviation, *sector representatives* note that the specifics of the sector need to be considered. Some *Agriculture sector representatives* highlight that additional science and knowledge is needed before their sector is included in the 2015 Agreement.

5.2. Question 5: What should be the role of the 2015 Agreement in addressing the adaptation challenge and how should this build on ongoing work under the Convention? How can the 2015 Agreement further incentivise the mainstreaming of adaptation into all relevant policy areas?

Member States generally support giving adaptation a more prominent role in the 2015 Agreement. According to *Poland*, adaptation increases attractiveness of countries by reducing the risks for investors. *Poland* support initiatives such as preparing adaptation strategies, simulating innovation to be used by all Parties, and enhancing cooperation between stakeholders. *Belgium*, *France* and the *Netherlands* add that adaptation should in principle build upon existing arrangements and institutions but that developing new ones could be considered if needed, while some *citizens* highlight that it is very likely that new institutions are needed. The *Netherlands* and *France* also notes the importance of making adaptation investments more attractive to private investors who need to make a large contribution through, for example, providing financial support or insurance. The *Czech Republic* highlights that adaptation actions should be tailored to local circumstances.

Local authorities point out that they have an important role to play in mainstreaming adaptation through awareness raising, knowledge sharing and strategic planning.

Some *industry representatives* stress that mitigation and adaptation should be addressed simultaneously but priority should be given to mitigation. Hence, they propose to target sectors where adaptation and mitigation efforts can be combined. From a different perspective, *NGOs* highlight the importance of adaptation in the pre-2020 discussions and the importance of having a robust mechanism to ensure the scaling of needs for adaptation is periodically reviewed. They also ask that funding for adaptation be increased.

On financing adaptation, one *NGO* suggests setting aside global emission rights to be auctioned under a Climate Fund with the proceeds directed for adaptation, R&D or other climate purposes. A few *NGOs* suggest that minimum of 50% of public climate finance between now and 2020 be spent on adaptation. Several *industry representatives* agree that the least developed countries should be supported with adaptation measures. One *citizen* suggests the creation of an adaptation fund for developing countries.

Some *business organisations* suggest that enhancing adaptive capacity will require analysis, setting priorities, planning and action at all levels of government. The role of businesses could be in technology transfers and best practice sharing. A number of *industry representatives* note that the private sector should be engaged with the development of technologies. Some *industry representatives* as well as some *citizens* note that close public-private cooperation is needed to address the adaptation challenge. The 2015 Agreement could establish a mechanism for the quantification of the needs for investment in adaptation by private sector investors.

On specific actions, *NGOs* argue that priority projects under the national adaptation plans should be urgently implemented, especially for most vulnerable countries. Some *NGOs* suggest that adaptation should be established as a permanent Subsidiary Body of Implementation (SBI) agenda item. They highlight that a new mechanism to deal with loss and damage should be part of the 2015 Agreement. On the other side some *businesses* note that loss and damage should not lead to liability claims, as there is no causal link between a country's or a company's emissions and climate impacts.

One stakeholder proposes to promote adaptation via its inclusion in other initiatives such as the Millennium Development Goals.

5.3. Question 6: What should be the future role of the Convention and specifically the 2015 Agreement in the decade up to 2030 with respect to finance, market-based mechanisms and technology? How can existing experience be built upon and frameworks further improved?

Market-based mechanisms

Industry representatives are of the view that global market based mechanisms should be central to promote emission reductions. The emission trading systems should ultimately be linked in a global trading scheme, a view supported by some *Member States* as well. A new market mechanism is proposed that should operate in a world of bottom-up pledges, nationally designed trading systems and nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs), within a Framework for Various Approaches. Some stakeholders, including *Belgium* and *trade unions*, note that market based mechanisms should be reformed to avoid double counting and to ensure environmental integrity.

Local authorities and some *citizens* highlight issues that limit the impact and effectiveness of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), REDD+ and the EU ETS and urge these issues to be addressed. Some *NGOs* note that the 2015 Agreement must provide minimum standards for linking regional and national emission trading schemes. Current existing offsetting schemes such as the CDM, according to *NGOs*, are flawed and should be limited. *Trade unions* note that the CDM provides disincentives for domestic action.

Finance

The *Netherlands* and *Poland* point out that eligibility to receive funding should change over time, responding to the changing responsibilities and capabilities of countries. According to *Poland*, no further burden on the public finances of developed countries should be expected, and instead the focus should be on making the investments more efficient.

NGOs comment that scaling up of funding is needed and that a broader number of countries should commit to mobilizing climate finance for the most vulnerable countries. New and additional international finance for energy savings, RES, forest protection and climate adaptation should be provided. Some *NGOs* suggest commitments of USD 60 billion for the period 2013-2015 to be made during Warsaw to reach USD 100 billion by 2020. Some *NGOs* suggest an agreed target of public finance during 2020-2025, with a review mechanism on the amount of finance and transparency of climate finance. In addition, all climate finance commitments should be separate from Official Development Assistance (ODA) commitments.

Several stakeholders, including *NGOs* and *trade unions*, suggest carbon taxes and removal of subsidies to re-direct investment into low carbon technologies. The *Netherlands, France* and *Belgium* highlight the importance of engaging private investors in funding through reducing project risk, while noting that public finances will need to continue to play an important role. They also point out that phasing out fossil fuel subsidies that would free up capital for low carbon investments.

One *think tank* suggests that the climate regime should be self-sustaining through auctioning of allowances in industrialised countries, through levies on offset or through putting a carbon price on international shipping and aviation. Other stakeholders also support funding through pricing in shipping and aviation while the *aviation sector representatives* note that a price on carbon would limit their ability to invest in efficient technologies. They perceive high fuel costs as incentives for efficiency.

Technology

According to *business organisations* and some *Member States*, the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network should provide information to assist countries in selecting the most appropriate technologies. Several *industry representatives* note that the instruments to limit emission reductions need to be technology neutral. Some of them also bring up the importance of an effective Intellectual Property Rights framework to enable technology development, and some note that technology transfers should not be obligatory.

Some *citizens* suggest that the EU should adopt a strategy to remove the phase out high-emitting technologies, such as replacing coal with shale gas resources. The EU should also make investments in R&D for RES, nuclear and hydrogen based power generation.

5.4. Question 7: How could the 2015 Agreement further improve transparency and accountability of countries internationally? To what extent will an accounting system have to be standardised globally? How should countries be held accountable when they fail to meet their commitments?

There is a broad consensus that a globally consistent MRV system is needed to increase transparency and accountability. Some stakeholders highlight the importance of the EU's role in sharing its experiences with MRV with the other Parties.

According to *business organisations*, regular reporting of inventory data should be obligatory under the 2015 Agreement to address transparency. While there have to be penalties for non-compliance, *business organisations* are of the view that these should not be too high so as to prevent participation in the agreement. *NGOs* propose an early-warning mechanism for non-compliance and suggest that the regime should build on the approach elaborated under the Kyoto Protocol. *NGOs* as well as some *Member States* suggest that a web-based reporting system is implemented to lower costs and ensure accurate and up-to-date information. Some *think tanks* suggest making the system available to the public online.

According to *NGOs*, a common template is needed for non-Annex I countries to specify and MRV their commitments, including providing clarity and detail related to the coverage of sectors and gases, role of LULUCF, assumptions and methods for calculating baseline scenarios. Some *NGOs* suggest that better rules for standardising NAMAs are needed to assess emissions reduction from the land use sector and preventing double counting.

Local authorities add that the introduction of reporting requirements at lower levels of government could be considered.

One *citizen* proposes the creation of governing body to directly report on the implementation of the 2015 Agreement. In cases on non-compliance, the countries could be mentioned on social networking sites along with reasons for failing to meet their commitments.

6. PREPARING THE PATH FOR THE 2015 AGREEMENT

6.1. Question 8: How could the UN climate negotiating process be improved to better support reaching an inclusive, ambitious, effective and fair 2015 Agreement and ensuring its implementation?

Several *Member States* put forward proposals on how to improve the UNFCCC process. *Belgium* also points out that discussion on amending the process should not interfere with the 2015 Agreement negotiations. The *Czech Republic* suggests allocating more time to informal meetings as opposed to formal plenary sessions and having more technical sessions at expert level. *Poland's* recommendation is to have the Conference of the Parties (COP) every two years rather than annually, while also increasing the engagement at negotiator level between sessions. *Belgium* also points out that political momentum should be created through ensuring ministerial participation at the COP, a view supported by some *NGOs*, *business organisations* and *think tanks*. *Belgium* also notes that the dialogue with stakeholders needs to be strengthened. The *Netherlands* suggest to design a process that would better involve the private sector to focus on how the transition should occur. *France* points out the importance of input from businesses and local authorities.

Other stakeholders call for increased stakeholder participation. *NGOs* ask for a multi-stakeholder approach. *Industry stakeholders* also call for a better stakeholder participation, commenting that industries could contribute to the decision-making process ensuring that the targets are achievable.

Several stakeholders suggest that prior negotiations between political leaders could occur under G8, G20, and the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate to ensure efficient process during the COP meetings. However, it should be ensured that there are no overlaps in the negotiations with other initiatives.

Several *NGOs* as well as some *local authorities, think tanks* and *some Member States* say that in order to have a more efficient process, it is important to have the draft negotiating text for the new agreement ready in time discussion at the UN climate conference in Lima at the end of 2014. Adequate negotiation time has to be ensured. Some *NGOs* bring up that budgetary support for delegates from least developed countries should be provided. One *NGO* proposes to have shared two to three year presidencies and extending the time of meetings of the subsidiary bodies.

Local authorities also ask for a multi-stakeholder approach with more opportunities for observers to intervene, make submissions, presentations in workshops and opportunities to speak. *Trade unions* stress that public participation in the process should be ensured.

6.2. Question 9: How can the EU best invest in and support processes and initiatives outside the Convention to pave the way for an ambitious and effective 2015 agreement?

Member States generally agree that additional international cooperative initiatives can help to close the mitigation ambition gap, mentioning the Montreal Protocol and the Climate and Clean Air Coalition among others. Both *business stakeholders* and *NGOs* suggest that the EU could focus on the MEF, G20, G8, ICAO and IMO to impact the negotiations. Some *Member States* see parallel negotiations in such fora as creating political momentum and hence contributing to the success of the UNFCCC. However, UNFCCC should remain at the fore-front and additional initiatives should be voluntarily taken by Member States.

Several *industry stakeholders* note that in order to remain a leader, the EU should show that its policies are successful and cost-efficient. Several *industry stakeholders* say that the EU should decide on an ambitious mitigation target as soon as possible, while others say that the EU should not take unilateral actions. Some suggest that the EU can showcase successful voluntary agreement to promote GHG efficiency. *NGOs* and some *Member States* note that the lead should be taken by the EU with an ambitious domestic policy.

NGOs and some *businesses* suggest that the EU External Action Service (EEAS) should increase its capacity and enhance outreach in third countries, scaling up climate diplomacy efforts. Some *NGOs* suggest the EU should invest and assist in the development of regional and national emissions trading schemes. The EU should also play a role in advancing sectoral agreements for important internationally operating industries.

Some *citizens* and *local authorities* highlight that the EU can work together with local governments and other stakeholders to develop better targeted sustainable development initiatives. Other *citizens* suggest that the EU should create a network of stakeholders to explore, develop and report on policy proposals and potential models for climate governance.