EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions

This document is the questionnaire for this consultation. The survey contains **4** initial questions (A-D) to identify respondents, **86** questions for which responses will be made public and **4** questions that are classified confidential, must be sent directly to the European Commission and will not be made public. The questions that are classified potentially confidential are on two separate pages (2 questions on each page) and highlighted in green boxes.

Period of consultation

From 3 June 2009 to 3 August 2009 inclusive

How to submit your contribution

This consultation seeks to obtain feedback from all categories of stakeholders regarding the different aspects of auction design and implementation covered in the Consultation Paper.

We are sorry for the inconvenience, but the web-based survey is not available yet. If participants wish to complete the survey on this document and send their contributions back to <u>contact_ets_auctions_consultation@icfi.com</u> their responses can be accepted in this format. The web-based survey will be available as soon as possible if participants wish to wait till that is available.

Received contributions will be published on the Internet. It is important to read the specific privacy statement attached to this consultation for information on how your personal data and contribution will be dealt with.

Specific privacy statement

"Received contributions, together with the identity of the contributor, will be published on the Internet, unless the contributor objects to publication of his or her personal data on the grounds that such publication would harm his or her legitimate interests. In such cases the contribution may be published in an anonymous form. Otherwise, the contribution will not be published nor will, in principle, its content be taken into account. Responses for questions deemed confidential in the consultation will not be available for view on the website irrespective of contributor objecting or not. "

Instructions to filling out the questionnaire

• Questions may only be answered in designated response fields

- For certain multiple choice questions, simply click on box to indicate choice
- Answer [Y/N] questions by typing "y" / "Y" or "n" / "N" on underlined area (____)
- Some responses require explanations, additional comments and detailed answers. These will either by identified by underline (_____) or an answer section (A:_____). The amount of text that can be entered here is unlimited.
- After completing the survey, please save and send to <u>contact ets auctions consultation@icfi.com</u>
- If any questions seem unclear in context or for method of response, please mail <u>contact_ets_auctions_consultation@icfi.com</u> to clarify

Thank you

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Section 1: Questions to categorize participants

Question A

Name of Company/Organization: VEOLIA

Principal nature of activities: Water, Transportation, Energy and Waste Management

Number of employees in 2008:

World-wide <u>336,000</u>	Europe-wide <u>233,000</u>
Turnover in 2008:	
World-wide <u>36,2 billions</u> €	Europe-wide <u>27,6 billions</u> €

Question B

Type of respondent:

Member State

Company operating one or more installations covered by the EU ETS

- Electricity generators
- Energy companies other than electricity generators
- Industrial sectors
- Aviation
- Other. Please specify:

Approx Annual Emissions: 17 millions tCO2

Intermediary

- Financ
 - Financial institution
 - Trading arm of non-financial institution

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	Od	
	Other.	Please specify
Trader	on own	n account
	Finand	cial institution
	Tradin	g arm of non-financial institution
	Other.	Please specify
Regula	ated ma	rket
	Carbo	n only
	Carbo	n and electricity
	Carbo	n and other energy products
Other	carbon	market
	Multil	ateral trading facility trading carbon derivatives
	Carbo	n exchange trading spot carbon
	Other.	Please specify
Clearin	ng hous	e
Centra	l counte	erparty
Other	(multip	le choices apply)
		Non-governmental organisation
		Trade association
		Carbon analyst
		Carbon publication
		Academic
		Other. Please specify

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Question C

Contact details will not be made public.

Question D

Questions relating to the "Specific privacy statement" above.

• Do you object to publication of your personal data because it would harm your legitimate interests? [Y/N] N

If so, please provide an explanation of the legitimate interests that you think will be harmed:

A:

• Are any of your responses confidential? [Y/N] <u>N</u>

If so, please indicate which ones and provide an explanation:

A:

Section 2: Survey questions (86) and potentially confidential questions (4)

Question 1

As a general rule throughout the trading period, in your opinion, are early auctions necessary? [Y/N] \underline{Y}

If so, what should the profile of EUA auctions be?

 \Box 5-10% in year n-2, 10-20% in year n-1, remainder in year n

 \Box 10-20% in year n-2, 20-30% in year n-1, remainder in year n

20-30% in year n-2, 30-35% in year n-1, remainder in year n

Other? Please specify: <u>Auctions for phase 3 should begin as early as 2011 in order</u> to get the system ready before the beginning of the phase. Early auctions after 2013 are not necessary but they can provide flexibility for the system. The percentages should be established after assessment of the flexibility needed at one point of time.

Question 2

Do you think there is a need to auction futures? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$

If so, why?

A:In Veolia's view futures are not necessary but they can be needed by some players. We favor an auctioning system that is as flexible as possible. Players should have the choice to bid on spot and/or futures, with no obligation for one type of bidder rather than another.

Question 3

What share of allowances should be auctioned spot and what share should be auctioned as futures for each year?

SPOT FUTURES

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•	year n	:	%	I	%
•	year n-1	:	%		%
•	year n-2	:	%		%

Please provide evidence to support your case.

A:

NB: The answer to this question will be published as part of the public consultation. Please do not submit confidential information as part of your answer to this question.

Question 4

Should the common maturity date used in futures auctions be in December (so the maturity date would be December in year n, both when auctioning in year n-2 as when auctioning in year n-1)? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$

If not, please suggest alternative maturity dates and provide evidence to support your view.

A:

This page contains two questions that will not be made public. These questions cannot be completed on this document

Request for potentially confidential information 1	mark const Direc 2/1, 2	lease send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, harked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning onsultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, hirectorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 (1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not e disclosed publicly.		
		1	-	pected emissions covered by ge and how much in advance?
	•	year n	:	%
	•	year n-1	:	%
	•	year n-2	:	%
	•	earlier years (please spec	cify) :	%

Request for potentially confidential information 2	 Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly. What share of the annual quantity of allowances you intend to purchase <i>via</i> auctions would you wish to buy spot or futures respectively? 		
		SPOT	FUTURES
	• year n	:	% %
	• year n-1	:	_% %
	• year n-2	:	_% %
	Please specify whethe	er you are an:	
	• ETS operator;	or	

•

Other participant.

For spot auctions:

What should be the **optimum** frequency of auctions?

\boxtimes	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?
	Monthly?
	Quarterly?
	Other? Please specify:
What	should be the minimum frequency of auctions?
\square	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?
	Monthly?
	Quarterly?
	Other? Please specify:
What	should be the maximum frequency of auctions?
	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?
	Monthly?
	Quarterly?
	Other? Please specify:

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A:Weekly auctions at EU level is necessary in order to ensure that each auction's volume is not too big. More frequent auctions could even be envisaged.

For spot auctions, what should be the:

- Optimum auction size? <u>5 millions tons</u>
- Minimum auction size? <u>1 million tons</u>
- Maximum auction size? <u>5 millions tons</u>

If deemed appropriate, please indicate a range and/or distribution over different sizes.

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A:

Question 7

For futures auctions:

What should be the **optimum** frequency of auctions?

\bowtie	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?
	Monthly?
	Quarterly?
	Other? Please specify:
What s	should be the minimum frequency of auctions?
\square	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?
	Monthly?
	Quarterly?
	Other? Please specify:

What should be the **maximum** frequency of auctions?

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	Weekly?
	Fortnightly?
	Monthly?
	Quarterly?
	Other? Please specify:
DI	• •

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A:Same argument as for spot auctions.

Question 8

For futures auctions, what should be the:

- Optimum auction size? <u>5 millions tons</u>
- Minimum auction size? <u>1 million tons</u>
- Maximum auction size? <u>5 millions tons</u>

If deemed appropriate, please indicate a range and/or distribution over different sizes.

Please provide evidence to support your case.

A:

Question 9

Should volumes of spot allowances be auctioned evenly throughout the year? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$

If not, how should volumes be distributed? (more than one answer possible) Please specify:



A larger proportion in the first 4 months of the year?



A larger proportion in December?



A smaller proportion in July and August?

Other? Please specify:

Question 10

In case futures are auctioned, should the volumes for spot and futures auctions be spread over the year in the same manner? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$

If not, how should they differ? (more than one answer possible)

No futures auctions less than six months before the maturity date.
A larger proportion in December.
A smaller proportion in July and August.
Otherwise? Please specify how and comment:_____

Question 11

Does the Regulation need to have provisions to avoid holding auctions during a short period of time before the surrendering date (30 April each year)? [Y/N] <u>N</u>

If yes, how long should this period be:

One week	2 weeks	3 weeks	1 month
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In case futures are auctioned, should there be similar provisions with respect to the period immediately prior to the maturity date? $[Y/N]_{-}$

If yes, how long should this period be:

 One week
 2 weeks
 3 weeks
 1 month

Which dates should be avoided? (more than one answer possible)

Public holidays common in most Member States? <u>1st Jan, Easter Monday, 1st</u> <u>May, period between Christmas and New Year.</u>

Days where important relevant economic data is released?



Days where emissions data are released?

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Other? Please specify:

Please specify the dates you have in mind in your answers.

Question 13

Is a harmonised 10-12 hrs CET auction slot desirable? [Y/N] \underline{Y}

If not, what alternative(s) would you suggest?

A:_____

Question 14

How long in advance should each element of the calendar be determined?

Annual volumes to be auctioned:



1 year in advance



2 years in advance



3 years in advance

more years in advance

Distribution of annual volumes over spot and futures (if applicable):



1 year in advance



2 years in advance

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\boxtimes	3 years in advance
	more years in advance
Dates of	of individual auctions:
	1 year in advance
	2 years in advance
\boxtimes	3 years in advance
	more years in advance
Volum	e and product type for individual auctions:
	1 year in advance
	2 years in advance
\boxtimes	3 years in advance
	more years in advance
Each a	uctioneer carrying out auction process (if more than one):
	1 year in advance
	2 years in advance
\boxtimes	3 years in advance
	more years in advance

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A:

Question 15

What should be the volume of allowances to be auctioned in 2011 and 2012?

- in 2011:_____% of the 2013 volume and ____% of the 2014 volume
- in 2012:____% of the 2013 volume and ____% of the 2014 volume

What percentage of these shares should be auctioned as futures?

- in 2011: ____% of the 2013 share and ____% of the 2014 share
- in 2012: ____% of the 2013 share and ___% of the 2014 share

Please provide evidence to support your case.

A:Dalkia favors a system where buyers have a choice between spot and futures and none of those products should dominate the other ones in terms of volumes or date of availability.

Question 16

What should be the rule with respect to allowances not auctioned due to *force majeure*?

	They should automatically be added to the next auction on the calendar, irrespective of the auction process.
	They should be auctioned within one month, though leaving flexibility as to which auction(s) the EUAs should be added.
	They should be auctioned within three months, though leaving flexibility as to which auction(s) the EUAs should be added.
$\bigotimes_{\text{next 4}}$	Other? Please specify: <u>The volume should be divided into 4 and auctionned in the</u> auctions, so within a month in case of weekly auctions.

Is 1,000 allowances the most appropriate lot size? [Y/N] \underline{Y}

If not, why not?

A:

Question 18

Is a single-round sealed-bid auction the most appropriate auction format for auctioning EU allowances? [Y/N] \underline{Y}

If not, please comment on your alternative proposal?

A:


Question 19

What is the most appropriate pricing rule for the auctioning of EU allowances?

Uniform-pricing.



Discriminatory-pricing.



Please provide arguments to support your case.

A:No discrimination between bidders. Uniform price should be a more efficient tool to reveal the right price of emissions.

Should the rules for solving ties in the Regulation be:



random selection; or

pro-rata re-scaling of bids?

Please comment on your choice.

A:Ramdom selection is to avoid.

Question 21

Should a reserve price apply?

A:A reserve price should be applied in order to avoid accidents, i.e. very low price due to lack of participants. But reserve price should be much lower than secondary market price so that the auction is able to reveal the emissions' fair value even when the secondary market is overvalued.

Question 22

In case a reserve price would apply, should the methodology/formula for calculating it be kept secret? [Y/N] \underline{N}

Please comment on your choice.

A:Methodology and price level should be made public.

Question 23

Is a maximum bid-size per single entity desirable in a Uniform-price auction?

[Y/N] <u>Y</u>

Is a maximum bid-size per single entity desirable in a discriminatory-price auction? [Y/N] \underline{Y}

Please comment on your choice.

A: A maximum bid-size per single entity is necessary in order to avoid market abuse. Regulation authority should be authorised to refuse anormal bid-sizes.

Question 24

If so, what is the desirable bid-size limit (as a percentage of the volume of allowances auctioned per auction – only one choice is possible):

10%: 🔀	15%:	20%:
25%:	30%:	More than 30%: Please specify:

Please comment on your choice.

A:10% per entity is a maximum.

Question 25

In case only one of the two following options would be chosen, to limit the risk of market manipulation or collusion, which one would be preferable?



A discriminatory-price auction format?



A maximum bid-size per single entity?

Please comment on your choice.

A:A maximum bid-size per entity seems to be more efficient in order to limit the weight of big players on the primary market.

Are the following pre-registration requirements appropriate and adequate?

Identity:

- Natural or legal person;
- Name, address, whether publicly listed, whether licensed and supervised under the AML rules; membership of a professional association; membership of a chamber of commerce; VAT and/or tax number;
- Contact details of authorised representatives and proof of authorisation; and
- CITL-Registry account details.
- Anything else? Please specify:

Declarations with respect to the past 5 years on absence of:

- Indictment or conviction of serious crimes: check corporate officers, directors, principals, members or partners;
- Infringement of the rules of any regulated or unregulated market;
- Permits to conduct business being revoked or suspended;
- Infringement of procurement rules; and
- Infringement of disclosure of confidential information.
- Anything else? Please specify:

Declarations and submission of documentation relating to:

\square	Proof of identity;
\square	Type of business;
\square	Participation in EU ETS or not;
\square	EU ETS registered installations, if any;
\square	Bank account contact details;
\square	Intended auctioning activity;
\square	Whether bidding on own account or on behalf of another beneficial owner;
\square	Corporate and business affiliations;
\square	Creditworthiness;
\square	Collateral; and
\square	Whether it carries out transactions subject to VAT or transactions exempted from VAT.
	Anything else? Please specify:

Do you agree that the pre-registration requirements for admittance to EU auctions should be harmonised throughout the EU?

Yes 🖂




Please comment on your choice.

A:Prevent discrimatory access.

Question 28

Should the amount of information to be supplied in order to satisfy the pre-registration requirements for admittance to EU auctions depend on the:



Question 29

Should the bidder pre-registration requirements under the Regulation apply in the same manner irrespective of whether or not the auctioneer is covered by the MiFID or AML rules? $[Y/N]_{-}$

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A:

If not, why not?

A:

Please provide arguments to support your case.

Question 30

Do you agree that the auctioneer(s) should be allowed to rely on pre-registration checks carried out by reliable third parties including: $[Y/N]_{-}$



Other auctioneers?





Other? Please specify:

Credit and/or financial institutions?

Please comment on your choice.

A:

In order to facilitate bidder pre-registration in their home country, should the auctioneer(s) be allowed to provide for pre-registration by potential bidders in other (or all) Member States than the auctioneer's home country e.g. by outsourcing this to a reliable third party?

No

Please comment on your choice:

A:

If so, should such entities be:



Covered by MiFID?

Covered by the AML rules?

Covered by both?

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Other? Please specify:

Please comment on your choice:

A:

Question 32

Should the Regulation prohibit the multiplicity of pre-registration checks in the case of Member States auctioning jointly?

Yes 🖂

No

Please comment on your choice.

A:Yes if pre-registration procedure is established at EU level and sunject to control.

Do you agree that the *level* of collateral accepted in EUA auctions should be harmonised for all EU ETS auctions? $[Y/N]_{-}$

If so, how should they be harmonised?

A:

If not, why not?

A:

Question 34

Do you agree that the *type* of collateral accepted in EUA auctions should be harmonised for all EU ETS auctions? $[Y/N]_{-}$

If so, how should they be harmonised?

A:

If not, why not?

A:

Question 35

Do you agree that 100% collateral in electronic money transfer ought to be deposited upfront at a central counterparty or credit institution designated by the auctioneer to access spot auctions? $[Y/N]_{-}$

If not, why not?

A:

What alternative(s) would you suggest? Please provide arguments to support your case:

A:

In case futures are auctioned, should a clearing house be involved to mitigate credit and market risks? $[Y/N]_{-}$

If so, should specific rules – other than those currently used in exchange clearing houses – apply to:



the level of the initial margin;



the level of variation margin calls;

the daily frequency of variation margin call payments?


If you have answered yes, please justify and elaborate on the rules that should apply and the mechanisms to implement them:

A:

Question 37

What are the most preferable payment and delivery procedures that should be implemented for auctioning EUAs?

Payment before delivery.



Both.

Please comment on your choice.

A:For payment and delivery procedures as well as for related questions (payment delay, payment failure, etc.) the existing standard master agreements (ISDA, IETA) provide satisfactory rules that could be used as model for the auctions.

Irrespective of the payment procedure, should the Regulation fix a maximum delay of time for payment and delivery to take place? [Y/N]

If yes; what should it be?

4 working days
5 working days
6 working days

6 working days

7 working day	/S
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Other? Please specify:

Question 39

Should the Regulation provide any specific provisions for the handling of payment and delivery incidents or failures? [Y/N] _

If yes, what should they be?

A:

Question 40

Should the Regulation provide for all matters that are central to the very creation, existence and termination or frustration of the transaction arising from the EUA auctions? [Y/N]_

If not, why not?

A:

If so, are the matters enumerated below complete? [Y/N]

- The designation of the parties' to the trade. •
- The characteristics of the auctioned product: •
 - Nature: EUAs or EUAAs, trading period concerned. 0

- Date of delivery: date at which winning bidders will receive the allowances on their registry account.
- Date of payment: date at which payment will be required from winning bidders.
- o Lot size: number of allowances associated with one unit of the auctioned good.
- Events of `force majeure' and resulting consequences.
- Events of default by the auctioneer and/or the bidder and their consequences.
- Applicable remedies or penalties.
- The regime governing the judicial review of claims across the EU.

If not, what additional matters should be foreseen in the Regulation and why?

A:

Question 41

Should the Regulation provide for rules on jurisdiction and the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments? $\rm [Y/N]$ _

If so, should these be:

- specific to the Regulation;
- by reference to the Brussels I Regulation;
- by citing exceptions from the Brussels I Regulation;



by citing additions to the Brussels I Regulation?

Please comment on your choice:

A:

If not, why not?

A:

Question 42

Which auction model is preferable?

Direct bidding?

Indirect bidding?

\times	Both?

Please comment on your choice.

A:Veolia favors an auctioning system that is as flexible as possible. Players should have the choice to bid directly or indirectly, on spot or futures, with no obligation for one type of bidder rather than another.

Question 43

If an indirect model is used, what share of the total volume of EU allowances could be auctioned through indirect bidding? <u>No limit. It should be each bidder's choice to bid directly or indirectly.</u>

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A: The total volume being made available for auctions, each bidder should have the choice between direct or indirect bidding procedures, this having no impact on the volume the bidder is allowed to buy. Only the bid-size limit for each bidder (question 24) should apply.

If the primary participants model is used, what provisions would be desirable for mitigating disadvantages of restricting direct access (more than one answer is possible):

Allow direct access to largest emitters, even if they trade only on their own
account?

If so, who should have direct access and what thresholds should apply?_____

D	isallow	primary	partici	pants tradir	ng on their	own account?
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Impose strict separation of own-account trading from trading on behalf of indirect bidders?

Other? Please specify: <u>No provision should be enforced</u>. It should be each bidder's choice to bid directly or indirectly without limiting primary participants' abilities.

Question 45

If the primary participants' model is used, what conflict of interest requirements should be imposed? (more than one answer possible)

- Separation of client registration and trading on behalf of clients from all own account trading activities.
 - Separation of collateral management, payment and delivery on behalf of clients from all own account trading activities.

Separation of anything else, please specify:

Question 46

What obligations should apply to primary participants acting in EU-wide auctions as:

• Intermediaries? A:

• Market makers? A:Some primary participants should act as market makers and thus have a commitment to buy above the reserve price.

Please provide arguments to support your case.

Question 47

Under what conditions should auctioning through exchanges be allowed (more than one answer possible):



Only for futures auctions open to established members of the exchange?



Also for spot auctions open to established members of the exchange?



Only when the exchange-based auction is open to non-established members on a non-discriminatory cost-effective basis?



Other? Please specify:

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A:No discriminatory access.

Question 48

Should direct auctions be allowed through:

- 1) Third party service providers? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$
- 2) Public authorities? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$

Please comment on your selection:

A:Direct auctions should be allowed no matter if the organiser is public or private.

Question 49

Do the general rules for auctioning EUAs suffice for ensuring full, fair and equitable access to allowances to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters? $[Y/N] \underline{Y}$

If not, why not?

A:

Question 50

Is allowing non-competitive bids necessary for ensuring access to allowances to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters in case of:

- discriminatory-price auctions? A:No •
- uniform-price auctions? A:No •

Question 51

If non-competitive bids are provided for in spot auctions, what maximum share of allowances could be allocated through this route?

5%

10%

	Othe
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er? Please specify:

Please comment on your choice.

A:

What rule should apply for accessing non-competitive bids (more than one answer possible):



Participants should only be allowed to use one of the two bidding routes?

Non-competitive bids should be restricted to SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters only?

1		

Other? Please specify:

Please comment on your choice.

A:

Question 53

What should be the maximum bid-size allowed for SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters submitting non-competitive bids?

5 000 EUAs
10 000 EUAs
25 000 EUAs
Over 25 000 EUAs, please specify exact size and give reasons for your answer:

Are there any other specific measures not mentioned in this consultation that may be necessary for ensuring full, fair and equitable access to allowances for SMEs covered by the EU ETS and small emitters? $[Y/N]_{-}$

If so, please specify:

A:

Question 55

What should be the minimum period of time before the auction date for the release of the notice to auction?

2 weeks	1 month	2 months \boxtimes
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Please comment on your proposal.

A:The full year agenda should be published at least 2 months before the beginning of the year.

Question 56

What should be the minimum period of time before the auction date for the submission of the intention to bid?

1 week 🖂	2 weeks	1 month
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Other Please specify:

Please comment on your proposal.

A:Intention to bid should be submitted as late as possible.

Are there any specific provisions that need to be highlighted in:

The intention to bid?

Please specify what they are.

A:

Question 58

What information should be disclosed after the auction:

- Clearing price (if allowances are awarded on a uniform-price basis or in the case of non-competitive bids being allowed)?
- Average price (if allowances are awarded on a discriminatory-price basis)?
- Any relevant information to solve tied bids?
- Total volume of EUAs auctioned?
- Total volume of bids submitted distinguishing between competitive and non-competitive bids (if applicable)?
- Total volume of allowances allocated?

Anything else? Please specify: <u>number of participants</u>, <u>number of winners</u>, <u>ratio</u> <u>supply/demand</u>, <u>% served for the marginal band</u>.

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What should be the maximum delay for the announcement of auction results?

5 minutes 🗌	15 minutes \boxtimes	30 minutes \boxtimes			
1 hour					
Other 🗌 Please	specify:				
Please comment on your proposal.					
A:					

Question 60

Do you feel that any specific additional provisions should be adopted in the Regulation for the granting of fair and equal access to auction information? $[Y/N]_{-}$

If so, what may they be?

Question 61

Should an auction monitor be appointed centrally to monitor all EU auctions?

[Y/N] <u>Y</u>

If not, why not?

A:

Question 62

Do you agree that the Regulation should contain general principles on [mark those that you agree with, [X]]:



the designation and mandate of the auction monitor; and



cooperation between the auctioneer(s) and the auction monitor?

If not, why not?

A:

Should these be supplemented by operational guidance, possibly through Commission guidelines? [Y/N] _

If not, why not?

A:

Question 63

Is there a need for harmonised market abuse provisions in the Regulation to prevent insider dealing and market manipulation? [Y/N] \underline{Y}

If not, why not?

A:

Please comment on your choice outlining the provisions you deem necessary and stating the reasons why.

A:

Question 64

Should the Regulation provide for harmonised enforcement measures to sanction [mark those that you agree with, [X]]:



Non-compliance with its provisions?




Market abuse?

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A:Sanctions are necessary for stability and credibility of the system.

Should the enforcement measures include [mark those that you agree with, \boxtimes]:



I			
ľ			

Financial penalties? If so, at what level should such penalties be fixed?

The power to address binding interim decisions to the auctioneer(s) and/or bidders to avert any urgent, imminent threat of breach of the Regulation with likely irreversible adverse consequences?



Anything else? Please specify:

Please provide arguments to support your case.


A:

Question 66

Should such enforcement measures apply at:



EU level?



Both?

Please comment on your choice.

A:

Question 67

Who should enforce compliance with the Regulation (more than one answer is possible):

 \square The auction monitor?

EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – Consultation on design and organisation of emissions allowance auctions

The auctioneer?
A competent authority at EU level?
A competent authority at national level?
Other? Please specify: _____
Please provide evidence to support your case.

A:

Question 68

Which of the three approaches for an overall EU auction model do you prefer? Please rate the options below (1 being the most preferable, 3 being the least preferable)

- <u>3</u> Limited number of coordinated auction processes.
- <u>2</u> Full centralisation based on a single EU-wide auction process.
- <u>1</u> The hybrid approach where different auction processes are cleared through a centralised system.

Please give arguments to support your case.

A:The main point is to have a centralised clearing platform.

If a limited number of coordinated auction processes develops, what should be the maximum number?

2
3
5
7
more than 7, please specify: _____
Please give arguments to support your case.

A:

Question 70


Is there a need for a transitional phase in order to develop gradually the optimal auction infrastructure? [Y/N] \underline{N}

If so, what kind of transitional arrangements would you recommend?

Question 71

Should the Regulation impose the following requirements for the auctioneer(s) and auction processes? [mark those that apply, \boxtimes]:

Technical capabilities of auctioneers:





appropriate investment in keeping the system up-to-date and in line with ongoing market and technological developments; and

relevant professional licences, high ethical and quality control standards, compliance with financial and market integrity rules.

Integrity:

	guarantee confidentiality of bids, ability to manage market sensitive information in an appropriate manner;			
	duly protected electronic systems and appropriate security procedures with regards to identification and data transmission;			
	appropriate rules on avoiding and monitoring conflicts of interest; and			
	full cooperation with the auction monitor.			
Reliab	ility:			
	robust organisation and IT systems;			
	adequate fallback measures in case of unexpected events;			
	minimisation of the risk of cancelling an individual auction once announced;			
	minimisation of the risk of failing functionalities (e.g. access to the bidding platform for certain potential bidders); and			
	fallback system in case of IT problems on the bidder side.			
Access	ibility and user friendliness:			
	fair, concise, comprehensible and easily accessible information on how to participate in auctions;			
	short and simple pre-registration forms;			
	clear and simple electronic tools;			
	(option of) accessibility of platforms through a dedicated internet interface;			
	ability of the auction platform to connect to and communicate with proprietary trading systems used by bidders;			
	adequate and regular training (including mock auctions);			
	detailed user guidance on how to participate in the auction; and			
	ability to test identification and access to the auction.			
Please	elaborate if any of these requirements need not be included.			

A:

Please elaborate what additional requirements would be desirable.


A:

Question 72

What provisions on administrative fees should the Regulation include (more than one answer is possible)?



General principles on proportionality, fairness and non-discrimination.





Rules on the amount of admissible fees.



Other? Please specify:

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A:

Question 73

Should there be provisions for public disclosure of material steps when introducing new (or adapted) auction processes?

A:

Should new (or adapted) auction process be notified to and authorised by the Commission before inclusion in the auction calendar?

A:

Question 74

Which one of the following options is the most appropriate in case a Member State does not hold auctions (on time)?



Auctions by an auctioneer authorised by the Commission.



Automatic addition of the delayed quantities to those foreseen for the next two or three auctions.

What other option would you envisage? Please specify:

A:Rules should be published in advance.

Question 75

Should a sanction apply to a Member State that does not auction allowances in line with its commitments? [Y/N] Y

If so, what form should that sanction take?

A:

Question 76

As a general rule throughout the trading period, in your opinion, are early auctions necessary? [Y/N]_

If so, what should the profile of EUAA auctions be:

5-10% in year n-2, 10-20% in year n-1, remainder in year n
10-20% in year n-2, 20-30% in year n-1, remainder in year n
20-30% in year n-2, 30-35% in year n-1, remainder in year n
Other? Please specify:

Question 77

Do you think there is a need to auction EUAA futures? $[Y/N]_{-}$ If so, why?

A:

This page contains two questions that will not be made public. These questions cannot be completed on this document

Request for potentially confidential information 3	Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly.			
	For aircraft operators covered by the EU ETS:			
	Have you determined a corporate hedging strategy for carbon needs? Yes [] No []			
	If so, what share of your expected emissions covered by the EU ETS in a given year n do you (intend to) hedge and how much in advance?			
	• year n :%			
	• year n-1 :%			
	• year n-2 :%			

Request for potentially confidential information 4	marl cons Dire 2/1, be d	Please send the answer to this question in paper and electronic format, marked on the envelope "Strictly Private and Confidential – Auctioning consultation", directly to the European Commission, DG ENV, Directorate C, Unit C2, to the attention of the Head of Unit, Office BU-5 2/1, 1049 Brussels, Belgium. It will be treated confidentially and will not be disclosed publicly. What share of the annual quantity of allowances you intend to purchase <i>via</i> auctions would you wish to buy spot or futures respectively?				
	SPOT FUTURES					
	•	year n	:	%		%
	•	year n-1	:	%		%
	•	year n-2	:	%		0⁄0

What should be the optimal frequency and size of EUAA auctions:

2 auctions per year of around 15 million EUAAs?



3 auctions per year of around 10 million EUAAs?


More than 3 auctions per year? Please specify:

Please comment on your choice.

A:

Question 79

What would be your preferred timing for EUAA auctions:



- November March?
- Other? Please specify:

Question 80

Should any of the EUAA auction design elements be different compared to EUA auctions (see section 3)? [Y/N]

If so, please specify and comment on your choice.

A:

Question 81

Do you agree there is no need for a maximum bid-size? [Y/N]_ If not, why not?

A:

Is there any information regarding aircraft operators made available as part of the regulatory process to the competent authorities that could facilitate the KYC checks performed by the auctioneer(s)? $[Y/N]_{-}$

If so, please describe what information is concerned and whether it should be referred to in the Regulation or any operational guidance published by the Commission.

A:

Question 83

In your opinion, is there a specific need to allow for non-competitive bids in EUAA auctions?

A:

Would this be the case even when applying a uniform clearing price format?


A:

Please provide arguments to support your case.

Question 84

Do you agree that there is no need for any specific provisions for EUAA auctions as regards [mark those that you agree with, [X]]:

- Involvement of primary participants, exchanges or third party service providers?
- Guarantees and financial assurance?



Information disclosure?

Auction monitoring?

- Preventing anti-competitive behaviour and/or market manipulation?
- Enforcement?

If not, please describe in detail what rules would be needed and why.

A:

Taking into account the smaller volume of EUAA allowances to be auctioned compared to EUAs, which of the three approaches for an overall EUAA auctioning model do you prefer? Please rate the options below (1 being the most preferable, 3 being the least preferable)

- _ Limited number of coordinated auction processes.
- _ Full centralisation based on a single EU-wide auction process.
- _ Hybrid approach where different auction processes are cleared through a centralised system.

Does your choice differ from the approach preferred for EUAs? [Y/N]_

Please provide arguments to support your case.

A:

Question 86

Do you agree that there is no need for any specific provisions for EUAA auctions as regards. [mark those that you agree with, [mark]]:



Requirements for the auctioneer(s) and auction processes?



Administrative fees?



Rules to ensure appropriate and timely preparation of the auctions?

If not, please describe in detail what rules would be needed and why.

A: