

"Seeking Common Ground"

Second consultation meeting on options for structural measures to strengthen the EU ETS on 19 April 2013 in Brussels

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Common Ground



Undisputed

All ETS sectors support emissions trading to achieve agreed emission reduction at lowest cost; investment decisions made based on ETS Directive rules

Undisputed

2020 target will be met; ETS carbon price reflects market under the present rules; EU sectors have outstanding effiency records; visibility and reliability beyond 2020; other policies cause carbon costs (i.e. taxes and RES fees)!

Undisputed

Structural (longer-term) ETS Review for <u>post-2020</u> is needed - and scheduled in the ETS Directive. Problem: None of the proposed interventions by EC solve ETS structural flaws

Common Ground



Undisputed

No global climate policy yet: No use in exporting jobs and importing emissions (through products), i.e. as long as EU acts in isolation

Undisputed

Global competitiveness = Resistance to carbon leakage:

ETS and entire "package" must safeguard/improve EU competitiveness

Undisputed

European Parliament together with all ETS manufacturing sectors reject backloading proposal.

Concern: Intervention increases EU carbon and energy costs and adds further burden on EU consumers

Common Ground



Undisputed

Coherent, sustainable (3 pillars!) Energy and Climate policy "package" is essential: ETS is one tool but cannot solve all issues; ETS manufacturing sectors represent only some 20% of total EU emissions

Undisputed

Efficient EU manufacturing growth adds value, provides employment and generates resources needed also for low-carbon innovation; subsidy cost-shifting for expensive, uncompetitive technologies towards ETS sectors removes resources

Undisputed

No early global fossil energy resource depletion and energy cost projections exaggerated: implications for alternative energy sources' competitiveness

New Ideas: structural and strategic



Structural improvements for ETS Review for <u>after 2020</u>

Dynamic Allocation based on actual production:

Actual instead of fixed ('frozen') historic production level "True up" (s. Australian scheme)

Cap ('total') for entire economy, **relative cap for industry** corresponding to actual growth

ETS visibility beyond 2020, therefore no «excess allowances» issue

New Ideas: structural and strategic



Structural improvements for ETS Review for <u>after 2020</u>

New Entrants Reserve (NER) serves as allowances source for growth and as sink in times of recession; NER left-over transferred to next trading period (not lost, not auctioned off)

Benchmarks based on weighted average to avoid carbon leakage Complementary unrestricted indirect allocation to provide predictability and to avoid carbon leakage

New Ideas: structural and strategic



Structural improvements for ETS Review for after 2020

Allocation based on actual production – why it solves current problems

- a. **No over-allocation, no excessive scarcity**: no dramatic CO2 price shifts
- Must Enable efficient growth (current rules insufficient)
 No underallocation for most efficient manufacturing:
 =Cross-sectoral reduction factor and linear curve = threat
 - Not solved by proposed EC options!
- c. **Minimizes carbon leakage** in contrast to current ETS design

New ideas and cooperative approach appreciated:

Enabling efficient growth in Europe through holistic approach, flexibility and convergence of ETS and EU and national policies with global developments = strategic longer-term, scenario-proof