
Brussels, May 21, 2007



McKinsey & Company

Competitive Effects

Dr. Christoph Grobbel


3rd Meeting of ECCP Working Group on Emissions Trading

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Today's discussion




400 Mt abatement need within ETS could drive EUA prices up to 40 EUR in 2020



^{*} Nuclear phase out in Germany and other European countries assumed as currently planned Source: McKinsey

In an EU-only system postponing the Nuclear phase-out in Germany could drop 2020 EUA prices from around 40 to 25 EUR

Abatement cost of ETS sectors 2020 EUR/t CO2e



If all German reactors would stay online until 2020 75 Mt additional abatement potential would be added compared to BAU*

Gt CO2e

Source: McKinsey


^{*} BAU case sees 0.47 tonnes of CO2e abatement per MWh. This assumes a 2:1 replacement by coal and gas

Banking should set a floor for EUA prices at the discounted future abatement cost from 2008 onwards

Discounted 2020 abatement costs of 25-40 €/t vs. forward prices


Euro/t of CO2

STATUS May 14, 2007



^{*} Discounted at 5% p.a.; current implied discount rate at EEX until 2012 is 3.6% p.a. but long-term interest rates are higher Source: McKinsey, EEX

Power plants generally profiting from EU ETS, but to very different extent AVERAGE SHORT- AND MID-TERM IMPACT OF EU ETS ON POWER SECTOR % of total costs




^{*} Assuming short- and mid-term electricity price increase of 10 EUR/MWh for CO₂ price of 20 EUR/t


^{**} At 95% free allocation relative to desired amount

Cost increase largely offset be revenue increases but incentive to shift marginal production abroad

AVERAGE SHORT- AND MID-TERM IMPACT OF EU ETS ON OTHER INDUSTRY SECTORS

% of total costs






^{*} Assuming short- and mid-term electricity price increase of 10 EUR/MWh for CO2 price of 20 EUR/t

^{**} At 95% free allocation relative to desired amount

Overview of allocation options



General design option*


- Grandfathering
- Free allocation of allowances based on historic emissions in fixed base period
- Benchmarking
- Product specific CO₂-efficiency benchmark
- Fuel specific CO₂efficiency benchmark

- Recent production
- Historic production
- Expected production
- Capacity × utilization benchmark




Price-in?







- Auctioning
- Auctioning without redistribution to affected industries
- Auctioning with redistribution to affected industries



Additional issues

- Special treatment of new entrants and closures?
- European or national solutions?
 - * Combinations possible
 - ** Price-in only of the difference between the benchmark and its own emissions
 - *** 100% without ex-post correction, 0% with ex-post correction
 - **** 100% without redistribution based on production/emissions; lower levels with redistribution based on production/emissions

Lessons learnt on emissions trading

McKINSEY PERSPECTIVE

- Banking in combination with commitments on future emission reduction can effectively set a floor in CO₂ prices
- Competitiveness issues have to be addressed not only from a P&L perspective, but as well from a production shift and GHG leakage perspective
 - Option 1: Cross border taxation scheme
 - Option 2: Production based allocation with benchmarking OR auctioning with redistribution of the proceedings
 - Option 3: Global (sectoral) agreements
- Allocation mechanism determines "pricing-in" of CO₂ allowance value

Source: McKinsey